Table Of ContentART
AND PRUDENCE
A STUDY IN PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY
by Mortimer J. Adler
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
1937
LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.
NEW YORK • TORONTO
ADLER • ART AND PRUDENCE
COPYRIGHT • 1937 * BY MORTIMER J. ADLER
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The Prudent Man, on the other hand, as such,
judging all things from the angle of morality and
in relation to the good of man, is absolutely igno
rant of everything pertaining to art. He can no
doubt, as he ought, judge the work of art as it
affects morality; he has no right to judge it as a
work of art.
* # #
In finding fault with a work of art,, the Prudent
Man, firmly established upon his moral virtue, has
the certitude that he is defending against the Artist
a sacred good, the good of Man, and he looks upon
the' Artist as a child or a madman. Perched on his
intellectual habit, the Artist is certain of defending
a good which is no less sacred, the good of beauty,
and looks as though he were crushing the Prudent
Man under the weight of Aristotle’s maxim: Vita
quae est secundum speculationem est melior quam
quae secundum hominem.
Jacques Maritain,
Art and Scholasticism
By permission of Messrs. Steed & Ward, Publishers
Preface
In the field of practical philosophy there is always the general
problem and the special case. Action is taken in singular situa
tions under particular circumstances. Thinking about action
must, therefore, take account of many contingencies, but it must
no less rely upon principles of great generality. The clear
formulation of the latter is usually supposed to be the province
of the philosopher. The man of action is supposed to look to
the facts of the case. This separation is unfortunate. There
can be no wisdom in action without principles. There can be
no determination of action by philosophy without the supple
mentation of casuistry in the application of principles. Strictly,
of course, the practical philosopher is not a casuist. But, recog
nizing the limitations of reason in practice, he knows that gen
eral principles must always submit to the qualifications of
casuistry. There is merit, therefore, in considering the general
problem and a special case at the same time. The former con
sists of questions about the applicable principles. The latter
raises questions of fact that must be answered before the prin
ciples can be applied. On the one hand, discussion of the
principles illuminates the particular case. It is understood when
it is seen as an instance of a general practical problem. On the
other hand, consideration of the special case tests the adequacy
of theoretical formulations; more than that, in imposing the ob
ligations of casuistry upon the philosopher it puts him, sympa
thetically at least, in the position of the man of action. The
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[viii] ART AND PRUDENCE
rapprochement of the philosopher and the man of action is cer
tainly a consummation devoutly to be wished. Philosophy is
not truly practical unless it can be heeded by practical men.
The man of action cannot be wise if he forsake philosophy, mis
trusting it as too remote from the perplexities of practice. These
two must understand each other if either is to do his work well.
Practical wisdom requires not only clarity and correctness in
principle, but the fullest appreciation of the intricacies of the
particular case.
In this book I have tried to be practically wdse about a difficult
practical problem. In general it is the problem of the moral
and political criticism of the fine arts, occasioned by the conflict
in operation of two practical virtues — prudence and art. The
special case is made by the current controversy about motion
pictures. In different periods different arts have been the focus
of such debate. In our time —the last few decades —the pri
mary concern is with the cinema. It is the subject of far more
consideration than any of the other fine arts. It has a wider
audience, both in terms of gross number and in terms of hetero
geneity, than any other. The existence of a tremendous body
of opinion about the effects of motion pictures on that audience
and about what should be done in the light of these supposed
effects, is therefore not surprising. In their substance the opin
ions current about the movies are not as novel as the movies.
They are as old as the problem —of which the cinema merely
creates a contemporary instance — and that problem is as old as
society. Nor are the principles new which can be used to
clarify this field of opinion. The modem mind recoils from
the notion that principles which can analyze a contemporary
problem may have been discovered before its circumstances
arose. Yet everything that can be said clearly about motion
pictures was said and well said long before motion pictures
existed or were discussed. Nothing has been added in con
temporary discussion—except scientific research which, of
course, adds nothing in the way of ideas or principles — and much
has been lost in the way of insight, clarity and order.
The history of the discussion of poetry and politics, of art
and prudence, reveals that the general principles applicable to
any instance of the problem of the arts in society were long ago
discovered. The classics contain the tradition of European
PREFACE [ix]
wisdom on this problem, as on every other. The classics are
always contemporary because the wisdom they contain is tradi
tional. One way of showing this is to use the classics as if they
were a discussion of contemporary problems. In comparison
with literature which is contemporary only in the sense of being
current, the classics give those who will use them a perspective on
present affairs, as well" as a richness, simplicity and subtlety not
found in thinking that is merely ad hoc. In the intellectual
sphere, modernism is provincialism. The classics are the remedy
for the besetting ill of our times. But, unfortunately, those who
have this ill-founded pride in the sufficiency of their own times,
have it precisely because they dislike the only medicine which
can cure them.
In this, as in almost every other, basic philosophical question,
practical or speculative, Plato and Aristotle are the primary
sources for its dialectical examination. With a few exceptions,
the rest is commentary. The chief exceptions, in the case of art
and prudence, are two. Christianity adds one dimension to the
problem, and we must, therefore, consult such writers as St.
Thomas Aquinas and Bishop Bossuet. Democracy adds another
dimension, and we must go to two of its exponents who consider
the place of the arts — Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey.
At first the basic opposition between Plato and Aristotle seems
to be final. As Christian theologians, Bossuet and Aquinas are
opposed as Platonist and Aristotelian. As democrats, Rousseau
and Dewey are similarly related. But Greek wisdom is not
ultimate. It is increased in stature and in depth by Christianity.
The opposition between Plato and Aristotle concerning the
criticism of the arts is profoundly qualified by the practical
theology of St. Thomas. The dialectic almost reaches the
moment of synthesis. Because it leans heavily on the moral
treatises of the Summa Theologica. in analyzing the relation of
art and prudence to each other and to the other virtues, Chapter
12 is the place in this book where the argument achieves greatest
refinement. So far as any resolution is possible of the issues
about criticism — whether aesthetic and political criticism are
separable, whether technical and moral goodness are independent
— it will be found there in principle.
The announcement of an effort to follow an abiding intel
lectual tradition makes any disclaimer of originality unnecessary.
[x] ART AND PRUDENCE
I have not only used Aristotle and St. Thomas as sources of
wisdom, but I have been guided throughout by the commentary
of Jacques Maritain, who has employed the same tradition in
Art and Scholasticism, a book which is for me the best analysis
of all the problems of fine art. The scope of that book is much
more general than this. I am concerned primarily with one
problem and, moreover, with that problem as it occurs in the
special case made by the cinema as fine art. , The attempt to
apply everything that is relevant in the intellectual tradition to
this contemporary problem necessarily requires some interpre
tation and extension of the basic texts I have relied upon. To
this extent, and only to this extent, my work has been construc
tive. I hope it will be understood that I have not cited or quoted
these texts as authorities in the sense in which authoritarianism is
disreputable in modern times. They are cited as indications of
the tradition in which I am working. They are quoted as
formulations so clear and precise that it would be rash to try to
rephrase them. They are used because of what they say and
not because of who said them. The reader will find much of
this material quoted in the notes at the end of the book. These
notes are referred to by numbers in brackets in the main body
of the text.
The programme of this book required not only an exposition
and interpretation of the relevant tradition concerning poetry
and politics, but also an analysis of the contemporary discussion
of motion pictures. The philosophical task here is the ancient
one of clarifying popular opinion. Much of the prevailing dis
cussion proceeds upon the provincial assumption that the prob
lem being discussed is a new one, peculiar to the locale of Europe
and America in the twentieth century. As a result it is strik
ingly unenlightened by reference to the moral, political and aes
thetic principles, without which the problem cannot be well
analyzed or understood. I have, therefore, tried to explicate
the charges which have been made against the movies, as well
as to discover what can be said in their defense. This will be
found in Part II. Since the principles there employed are tra
ditional, some repetition of Part I is unavoidable ; but I hope
that the repetition is justified by a resulting clarification of cur
rent polemic. This part is so written, particularly Chapters 6
and 7, that it can be read carefully or hastily according as the
PREFACE [xi]
reader is more or less interested in the intricacies of the problem.
The most important result of Part II is the separation of dif
ferent sorts of questions raised by the various claims for and
against the cinema. The basic questions of fact are isolated
from problems of evaluation and policy. These questions indi
cate the sort of knowledge needed to solve the practical problem
in its present incidence, knowledge not provided by a discussion
of the problem in general. At this point consideration of the
special case carries us beyond the traditional treatment of the
general problem. It is here, also, that the problem of the motion
picture is uniquely distinguished. Not only is the cinema ex
ceptional among the arts today in receiving the attention of a
papal encyclical; not only is it the one art which is so conscious
of its public responsibilities that it seeks “self-discipline at the
point of production” ; but the cinema is unique, today or any
other time, in being the only fine art ever subjected to elaborate
scientific research with regard to its moral and social influences.
This scientific research was done for the most part by psy
chologists and sociologists. It is of the same sort that can be
found in the fields of other practical problems, such as crime,
urbanization, immigration, etc. Acquaintance with this type of
research suggests the need for a critical examination of its
methods and findings in order to ascertain the reliability and
significance of the answers it gives to questions of fact. In 1932
Professor Jerome Michael and I completed a survey of crim
inological research. That study grew out of a report made to
the Bureau of Social Hygiene, and was subsequently published
under the title Crime, Law and Social Science. Scientific in
vestigations of the motion picture as a factor in human behavior
did not receive special treatment in our survey. Many of them
had not yet been completed. As a result of their reading of
Crime, Law and Social Science, representatives of the motion-
picture producers asked me to review for them the recent
empirical investigations specifically concerned with the influen.ee
of motion pictures on human behavior —to make, in short, a
similar analysis of the problems, methods'and results of research.
Because of the vastness of the materials, the survey of criminolog
ical work could not present an examination of each of the
investigations in detail. But in reporting on motion-picture re
search, minute examination was possible, and seemed advisable
[xii] ART AND PRUDENCE
as a way of making plain some of the characteristics of current
work in psychology and social science. I am grateful for per
mission to use much of the material of my original report in
this book, — presented here in a somewhat extended form. This
constitutes the substance of Chapters io and n of Part III.
However laborious and distasteful it may prove, a careful read
ing of these two chapters, in the light of the distinction between
knowledge and opinion made in Chapter 9, will enable the
reader to form his own judgment on the question whether
science has contributed to our understanding of the perennial
problem of the arts in society, or supplied us with knowledge
which can be used in its solution.
It may be objected, as it has been in certain quarters, that the
movies are not an art hut an industry and that, therefore, they
do not deserve the same kind of consideration which is given
to music and poetry. In itself this objection is not worth
answering, but the situation it reflects is serious. It reveals a
failure to understand the status of the cinema as fine art, par
ticularly on the part of its moral and political critics. The moral
and political criticism of an art is usually exaggerated and even
distorted by a lack of sensitivity to its problems of workmanship
and production, its artistic aims and its technical means. I have,
therefore, tried to complete my account of the various parts of
criticism by analyzing the relation of the cinema to the other
fine arts, by formulating the elements of its technique, and by
setting forth the principles by which the cinema can be criticized
aesthetically. This will be found in Part IV. It completes the
discussion of intrinsic and extrinsic criticism begun in Chapter
12. It also faces the problem of good taste and aesthetic culti
vation which is intensified by the popularity of an art.
A word about terminology is necessary. As an analysis
grows, verbal usages shift. I have used the word “poetry” in
the earlier parts of this book as synonymous with “fiction.”
Thus used, it includes the motion picture as a species of poetry.
Only in the last part have I more narrowly defined the scope of
poetry to distinguish it from the cinema. I have used the word
“art” narrowly throughout the first eleven chapters, (1) to
mean only fine art, and (2) to signify the work of art rather
than the technical skill possessed by its maker. It is only in
