because it feels good

188 Pages·2012·1.25 MB·English

by  Ole Martin Moen

BECAUSE IT FEELS GOOD

A Hedonistic Theory of Intrinsic Value

Ole Martin Moen

Doctoral Dissertation in Philosophy
Faculty of Humanities
University of Oslo, Norway

December 2012

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Because It Feels Good:
A Hedonistic Theory of Intrinsic Value

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© Ole Martin Moen

Exceptions:

Pages 53–72 © Springer
Pages 135 – 170 © Reason Papers

Word count: 72,200

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To my parents,
for letting me think for myself

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Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure—
Such marks in pleasures and pains endure
Such pleasures seek if private be thy end:
If it be public, wide let them extend.
Such pains avoid, whichever be thy view:
If pains must come, let them extend to few.

– Jeremy Bentham

Memory verse
Principles of Morals and Legislation
Chap. IV, Note 1

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Contents

Preface 1

Introduction 5

1. The Problem of Intrinsic Value 5
2. Hedonism in the History of Philosophy 10
2.1. Early Hedonism 10
2.2. Plato 14
2.3. Aristotle 17
2.4. Epicurus 19
2.5. Hedonism in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages 21
2.6. Hedonism in the Renaissance and Early Modernity 24
2.7. Utilitarianism 28
2.8. Hedonism in the 20th Century 30
3. Overview of the Argument 32
3.1. Pleasure and Pain 32
3.2. Value and Intrinsic Value 38
3.3. Metaethics 41
3.4. Nothing but Pleasure and Pain 47

1. The Unity and Commensurability of 53
Pleasures and Pains

1. Introduction: Two Opposing Intuitions 53
2. Response Theory 57
3. Split Experience Theory 62
4. Dimensionalism 66

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2. Hedonism and the Cluster Challenge 73

1. Introduction 73
2. P1: Pleasure is Intrinsically Valuable and Pain is 74
Intrinsically Valuable
2.1. The Instrumental Value Objection 76
2.2. The Desire Objection 77
2.3. The “Not All Intrinsic” Objection 79
3. P2: Nothing Other than Pleasure is Intrinsically Valuable and 82
Nothing Other than Pain is Intrinsically Disvaluable

3. Value Monism 89

1. Introduction 89
2. Heterogeneity, Incommensurability, and Rational Regret 90
3. The Nominal-Notable Commensuration Principle (NNC) 95
4. Monism, Pluralism, and NNC 97
5. Conclusion 102

4. Unexpected Allies: How Value Anti-Realists 103
Help Hedonists

1. Introduction 103
2. The Queerness of Value 104
3. The Evolution of Value 107
4. The Hedonist Solution 112

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5. The Classical Objections to Hedonism 119

1. Introduction 119
2. The Paradox of Hedonism 120
3. Philosophy of Swine 125
4. The Open Question Argument 128
5. The Experience Machine 131
6. Conclusion 133

APPENDIX:

6. Is Life the Ultimate Value? 135

1. Introduction: The Problem of Ultimate Value 135
2. The Dependence of “Value” on “Life” 138
3. The Problem of Subjectivity 144
4. Four Suggested Solutions to the Problem of Subjectivity 146
4.1. The Argument from Denying the Choice to Live 146
4.2. The Argument from Performative Contradiction 149
4.3. The Argument from Axiomaticity 150
4.4. The Argument from Denying the Applicability of “Optionality” 152

5. My Solution: The Value of Happiness 155
5.1. Happiness as the Ultimate Value 156
5.2. The “Moving the Problem” Challenge 162
5.3. The “Surrender” Challenge 164
6. Conclusion 169

Bibliography 171

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Preface

What things are worth having, not only as a means to promote a further good, but
as goods in and of themselves? Hedonism is the theory that only one thing is
good in and of itself: pleasure (Greek: hēdonē); and that only one thing is bad in
and of itself: pain. Hedonists need not deny that things such as knowledge,
friendship, honor, health, and justice are genuine goods. The only thing hedonists
must deny is that these are goods in and of themselves. According to hedonism,
these—and everything else worth having—are good only insofar as, and in that,
they help promote pleasure and avert pain.
A bold and sweeping theory, hedonism is controversial, and several
forceful arguments have been launched against it. Most famous, perhaps, are
Robert Nozick’s Experience Machine thought experiment, G. E. Moore’s Open
Question Argument, and the Paradox of Hedonism. Charged with being
simplistic, with yielding too radical implications, and sometimes even with being
inconsistent—thus purportedly failing even the most basic success criterion for a
philosophical theory—hedonism is unpopular. In Ben Bradley’s words: “[I]f a
philosopher [today] is asked to point out examples of truths that philosophers
have conclusively established, the first would probably be that justified true
belief is insufficient for knowledge; the second that hedonism is false.”1
In this work I suggest that the rejection of hedonism is rushed. I make the
case that the arguments against hedonism can be met, and that there are strong,
and largely overlooked, positive arguments that count in its favor.
I would, of course, love to see my arguments convert even the most
resilient opponent. Realistically, however, where an argument takes you depends
on where you start out. For my close intellectual neighbors, such as desire

1 Ben Bradley, Well-Being and Death (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xiv.
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satisfactionists, I hope to make a good case for endorsing hedonism. For the ones
further away, I hope at least to make it clear that hedonism is a theory worthy of
consideration.
As it is a doctoral dissertation, this is at times a technical work. I have
tried, however, to keep technicalities to a minimum, to carefully introduce the
terms that I use, and to make the text readable not only to academic philosophers,
but also to researchers working in other fields. Philosophy is a general area of
inquiry and, I hope, an area of general interest. As such, if the subject becomes
insulated, an important part of its purpose is not fulfilled. The problem of what
(if anything) is good in and of itself, moreover, is a perennial problem, and a
problem of interest not only to people in philosophy departments. I hope my
argument will be accessible, for instance, to economists, psychologists, and
social scientists working in the emerging field of “happiness research,” and to
intelligent laypeople with a serious interest in ethical theory. My aim has been to
write as accessibly I can without sacrificing philosophical rigor.
This work is a collection of six self-standing essays and a substantial
introduction. Jointly, the essays constitute an argument for hedonism. Two of the
essays have been through peer-review: Essay 1, “The Unity and
Commensurability of Pleasures and Pains,” is forthcoming in Philosophia; Essay
6 (appendix) has been published in Reason Papers. How the six essays relate,
and how they jointly constitute an argument for hedonism, is explained in detail
in the introduction. The introduction, I should add, contains the most technical
issues, and non-philosophers should feel free to skip sections 3.2 and 3.3.
This work is the result of an intellectual journey, for had you asked me
five years ago, I would have joined the majority in saying that hedonism is
almost certainly wrong. Rather than being a hedonist, I held that the process of
living is an end in itself, and that the value of pleasure lies in its being one of the
many things that are constitutive of a good life. In the appendix essay (“Is Life
the Ultimate Value?”) I discuss such a view in detail. For readers sympathetic to
this view, I recommend starting with the appendix. For the rest, consider it
optional reading at the end.
It takes more than a doctoral candidate to write a dissertation. I am
grateful to the Faculty of Humanities at University of Oslo, which has given me a
generous fellowship and has entrusted me to work on something as broad and
controversial as a defense of hedonism. Thanks are also due to my advisers,
Panos Dimas and Roger Crisp. They have not only helped improve this work
with their unfailingly thoughtful comments, but have also—one comment at the
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