Armor, May-June 1994 Edition - Fort Benning - U.S. Army

56 Pages·2011·6.61 MB·English

During the last week of May 1944, the coast of But to those veterans who were there, and for
southem England was aswann with 1,627,000 those who remain, it is not a movie. It was -
American soldiers and 53,000 sailors, poised in and still is - real blood, real pain, real fear, and
what General Dwight D. Eisenhower called a real courage that drove the Nazis from their for·
"great human spring, coiled for the moment tified postions along the coast of France. Many
when its energy should be released and it of these old soldiers still carry the physical and
would vault the English Channel in the greatest mental scars from their various roles in the inva
amphibious assault every assembled.n What sion. The ones that saw the most action usually
must it have been like for those troopers, know· say the least - true soldiers are that way -
ing they stood on the threshold of such a mighty they do not glory in death and camage. But if
endeavor? Knowing that the fate of our genera· you ask them, if you catch them on the right
tion rested so heavily upon their shoulders? day, oftentimes they'll tell you about Normandy.
Their tales will begin quite generally, with talk
Where might the world be today ;Ji""< about planning, movement, and
without the bravery and sacritice at ~ execution - all valuable experi-
those soldiers, both U.S. and Allies, ences today's soldier can learn
on that blustery 6th day of June, from. But usually, after a while, their
1944? Would Europe, Africa, and stories will become quite personal,
Asia have known freedom? Would and they will speak gently, some·
European Jews have survived the times in tears, of friends and com·
atrocities of the death camps? Would fascism rades who are now immortal - forever etched
have been contained? Would American soil in their memory by their actions on those critical
have become the next battleground? June days. Some came home, some didn't. But
all are important.
Time often dulls the memory of great events We owe it to those tough, old soldiers to never
the way frequent washing fades our favorite forget what they overcame and what they ac
shirt. The luster disappears, the crispness goes complished. We ought to talk to them more, to tell
away, and we start to take for granted the com· how important they are to us, and last but most
fortable fil. Fifty years after "the longest day, importantly, to thank them. Thank them for our
n
many of us have become comfortable with our freedoms and our security and our beloved na·
freedom. We've allowed the sacrifice of the pre tion. Go find a veteran and shake his hand. Talk
vious generation to slip from our consciousness, to him. Usten to him. Leam from him. How can
and the storming of the beaches al Normandy we as professional soldiers do any less?
becomes, for some of us, just another scene
from a Hollywood movie. - J.O. Brewer
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:
~~<::t. .. ~
GORDON R. SULLIVAN MILTON H. HAMILTON
General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the
Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army
"'"
The Professional Development Bulletin of the Annor Branch PB-17-94-3
Editor-in-Chief
Features
MAJ J. D. BREWER
5 When Tanks Took Winga
Managing Editor
by Colonel Raymond R. Battrean, USA, Ret.
JON T. CLEMENS
7 A Future U.S. Main B.lttleTank For the Year 2010 - A New VIsion
by J.B. Gilvydis
Commandant
MG LARRY R. JORDAN 12 The New MPAT Aound
by Sergeant Rrst Class William Fogg and Staff Sergeant Robert Homer
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published
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bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401
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Disclaimer. The Information contained In 18 Loat Potentlal; Frozen Groupa end Tank Gunnery Performance
ARMOR represents tile professional opinions of by lieutenant Colonel Edward Earl Hampton, Jr.
the alrthol's and does not necessarily reflect the
22 Martdng the BattIefIetd
official Army or TRAOOC position, nor does it
by Major Mike Prevou
change or supersede any information presented
In other of1lcial Army publications. 26 What tf1. .. (How MS might have made a dtffenmce In DESERT STOAM)
Official distribution is limited to one copy lor by David C. Nilseo
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36 The Making of an Ml Tank DrIvttr
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by Csptain Oakland McCulloch
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quarters, reconnaissance squadron head 38 Training CION Combat Skllfa at the Home 01 Armor
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46 Is Wen·Rounded Actually Better?
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includes: all armored, direct·fire ground combat
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May-June 1994, Vol. em No.3 "'..",
New Uses for the Lowly CONEX doesn't quite address the situation. I can the transfer 01 command and control during
Immediately think 01 two situations where a lumps.
Dear Sir: mCOenNtE. X-type syslem may meet the require duTrhineg stehcoosned oIsc ctahsei ounsse wahse ann tehxee rfucinscet ioCnP
The first 01 these Is as a replacement for ality 01 a CP Is desired bul the presence 01
Caplaln Chrislopher Mitchell's article, the Msn found in the AlOC. Mounting the a tracked vehicle Is not. Again, while in
·Convertlng a CONEX Conlalner Inlo a CONEX semi-permanently on a 2.S-lon Germany, we built up a 2.5-100 truck lOt the
BrvTF Comnand Post," (ARMOR, January truck provides only Slightly degraded cross purpose. There were several drawbacks to
February 1994) made me stop and 1hInk, oountIy mobility (beller on hard surfaces), this approach, not the least 01 which was
'Gee, I wish I'd thought of hI." and allows the TF 00fM18IKIef to use the that it tied up a vehicle. To make the shel
CPT Mitchelrs solution Is certainly iMo Msn as a TAC VfIhicIe. While I was an ler rugged enough, we built a framewor1l: 01
valive and comprehensive. I'm sure that S3(Air) with 1-68 Armor (Wildf\ecken), we welded 3-flch pipe, to which we then ai
many readers are already thinking 01 ways had the luxury 01 an extra MS77 which we tached plywood panels. (We also lound
to apply this solution to other problems used in this role. Having a duplicate 53 some liberglass Insulation laying around.
typically found in the field when the MTOE command POSI vehicle greatly enhanced so we fully Insulated the shetter as well. II
(Note: Fort Knox Defcnse SwilCh NClwon. (DSN)
DIRECTORY - Points of Contact ~fix is 464. Commcn:ial prefIX is Ala COIk .502-
624-XXXX).
u.s.
ARMOR Editorial Offices ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL
Editor-in-Chier Commandant (ATZK·CG)
Major J. D. Brewer 2249 MG Larry R. Jordan 2121
Managing Editor
Assistant Commandant (ATSB·AC)
Jon T. Clemens 2249
BG Lon E. Maggan 7555
Editorial Assistant
Vivian Thompson 2610 Chie.r or Staff, Armor School (ATSB·OAS)
Production Assistant COL John C. Johnston 1050
Mary Hager 2610
Command Sergeant Major
Contributing Artist
CSM Ronnie W_ Davis 4952
SPC Jody Hannon 2610
Armor School Sergeant Major
MAD...ING ADDRESS: ARMOR: ATTN: ATZK-PTD, Fort CSM Henry F. Hurley 5405
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16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB·SBZ)
COL Richard W. Rock 7848
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2 ARMOR - May-June 1994
quickly gained the nickname 'S3 Winne VII Corps' screening lorce. In contrast, say this, and undoubtedly runs \he risk of
bago.") While the resulting shelter worked Bradley-pure divisional cavalry was liable to belng blacklisted or barred from Fiddler's
great, we could not dismount it easily. A rapid mauling, and required rapid relief by Green by his Armor counterparts. Ah - but
CONEX would have given us that flexibility. Ml battalions once they had contacted the the truth will out - so here goesl
Enhancements to the field tralns CONex enemy. From battalions up to divisions, As a branch, we have been flirting With
command posl may make It even more commanders chose 10 pull back their extinction, or at least significant modifica
llexible, requiring minimal expense. One of Bradley-equipped scouts and tead with tion 01 our utility, for a long time. Why, you
these might be permanent mounting on a tanks because they knew that the Bradleys ask? In just plain cajun - it's because we
low trailer, which would still require a prime would die where tanks could absorb pun are too heavy, cost too much to operate,
mover (the HHC commander or ISG ishment. counterpunch, and prevail. and can't really participate in a force pro
HMMWV come to mind), but would not oc We could have won the war without MIs, jection strategy because we cannot rapidly
cupy valuable cargo space in a truck bed. but I submit that there is no need to win deployl
Further, lifting eyes on the CONEX would wars by the slimmest of possible margins As Major Spurgeon and Mr, Crist point
allow it to be sling loaded and moved by when it Is overwhelming firepower and pr0- out, I hope the next Jerk like Saddam
helicopter for those operations where a tection that allow us to win at the lowest Hussein cuts us enoogh slack to give us
rigid wall shelter is desired but a wheeled possible cost. Casualties are arguably the the lime needed to deploy the significant
or tracked vehicle Is inapproptiate. Installa American center 01 gravity in any operation amount of iron we used In DESERT
tion of permanent antenna mounts would (for political and public support reasons), STORM, But I wouldn't bet on itl We've got
promole rapid setup and tear-down. as the situation In Somalia seems to vali to get there quick and we've got to have
long-term use of a CONEX in the CP date. The tragic inability to rescue the mis the equipment and operational techniques
role will require modifications such as wir fired Ranger mission on October 3, 1993, that allow us to do the deed when we get
ing lor lights and power, radios and anten due to a lack of armored vehicles, Indicates there. Insofar as the latlef, I think we're in
nas, and ventilation, Safety considerations that even in theoretically humanitarian 0p pretty good shape.
erations there is a case to be made for
such as secondary egress must be ad heavy armored support. We used to have this thing called a m0-
dressed. light discipline is another area of torized division - the 9th Infantry Division
concern. Improvements are limited only by My second problem is that I don't believe (Motorized). Designed as a middleweight,
our imaginations, however. that helicopters and ground vehicles can be and structured at the brigade level, in a
As a former HHC commander myself (1- integrated into the same platoons in the lashlon strongly reminiscent of the old regJ.
63 Armor [OPFOR)), I recognize the chal near Mure, if ever. This is not an issue of mental combat teams, the division Initially
lenge of providing adequate resources to inexperienced leaders at that level, but used the Improved TOW Vehicle (lTV) and
the field trains. CPT Mitchell answers the rather the radically dissimilar nature 01 helJ. then the HMMWV TOW as its pivotal
problems of secondary or support com copters and ground vehicles. While ground weapons plalfonn. Ahh - you say, there it
mand posts at minimal expense, I con vehicles oa::upy space and have suppties is - any self-respecting, strapped, Dehner
gratulate him on his efforts. pushed 10IWard to them, helicopters only tanker boot-wearing real man knows that
temporarily "borrow" space between trips you ain't gonna kill nothing with a HMM'NV
back to refueling and rearming positions. TOW, To which I reply, although certainly
MARK L KIMMEY The notional multi-role platoon would be at not ideal, I would ask that you check the
CPT, Armor, USAR only half strength much 01 the time, and results 01 at least three brigade combat
Norristown, Pa. the poor lieutenant would have to keep team rotations at our training Super Bowl
track 01 helicopter support elements far to - the NTC.
his rear. A better way to incorporate Spur
Casualties: "The American geon and Crisfs recommendations would Although memory fades (and we have the
Center of Gravity" baeir o10p eerxaptiloonres dpouwshnin tgo clooworedri nleavteedls .g Brouut nldo r tIe tnhdinekn cay c tuor soonryly rreevmieewm wbiell r sthhoe wg othoadt sthtuefsf)e,
brigades amassed the following impressive
rational and efficient use of resources, their
Dear Sir: platform-specific support requirements results:
should remain segregated Into separate • A consistent operational ready rate of
units which can meet these needs more ef 95%.
"Armor in the 21st Century" by MAJ
Harold Spurgeon and Stanley Crist (AR fectively. • A "kill ratio- against one helluva tough
OPFOR in T-ns and BMPs which ran 30-
MOR, January-February 1994) is a timely These quibbles aside, the authors cor
40% higher than the normal heavy brigade
reminder that the Army needs 10 be ag rectly Identify the need to develop rapidly
rotation,
gressively foaJsed on the battlefield of the deployable armored forces closely inte
• Records (which may stiU exist) for \he
future. Its recommendations of greater af grated with attack helicopters as a primary
best battalion and brigade kill percentage
mor air deployability in the force projection means to meet and dominate the battle
against the OPFOR - both in individual
Army and the greater integration 01 Army fields of the Mure.
battles and for the entire rotation.
aviation into future operations afe well
taken. However, there are two points with I could go on, but suffice It to say that
which I disagree. DAVID NILSEN alter the OPFOR got over their giggles
Bloomington, III. about "those non-survivable" HMMWV
The first is the assertion that DESERT
TOWs (that took the first battle) - they re
STORM could have been fought without
the M1. Fought, yes, but not as success Another Look at the alized that this mounted motorized force
was for real. During the final After Action
fully, not as rapidly, and most 01 all, not Motorized Division
Reviews lor each brigade rotation, a com
with limited casualties, Because of bad
mon theme was, "Va'il done good, but
weather including shams/s, attack helicop
lers were frequently unavailable during \he Dear Sir: you'd really be hot stuff with an AGS ... •
WAITOUTI
heavy fighting between VII Corps and the
I don't want to indicate that we've been a
Republican Guard on February 26 and 27, The recent flurry 01 activity about the Ar lillie slow about the acquisition of an AGS,
and American forces without MIs would mored Gun System (AGS), as well as Ma but both the current Chief of Staff 01 the
have suffered fearful casualties had they jor Spurgeon and Mr, Crist's article in the Army and I had hair when we first commit
attempted to lorce a decisive engagmenl. January-February issue, is invigorating stuff ted ourselves 10 it. We are both now folll
It was the M1 s present with the 2d ACR for the Armor community, A former tank cally-challenged! Folks, we clearly got to
that allowed that unit to persevere in its battalion commander and Second Armored
mission to fix the Republican Guard as the Regimental Cavalry 53 probably shouldn't Continued on Page 50
ARMOR - May-June 1994 3
MG Larry R. Jordan
Commanding General
U.S. Anny Annor Center
Information Age Dawns
At 1994 Armor Conference
This year's Annor Conference dif lying question could be whether this menl, small unit doctrine and TIP,
fered from previous ones in signifi approach runs counter to the concept and professional development.
cant aspects. The intent was to im of branch. lnleresLingly. the same
merse the participants in the world of questions were asked during the Char· TIle traditional role and concept of
virtual reality training and the digit fee Era as the established branches of branch meld neatly into the renewed
ized battlefield of Force XXI - the Cavalry, Infantry. and Artillery tended emphasis of the mounted. combined
Army of the 21st Century. to view the new Mechanized Force, arms team. TIle evolution of our over·
and later Armored Forces. as competi arching doctrine contained in the lat
To accomplish this immersion. key
presentations were supplemented by loB. est FM 100-5. O~ratjOltS, provides
the framework. TIle concept of Battle
placing attendees on the future digit
TIle current Annor Branch. and the Dynamics - areas where battle is
ized battlefield through multimedia
Armor and Cavalry Force it repre· changing - provides the vehicles.
and distributed simulation repre
senls, were bom of the concept of TIle Battle Dynamics of Battle Space
sentations. This was followed by ex
combined arms. Our focus on the en and Battle Command, in particular.
tensive hands-on participation in vari
tire mounted. combined anns team is help us focus on the entire Mounted
ous training exercises using virtual
and live equipment. The goal was to not new - it is fundamenla1 to the Force as the central feature of our m0-
way we do business. In creating the bile warfighting capability. They also
provide the force with the opportunity
flfSt American armored divisions. led to the establishment of the
to see. touch. and experience the
Chaffee described them as "a bal Mounted Warfighting Battle labora
power of the Information Age as it
anced fighting team of combat anns tory. TRADOC's agent for preparing
applies to the business of warfighting.
and service units all of equal impor the mounted portions of Force XXI.
1be message presented was that Force
tance and equal prestige."
XXI is about using advanced technol
ogy. innovative organizations, and re As Director of the MWBL. I serve
fined doctrine and training to produce Given that we organize. train, and as the "Integrator of the Mounted
commanders better able to practice fight as combined anus teams, one Combined Anns Team," just as my
the art of battlc command with more might ask., "What is the relevance of counterpart at Fort Benning integrates
capable, agiJe, and versatile units. branch?" While we seldom operate as the team - including mounted ele
Another way the Armor Conference ~ elements of any branch. branches ments - playing in the Dismounted
are and will remain both relevant and Baulespace arena. Battle Lab Direc
differed was the focus on fundamenla1
essential. TIley in many ways are the lOB carry a broader. more universal
change across the entire Mounted
"professionaJ glue of our business - responsibility along with their branch
Force. rather than a more narrow view
the embodiment of the history. tradi proponency roles. They, in essence,
of Annor and Cavalry.
tions. and values of our portion of the become proponents for that entire por
Some might question why the tradi· profession." The branch structure and tion of the battlefield falling under
tional focus of the Annor Conference proponent system contribute to effec their respective Battle Dynamic. The
was diverted 10 a more general discus- tive personnel policy, individual train focus of the Armor Conference
sion of "Mounted Forces." An under· ing, combat and materiel develop- merely ref]ected this reality.
4 ARMOR - May-June 1994
-.-
When Tanks Took Wings
'-
Seventeen combat-loaded M41A3s.
with their Vietnamese crew aboard.
flew into battle 28 years ago.
by Colonel Raymond R. Battreall, U.S. Army. Retired
Author's Nole: I'm writing to relate operations against the enemy ceased, His intentions. however, were not
a historical milepost for Armor which and the division began moving south known to Military Assistance Com
could not be told before because the against the I Corps headquarters in Da mand. Vietnam (MACV) HQ because
State Depart~nt disowned u.s at a Nang. There was considerable anxiety the Senior Corps Advisor, Marine
rather high level of classification. Suf that the corps HQ might join the mu LTG Lewis Walt. had restricted all
ficitmt years hove passed, however, tiny, for the commander and several advisors to their biliets. His intent was
toot everything has long since been key staff officers were Buddhists. to avoid U.S. involvement on both
automatically downgraded A routine Organic to the ARVN I ID was the sides of the mutiny. (During the fall
notice of this historic movement - 7th ARVN Cavalry whose com of 1965, during an uprising of Mon
rouline at least from the Air Force's mander wanted no part of the mutiny. tagnard tribesmen, U.S. Special
point of view - apINors in the USAF But he realized that. no matter how it Forces advisors found themselves fac
operational history of the Vietnam came out in the end. he and his squad ing Government Troops advised by
era. ron would still have to work with the other U.S. Anny trainers.)
division. He therefore obeyed the or
Walt's order resulted in the loss of
der to march on Da Nang with his
all communications with the units in
From March into May of 1966 the three anTlored cavalry assault troops
volved. MACV was, therefore, very
Buddhist chaplains of the Anny of the and one troop of M41A3. 76-mm gun
much concerned about the armor
Republic of Vietnam's (ARVN) crack "Walker Bulldog" light tanks. 8U1 he
threat to Da Nang.
1st Infantry Division incited their seized every excuse to delay his
troops to open mutiny against what movemen! and, in fact. avoided any 4th ARVN Cay, headquartered just
was perceived to be the Catholic contact with troops loyal to the gov outside Da Nang. also wanted to re
dominated government in Saigon. All ernment. main loyal but was faced with the
ARMOR - May-June 1994 5
same dilemma of not knowing thought a brand-new LTC (I
which way the corps HQ would had barely five months in grade
go. Its commander literally re· at the time.) could marshal one
fused to answer either the tele· fourth of the world-wide USAF
phone or radio from corps, inventory of C·133s and get
thereby evading the need to take every waiver in the book with
sides. Meanwhile, Prime Minis out considerable help from
ter Ky had dispatched three VN much higher pay grades. None
Marine battalions to Da Nang theless, we had accomplished
by sea and was worrying about the first combat-operational air
how to counter the annor threat lift of tanks in the history of
given 4th Cav's uncertain status. warfare. Oh, sure, we had flown
He hit upon the idea of sending empty tanks once around the
1st Troop (M4IA3), 5th ARVN airfield to prove we could do it
Cav from Xuan Loc in ID Corps to ity." I explained that the weight of the on Strategic Anny Corps (STRAC,
Da Nang. The only way to get it there crew was included in the weight of FORSCOM's predecessor) mobility
in time was to airlift it, so he c31led the tank J'd given him, and he replied, exercises; and we'd flown empty
upon MACV for help. "Well then, Sir, I guess they'd better tanks over oceans when the delivery
ride in their tanks." And that's exactly priority was high enough. But never
As Senior Advisor, Republic of Vi
what they did! before had we flown combat-loaded
etnam (RVNAF) Annor Command, I
tanks with crews ready to go into ac
can only speculate as to how high up I admit to worrying as the first plane
tion on arrival at the other end. And
the chain the decision was made, but waddled out to the runway and to
that is just what 115 ARVN Cav did!
one day in April, I received instruc holding my breath as it started its
11le M41s shown on TV clearing the
tions from MAC 13 (MG William De takeoff roll, but it broke ground
ca, streets of Da Nang of mutinous ele
Puy, later TRADOC) to supervise smoothly and disappeared to the
ments were theirs.
the loading of 115 Troop aboard four north. We loaded the remaining air
USAF C-I33s at Tan Son Nhut Air craft. By the time the last was ready I never did answer Secretary Rusk's
base, I learned that the C·133 was, in to go, the first had returned from Da message, though 1 suppose somebody
fact, a "stretch" C-I30 with a length Nang for a second load. Each plane did. Its classification and political sen
ened fuselage. Its internal dimensions flew two sorties, and one flew a third sitivity were such, however, that I felt
could accommodate two M41s if we to deliver the seventeenth tank. Just as constrained not to report this historic
could get them inside without tearing this last tank was loading at around event at the time. But 28 years have
the plane apart and if we could keep midnight, a USAF sergeant tapped me passed, and it's about time for the ar
the load balanced. We would have on the elbow and asked if I was Colo mor community to learn what hap
only 1,14-inch clearance on each side! nel Battreall. He then handed me a pened.
TWX message which I read by flash
When the fully combat-loaded tanks light.
(fuel, ammo, rations, and crew indi
It was addressed to me by name Coronel Raymond A. Battre·
vidual gear) met the aircraft, I gave
from the State Department in Wash all, (Ret.), was commissioned
the U.S. loadmaster their weight from
ington and read, "You are interfering in Cavalry from West Point in
the vehicle's tech manual. He labored
in domestic politics. Cease and desist 1949 and served in the 14th,
with a slide rule and then told me
forthwith." It was signed "Rusk." For 11 th, and 3d ACRs and 1s l
where to place them inside. Having
a split second I contemplated a reply,
learned long before that the best way Cav Div. He was Senior Advi·
asking the Secretary just what he
to load annor on a train was for the sor to the 4th ARVN Cav from
thought we'd been doing all aJong,
officers to lead the way to the loading May to Nov 65; Senior Advi·
but discretion prevailed. Thinking of
dock and then get out of the way sor, Republic of Viet Nam
Gen. Patton's reaction when ordered
while the sergeants and drivers did Armed Forces (RVNAF) Ar·
not to seize Palenno during World
their thing, I gave the word to the War n, I said, "Sarge, you didn't find mor Command from Nov 65
AR VN platoon sergeants and stood
me out here in 311 this darkness, noise, to May 66 and again from
back to watch. Everything went
and confusion, did you?" He thought Aug 70 to Apr 72. He also
slowly but smoothly as each tank
briefly and replied, "No, Sir, I guess I commanded 3d Sqdn, 3d
backed into the plane. This having
didn't." I told him to return to his of· ACR in 67-68; served as SJS,
been done and the tanks tied down, I
fice and I would be in to accept the SOUTH COM and Deputy
asked the loadmaster where he wanted
message shortly. I waited until the last
the crews to sit. He replied in horror, Chief, U.S. Military Training
flight broke ground and then acknow
"My God, Sir, we can't take the Mission, Saudi Arabia; and
ledged receipt.
crews. We already have waivers for completed his service as Dj·
wing load and floor load, and besides I recall wondering how Dean Rusk rector of Armor Doctrine,
they'd screw up my center of grav- got my name and marveling that he USAARMS, Ft. Knox, in 7a.79.
6 ARMOR - May"/une 1994
A Future U.S. Main Battle Tank
For the Year 2010 - A New Vision
by J.B. Gllvydis
Introduction
The U.S. lank design community,
looking toward the lank of the year
2010. is following two parallel path
ways, one conventional and the other
electrical.
These paths will explore nOI only
improvements of present tank tech
nologies, but the development of new
technologies which are essential for
laying a sound foundation for the lank
of the year 2010. But why two path
ways; why nOI just one? There is a
reason: the all-electric tank is consid
ered a very high-risk proposition that
may nOl materialize. But that does not
mean we should abandon it outright.
"One should not think of a tank as some kind of a ton-weight entity,
We should try to approach it with a
which unfortunately is the "in" thing to do today. A tank is not just any
well prepared and coordinated plan.
vehicle carrying a tank gun."
The all-eleclric tank, of course, is
not a new idea. Many people worked force. The tank that will be a member The Threat
on it in the past Unfortunately, there of that force is also projected to be
has been a lack of progress in the much smaller and lighter in compari The threat date against which its re
electric armament and high-power son with its oversized and overweight quirements should be written, how
electric storage technologies. A new counterparts of today. The weight goal ever, is nOI the year 20 I 0, as most
method will have to be devised and is 50 tons. Of course, this does not people would falsely assume, but
followed with the emphasis on coordi mean that the future tank could not 2010 plus a number of years repre
nation and seriousness. tum out to be much lighter or much senting its life. Thus, for a bare mini
We certainly cannot discount the heavier than 50 Ions. It all will de mum 10-year life. the threat date
possibility that someday. somewhere. pend on how successfully the required would be 2020. More realistically. it
technologies can be developed.
someone will be successful in this en should be a 20-year life with a threat
deavor. If so. it could bring us a very Of course, our primary objective date of 2030. For argument's sake, let
big pay-off. It is well worth trying. will be to hold and preserve the three us say it is 2020. Even this date
main tank characteristics that distin would be a shock to most people who
We also should proceed with contin- guish it from other combat vehicles are accustomed to equating threat
ued development of conventional dates with the date of a tank's intro
- firepower, survivability and mobil
technologies. This approach still leads ity. One should not think of a tank as duction. It is time to change and be
to many exceptional improvements responsible. It is proposed thai for the
some kind of a ton-weight entity.
and is a proven, low-risk path. It can which unfortunately is the "in" thing year 2010 tank. the Ihreat date of
also serve as a fall-back position. We
to do today. A lank is not just any ve 2020 be set as a minimum (2030
certainly should never put all our eggs would be preferred).
hicle canying a tank gun. Thai would
into one basket. There is too much at
stake. too much to lose. not require any great preparation. There will be people saying that it is
What we are talking about here is a impossible to project what the threat
For the future, we are planning a different kind of beast - a true main might be around the year 2020, much
light and highly mobile U.S. combat battle tank for the year 20 I O. less for the year 2030. Let us not lis-
ARMOR - May-June 1994 7
ten to them; it is possible to project as the future conventional system. In VertkaJ Threat Top-attack protec
the threat accurately for the year addition, an efficient energy storage tion is required against the vertical
2020. There is no reason why it can system will be required. along with threat. be it a missile or a bomblet.
not be done. the switches. contacts, cables. heat guided or dumb. using a shaped
dissipation systems, etc. that are pan charge jet or an EFP (Explosively
To develop a successful tank for the
of the EM gun system. Formed Projectile). Presently. it is
year 20 I 0, we will require a major
stipulated that if a special counter
upgrade of some of our present tank
measure (CM) package (smoke gre
subsystems. plus new technology de
Protection nades, jammers. etc.) is used on the
velopments. Here is the main list of
vehicle. its top allack protection could
those subsystems:
be drastica1ly reduced both in armor
Horizontal Threat. If development
thickness and density. The CM pack
follows tradition. and there is no rea
age will have to counter all kinds of
son to believe it will not. threat KE
Firepower guided top-auack munitions by using
penetration can be expected to be at
techniques such as jamming their
least as good as ours. And in the years
By the year 2020, we can expect guidance. misdirection. smoke cover.
2010 to 2020 and beyond that could
that threat tank protection will im etc. It prevents guided munitions from
amount to a substantia1 penetration.
prove by a minimum of 50 percent hitting their targets. Only the dumb
To counter it. we will need armor with
over the present 1'8OU capabilities. A munitions sneak through its cover of
at least a 1000percent improvement in
lOO-percent would noc: be a surprise. protection and are not affected. Pres
protection over what we presently
To deal successfully with these pro ently there is no countermeasure
have in the frontal turret armor of the
jected increases, we will require a KE against dumb munitions. They are free
MIA!. This will be a must. So. the
round with twice the penetration capa to hit their targets. Of course. the
armor will have to be light in com
bility of the M829A2 penetcator. and probability of dumb bomblets hitting a
parison with what we have today. This
target is very low. but when high
implies the armor should have mass
numbers of them are launched over a
efficiencies in the range of 4 to 6
-... We will require a KE against KE penetrators. and it should suspected target. some will hit. They
round with twice the penetra work against all the penetrators - all do constitute a threat.
tion capability of the M829A2 shapes and sizes - and not just some Presently. the top annor (applique)
penetrator, and we do not specific ones as it is customary today. weight distributions for vehicles with
have anything like that...· This is a tall order. But. this is what CM systems implies that dumb born
we must have if we want a survivable blets do not penetrate much. that they
tank in the year 2010. do not amount to much as a threal
we do not have anything like that. This is questionable. In the last De
either in our arsena1 or on our draw This same annor, possibly with an fendory Exhibition held in Athens,
ing boards. Our latest gun systems in additiona1 applique in the form of re Greece, October 6-10. 1992. the Rus·
development. the ATAC (XM29I) and active armor or something new. sians were selling dumb anti-tank
the high pressure 120mm (XM302). should a1so withstand a shaped charge bomblets (PTAB-IM) that penetrate
will not be adequate either. We will (SC) attack on the order of approxi 210mm (approximately 8.25 inches)
need a new and a much more power mately twice the Hellflre capability. of RHA. This is a tremendous pene
ful system. Against this threat, its mass efficiency tration capability and CM systems do
should be in the order of 6 to 10. not counter them; at least not yel.
For the conventiona1 system, we'll
require a new gun. either a brand new
This integraJ armor. designed against It is highly recommended that lOp
design or an upgrade of an existing
both the KE and SC threat munitions. attack protection with its CMs be
system. With it we'll need a new KE
might not be possible using our exist evaluated in light of these new devel
round capable of twice the penetration
ing technologies. It may require radi opments and CQrTCCtive action be in
of the M829A2. It should be relatively
ca1 new thinking and new innovations. stituted in how to deal effectively
light and compact.
It should be of modular design. It a1so with this potential dumb threat. We
For the electrical system, there is a should be designed for both the fron need better methods to deal with it.
requirement for an EM gun, be it a tal and side applications. for both the
rail. coil, or any kind of an electro hull and the turret. The side armors Mines. Presently, there exists a large
chemical hybrid. it should be rela should defeat defined threats within a variety of "bottom" threats. They are
tively companlble in weight and size customary 6O-degree frontal arc. It land mines with various defeat
to existing gun systems. It should be a1so should have design variations for mechanisms (blast, SC jet. EFP. etc.)
reliable and cost-efficient. It should a lesser arc. such as 40 and 20 de· made of various materials (metals.
have the same penetration requirement grees. for trade-off purposes. plastics, etc.) and having various sens-
8 ARMOR - May-June 1994