ARMOR JanFeb2007 Covers.indd

56 Pages·2006·2.56 MB·English

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-07-1
Editor in Chief Features
LTC SHANE E. LEE
7 Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale
for U.S. Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction
Managing Editor by Captain Daniel Helmer
CHRISTY BOURGEOIS 12 Lebanon 2006: Did Merkava Challenge Its Match?
by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Retired
Commandant 15 Teaching and Learning Counterinsurgency
MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS at the Armor Captains Career Course
by Major John Grantz and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl
18 The Challenge of Leadership
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- during the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations
month l y by the U.S. Army Armor Center, by Major Jon Dunn
ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th
Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. 20 Building for the Future: Combined Arms Offi cers
by Captain Chad Foster
Disclaimer: The information contained in AR-
MOR represents the professional opinions of 23 The Battalion Chaplain: A Combat Multiplier
the authors and does not necessarily reflect by Chaplain (Captain) David Fell
the official Army or TRADOC position, nor
26 Practical Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection
does it change or supersede any information
by Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri,
presented in other official Army publications.
Lieutenant Commander J ohn A. Cardillo, and Major William M. Stowe III
Official distribution is limited to one copy for
each armored brigade headquarters, arm ored 35 Integrating Cultural Sensitivity into Combat Operations
cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battal- by Major Mark S. Leslie
ion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron
39 Advice from a Former Military Transition Team Advisor
head quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-
by Major Jeff Weinhofer
quar ters, armored cavalry troop, armor com-
pany, and motorized brigade headquarters of 42 Arab Culture and History: Understanding is the First Key to Success
the United States Army. In addition, Army li- by Captain Ralph E. Elder
braries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and
MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for 45 Armor Advances Worldwide
armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, by Professor Richard M. Ogorkiewicz
organizations, and the training of personnel
48 Future of Armor
for such organizations may request two copi es
by Captain Brian William Bradley
by sending a request to the editor in chief.
Reprinted from the November-December 1966 issue of ARMOR
Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only
53 Army Seeks Recommendations for MCOE Patch, Crest, and Motto
those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor
Center has proponency. That proponenc y in- 54 Mounted ManeuverNet
cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat
systems that do not serve primarily as infantry Departments
carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these
systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; 2 Contacts
any miscellaneous items of equipment which 3 Letters
armor and armored cavalry organizations use 4 Commander’s Hatch
exclusively; training for all 19-series officers 5 Driver’s Seat
and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers;
6 1st Armor Training Brigade
and information concerning the training, logis-
The Evolution of Land Mine Warfare Training for IET Soldiers
tics, history, and leadership of armor and ar-
by Captain Daniel Trost
mored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment
50 Reviews
level and below, to include Threat units at
those levels.
Material may be reprinted, provided credit is
given to ARMOR and to the author, except
where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offi ces. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor,
ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
January-February 2007, Vol. CXVI, No. 1 USPS 467-970
“From My Position...”
“The training of troops when intelligently directed is the greatest In his article, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for
of morale builders, as they are quick to sense that they are being U.S. Forces on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction,” Captain
prepared to meet effectively any emergency that may arise.” Dan Helmer describes an Israeli army that entered Lebanon as a
highly effective low-intensity conflict force. Its soldiers were highly
— Major General John A. Lejeune
proficient at conducting raids, fixed-site security, and cordon and
Reminiscences of a Marine, 1929
search missions, among others. This proficiency, however, came
with a price. For a number of seemingly valid reasons, many ar-
The armor force’s participation in the long war has forced it to mored units were unable to maintain their proficiency in tank gun-
quickly adapt institutional and unit training so that tankers and nery and combined arms maneuver. As a result, what began as a
cavalrymen can more effectively meet the daily emergencies Gen- fairly straightforward mission to seize key terrain quickly became
eral Lejeune referred to. Soldiers departing the Armor School an exercise in casualty evacuation, vehicle recovery, and improvi-
for operational tours leave Fort Knox with a much wider and, in sation.
some cases, a much deeper understanding of the critical skills
necessary for them to succeed on today’s battlefields than was Most military professionals understand that the U.S. Army has
the case just a few years ago. Understandably, unit training has been very successful in conducting counterinsurgency operations.
focused specifically on the unique challenges awaiting soldiers in Although many of these successes are very controversial by mod-
theater. As a result, some of the combat skills we took for granted ern standards, they nevertheless are helpful in understanding the
just a few years ago are not as sharp today as they once were. current conflict. The U.S. Army’s successful campaign in the Phil-
ippines at the turn of the century is one of those history lessons that
To put this situation in perspective, some of our tank companies we cannot afford to ignore simply because of some uncomfortable
and cavalry troops will soon be commanded by captains who have truths associated with the conflict. As professionals, we must learn
never participated in company-level maneuvers. Some of our tank to apply lessons that transcend time while avoiding the heavy-
crews will be led by staff sergeants with only limited experience handed excesses of the past. In their article, “Practical Lessons
with Tank Tables VIII through XII, and vague memories of their last from the Philippine Insurrection,” Lieutenant Colonel Jayson Altieri,
mounted combined-arms live-fire exercise. In the short term, this Lieutenant Commander John Cardillo, and Major William Stowe III
situation is manageable because enough institutional knowledge provide us with a large list of valuable lessons gleaned from one
currently exists within the force to properly address any near-fu- of our first overseas experiences with counterinsurgency.
ture contingencies. Over time, however, the armor force could be-
gin to lose its proficiency in the core competencies that define the Balance is the key to providing our soldiers with the means to ef-
unique contributions we bring to the fight. fectively meet the complex emergencies they will face today and
the unpredictable emergencies of tomorrow. We can neither com-
Some could argue that given our opponent’s limited capabilities, pletely abandon the hard-won lessons of our experience with coun-
we really do not need to be as proficient in these skills as once terinsurgency in favor of dealing with a conventional threat, nor
thought necessary to prevail in a high-intensity conflict. After all, can we allow core “kinetic” competencies to completely atrophy in
we have yet to encounter an enemy who can match our firepower, an effort to defeat current irregular enemies. The intent of both of
technology, training, or leadership. What happens though when we these articles and others included in this issue is to provide a small
encounter a highly trained, disciplined, and well-led, but no less portion of the common intellectual basis necessary to begin the dis-
asymmetric, enemy? Although many initial spot reports turn out to cussion that must occur if we are to strike the proper training bal-
be false, it appears that the Israeli army encountered this unnerv- ance; future success depends on the outcome of this discussion.
ing situation during its most recent combat operations in Lebanon
this past summer. S.E. LEE
By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
Administrative Assistant to the
General, United States Army
Secretary of the Army
Chief of Staff
0630303
Points of Contact
DSN prefix – 464-
Commercial prefix– (502) 624-
ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center
Editor in Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG)
LTC Shane E. Lee 4087 MG Robert M. Williams 2121
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Managing Editor Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG)
Christy Bourgeois 4582 BG Michael S. Tucker 7555
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Editor Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS)
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Editorial Assistant Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM)
Kathy A. Johnson 2249 CSM Raymond Chandler 7091
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Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA)
COL Marlin Levendoski 1315
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ing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or print-
ed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, Rich Text Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development
Format, or ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or COL Richard G. Piscal (ATZK-TD)
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publication by, other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle
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COL Alan Mosher 4009
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If you use Power Point for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of ex- Aubrey Henley 5155
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Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (ATZK-UA)
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es, and delivery problems, or for awards in format ion, con tact Con-
Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS)
nie Stiggers or Connie McMillen, United States Armor Association,
MAJ Bryan Salyers 3519
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E-mail: [email protected]
phone [phone]; or FAX [phone]. You can also access the
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lems or changes of unit address, e-mail us at [email protected].
mil; phone DSN 464-2249, com mercial [phone]; or FAX DSN Director of the Armor School (ATZK-DAS)
464-5039, commercial [phone]. Requests to be added to the of- COL Robert Valdivia 1050
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itor in Chief.
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EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, COL Peter D. Utley 8736
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16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ)
ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine web site
COL Robert R. Naething 7848
at www.knox.army.mil/armormag.
E-mail: [email protected]
ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24- NCO Academy (ATZK-NC)
hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, CSM Samuel Wilson 5150
training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force. E-mail: [email protected]
2 — January-February 2007
Loss of Hetz Due to Political Restrictions The IDF commanders were limited by Sha- erally light force based around the M1114 and
ron’s military initiatives, which (for political pur- the Stryker family of vehicles, and trained to
Dear ARMOR,
poses) were obscure. Loss of air cover was de- conduct primarily anti-insurgency operations
Mr. Warford’s article, “The Secret Testing of cisive and unlike the war in 1973, where ag- while continually deployed. The Army National
M111 “Hetz” Ammunition: A Model of Failed gressive ground action led by Sharon across Guard should be reconfigured as the primary
Commander’s Responsibility,” which appeared the canal neutralized SAM batteries, Syria’s air heavy force, based on Abrams tanks, Bradley
in the September-October 2006 issue, is chal- defense artillery was defeated by successful fighting vehicles, and field artillery platforms,
lenged by some Israeli officers and writers. The Israeli Air Force countermeasures. and trained to break nations and destroy mass
opposition proposes the loss of Hetz was a enemy forces as the national strategic fist. The
I do not believe Sulton Yakoub serves the pur-
negative result ensuing from political restric- Army Reserve should be reset as the support
pose of your essay; the battle on the Dama-
tions; specifically, restrictions placed on the component, trained to rebuild places deemed
sus/Beirut Highway is closer to the parameters
field commander’s knowledge of the battle worthy of rebuilding, and for low-density skills
of your paradigm.
tempo and objectives and resulting action at heavily required for occasional operations.
Sultan Yakoub. TERRY M. STAUB We are engaged in a GWOT that will boil and
The 362d Battalion was a reserve unit, ac- cool (much like the Cold War) over the next 30
companied by younger orthodox infantry “draft- Future Force Structure Completely Wrong to 40 years, toppling a dictator here, blowing up
ees.” They were not expecting to run or literally some infrastructure there, and covertly whack-
lager in the midst of an entire Syrian armored ing key bad guys hither and yon. Sometimes
Dear ARMOR,
division. it may require heavy mechanized forces to to-
The fundamental force structure of the U.S. tally break a country. Other times, it will be a
Air support was unavailable; at that stage Army in the Active, National Guard, and Re- few bombs or individual bullets. The number of
of development, surface-to-air-missile (SAM) serve Components is completely wrong for the young Americans desiring to be forward-de-
batteries nullified Israeli Air Force support to current 40-year war against non-state terror- ployed warriors on this long-term basis is fi-
ground operations. The disengagement of the ism. And nothing in the current brigade-based nite, certainly not enough to sustain the current
362d was a miracle in itself made possible by transformation process will fix it. mobilization tempo of all three components.
curtains of artillery protecting the withdrawing
column’s flanks. Movement in daylight before At their heart, U.S. Army ground forces are The current war in Iraq notwithstanding, the
the withdrawal was nearly impossible as a sin- still designed to defeat large, mechanized, en- GWOT will not typically require mass forma-
gle person could draw multiple rocket rounds. emy elements through the use of maneuver, tions of M1s, M2s, and cannons. The Active
The night action was fought hand-to-hand with shock, and firepower. They are not fundamen- Duty warrior should reflect this with training and
Syrian commanders. tally designed to defeat an insurgency and win skills as a street-walking, door-knocking, lan-
the hearts and minds of a terrorized local pop- guage-talking, anti-insurgency soldier. The Ac-
The tempo of the battle’s daily objectives was ulace. Further, the operational tempo of this tive Duty soldier should expect a career that
fed piecemeal once the Israeli Defense Forces Global War on Terror (GWOT) is rapidly dete- sees him off to land on foreign shores again
(IDF) gained the Litani River. Some suggest riorating the entire U.S. Army’s force structure and again throughout his career; sometimes
Sharon manipulated the events to invest Bei- skills and recruitment focus. We are not struc- for a few days and sometimes for more than a
rut a “fait accompli,” allowing Begin deniability, tured or training for the current fight and no year at a time. This soldier should enlist with the
and immobilize a cabinet that may have disap- longer offer the soldier any real choice among understanding that the Army of the 1980s and
proved. The IDF was also more intent on re- components. 1990s, and its normal civilian lifestyle, except
covering two soldiers missing in action who with guns and gear, is a thing of the past, and
belonged to the tank on display; their corpses Bottom-line: the U.S. Army Active Component he will be out the door and all over the world as
were returned in 2003. should be rebuilt, from the ground up, as a gen- a light, expeditionary ground-pounder, with his
M1114 and Stryker to move him around and
provide firepower. This Active Army will more
reflect the expeditionary forces of the British
2007 Armor Warfighting Symposium Empire of the late 1800s, forward based around
the world, and ready to move, shoot, and com-
Armor: Strong Today — Strong Tomorrow
municate at a moment’s notice.
Entire careers will be spent overseas. It will
The 2007 Armor Warfighting Symposium will be hosted at Fort Knox by the United States
not be a married Army with families — that will
Army Armor Center from 29 April to 3 May 2007. The theme for this year’s symposium is
have to wait for 20 years and retirement. Criti-
“Armor: Strong Today — Strong Tomorrow.”
cally, this force will specifically recruit young
In keeping with this theme, the symposium will have a dynamic and varied agenda. Along men and women who desire an active, busy,
with the normal vehicle and product displays, each day’s agenda will have a mixture of and aggressively mobile lifestyle with hopes of
subject-matter expert (SME) briefings and focused discussion panels. Many of the Ar- engaging America’s enemies wherever they
my’s top leaders will be invited as guest speakers for the symposium. Attendees will get are, whenever they can.
a complete update on the current and future Army, as well as an update of the current
National Guard recruitment will focus on young
status and future direction of Armor and Cavalry. Units are encouraged to send Soldiers
men and women who seek to serve their coun-
to the symposium — the information they gain will more than offset their travel costs and
try at critical times, while maintaining a civilian
time away from their unit.
lifestyle and career. Until the GWOT, this has
The Armor Center will also award the Frederick M. Franks Award at the 2007 Symposium. always been the role of the National Guard. It
This early reminder should make everyone aware of the opportunity to nominate a de- is only the past five years that the National
serving individual for the award. Each year the Armor Center presents this award to an Guard has been totally mobilized, repeatedly,
Active Duty or Reserve officer, noncommissioned officer, or Department of the Army civil- and it is showing wear and tear. Most people
ian who has demonstrated a long-time contribution to warfighting capabilities of the U.S. do not join the Guard with dreams of heading
Army. This award is a great chance to recognize someone who has worked hard to make out the door every few years for 18 months at
the Armor Branch and the Army better institutions. Please give careful consideration to a time. They join in support of the Minuteman
anyone in your organization who might be a good nominee. Details for submission of the heritage with the desire to be there at the stra-
Frederick Franks Award, as well as details on all aspects of the Armor Symposium are tegic moments in defense of the Nation.
available on the symposium website at: http://www.knox.army.mil/armorsymp.
Continued on Page 52
January-February 2007 — 3
Major General Robert M. Williams
Commanding General
U.S. Army Armor Center
Maintaining Armor
Core Competencies
The U.S. Armor Force has had certain rarely, if ever, conduct maneuver opera-
characteristics throughout its existence tions above that level. A generation of of-
that sets it apart from other branches as ficers and Soldiers are becoming less fa-
the “Combat Arm of Decision.” Speed, miliar with offensive and defensive oper-
know that the horse keeps them alive in
long-range fires, and the unique ability to ations. On the plus side, reconnaissance
battle. In this technological age, we must
cross the beaten zone, coupled with the skills are still quite strong due to the need
not forget that greater care of our equip-
Warrior Ethos that our Armor Soldiers and for current, actionable intelligence in sup-
ment is still important, which requires
Cavalry Troopers have always displayed, port of operations.
training on how to run a proper unit main-
make our branch unique and exception- • Gunnery. Units are proficient with tenance system.
al. This capability is not issued on grad-
machine gun engagements; however, main
uation from Armor Basic Officer Lead- What can we do to stop this degradation
gun engagement skills have been signifi-
er Course (BOLC) III or one station unit of our core competencies? The Armor
cantly degraded. Gunnery training from
training (OSUT), however. Strapping on Center and School are aware of this situ-
the standpoint of training management is
tanker boots or donning a Stetson does ation and are addressing some of these
also a skill that we are losing at the junior
not magically transform an average Sol- issues through course training. The Ma-
officer and senior noncommissioned of-
dier into a steely-eyed mounted warrior. neuver Captains Career Course, BOLC
ficer level. In a recent survey of career
Our unique capabilities, which we all train III, and NCO Academy continuously
course captains, who were assigned to Ar-
and drill on, require a set of core compe- work to improve instruction on topics,
mor battalions, a significant number of
tencies. I am concerned, based on reports such as gunnery training management,
officers reported they had never fired a
from the field as well as observations of maintenance and supply, and tactical op-
full-up gunnery. We are losing not only
training units, that the long war is taking erations at the high end of the warfight-
the technical skills associated with de-
a toll on our core competencies. ing spectrum. We are investigating the
stroying targets, but also the leadership
possibility of reinstating a two-week tank
The broad branch core competencies for skills associated with training technical
commander’s certification course to ad-
Armor include: command and control, procedures.
dress gunnery and maintenance shortfalls
gunnery, maintenance/combat service
sup port, and maneuver. Reconnaissance • Command and Control. While our for Soldiers who lack depth and experi-
is addressed as part of the maneuver com- junior leaders are being exposed to better ence in this critical competency.
petency. Due to the nature of current oper- integration of branches, services, and al- While I fully understand the require-
ations, we are receiving reports that these lied forces, there are very few maneuver ments for training the Armor Branch to
competencies are beginning to atrophy. operations being conducted above com- fight the current enemy, we cannot forget
Initial insights obtained from surveys of pany level. Many operations are standard- that we must always be prepared to en-
students and cadre at the Armor School, ized and do not require a high level of dy- gage and destroy the enemy in offensive
coupled with queries sent to brigade and namic retasking of assets, collocation of and defensive operations across the spec-
battalion commanders from the opera- command nodes, or large-scale deconflic- trum, as well as conduct stability and re-
tional force, indicate that maneuver, gun- tion of battlespace. construction operations. In this issue of
nery, and command and control tasks are • ARMOR, several articles highlight lessons
Maintenance. Our Soldiers are doing
indeed suffering. Maintenance and sup- learned by the Israeli Defense Force in
a great job keeping their assigned equip-
ply-related tasks have experienced some its most recent conflict with Hezb ollah,
ment working, but we have defaulted to
deterioration as well. What follows is a specifically lessons learned by its mech-
crisis maintenance management instead
roll up of what we are seeing from the anized forces. I ask all leaders in our force
of preventive maintenance in too many
force: to continue to find the time and resourc-
cases. Time constraints and competing
• es to train our Soldiers and junior lead-
Maneuver. While our force is getting requirements remove junior leaders from
ers on those tasks that make our branch
more proficient at cordon and search op- planning and executing essential mainte-
unique and essential to our great Army
erations at platoon and company levels, nance events such as services. Troopers
and the United States.
battalion and squadron commanders are have always ridden their horses hard, but
concerned about the fact that their units they also take care of them because they Forge the Thunderbolt!
4 — January-February 2007
CSM Otis Smith
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor Center
Tanks Don’t Float
The Armored Force has experienced sev- of him to guide him as he maneuvered
eral water-related armored vehicle inci- across the rough countryside. Something
dents; this article focuses on one specific felt wrong as the Bradley made an abrupt
incident and discusses countermeasures maneuver. The tank driver knew that his
that can save crew members’ lives. NVD did not give him good depth percep-
•
tion, so he asked for assistance from the Situational awareness — inside the
What could possibly go wrong? As an M1A2
TC. The TC glanced forward through the tank, position the turret so the driver
system enhancement program (SEP) driv-
CITV and gave the command to proceed. can egress through the loader’s or tank
er, he had done this many times. The mis-
Almost immediately, the tank driver felt commander’s hatch in the event his
sion was simple — a cross-country tacti-
the ground give way as the tank slid into hatch fails to open.
cal road march over rough terrain, roads,
the canal. The TC gave the evacuation •
and canals, following behind two Brad- Ground guides should be used as stat-
command. The tank driver popped his
ley Fighting Vehicles with another M1A2 ed in U.S. Army Field Manual 90-13,
hatch, but it would not open because the
SEP bringing up the rear. The route was River-Crossing Operations. This man-
NVD would not come loose. The only
well traveled, but there had been reports ual provides step-by-step procedures
other means of egress, the hell hole, was
of enemy contact. There was also a known for crossing water hazards.
blocked due to the orientation of the tur-
risk of improvised explosive devices •
ret. The TC saw the tank driver’s prob- Practice rollover drills and egress pro-
(IEDs) along the route. This particular
lem and attempted both power and man- cedures constantly — especially at
mission would start in late afternoon and
ual traverse of the turret. By the time the night.
continue into the night.
TC was able to move the turret, and get
Tank crews must always remember that
The pre-operational brief and preven- the tank driver through the hell hole, he
when an evacuation incident occurs, safe
tive maintenance checks were part of the had drowned.
evacuation of your entire crew is first pri-
standard pre-combat inspection. Since
Several events occurred, making a bad ority — worry about shutting down the
there was the possibility of enemy contact
situation even worse. The following pre- tank later. Tank crews must rehearse this
and they would be traveling at night, the
cautions could lessen the egress time and drill regularly. Commanders must inte-
tank driver knew he was required to drive
permit successful evacuation: grate crew evacuation drills into all gun-
buttoned up and in blackout conditions.
• nery and maneuver training; training must
He also knew that he would need to install Plan your mission — when vehicles
be performed until knowing what to do
his AN/VVS-2(V) 2A night vision device are required to maneuver near or across
and when to do it is second nature. We
(NVD). He remembered that he had ex- water hazards, take precautions to en-
owe it our soldiers to enforce these stan-
perienced problems with the NVD before; sure the crew understands where the
dards. The Armor Center continues its ef-
it had even vibrated loose and dropped vehicle is located in relationship to
forts to reduce risk to tank crews; howev-
into his lap once while he was driving. the hazards. Conduct a map recon-
er, tank crew members must know how
The ever-resourceful tanker had the an- naissance of the route prior to the mis-
to implement effective control measures
swer to that situation — he tightened the sion. And remember, weather and ter-
to minimize risk to crew members across
NVD support thumb screws attaching the rain conditions may change during the
the board.
NVD to the driver’s hatch with his handy course of the mission — dry creeks
pliers. He now knew the NVD was secure aren’t always dry. Special thanks to Mr. William D. Wat-
and would not come loose. • son Jr., for his contributions to this arti-
Conduct preventive maintenance
cle. Mr. Watson is the System Safety En-
As the mission began, the tank com- checks and services (PMCS) to ensure
gineer for Combat Developments at the
mander (TC) used his commander’s in- all exits are free and clear of any equip-
U.S. Army Armor Center. We thank him
dependent thermal viewer (CITV) (an- ment that could block or degrade quick
for his dedication to training and support-
other night vision device) to assist the egress in case of an emergency. If you
ing our troops.
tank driver and for his own situational are required to use the AN/VVS-2(V)
awareness. As night fell, the tank driver 2A NVD, ensure the thumb screws are “Teach our young Soldiers and leaders
used the tail lights of the Bradley in front loose enough to be removed quickly. how to think; not what to think.”
January-February 2007 — 5
The Evolution of Land Mine
Warfare Training for IET Soldiers
by Captain Daniel Trost
Since the invasion of Iraq on 20 March quency radio initiators and alter how, ity to recognize when things just do not
2003 by coalition forces, the U.S. mili- when, and where they emplace devices. look right. Using the “every soldier as a
tary has combated the ever-evolving threat Soldiers, not just leaders, on the ground sensor” model, trainers are better equip-
of improvised explosives devices (IEDs). must now better understand our inherent ping soldiers with the knowledge to bet-
Roadside bombs are not a new threat to vulnerabilities and how our standard op- ter understand how and what to look for,
U.S. forces; however, their effectiveness erating procedures directly contribute to as well as how to react when in contact
and use increases as we increase our ef- those vulnerabilities. Leaders must en- with threat forces.
fectiveness in closing with the enemy. As sure that all soldiers realize that counter-
Each company in the 1st Armor Training
with all warfare, technological upgrades IED measures start at their level.
Brigade now has a company-level IED
and tactical improvements by one army
The evolving IED threat brought about training aid kit or “IED in a box.” These
force the opposing army to adapt with
a complete restructuring of programs of kits are no cost and are a locally produced
varying results.
instruction for all initial entry soldiers in assembly of commonly encountered mu-
Soldiers in Vietnam were subjected to basic combat training (BCT) and one- nitions and triggering devices. The kits
IED threats on their convoys and patrols station unit training (OSUT). Previously, offer units and soldiers a permanent train-
much like units in Iraq and Afghanistan soldiers were taught land mine familiar- ing tool, which can be used during con-
today. The solutions for IEDs in Vietnam ization, mine identification, probing for current and opportunity training through-
were to heavily armor and arm convoys mines, and conducted practical lane ex- out the cycle. Also, IED training does not
to massively increase their defensive pos- ercises to clear and negotiate mine fields. require commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
ture and firepower. This proved effective The training has transitioned from a strict- products; simple products, such as the
in deterring the opposition from direct at- ly land mine curriculum to a combina- “IED in a box” provide units a great train-
tacks, but was not the silver bullet in com- tion of intensive land mine/IED exercises, ing value with minimal monetary and man-
bating the IED threat completely. which include reacting to an IED, identi- hour costs. Although the COTS products
fying an IED, and reacting to an IED at- are outstanding at offering realistic sce-
Insurgent forces of today are less likely tack. Soldiers arriving at the land mine narios with auditory and visual feedback,
to stand and fight as did the Viet Cong and warfare site will immediately react to a they should be used during capstone ex-
North Vietnamese. Rather, they seek to simulated IED detonation, which not only ercises to ensure soldiers have mastered
cause terminal failure of our tactics and serves as a practical exercise, but also their 10 level task sets. Not only does this
equipment in an attempt to draw in a large as a wake-up call as they enter the training afford soldiers the opportunity to experi-
reactionary force. Once they have accom- environment. During training, soldiers ence a realistic attack, but it also sets con-
plished this, they meld back into the pop- also learn the five “Cs” — confirm, clear, ditions to test soldiers’ tactical reactions.
ulous and study our response. Our reac- call, cordon, and control; five meter and The “IED in a box” is one of the great and
tion is what drives their evolution in tac- twenty-five meter searches; IED identifi- simple tools now incorporated into the
tics and lethality. cation; and IED reporting. IED training matrix, which will further
enhance the combat effectiveness of new-
The propagation of tactics and technol- The land mine warfare training culmi- ly minted soldiers.
ogy among our enemy is driven by the nates in a collective task practical exer-
fact that they realize they will be success- cise where soldiers identify an IED, re- The IED and its evolution as a battle-
ful as long as they continually change act to an IED, administer first aid, and field condition is not a revolutionary tac-
how they implement IED threats. These properly report an IED. More important- tic; the training we conduct to better equip
changes do not occur at theater level, but ly, this single-day training is just a small our soldiers to meet this threat is revolu-
at the local operating level, and are often part of the IED immersion taking place tionizing our Army. Every soldier at ev-
cross-pollinated within insurgent groups throughout BCT and OSUT. The real ery level will meet this threat with varying
throughout theater. For example, a tactic training begins at the unit level with the degrees of success. This training should
that is effective in Baghdad may not be integration of “every soldier is a sensor,” not remain at the BCT level, but should be
effective in Al Anbar, but it is guaranteed where drill sergeants and cadre alter as- part of every unit’s ongoing training pro-
that as we counter the threat in Baghdad, pects of the training environment and gram. Gone are the pre-deployment train-
established tactics from other areas of op- task soldiers to identify the environmen- ing days afforded many new soldiers; lead-
eration not seen in Baghdad for some time tal modification. It can be simple exer- ers and trainers must continue to provide
will reemerge. cises, such as emplacing cones along a the most combat effective soldier possi-
road-march route while requiring soldiers ble to the force while improving condi-
The enemy is exploiting our ability to to report the environmental discrepancies tions to combat IED attacks. To alleviate
rapidly change our tactics; they rapidly they notice. To challenge soldiers even IED attacks, we must continue to use the
alter tactics as our forces adjust to “cur- further, IED training aids can be placed greatest asset available to us: the soldier
rent” enemy tactics, techniques, and pro- in and around soldiers to allow them to on the ground; the training they have re-
cedures. They do this by moving from implement reactionary measures. This ceived and their will to fight will win this
command-detonated IEDs to high-fre- training greatly enhances a soldier’s abil- battle.
6 — January-February 2007
Not Quite Counterinsurgency:
A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces Based
on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction
by Captain Daniel Helmer
On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah fighters, possibly led or directed portedly was blown more than 10 feet into the air). One soldier
by Imad Mughniyeh, once the world’s most wanted terrorist, be- was killed by Hezbollah sniper fire as an armored force with in-
gan a diversionary rocket attack on military targets in Northern fantry support attempted to extricate the quick-reaction force. 1
Israel before launching a lightning attack across the border against
Israeli soldiers in armored HMMWVs. The attack resulted in These were the opening volleys in a month-long war in which
killing three soldiers, wounding two others, and capturing two Hezbollah demonstrated that the spectrum of warfare for which
prisoners. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) dispatched a quick-re- regular forces must be prepared is larger than the two poles of
action force, led by one of the world’s most advanced tanks, the counterinsurgency and maneuver warfare. It is vital that we not
Merkava. Hezbollah militants, armed with a proficiency they regard Hezbollah’s 30-day performance as a fluke unlikely to be
would demonstrate throughout the war, ambushed the quick-re- encountered by the U.S. military. Indeed, while elements of the
action force, blowing up the lead tank with a several-hundred war are unique to the Israel-Lebanon conflict, such as Hezbol-
pound pitcharge-type improvised explosive device (IED). All lah’s positioning on a border adjacent to Israel and its capability
four crew members in the tank were killed instantly (the tank re- to terrorize the Israeli population with rockets and missiles, at
the tactical and operational levels, other enemies of the United taneously supplying inspiration, technical help, and weaponry
States can learn much from the Hezbollah experience. The fact to the Palestinians.6 According to a senior analyst with Defense
of the matter is that Hezbollah leaders, an avowed if not active News, understanding that a future conflict would likely be a de-
enemy of the United States, who likely have agents working in fensive action against an Israeli incursion seeking to destroy
our country, believe they have arrived on an exportable model them, Hezbollah leaders studied the historical model of the Viet
of Islamist insurgency, and other terrorist organizations are al- Cong as inspiration for establishing an advanced tunnel network,
ready openly seeking to gain lessons learned from the conflict.2 extending through the main avenues of approach into southern
Given that there are real limitations on garnering a full under- Lebanon.7
standing of what happened in Lebanon so soon after the 14 Au-
Working secretly, Hezbollah built up weapons stockpiles, par-
gust 2006 ceasefire, this article, using interviews with a number
ticularly short- and medium-range rockets and antitank guided
of key observers and open-source reporting on the war, seeks to
missiles (ATGM), and developed reinforced, highly camouflaged
explain the possible lessons and implications for the mounted
bunkers throughout their area of operations — all in spite of ex-
maneuver warrior of what Israel came to call “Operation Change
tensive monitoring by UN observers and Israeli intelligence.
of Direction.”
Confronted after the war with the location of a football-field-
A New Model sized bunker complex, with meter-thick, steel-reinforced con-
crete on an open hillside in Labboune, one UN observer remarked
Six years after Israel’s ignominious withdrawal from south Leb-
that Hezbollah must have brought in cement by the spoonfuls.
anon and six years after the beginning of the Second Palestinian
The bunker complex was situated only two-hundred meters north
Intifadah (the al Aqsa Intifadah), IDF forces remained woefully
of the Israeli border and only several kilometers from UN head-
unprepared for a new fight in Lebanon. In the final 15 years of
quarters in an-Naqurah; neither the UN nor IDF realized the ex-
the occupation, only a small cadre of IDF soldiers experienced
tent and sophistication of the bunkers, and the IDF was unable to
the terrible uncertainty of asymmetric war in Lebanon’s south.
destroy them or force the fighters to evacuate them during fight-
The rest of the IDF, according to two-time IDF Lebanon veteran
ing.8 Unlike in the occupied territories, neither signal intelligence
and respected historian, Michael Oren, trained to win the conven-
nor human intelligence could successfully penetrate Hez bollah
tional surprise encountered during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.3
before or during the war.
Subsequent to the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifadah in 2000,
Throughout the six years of relative quiet, Hezbollah focused on
the IDF leadership realized that it was ill-prepared for the fight-
extensive intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), mon-
ing against Hamas, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
itoring IDF units to its south by eavesdropping on IDF soldiers’
and other extremist forces that held the hearts and minds of much
cell phone calls; using criminal networks of mostly Bedouin drug
of the populations of Gaza and the West Bank. “When the Inti-
dealers, other criminals, and malcontents to provide information
fadah broke out, the IDF went on a massive retooling [effort]…
on IDF movements and plans; and by inconspicuously taking
we went to be an urban anti-terrorism force, like a large SWAT
extensive notes on Israeli movements for months at a time. As
team…and became the most advanced large scale anti-terrorism
Timur Goksel, the former chief spokesperson for UNIFIL (the
force in the world,” explains Oren.4 From 2000 through 2006, al-
title of the UN observers), describes Hezbollah, “What was re-
though skirmishes occurred from time to time on the Northern
ally significant is the amount or quality of staff work that goes
Border, including kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of sev-
into their activities that renders them different from any other
eral IDF soldiers, as well as shelling and sniper fire in the dis-
guerrilla outfit.”9
puted Shebaa farms area, the Hezbollah threat went largely ig-
nored. Responses to Hezbollah provocations were extremely Although Hezbollah launched the surprise raid on 12 July and
limited, and similar to the United States’ focus on conventional “was itching for a fight and got a fight,” it did not anticipate the
war against the USSR after Vietnam, the IDF was determined to tremendous Israeli response to the kidnapping of two soldiers.10
focus on a different enemy than the one to which it had just ced- As a result, the IDF possessed the initiative in the first hours and
ed an 18-year struggle.5 even days of the war when it focused excessively on the use of
its air force. When the IDF launched its ground incursions, they
The core combat competencies required for the urban fight in
anticipated (just as the U.S. anticipates in Iraq and Afghanistan)
the occupied territories were significantly different from those re-
that when confronted with a regular force on the offensive, Hez-
quired for the fight in which the IDF would find itself in Leb-
bollah would essentially melt into the countryside. In fact, pre-
anon. By 2006, the IDF excelled at conducting cordon and search
vious to 2000, this had been the doctrine of Hezbollah.11 Yet,
operations, door-to-door searches, hasty raids, and identifying
Hezbollah doctrine had evolved, and Hezbollah prepared to en-
and capturing or killing suspected Palestinian terrorists and guer-
counter the IDF unlike any guerrilla force in history. In the words
rillas. Through a network of collaborators exploited since the
of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, “The resis-
1970s, the IDF gained extensive intelligence information on Pal-
tance withstood the attack and fought back. It did not wage a
estinian terror organizations. Israeli control of the borders of
guerrilla war either….it [Hezbollah] was not a regular army but
Gaza and the West Bank meant that Palestinian fighters often
was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It was some-
possessed inferior weapons and were forced to fight in a virtu-
thing in between.” “This,” he said, “is the new model.”12
ally untenable situation. Israeli information dominance made
training difficult for Palestinian forces. Meanwhile factionaliza- “We were caught unprepared.”13
tion prevented a unitary military effort against the Israelis. In ef-
The IDF encountered innumerable problems with Hezbollah’s
fect, the IDF, like the U.S. military, was a seemingly militarily
“new model.” In a city that became a showcase for the IDF’s tac-
superior counter-terrorist/insurgent force fighting a militarily
tical failures during the war, despite repeated incursions and air
inferior terrorist/insurgent enemy.
attacks aimed at the Lebanese Shiite city of Bint Jbail through-
Meanwhile, Hezbollah, flush with their 2000 victory, did not out the war, the IDF was unable to take the city, allowing Nas-
rest on its laurels. Believing that another showdown with the Is- rallah to claim it as Hezbollah’s Stalingrad. As Goksel puts it,
raelis was looming, it began the arduous task of exploring les- “in one day in 1982 they [the IDF] reached Beirut; here, in six or
sons learned from its 17-year open war with Israel, while simul- seven days, they couldn’t go more than a few miles.”14 Among
8 — January-February 2007