Asymmetric warfare in South Asia: the causes and consequences of the Kargil Conflict

426 Pages·2009·2.77 MB·English

by  Peter R. Lavoy

Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia
The1999conflictbetweenIndiaandPakistannearthetownofKargilin
contested Kashmir was the first military clash between two nuclear-
armed powers since the 1969 Sino-Soviet war. Kargil was a landmark
eventnotbecauseofitsdurationorcasualties,butbecauseitcontaineda
veryreal risk ofnuclear escalation. Until theKargil conflict, academic
and policy debates over nuclear deterrence and proliferation occurred
largelyonthetheoreticallevel.Thisdeepanalysisoftheconflictoffers
scholars and policymakers a rare account of how nuclear-armed states
interactduringamilitarycrisis.WrittenbyanalystsfromIndia,Pakistan,
and the United States, this unique book draws extensively on primary
sources, including unprecedented access to Indian, Pakistani, and US
governmentofficialsandmilitaryofficerswhowereactivelyinvolvedin
theconflict.Thisisthefirstrigorousandobjectiveaccountofthecauses,
conduct,andconsequencesoftheKargilconflict.
peter r. lavoy is the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for
Analysis. Previously he served as Director of the Center for
Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School and
Director of Counterproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary
ofDefense.

Asymmetric Warfare
in South Asia
The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil
Conflict
Editedby
Peter R. Lavoy
cambridge university press
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Contents
Listofmapsandtables pageix
Listofcontributors x
Preface xiii
Listofabbreviationsandacronyms xv
1 Introduction:theimportanceoftheKargilconflict 1
PETER R. LAVOY
Whythisstudymatters 2
Controversiesclarified 5
TheKargilconflictincontext 14
EnduringrivalryinSouthAsia 23
Thenuclearrevolutionreconsidered 29
Part1 Causesandconductoftheconflict 39
2 ThestrategiccontextoftheKargilconflict:aPakistani
perspective 41
ZAFAR IQBAL CHEEMA
Introduction 41
Thehistoricalrationale 42
FCNAandtheNorthernAreas 49
Contemporaryrationale:theSiachenGlacier 52
TheKashmiruprising:theLineofControlandtheNeelumValley 55
Pakistan’sofficialversion 57
PotentialobjectivesoftheKargilconflict 61
Conclusion 62
3 Pakistan’smotivationsandcalculationsfortheKargil
conflict 64
FEROZ HASSAN KHAN, PETER R. LAVOY, AND
CHRISTOPHER CLARY
Ahistoryofgrievance 68
Restoringhonor 74
v
vi Contents
TheimmediatecauseofKargil 80
Anewchainofcommand 83
Assumptionsandmiscalculations 86
Conclusion 90
4 MilitaryoperationsintheKargilconflict 92
JOHN H. GILL
Preludetoconflict 93
Buildup:localandnational 105
Indiancounteroffensive 114
Combatoperations:anassessment 120
Observations 123
5 Americandiplomacyandthe1999KargilSummit
atBlairHouse 130
BRUCE RIEDEL
Prologue 130
Introduction 132
KargilandKashmir 132
Nawazcallsforhelp 135
The4thdawns 137
Aftermath:newdealinNewDelhi,coupinIslamabad 141
6 Kargil:thenucleardimension 144
TIMOTHY D. HOYT
PreludetoKargil:theMay1998tests 146
Kargilasanuclearcrisis 155
Post-Kargilinteraction:thenucleardimension 161
Conclusion 167
7 WhyKargildidnotproducegeneralwar:thecrisis-
managementstrategiesofPakistan,India,andthe
UnitedStates 171
PETER R. LAVOY
SouthAsia’snuclearrevolution 172
Pakistan’scalculations 177
India’sconflict-terminationstrategy 190
Internationaldiplomacy 197
Conclusion 204
Part2 Consequencesandimpactoftheconflict 207
8 Surpriseatthetopoftheworld:India’ssystemicand
intelligencefailure 209
JAMES J. WIRTZ AND SURINDER RANA
Contents vii
Thetheoryofsurprise 211
ThefaitaccompliatKargil 215
Planningthefaitaccompli:theviewfromPakistan 216
Ripeforsurprise:theviewfromIndia 219
ProblemswithIndia’sintelligenceorganizations 220
Conclusion 228
9 MilitantsintheKargilconflict:myths,realities,and
impacts 231
C. CHRISTINE FAIR
Background:originsofthemyth 231
Pakistan’sinternaldynamics 236
ImpactintheValleyofKashmir 244
ImpactonPakistan’sforeignrelations 248
Conclusion 256
10 TheimpactoftheKargilconflictandKashmironIndian
politicsandsociety 258
PRAVEEN SWAMI
Popularculture 259
TheKargilelection 263
TheKargilwarandtheconflictinKashmir 270
Conclusion:war,terrorists,andtemples 277
11 TheKargilconflict’simpactonPakistanipoliticsand
society 280
SAEED SHAFQAT
ThePakistaniprintmedia’sKargil 282
Thedomesticpoliticalimpact 289
Thereligiouspartiesoutflankthemainstream 290
Politicalmanagementandmismanagement 296
Thecoupanditsaftermath 304
Conclusion 306
Part3 Lessonslearned 309
12 ThelessonsofKargilaslearnedbyIndia 311
RAJESH M. BASRUR
Organizationallessons 313
Strategiclessons 320
Conclusion:lessonswelllearned? 328
13 ThelessonsofKargilaslearnedbyPakistan 333
HASAN-ASKARI RIZVI
MilitarylearninginSouthAsia 334
viii Contents
Misperceivingothers:Pakistaniperceptionsofinternationalresponse 337
Theharshspotlight 340
Operationallessons 346
Assessmentoftheconflict 349
Conclusion:hasPakistanlearned? 350
14 TheKargilcrisis:lessonslearnedbytheUnitedStates 353
RODNEY W. JONES AND JOSEPH MCMILLAN
LessonsforUSrelationswithIndiaandPakistan 354
Lessonsfornuclearstabilityandnonproliferationpolicy 359
Lessonsforfutureengagement 365
Conclusion 373
15 Kargil,deterrence,andinternationalrelationstheory 377
ROBERT JERVIS
Introduction 377
Natureofthepuzzle 379
RoutestoKargil 381
Surprise 387
Nuclearweapons,nuclearwars 388
Conclusion 396
Index 398
Maps and tables
Maps
1.1 JammuandKashmir page17
2.1 Indianingressafter1972andallegedPakistaniincursion 50
2.2 UnoccupiedareasalongtheLoC 59
4.1 Mushkoh,Dras,andKaksarsectors 99
4.2 Bataliksector 100
4.3 ChorbatLaandTurtok(Hanif)sectors 101
Tables
1.1 TheKargilconflict’simplicationsfornuclear-deterrence
theory 36
4.1 IndianandPakistaniforcesintheKargilconflict 127
10.1 Resultsinthe1998and1999GeneralElectionsformajor
parties 265
10.2 Votingpatternsinfourkeystates,GeneralElections1998and
1999 266
10.3 Anoverviewofthe“pro-active”policy 273
11.1 Partyshareofvotes:all-PakistanNationalAssemblyelections 291
ix