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Ballistic Missile Silo Door Monitoring Analysis
Michael W. Edenburn and Lawrence C. Trost
Arms Control Studies Department
Nuclear Weapons Program Integration and Studies Center
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. 5800
BOX
Albuquerque, NM 87185-0425
ABSTRACT
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This paper compares the cost and effectiveness of several potential options that may be used to
monitor silo-based ballistic missiles. Silo door monitoring can be used to verifj that warheads
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removed to deactivate or download silo-based ballistic missiles have not been replaced. A
precedent for monitoring warhead replacement using reentry vehicle on site inspections (RV-
0S1s) and using satellites has been established by START-I and START-II. However, other
;
monitoring options have the potential to be less expensive and more effective. Three options are
the most promising if high verification confidence is desired: random monitoring using door
sensors; random monitoring using manned or unmanned aircraft; and continuous remote
monitoring using unattended door sensors.
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Contents
The Motivation for Silo Door Monitoring ................................................................3
Motitoting Options .......................................................................................... 6
Random Monitoring with Confirmation ......................................................... 6
Random Monitoring without Confirmation ......................................................7
Continuous Motitoting .............................................................................8
Evaluation Ctitetia mdStidy Objective ........................................................ 9
hdysisofMotitoting Options ......................................................................... 11
Resul&ad Conclmions ...................................................................................24
Appendix A. Missile upload detection probabilities for random monitoring with
cofimation .................................................................................................30
Appendix B. Missile upload detection probabilities for random monitoring without
confirmation .................................................................................................34
Appendix C. General assumptions about monitoring manpower and cost estimates .............38
Appendix D. Manpower and cost estimates for random monitoring with coni%mation .........40
Appendix E. Manpower and cost estimates for random monitoring without confkmation ......48
Appendix F. Manpower and cost estimates for continuous monitoring ............................ 56
Appendix G. Design Features for a Monitoring System Using Over-Flights with
Ummedficrti ........................................................................................59
Appendix H. Design Features for a Monitoring System Using Random Monitoring with
Silo Door Sensors ..........................................................................................62
Appendix I. Design Features for a Continuous Remote Monitoring System Using
Unattended Door Sensors ................................................................................. 64
References .............................................................~..................................... 66
2
The Motivation for Silo Door Monitoring
This paper compares the cost and effectiveness of potential monitoring options which could be
used as part of a verification regime to confirm that warheads removed to deactivate silo-based
ballistic missiles, pursuant to possible fhture international treaties or agreements, have not been
replaced. The monitoring options considered could also be used to veri~ that downloaded silo-
based missiles remain downloaded, but this application is not addressed in this paper.
At the 1997Helsinki Summit, presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed that “the Russian Federation
and the United States of America shall deactivate, by December 31, 2003, all strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under the Treaty (START-II), by removing their
nuclear reentry vehicles or taking other jointly agreed steps.” If START-II is ratifiedj it will
require eliminating Peacekeepers, SS-18s, SS-24s, and all but 105 SS-19s.
If missiles are deactivated by removing their warheads, they can be reactivated by replacing their
warheads. Since the missiles must be deactivated by December 31, 2003 and eliminated by
December 31,2007, the potential for covertly reactivating the missiles in violation of START-II
would exist for four years. Silo door monitoring could be used to detect covert reactivation
during this transition period. Table 1 shows the number of silo-based missiles that must be
deactivated, and the associated numbers of warheads, if START-II is ratified (Jane’s, 1998 and
Reporter, 1998). The tzible assumes that Russia will possess 168 SS-19s upon completing the
terms of START-I, and that they will retain the 105 SS-19s allowed by START-II. On January
1,2004, the total upload capability for deactivated silo-based missiles will be 2518 warheads--a
significant fraction of the 3000 to 3500 accountable warheads allowed by START-II for each
country--if the treaty is ratified and the Helsinki agreement is put into effect. Thus, upload
capability for silo-based missiles that have been deactivated will be a significant fraction of total
ballistic missile force warheads. Because there will be a large number of warheads
associated with deactivation, it may be desirable to have a verification regime that gives
high confidence in discovering uploads before a large fraction of the deactivated force can
be uploaded.
START-II calls for the same verification regime as START-I, which includes ten reentry vehicle
on-site inspections (RV-OSIS) each year and the use of satellites (NTM). It is not likely that the
basic START-II verification regime will change; however, the terms for deactivation have not
been negotiated; and, it is possible that additional verification measures for deactivated missiles
can be negotiated as an integral part of deactivation negotiations. The obvious candidate options
for additional monitoring associated with deactivation are RV-OSIS and satellites since a
precedent for them was set by START-I and START-II.
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Table 1. Potential Warhead Uploading on Silo-Based Ballistic Missiles
to be Deactivated Under START-II
Silo-Based Numbers of Warhead Upload
Missiles to be Missiles to be Potential
Eliminated Under Deactivated
START-II
Us.
Peacekeeper 50 500
Russian
SS-18 154 1540
I SS-19 I 63 I 378 I
SS-24 10 100
Total Russian 227 2018
1 I
Total 2518
RV-OSIS and satellite imaging give very different verification results. At each inspection, an
RV-OSI will confkm that a missile has or has not been covertly uploaded. If all missiles have
been uploaded, an RV-OSI should discover uploading atthe next inspection. In contrast, satellite
imaging cannot confirm that a missile has or has not been uploaded because it cannot see into a
closed silo: it must catch uploading in the act. The confidence one has in discovering an
uploading process depends in part on whether or not an inspection is able to confirm the absence
of uploads. It also depends on the rate at which missiles are uploaded and on the rate at which
inspections are conducted. In Appendix A we estimate the probability of discovering uploading
if an inspection can confirm the absence of uploads, and in Appendix B we estimate the
probability of discovering uploading if an inspection cannot confirm the absence of uploading in
which case uploading must be caught in the act. Both appendices consider a 154 missile,
deactivated SS-18 force and assume that anSS-18 can be uploaded in 12hours.
As an example, if 10 RV-OSIS are conducted each year, the probability that uploading will be
discovered before all missiles are uploaded is a little less than 25% (see Figure 3, with
confirmation). This assumes that the Russians can upload 8 missiles each day and if it takes
them 12 hours to upload each missile. Thus, ten RV-OSIS do not give high confidence in
discovering uploading before a large Iiaction of the force is uploaded; however, they guarantee
that uploading will be discovered on the next inspection after the entire force has been uploaded.
Under the same assumptions, roughly 2000 RV-OSIS are needed to get a 90% discovery
probability before 30 missiles (20% of the SS-18 force) are uploaded. Two-thousand annual RV-
0S1s would cost roughly $20 million (see Figure 4).
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According to Figure 3 (without confiiation), we need roughly 9000 annual random satellite
images to reach a 90°/0probability of discovering an upload before 30 missiles are uploaded. For
9000 images, the total annual cost will be roughly $46 million (see Figure 10). The combination
of 9000 random satellite images and 10 RV-OSIS each year would give good confidence in
discovering uploading before 30 missiles are uploaded and would guarantee that uploading will
be discovered shortly after all missiles have been uploaded. The combination would cost in
excess of $40 million each year.
Other monitoring options have the potential to provide higher detection confidence at
lower cost. In the remainder of this report, we will compare RV-OSIS and satellite monitoring,
with other silo door monitoring options.
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Monitoring Options
While the overall objective of silo door monitoring is to verifi that missiles which have been
deactivated by removing their warheads have not been reactivated, different silo door monitoring
options will approach the objective in different ways and will obtain different types of results.
The differences will become clear as we discuss the different monitoring options and divide them
into three classes. Within each monitoring class, the different monitoring options have similar,
but not identical, features. The following list shows the three classes of monitoring options.
Random Monitoring with Confirmation
Random monitoring with warhead counting inspections
Random monitoring with warhead counting using aircraft
Random monitoring using door sensors
Random Monitoring without Confirmation
Random monitoring using inspection teams
Random monitoring using over-flights with manned or unmanned aircraft
Random monitoring using satellites
Continuous Monitoring
Continuous monitoring using inspection teams
Continuous monitoring using unmanned aircraft
Continuous remote monitoring using unattended door sensors
Random Monitoring With Confirmation
Confhnation means that the silo doors are opened and missiles are inspected to confkm that
warheads have not been replaced, or alternately, sensor packages applied to each silo door are
checked by inspectors to confirm that the silo doors have not been opened. This class of
monitoring option will give very high confidence that warhead replacement will eventually be
discovered even though uploading may not be detected as it occurs. The cordldence in
discovering an uploaded missile depends on the number of missiles uploaded, the frequency of
monitoring, and the rate at which warheads are replaced. The relationship between these
parameters is quantified in Appendix A and in Figure 3 for a 154 missile SS-18 force. The
analysis in Appendix A assumes that monitoring is performed at random times. Randomness
slightly improves detection probability compared to periodic monitoring when the absence of
warheads is confirmed but is less important than for inspections that do not confirm the absence
of warheads. The advantage of this class of options is that it practically guarantees that
uploading will be discovered during the first inspection after all missiles have been uploaded. A
potential disadvantage of this monitoring option class is that it requires greater cooperation by
the country being inspected than do other classes since inspectors must gain access to the site and
to the silo’s interior. If site access or silo door opening is delayed, inspection frequency may
decrease and the time required to discover uploaded missiles may increase. Appendix D covers
random monitoring with confhmation options in more detail.
Random Monitoring With Warhead Counting Inspections-This option would use an
inspection team to randomly inspect sites. The inspection would require that silo doors be
opened and that the warheads on each missile be counted to confirm that missiles remain down- .
loaded. It requires cooperation by the inspected party to open silo doors and remove missile
shrouds in a timely manner and allow sufficient time for inspection. This monitoring option is
very intrusive and relatively expensive; however, there is a precedent for this type of monitoring
under START-I and START-II, namely reentry vehicle on-site inspections (RV-OSIS).
Random Monitoring with Warhead Counting Using Aircraft-This option would use an
aircraft equipped with visible light and infrared cameras to count warheads in opened silos. Host
country ground-teams would be required to open and close silo doors to permit photographic
imaging of the silo’s interior. This option might only be effective for monitoring deactivated
ICBMS whose warheads and shrouds have been completely removed. If shrouds were left in
place, this option would not be effective. Aircraft base location and weather are also issues for
this type of monitoring, and the host country may have safety or security concerns about an
aircraft flying directly over open silos.
Random Monitoring Using Door Sensors--This option would use an inspection team to
randomly inspect sites. Instead of opening the silo door to count warheads, the inspector
interrogates a sensor package applied to the silo door to confirm that the silo door has not been
opened. The sensor package would use technical devices such as motion sensors, inclinometers,
magnetic switches, or encoded break beams that continuously monitor silo door status, and it
would include tamper protection. This type of inspection does not require that silo doors be
opened unless the sensor has been disturbed. Replacing warheads requires opening the silo door;
thus, confirming that the door has not been opened is equivalent to confirming that warheads
have not been replaced. The necessity of finding a good location for sensors and resistance to
countermeasures will be the main issues for this type of monitoring. This option is described in
more detail in Appendix H.
Random Monitoring Without Confirmation
With this class of monitoring options, silo doors are monitored randomly to see if they are
closed, but they are not opened to confirm that warheads have not been replaced, and sensors are
not used to confirm that doors have remained closed. This class of monitoring options relies on
random and frequent inspections to achieve a high probability that warhead replacement will be
caught in the act. Detecting an open silo door or detecting warhead replacement equipment
around the silo door would constitute catching uploading in the act. We assume that 12hours are
required for uploading an SS-18, thus there is a 12hour period over which SS-18 uploading can
be caught in the act. The confidence in detecting an upload depends on the number of missiles
uploaded and on the frequency of monitoring. The relationship between these parameters is
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