Table Of ContentARMORED
COMBAT
IN
VIETNAM
ARMORED
COMBAT
IN
VIETNAM
Donn
General A. Stariy
ARNO PRESS
New York •1980
Copyright (c) 1980by Arno Press Inc.
All rights reserved.
LibraryofCongressCataloging in Publication Data
Starry, Donn A 1931-
Armored combat in Vietnam.
Includes index.
—
1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975 Campaigns.
—
2. United States. Army. Armored Force History.
3. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975—United States.
I. Title. 11. Series.
[DS558.9.A75S73 1980] 959.704'342 80-21035
ISBN 0-405-13699-4
Manufactured in the United States of America
,
Foreword
The United States Army met an unusually complex challenge in
Southeast Asia. In conjunction with theotherservices, the Armyfought in
support of a national policy of assisting an emerging nation to develop
governmental processesofitsownchoosing, freeofoutsidecoercion. Inad-
dition to the usual problems ofwaging armed conflict, the assignment in
Southeast Asia required super-imposing the immensely sophisticated task
of a modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting
them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to
fufill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing with the frustra-
tions of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting conventional campaigns
against well-trained and determined regular units.
It is still necessary for the Army to continue to prepare for other
challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that history never repeats
itself exactly and that no army ever profited from trying to meet a new
challenge in terms of an old one, the Army nevertheless stands to benefit
immensely from a study of its experience, its shortcomings no less than its
achievements.
Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories will pro-
vide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in Southeast Asia,
we have sought a forum whereby some of the more salient aspects of that
experiencecan bemade available now. At the requestoftheChiefofStaff
a representative group of senior officers who served in important posts in
Vietnam and who still carry a heavy burden ofday-to-day responsibilities
have prepared a series of books. These studies should be ofgreat value in
helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at the same
time contributing to the historical record and providing the American
public with an interim report on the performance ofmen and officerswho
have responded, as others have through our history, toexactingand trying
demands.
The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was accom-
plished while thewar in Vietnam was at its peak, and the booksfrequently
refer to events of the past as if they were taking place in the present.
All books in the series are based primarily on official records, with addi-
tional material from published and unpublished secondary works, from
debriefing reports and interviews with key participants, and from the per-
sonalexperienceoftheauthor. Tofacilitatesecurityclearance, annotation
111
FOREWORD
anddetailedbibliographyhavebeenomittedfrom the publishedversion; a
fully documented account with bibliography is filed with the U.S. Army
Center of Military History.
The story of armored combat in Vietnam was written at Fort Knox be-
tween 1973 and 1976 by a task force under the direction ofMajor General
Donn A. Starry, thencommanderoftheArmorCenter andcommanderof
the Armor School. General Starry has been involved in the planning or
direction of armored operations and development since he was graduated
from the U.S. Military Academy in 1948 as a second lieutenant ofcavalry.
After serving in command and staffpositions from platoon to battalion in
armoredunitsin Europeuntil 1953, hebecame astaffofficerin the Eighth
Army in Korea and then an instructor in combined arms and nuclear
weapons employment at the U.S. Army Intelligence School. He later served
as an armored battalion commander and staff officer in U.S. Army,
Europe. In 1966 he assumed duties in the G—3 Section, U.S. Army, Viet-
nam, and was a member of the Mechanized and Armor Combat Opera-
tions, Vietnam, study group which evaluated armored operations in Viet-
nam. Afterservingin assignmentswith the ViceChiefofStaffofthe Army
and the Secretary ofDefense, he returned to Vietnam tojoin the plans of-
fice ofJ—3, Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
and in 1969 assumed command ofthe 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in
Vietnam. In 1970 he returned to the United States and served successively
as Deputy Director of the Operations Directorate and Director of Man-
power and Forces. After two and one-halfyears as the commander ofthe
Armor Center, he assumed command ofV Corps, U.S. Army, Europe, in
1976. Promoted to full general, inJuly 1977 General Starry became com-
manderoftheU.S. ArmyTrainingand DoctrineCommand, Fort Monroe,
Virginia.
JAMES C. PENNINGTON
Washington, D.C. Brigadier General, USA
15 September 1977 The Adjutant General
Preface
This bookis an account ofthe operationsofarmored unitsoftheUnited
States Army in the Republic ofVietnam. The term armored units as used
here is generic and includes tank and mechanized infantry batallions and
companies, armored cavalry squadrons and troops, and air cavalry
squadrons and troops — all forces whose primary modus operandiwas to
fight mounted.
Of necessity the story begins not with the arrival of the first U.S. ar-
mored units in Vietnam in 1965 but with armor in Vietnam during the
years immediately after World War II. The generally unsuccessful ex-
perience of French armored forces in Southeast Asia from the end of
World War II to 1954 convinced American military men that armored
units could not be employed in Vietnam. It was widely believed that Viet-
nam's monsoon climate together with its jungle and rice paddies consti-
tuted anenvironment too hostileformechanized equipment; itwasfurther
agreed that armored forces could not cope with an elusive enemy that
operated from jungle ambush. Thus at the outset of American participa-
tion in the conflict and for some time thereafter, Army planners saw little
ornoneedfor armoredunitsin theU.S. forcestructureinVietnam. At the
same time, however, extensive American aid that flowed into Vietnam
after the French left the country was directed in part to developing an ar-
mored force for the newly created Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
It was not until 1967, however, when a study titled Mechanized and
Armor Combat Operations, Vietnam, conducted by General Arthur L.
West,Jr., wassent to theChiefofStaffandSecretaryofthe Army, that the
potential of armored forces was fully described to the Army's top leaders.
—
Despite thestudy'sfindings that armored cavalrywasprobably themost
—
cost-effectiveforceonthe Vietnam battlefield therewaslittlethatcould
be done to alter significantly either the structure offorces already sent to
Vietnam or those earmarked for deployment. By that time, constraints on
the size of American forces in Vietnam had been imposed by Defense
SecretaryRobert S. McNamara anddecisionsonforcedeploymentextend-
ingwell into 1968 had alreadybeenmade. The armoredforceofthe Army
of the Republic of Vietnam, meanwhile had been successful enough in
fighting the elusive Viet Cong that U.S. armored units had been deployed
in limited numbers, usually as part of their parent divisions.
PREFACE
vi
From early March 1965 until the cease-fire in January 1973, U.S. ar-
mored units participated in virtually every large-scale offensive operation
and worked closely with South Vietnamese Army and other free world
forces. After eight years of fighting over land on which tanks were once
thought to be incapable of moving, in weather that was supposed to pro-
hibit armored operations, and dealing with an elusive enemy against
whom armored units were thought to be at a considerable disadvantage,
armored forces emerged as powerful, flexible, and essential battle forces.
In large measure they contributed to the success of the free world forces,
not only in close combat, but in pacification and security operations as
well. When redeployment began in early 1969, armored unitswere not in-
cluded in thefirst forcesscheduled for redeployment, and indeed planners
moved armored units down the scale time and again, holding off their
redeployment until the very end.
In almost equal parts this study has drawn from official war records of
armored units and personal interviews with men of those units. The book
makes no attempt to document every armored unit in every battle. Nor
does it list in detail the lessons that maybelearned from the Vietnam con-
flict, although it does call attention to some. In so doing it sometimes
isolates and focuses on the mounted combat aspects ofoperations that ac-
tually included many different American and other free world units. The
reader should keep in mind that the author's intent is to tell the story of
mounted units, and not to describe battles in their entirety.
Documenting this story of mounted combat in Vietnam was not a one-
manjob. Of the many people who helped, several deserve special thanks.
Lieutenant Colonel George J. Dramis, Jr., director of the task force,
developed the first topical outline, assessed the historical significance of
each bit ofthewealthofinformationavailable, andranthetaskforcefrom
day to day.
The members of the task force, Vietnam veterans with firsthand ex-
perience, whose collective knowledge contributed to the continuity of the
story were armor officers MajorJohn G. Russell, Major Thomas P. Bar-
rett, Captain Robert M. Engeset, CaptainJohn L. Hagar, Captain Gerald
A. McDonald, Captain Maurice B. Parrish, CaptainJeffreyA. Stark, Cap-
tain Clavin Teel, Jr., and Sergeant Major Christopher N. Trammell; in-
fantry officers Captain Robert P. Antoniuc and CaptainJohn Strange;
J.
and Captain Dennis M. Jankowski of the Quartermaster Corps. The con-
tributions ofthe Infantry School, particularly those of Lieutenant Colonel
Wayne T. Boles, were invaluable. Without the good work of the ad-
ministrative staff, Mrs. Pege R. Bailey, administrative assistant, Mrs.
