Asian Affairs (assortment of journal articles)

383 Pages·2008·2.2 MB·English

by  Various

AFGHAN/PAKISTAN BORDER DISPUTES
ANTHONY HYMAN
Based on a lecture given to the Society on 28 May, 1980. Anthony Hyman studied Indian and Islamic
History at the School of Oriental and African Studies and is a frequent contributor to press and radio
on South Asia and Islamic Affairs. He has recently returned from the Pakistan borders where he
gathered material for subsequent press and radio use. Mr Hyman is currently writing a book on
contemporary Afghanistan to be published in 1981.
Because of ambiguities in the title of this lecture, I should renounce any intention
to examine, or reexamine, or demarcate on the Durand Line, the British-drawn
frontier between the two states. Instead, we shall look at the Afghan civil war,
and how far the problems of the Kabul Government and its Soviet backers are
really connected to the Pakistan borders.
The whole topic is therefore not on the definition of frontiers, but on their
clandestine use by guerrilla forces, or possibly by outside agencies, for
intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The overall picture of current
events there is greatly complicated by the distortions which news is subject to,
from all sides, - Afghan, Pakistan, Soviet as well as western media. The claims
of Soviet media and of the Babrak Karmal Government can be summed up in
the often-laboured theme that the popular Afghan revolution of April, 1978, is
being wrecked by outside interference, and of course the historical parallel
which springs to the Russian mind is that of the Basmachi resistance to the
Bolshevik revolution. The Basmachi bands of Turcomans and Uzbeks fought a
doomed battle in Central Asia until 1931, when the last Basmachi band was
destroyed by Soviet forces. The friends of the Karmal regime claim that the
Afghan resistance likewise comes essentially from counter-revolutionaries and
robber bands, supported from outside, and the parallel pleases the Soviet media
especially because, (as everyone knows), the Basmachis were utterly defeated,
and Central Asia then remodelled into model Soviet states.
Although the historical perspective is essential to understand the present
situation in Afghanistan, I am certain that this particular Basmachi parallel
cannot be sustained before an objective public. The nature of the Afghan
opposition to the three successive Soviet-backed regimes in Kabul is very
different from the Basmachi risings, nor is there any true parallel between the
Bolshevik Revolution and the “Glorious Saur” Revolution of April, 1978.1 shall
attempt to show why in this description of the organization and activities of
some of the Afghan resistance groups.
The first point is the sweep of political views contained within that resistance,
ranging from the far-right to the far-left wing, from Muslim fundamentalists to
secular or liberal political parties and Marxist groups, from tribesmen to urban
workers and intellectuals. The second point is that this opposition to the Kabul
Government’s rule is so far from being artificial that it is found in virtually
every province, even hundreds of miles from the Pakistan frontiers from which
it is alleged imperialist plots are being hatched. Resistance grew spontaneously
from brutal attempts of the Afghan Marxists to transform society, and its spread
was aided by Afghan distrust of the overwhelming Soviet presence, both
military and civil, even before the Christmas coup last year. History after all has
many examples of intense Afghan attachment to independence, against their
more powerful neighbours Iran and India, then against British Indian imperial
designs, as now against Soviet grand designs - so the popular Afghan reaction to
Soviet interference should come as no surprise.
Confusion about the scale and nature of the Afghan opposition has grown
from carefully fostered propaganda, the key centres being Peshawar and
Moscow with a very poor third being Kabul itself.
In Peshawar all the running is made by rival Afghan parties whose following
is based mainly in the border provinces close to the North West Frontier of
Pakistan - that is, in south and S.E. Afghanistan. The best-established party is
Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who arrived in Peshawar in 1974/75
with some fifty Muslim fundamentalists from Kabul University, after failing in a
plot against President Daoud, and losing out in a struggle for influence with left-
wing groups. Originally united, the fifty Afghans soon split into four separate
and antagonistic parties in exile, with Gulbuddin enjoying the backing of
Pakistan’s Prime Minister.
The young Gulbuddin (only 33 years old now in 1980) found help for the
brand of Islamic fundamentalist fervour he preached not because of its intrinsic
qualities, but because it served as a useful response to the Pukh-toonistan idea
purveyed from Kabul at that time - the pet ideal of President Daoud to detach
the Pathan (Pukhtoon) and Baluch areas of Pakistan. As so many other political
exiles before him, Gulbuddin had to choose to further his political aims while
compromising his independence, by accepting limited weapons, training and use
of friendly territory to mount raids into Afghanistan.
With the failure of their attempts to promote armed rebellion within
Afghanistan, and the ensuing recriminations, the small party split into two, and
then four separate factions, led by older theologians believing in fundamentalist
Islam, like the young Gulbuddin, but blaming his rashness and vanity for failure.
Jamiat Islami, the largest of the three other fundamentalist parties, is led by
Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, aged forty - a former Professor of Muslim law
at Kabul University. Rabbani has travelled widely in the Middle East since 1974
in search of patrons for an armed struggle to create a model Islamic state out of
Afghanistan. These efforts have not been rewarded with much success, although
a trickle of money from well-wishers, mainly in the Gulf states has paid for
small-scale supplies of rifles and ammunition, as well as the upkeep of party
offices in Peshawar and in Iran. Unlike the other parties based in Peshawar,
Jamiat Islami is mainly non-Pukhtoon in membership, with its strength in the
Tajik (Persian-speaking Afghans) community of far-off Badakhshan, and the
north-eastern region. The Jamiat is active also on the fronts close to the
Peshawar borders.
Two smaller fundamentalist parties are led by ulama (doctors or teachers of
religious law) of the older generation. Mohammed Nabi
Mohammedi, sixty years old, preached Islam in Scandinavia in the early 1970’s,
with Libyan funds, heading Herakat Inqilab Islami. This party has a following in
the southern borders, between Ghazni and Kandahar.
Mohammed Yunis Khalis, aged around sixty five, heads Hizb-i-Islami (2), a
party built round hard-core members of the original Hizb, who follow Khalis
rather than Gulbuddin. There is no real ideological difference between the four
fundamentalist parties, but essentially a clash of personalities, sparked off by the
pretensions of Gulbuddin as leader, in spite of his youth and lack of religious
education, (even his familiar title of “Engineer” is one of courtesy, as he did not
complete his degree course at Kabul University).
The somewhat dubious origins of the four fundamentalist parties should be
distinguished from their present activities as self-proclaimed, “mujahidin”,
(muslim fighters or warriors for Islam), as their role and foreign ties have
changed dramatically since the Afghan civil war became general; after March,
1979, with the uprising and mutiny of the garrison at Herat (the important city
close to the Iranian frontier in the west) the four fundamentalist parties based on
Peshawar linked up more closely with the tribes of south and S.E. Afghanistan.
The leaders of the parties claim to be leading and directing the jihad, or holy war
against communism and Russian domination, though the truth is certainly more
complex.

It is not the ideology of strict Islamic practices which appeals to tribal society
so much as arms deliveries and promises of ammunition for the future. Some
tribal chiefs have pledged support to as many as four parties simultaneously, but
this “support” can be tenuous indeed, as party militants have found to their cost
when attempting to order around tribal levies on battle fronts. Yet there is a
general respect for their resistance to what they all call the Soviet “puppet
regime” certainly in the towns too, as repeated strikes and demonstrations have
proved.
Party militants in Peshawar, as across the borders, are often educated young
Afghans, fresh from Kabul University or high schools, firm believers in the
promotion of moral and religious reformation, and the revival of the place of the
mosque in Muslim society. It is hardly surprising that the offices of these parties
in Peshawar are decorated with Iranian posters of Ayatollah Khomeini, as well
as Maulana Maududi, the Pakistani creator of the ultra-conservative Jamiat-i-
Islami of Pakistan. There are also believed to be strong financial links between
some of the parties and religious circles in Iran and Pakistan, and militants draw
confidence from the apparent success of fundamentalist ideas in both
neighbouring states.
But in private conversation, militants will often admit that there are problems
in converting the Afghan population to what amounts to a very different version
of Islam. They admit that Afghans often know little about Islam, but declare that
the firm if untutored faith of the tribesmen will bring them round to accept “true
Muslim leadership”. In this way they rationalise genuine difficulties which these
radical reformers of Islam would have in imposing a new order in a highly
traditional society.
The great advantage enjoyed by the two Afghan Fronts over the
fundamentalist parties is exactly this traditional status of hereditary saints (or
pirs) over the tribes of a wide region. Pir Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and Pir Sayyid
Ahmed Gailani are venerated by some millions of Afghans in the south and S.E.,
giving each a devoted following among the Pukhtoon tribes, some of whom
undoubtedly believe that their pirs’ spiritual qualities can ensure victory against
atheist communists. It is said that amulets (taviz) are distributed to mujahidin
(muslim fighters), who believe that amulets make them impervious to bullets.
Certainly the very presence of the Pir at a battle front has given added
confidence to tribesmen.
Pir Sibghatullah Mojaddedi is Chairman of Afghan National Liberation Front
(ANLF), with probably the widest support of influential tribal chiefs in this
Pukhtoon region. The Mojaddedi family has for long been an important
conservative force in Afghan politics, with close links to the royal family, in
exile in Rome since 1973. Mojaddedi is an austere, shrewd-looking man of 55,
fluent in many languages, who wears his rich robes and turban with great
dignity, receiving with composure frequent delegations from the tribes seeking
rifles and ammunition. ANLF is rumoured to be best provided of all the parties
or Fronts in Peshawar, able to distribute quantities of arms for the guerrilla war,
paid for by Arab oil states.

Although until now spokesmen for Afghan groups have been reluctant to
admit aid from any source, Pir Sayyid Ahmed Gailani, heading the National
Islamic Front for Afghanistan, candidly agreed in an interview that the Front did
get money from Arab, mainly Gulf, states, insisting that these were in the form
of small private contributions. Gailani is 48 years old, descended from an
illustrious line of pirs from Baghdad, but in dress, life-style and ideas much less
traditional than other leaders, and to that extent perhaps more credible (to
western eyes) as a secular political leader.
Different from other parties in Peshawar is Afghan Mellat, a well-established
political party of social democratic tendency, with many members in
Afghanistan until limited democracy was suppressed with the Marxist coup of
April 1978. Afghan Mellat gets no money from Iran, Arab states or Pakistani
sources - perhaps because its political stance is too progressive and too overtly
secular to appeal to these patrons. But the party continues to attract Afghan
liberals and nationalists willing to fight on for independence, but who desire
social changes and democracy for Afghanistan. Major Shams is the 45 year-old
head of the party in Peshawar, and a dedicated group of Afghan intellectuals is
spreading their views among the more educated Afghan exiles. One of the
strengths of Afghan Mellat is the appeal the party has among Army officers and
civil servants - many purged but the rest still well-placed in posts in
Afghanistan. Members of Afghan Mellat have fought alongside other parties in
guerrilla bands, and are said to have close links with tribes along the Waziristan
borders, in particular.
The great defect in these parties is their limited appeal to one ethnic grouping,
the Pukhtoons, and to one region or group of tribes, rather than to the Afghan
people as a whole. Recent attempts inspired by foreign Governments to unite the
main parties based in Peshawar have failed so far to produce anything but
formal and empty promises of cooperation. But early this year, an initiative from
within Afghanistan itself came about, called Loya Jirga, “Great Assembly or
Parliament” (named after traditional special assemblies called at crises in the
past). It is a bold attempt to resolve rivalries by bringing into being a party-less
Alliance which could plan for an independent and united alternative
Government for Afghanistan, and start to coordinate local guerrilla wars.
The need for such a patriotic initiative has attracted a large number of capable
and distinguished Afghans into the Loya Jirga, which assembled at the
beginning of the year (immediately after the Soviet coup) with two thousand
delegates gathered from nearly every Province of Afghanistan. They met in
mosques of Peshawar, safely across the border, approving the general aims and
strategy of the Loya Jirga, leaving sixty trusted delegates in Peshawar to form a
Council, after dispersing to their regions on 22 February. The President of Loya
Jirga is Omar Babrakzai, a judge of forty, and many ex-M.P.s, leaders of tribes,
officials or officers are delegates. Although Loya Jirga has so far been unable to
persuade the main leaders in Peshawar of the need to unite, many Afghan
nationalists on the fringes of parties, as well as some of the smaller parties and
factions -Afghan Mellat for instance - in Peshawar, are attracted to its
progressive, secular views. In an interview Omar Babrakzai described the aims
of Loya Jirga to fight a patriotic war for independence and preservation of their
religion and traditions, all three of which are threatened by successive
Communist regimes based in Kabul. Babrakzai stated that Afghanistan has the
right to separate and independent existence as a recognized nation, and that
Soviet Imperialism had no business in his country. Soviet Imperialism was even
more dangerous than other types of Imperialism or Colonialism, he declared;
while other colonialists are interested only in exploiting the raw materials of a
country, the Russians attempt also to destroy its culture, history, traditions and
religion.

Both Loya Jirga and Gailani’s Front were split down the middle in July, when
Gailani’s ambitious young nephew Sayyid Hassan formed a third new group.
This chronic disunity has been traced to infiltration by Soviet-trained agents, but
it seems to be deeply rooted in Afghan culture. Inside Afghanistan rival parties
have fought against each other this summer, as well as against the Russians.
There are upwards of twenty Afghan parties, factions or cliques in Peshawar,
many no more than a small group of Afghans without influence or abilities.
Some of the self-proclaimed Afghan leaders travel between Washington, Europe
and Pakistan or Iran, claiming to be the virtual leader of the guerrilla war, like
Zia Khan Nasri, a young US-based Afghan adventurer who has lost much of the
illusory glamour which he persuaded the media was his due last year. Other
charlatans have claimed to be envoys of King Zahir Shah, who was deposed by
President Daoud in 1973; living now in Rome, his name is still held to be
attractive to many tribal groups as the sole symbol of authority which they
would recognize without question.
There were also some hundreds of Afghan Marxists of the Parcham party
living in Peshawar until January, when they rushed north of the border after the
coup to take important posts in the Babrak Karmal Government. The Parchamis
were, of course, persecuted under both Tarakki and Hafizullah Amin, as the
bitter factional rivalries between the two wings of the Afghan Marxists
precluded cooperation, except during the brief months of illusory unity
immediately after the Saur Revolution of April, 1978. In their place now, it is
said, some Khalqis have arrived in Peshawar, plotting to overthrow the Soviet-
established Karmal regime.
What is the significance of this profusion of parties of Afghan nationalists,
based close to the southern borders in Peshawar? And is Peshawar merely the
home of lost causes, of expropriated landlords or of religious fanatics plotting
from afar to bring down an enlightened, reformist Government in Kabul - as
claimed by its defenders ?

There are many rival parties of Afghans sprung into existence basically
because Afghanistan is a very much divided culture, with tribe pitted against
tribe, ethnic group against rival groups; history, geography and contemporary
politics combine to reinforce strong traits of individualism -even in such a small
grouping as that of the left-wing.
Of the Afghan left-wing, we have seen the bitter warring between the Khalq
and Parcham factions or parties, but a third grouping exists, the Shula-i-Javid,
the pro-Peking Marxist-Leninists. It is active in opposition to this and the
previous governments, particularly strong in Badakhshan, the far-flung eastern
province which has a narrow common border with China across the Pamirs.
Notwithstanding the formidable obstacle which the Pamir mountains represent,'
Soviet propaganda has claimed that Chinese supplies of arms and, “light tanks”
have been parachuted into Badakhshan to help the Shula-i-Javid. Not only does
geography virtually prevent such military aid, but the idea of light tanks being
parachuted down into the remote corners of Badakhshan is certainly pure
fiction, since tanks are never used by guerrilla forces in Afghanistan, even
though repeatedly captured. It is not hard to understand how a tank is useless to
guerrilla forces fighting far off the roads, where they can be bombed from the
air, and to whom oil supplies are rare or unknown. The sole use to which a
captured tank or amoured car has been put by Afghan guerrillas is to strip off it
the heavy guns before burning.
Leaving the remote eastern corner of Afghanistan, opposition groups based in
Pakistan (or in Iran) do, of course, have easy access to supplies of arms and
ammunition, provided they have enough funds to pay for them. It is the border
arms workshops of Darra Adam Khel, south west of Peshawar in tribal territory,
which serves the entire region, as it has done for a century. Both as
manufacturers of rifles and ammunition of various types, and as wholesale
importers, the Darra merchants of death have thrived off the Afghan civil war.
Prices for small arms and ammunition have risen sharply since the spring of
1979, (when the civil war became general) - prices doubling in many lines, with
the extra demand and the virtual monopoly of supplies held by the Darra arms
traders.
Groups of Afghan mujahidin come to Darra each day to negotiate for rifles
and ammunition, often paying on “H.P. terms”, by giving over a down-payment,
and a promise to pay the balance on a set date, signed by a guarantor. The
quantities bought in each transaction are usually small, but the thousands of
traders and artisans in the workshops lining the high street and extending down
the sides of Darra are never short of work.
It is the Lee Enfield 303 which is the most popular rifle here, the standard
issue of the British Indian Army, formerly of the Afghan Army, and still the
favourite snipers’ weapon on the North West Frontier. Although Darra-made
303s vary in quality and price according to the use of locally-made or imported
parts, they are much cheaper than a British-made rifle. Prices start at £120 for a
crude version, rising to £200-£250 for a 303 with British-made bolt and
magazine, while an authentic British 303 commands much more - £600 plus for
a World War II model, and more than £800 for a brand new model.
Many of the Afghans in the market for arms cannot afford even the cheapest
version of the 303, and settle for what are called, “hunting rifles”, of 7 mm
calibre, priced from as low as 1000 Rupees (less than £50), with a range only
half that of the 303’s.