Aristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha. Symposium Aristotelicum

549 Pages·2012·29.12 MB·English

by  Aristotle

Aristotle's Metaphysics
Alpha
Symposium Aristotelicum
edited by
CARLOS STEEL
uHth a new critical edition of the Greek Text by
OLIVER PRIMAVESI
OXPORD
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PREFACE
The i8th Symposium Aristotelicum, dedicated to the first Book of Aristotle's
Metaphysics, was held in Leuven from 7th to 13ch July 2008. The symposium
was hosted by the international centre Aristoteles latiiius and the De Wulf-
Mansion Centre for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy at the
Institute of Philosophy. It was a pleasure to see the Symposium Aristotelicum
return to Leuven, where the second Symposium was organized in 1960 by the
late Suzanne Mansion. The seminars were held in premises of the Irish College
and, on Wednesday, at the Royal Academy in Brussels. There is the list of all
participants below. Michael Frede was still involved in the early preparation of
this symposium, but we were alas bereft ofhis participation. The organization
of the coUoquium would not have been possible without the financial support
ofthe Flemish Research Foundation (FWO), the Cornelia de Vogel Foundation
and theJoseph Van de Wiele Foundation. I am very pleased to have this volume
published at Oxford University Press following the publication of the previous
coUoquia. 1 express my gratitude to Peter Momtchiloff and to the anonymous
referees ofthe Press. In the preparation ofthis complex volume for publication, I
could count on the technical collaboration ofMichiel Van den Bosch (Typeface
n.v., Leuven).
Aristotle's book Alpha stands as the introduction ofa complex work later called
Metaphysics. On the composition ofthis work, on the overall unity ofAristotle's
metaphysical project and on the place of Alpha in it, there has been an long debate
among scholars. Werner Jaeger, for instance, argued that Alpha was an earlier
attempt by Aristotle at defining wisdom and had only later been integrated as an
introduction in a much more sophisticated project ofa science ofbeing as being,
- a claim not sharedby the contributors of this volume. In Alpha, Aristotle presents
his philosophical project as a search for wisdom, the supreme form ofknowledge
worth for its own sake. This wisdom is found in the knowledge of the first
principles allowing us to explain whatever exists. As Aristotle shows, the earlier
philosophers had all been seeking such a wisdom; they had, however, divergent
views on what these principles are and how they are causes ofeverything. Before
Aristotle sets out his own views on the principles, he examines in this first book
his predecessors' views. Since antiquity, this book thus played a crucial role in
all attempts to reconstruct the early history ofphilosophy. Most scholars tend to
readthis text as the story ofa gradual discovery ofthe four causes culminatingin
Aristotle's own doctrine. But, as Stephen Menn in his forthcoming book on the
Metaphysics argues, Aristotle's reading ofthe early history ofphilosophy is much
less progressive and optinustic than is mostly thought. In A 3-6, Aristotle does
not show that the earlier views gradually converge in understanding wisdom as
the science ofthe four causes, but rather presents them as a "series ofaspirations
to wisdom, each successively disappointed". Disappointed, but not entirely, as
they confront us with a series offundamental difficulties about the principles, as
is clear in Aristotle's critical examination ofhis predecessors' views, ending up
with a lengthy discussion ofPlato's doctrine ofthe Forms, in A7—10. In book
Beta (which was the subject ofa previous Symposium) Aristotle will discuss the
aporiai about the concept ofultimate wisdom in a systematic way. This first book,
however, is a unique opportunity to discuss the difficulties not in an abstract
manner, but in confrontation with different positions defended by the first sophoi.
Book Alpha is notjust a fundamental text for reconstructing the origin ofGreek
philosophy, it sets itselfthe agenda ofAristotle's own project ofwisdom after
what he learned from his predecessors, and in particularly from Plato.
Metaphysics Alpha is undoubtedly one of the most studied texts of Aristotle,
as it is also used as the obligatory starting point for all studies on early Greek
philosophy. Yet the discussion at the Symposium of the whole text, section by
section, in an international group of scholars, reading the text primarily from
Aristotle's intention, and not taking it as a 'Fundgrube' of earlier doctrines,
has provided original approaches to well-trodden texts. In comparison to the
previous volumes ofthe Symposium Aristotelicum, this volume has the privilege of
presenting a new critical edition ofthe text which was central in all discussions.
Oliver Primavesi not only contributed to the Symposium a paper on one section,
but also offered the participants a new edition of Metaphysics Alpha, with an
impressive apparatus, based upon an exhaustive investigation of the whole
manuscript tradition, the medieval translations and the indirect tradition. His
introduction to the edition reveals new insights into the question which has
haunted editors of the Metaphysics since Bekker, namely the relation between
the two traditions of the texts (a and β). The contributors were grateful to
have this text at their disposal in their discussion at the Symposium and in the
final redaction oftheir respective chapters. Primavesi himselfprofited from the
input of the expert readers of the new edition. The symposium thus offered a
wonderful laboratory for this major editorial project. I am convinced that all
scholars working on this celebrated text ofAristotle will be delighted to have not
just 'proceedings' of a symposium, but also appreciate having this new edition
included in this volume.
Carlos Steel
Leuven, 2 May 2012
CONTENTS
i8th Symposium Aristotelicum, Leuven, 7-1j July 2008
List Of Participants ix
1. The Oesire to Know {Metaphysics A1) 1
GlUSEPPE CAMBIANO
2. A Science of First Principles {Metaphysics A2) 43
SARAH BROADIE
3. History and Dialectic (Metaphysics A3, 983*24-984^8) 69
RACHEL BARNEY
4. 'The Next Principle' iMetaphYsicsA3-4, 984^8-985^22) 105
GÄBOß BETEGH
5. Pythagoreanism: emergingfrom the Presocraticfog {MetaphysicsAs) 141
MALCOLM SCHOFIELD
6. Plato as seen hy Aristotle (Metaphysics A 6) 167
CARLOS SXEEL
7. Critique of Earlier Philosophers on the Good and the Causes
(MetaphYsicsA7-A8g89^1S) 201
STEPHEN MENN
8. Second thoughts on some Presocratics (MetaphysicsAB, 989*18-990*32) 225
OLIVER PRIMAVESI
9. The Doctrine of Forms under Critique — PART r
(MetaphysicsAg, 990*33-991^9) 265
DoHOTHEA pREDE
10. The Doctrine of Forms under Critique - PART 11
(Meiep/iy5!oA9,99i^9-993*io) 297
MlCHEL CRUBELLIER
11. Conclusion - and Retrospect (Metaphysics A10) 335
JOHN M. CoOPER
12. Bibliography 365
VIII
ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS A: A NEW CRITICAL EDITION WITH INTRODUCTION 385
OLIVER PHIMAVES1
Introduction: The Transmission of the Text and the Riddle of the Two Versions 387
OLIVER PRIMAVESI
Bibliography 459
Text ofMetaphysics A (and of the corresponding parts ofM 4-3) 4o5
OLIVER PHlMAVESI
Index of Names 517
Index locorum 521
General Index 534
IX
18TH SYMPOSIUM ARISTOTELICUM, LEUVEN, 7-13JULY 2008
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Contributors
Rachel Barney, University ofToronto
Gabor Betegh, Central European University, Budapest
Sarah Broadie, University of St Andrews
Giuseppe Cambiano, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa
John M. Cooper, Princeton University
Michel Crubellier, Universite Lille III
Dorothea Frede, Universität Hamburg
Stephen Menn, McGill University and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Oliver Primavesi, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Malcolm Schofield, StJohn's College, Cambridge
Carlos Steel, University ofLeuven
Otherparticipants
Keinipe Algra, University ofUtrecht
Enrico Berti, University ofPadova
Myles Burnyeat, All Souls College, Oxford
Elisabetta Cattanei, University of Genova
Alan Code, Stanford University
Pierre Destree, Universite de Louvain
Gail Fine, Cornell University
Frederic Gain, Universite de Lille III
Daniel Graham, Brigham Young University
Terry Irwin, Keble College, Oxford
Andre Laks, Universite Paris Sorbonne
Geoffrey Lloyd, Darwin College, Cambridge
Hendrik Lorenz, Princeton University
Claire Louguet, Universite de Lille III
Jaap Mansfeld, University ofUtrecht
Ben Morison, Princeton University
Carlo Natali, University of Venice
ChristofRapp, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Cristina Rossitto, University ofPadua
David Sedley, Christ's College, Cambridge
Annick Stevens, Universite de Liege
Gerd Van Riel, University of Leuven
SYMPOSIUM ARISTOTELICUM
ΐ· (i957) Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, edited by I. Düring and
G. E. L. Owen, Göteborg 1960.
2. (1960) Aristote et les prohlhmes de mithode, publie par S. Mansion, Louvain-
Paris: Nauwelaerts 1961.
3. (1963) Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics, edited by G. E. L. Owen, Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1968.
4. (1966) Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast, herausgegeben von
I. Düring, Heidelberg: Lothar StiehmVerlag 1969.
5. (1969) Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik, herausgegeben von P. Moraux
und D. Harlfinger, Berlin: Walter De Gruyter 1971.
6. (1972) Etudes sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, publiees par P. Aubenque, Paris:
Vrin, 1979.
7- (1975) AristotleonMindandtheSenses,tditedhyG.E.TL.Lloydind
G. E. L. Owen, Cambridge University Press 1978.
8. (1978) Aristotle on Science: The Posterior Analytics, edited by Е. Berti, Padova:
Antenore 1981.
9. (1981j Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia,
herausgegeben von P. Moraux undJ. Wiesner, Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter 1983.
10. (1984) Mathematics and Metaphysics in Aristotle = Mathematik und Metaphysik
bei Aristoteles, herausgegeben von A. Graeser, Bern-Stuttgart:
P. Haupt 1987.
11. (1987) Aristoteles Politik, editedby G. Patzig, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht 1990.
12. (1990) Aristotle's Rhetoric. Philosophical Essays, edited by D. Furley and
A. Nehamas, Princeton University Press 1994.
13· (1993) OnAristotle'sDeinterpretatione[notpublished].
14. (1996) Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda, edited by M. Frede and D. Charles,
Oxford University Press 2000.
15· (1999) Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption, Book I, edited by F. de Haas
andJ. Mansfeld, Oxford University Press 2004.
16. (2002) Aristotle's Metaphysics Beta, edited by A. Laks and M. Crubellier,
Oxford University Press 2009.
17. (3005) Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII, edited by C. Natali, Oxford
University Press 2009.
18. (2008) Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha, edited by C. Steel, Oxford University
Press 2012,
19. (2011) Aristotle's De Motu Animalium, in preparation by 0. Primavesi and
Ch. Rapp.
1
The Desire to Know
Metaphysics A1
GIUSEPPE CAMBIANO
The first chapter ofAristotle's Metaphysics begins with the celebrated sentence
that "All men by nature desire to know (τοί3 εΙδέναν όρέγονταν φύσει)" and
ends with the claim that "clearly wisdom (σοφία) is science (έπιοττήμη) about
certain causes and principles". How does Aristotle reach this conclusion? At­
tempting to reconstruct Aristotle's argument, I will divide the chapter into six
parts - 980*21-27; 980*27-^25;980^25-981*12; 981*12-^13; 981^13-25; 981^25-
982*3 - each characterized by peculiar topics and modes ofargument. But the
conclusion ofA 1 leaves indeterminate the causes and principles which are the
objects of sophia, and therefore I will end with both a short analysis of some
points of the second chapter, which explain that it is a matter of first causes
and principles, and some briefremarks about the question ofthe relationships
between A 1-2 and the lost Aristotle's Protrepticus.
I. The human desire ofknowing
АЦ men by nature desire to know. A sign of this is the deHght men take in having
perceptions; for even apart from their usefulness they take deKght in these percep­
tions for themselves, and above аП in perception by sight. For not only with a view
to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing to almost
everything eke. The reason is that this, most of aU the senses, makes us know and
brings to Hght many differences'. (980*21-27)
' The translatiom ofAristotelian texts are taken from the Revised OxfordTranslation (edited by
J. Barnes), with some minor changes, and those ofAlexander ofAphrodisias &om Dooley's transktion.
2 GIUSEPPE CAMBlANO
The initial statement, both universal and affirmative, is strengthened by phusei.
Sometimes, for example in the Physics, Aristotle takes this expression to be
equivalent to "always or for the most part". But clearly 'all men' excludes that
only most men desire to know.^ If we assume that there is a connection be­
tween temporality and modality or that they are not distinguished in Aristotle's
thought, we can assert that the desire to know belongs always and necessarily to
aU men. Maybe in Aristotle's choice the verb oregesthai, instead of epithumein, for
example, or similar verbs, aims at emphasizing that it is a desire for something
regarded as objectively good, rather than a merely impulsive desire. From this
standpoint oregesthai appears to be synonymous of ephiesthai, which expresses a
natural tendency towards something.^ By the words 'all' and phuseiAii^toUs un­
derlines that this desire belongs to human nature in general and, consequently,
to every man individuaUy.+ But how can we know and state that aU men by
nature desire to know? Aristotle does not introduce this universal statement
as an endoxon, namely as a reputable opinion wluch is accepted "by everyone
or by the majority or by the wise — i.e. by aU, or by the majority, or by the
most notable and reputable ofthem" {Topics i i. ioo^2i-23;i io. 104^8-11), and
which accordingly can be assumed as the premise in developing an argument.
Nor does he present the content ofhis statement as a phainomenon in the strict
sense ofan observed fact (as, for example, the existence ofmovement). Nor
does he discuss it by means of the method described in NE vii 1, 1145^2—7,
where he says that we must "set the phenomena before us and, after first dis­
cussing the difficulties, go on to prove, ifpossible, the truth ofall the reputable
opinions about these affections or, failing this, of the greater number and the
most authoritative, for ifwe both resolve the difficulties and leave the reputable
opinions undisturbed,we shaU have proved the case sufficiently". On the other
hand, that our universal statement is neither an endoxon nor an observed fact is
confirmed by the circumstance that Aristotle thinks that it requires a justifica­
tion. What he produces is a sign, from which the truth ofthe initial statement
can be inferred. It seems to be presupposed here that a sign is more evident
^ On present tense sentences as referring not only to the time they are uttered, but as timeless
sentences, meaiüng that things are always in the way the sentence states them to be, that is in an omni-
temporal sense,see Hintikka 1973, 80—4.
3 The verb ephiesthai is frequendy used in Met. A,but see also Pol. vii 13, i33i^39-4i:"the happiness
and weU-being which аИ men manifestly (phanerdn) desire (ephientm), some have the power ofattaining,
but to others, from some accident or defect ofnature, the attaitmient ofthem is not granted". This is a
phainomenon (see phanerdn) and, consequently, needs not to be proved by a sign inference or by a deduc­
tion from premises.
* If we apply the distinction between universal predicarion katä pantos and universal predication
kath' hautb [ЛРо i 4, 73"26-31), then the result will be that such an oiexis tou eidenai pertains both to
each member ofthe class 'man' and to the essence ofman. On this distinction, see Le Blond 1996,75-8;
Sorabji 1980,183-208.