Table Of ContentAristotle
SEMANTICS AND ONTOLOGY
VOLUME TWO
L. M. DE RIJK
ARISTOTLE
SEMANTICS AND ONTOLOGY
VOLUME TWO
PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA
A SERIES OF STUDIES
ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
FOUNDED BY J. H. WASZINKf AND W.J. VERDENIUS|
EDITED BY
J. MANSFELD, D.T. RUNIA
J.C.M. VAN WINDEN
VOLUME XCI/II
L.M. DE RIJK
' '6 8 V
ARISTOTLE
SEMANTICS AND ONTOLOGY
VOLUME II! THE METAPHYSICS. SEMANTICS
IN ARISTOTLE'S STRATEGY OF ARGUMENT
BY
L.M. DE RIJK
BRILL
LEIDEN · BOSTON · KÖLN
2002
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de (1924-)
Aristotle : semantics and ontology / by L.M. de Rijk.
ρ cm.—(Philosophia antiqua, ISSN 0079-1687; v. 91)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents: v. 1. General introduction, the works on logic.
ISBN 9004123245 (alk. paper)
1. Aristode—Language. 2. Aristotle—Organon. 3. Logic, Ancient. 4. Aristotle.
Metaphysics. 5. Metaphysics. I. Title. II. Series.
B491.L3 .R45 2002
185—dc21 2002018326
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme
Rijk, Lambert Marie de:
Aristotle : semantics and ontology / by L.M. de Rijk. - Leiden ; Boston ; Köln :
Brill
(Philosophia antiqua ; Vol. 91/11)
Vol. 2. The Metaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument. 2002
ISBN 90-04-12467-5
ISSN 0079-1687
ISBN 90 04 12467 5
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME TWO:
The Metaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument
Chapter Seven: Preliminaries to Metaphysical Enquiry 1
7.1 How to tackle 'scientific' problems 2
7.11 The predecessors observed and criticized 3
7.12 Wisdom and the knowledge of causes and
principles 4
7.13 The general introduction presented in Met. a 7
7.14 Three methodological hints 10
7.15 An infinite chain of causes rejected 11
7.16 How to frame a persuasive argument 12
7.2 The scope and proper method of metaphysics (Met. B) ... 14
7.21 The proper scope of metaphysical investigation 15
7.22 How to zoom in on causes and principles 17
7.23 Summary of Met. A, a, and Β 21
7.3 Metaphysics assessed among the disciplines (Met. Γ,
chs. 1-3) 22
7.31 Preliminary: Aristotle's method and strategy. The key
terms: 23
(a) Επιστήμη 23
(b) Είναι and its cognates 24
(c) The phrase τό öv ή öv 24
(d) The use of συμβεβηκός ('coincidental') 25
(e) The phrases καθ' αυτό and κατά συμβεβηκός 27
7.32 The unity of metaphysics 27
7.33 The convertibility of 'being' and 'one' 30
7.4 The semantic strategy revisited 33
7.41 Categorization and using the ^Mö-locution 34
7.42 On the use of the phrase καθ' όλου 36
7.5 The axioms LNC and LEM codified 39
7.51 The logico-ontological nature of LNC and LEM 39
7.52 The framing of the two firmest principles 41
7.6 The truth of LNC vindicated elenctically 43
7.7 The eight arguments in favour of LNC 47
7.71 First argument (1006a28-31) 48
7.72 Second argument (1006a31-1007b18). 'To signify
one thing' 49
7.73 Third argument (1007b18-1008a2) 62
7.74 Fourth argument (1008a2-7) 64
7.75 Fifth argument (1008a7-34) 65
7.76 Sixth argument (1008a34-b2) 67
7.77 Seventh argument (1008b2-31) 68
7.78 Eighth argument (1008b31-1009a5) 69
7.79 A corollary on the failures of the Protagorean
doctrine 71
7.8 The complete correlation between 'being' and 'being
thought' censured 76
7.81 Aristotle's strategy of argument 76
7.82 On the relationship between 'real thing' and 'thing
perceived' 78
7.83 The refutation of the Protagorean thesis
completed 80
7.84 Aristotle's summary of chs. 3, 1005b8 to
6, 1011b12 85
7.9 The arguments in favour of LEM. How to assess them 86
7.91 The seven arguments in support of LEM 89
7.92 Two additional remarks ( 1012al 7-28) 94
7.93 Some erroneous views about things 94
7.94 Recapitulation 96
Chapter Eight: The Proper Subject of Metaphysics 98
8.1 The assessment of metaphysics among the theoretical
disciplines 98
8.2 Two of the four senses of 'what is' should be cast
aside 107
8.21 The differentiation of'what is' (τό öv) 107
8.22 Some basic misunderstandings concerning
Met. Δ 7 108
8.23 Met. A 7 taken from the semantic point of view 110
8.3 'What is coincidentally' should be ruled out 117
8.31 Συμβεβηκός as defined in Met. Δ 30 117
8.32 Συμβεβηκός as defined in Met. E, chs. 2-3 121
8.4 'What is qua true' should also be discarded 126
8.41 Falsehood in Met. Δ 29 126
8.42 Antisthenes's erroneous semantic position
countered 130
8.43 The role of the λόγος-πράγμα issue in the present
discussion 133
8.44 The exposition of ψεΰδος continued 135
8.5 'What is' taken as 'what is qua true' in Met. Ε 4 135
8.51 On the notions 'is-true' and 'is-not-true' in
Met. Δ 7 136
8.52 The anatomy of the apophantic expressions
instanced 137
8.53 The purport of chapter Ε 4 139
8.54 'What-w-qua-true' as basically being a mental
construct 140
8.55 The 'what-w-qua-true' issue dismissed 142
Chapter Nine: The Claimants for the Title 'true ousia'
Examined 148
9.1 Ούσία as the primary sense of 'what is' 148
9.11 What is 'primary being'? 153
9.12 Finding one's way among the common-sense
opinions about ούσία 157
9.2 Is the substratum (τό ύποκείμενον) the ousia? 158
9.21 Can the form be called an 'underlying thing'? 161
9.22 Matter's credentials put to the test 162
9.23 Can 'substance' be 'predicated' of matter? 164
9.24 Matter's credentials nullified 166
9.3 Ούσία taken as essence or quiddity (Z, chs 4-6) 167
9.31 The role of the καθ'αύτό appellation 167
9.32 On using the ίμάτιον device 170
9.33 On the definiens as expressing a thing's
quiddity 174
9.34 An appendix on the notion of 'being-one' as
discussed elsewhere 177
9.35 The discussion of oneness in Met. I, chs. 1-2.
Connotative'one' 182
9.4 How to grasp a thing's ούσία properly 186
9.41 On one-word expressions including an intrinsic
determinant 186
9.42 Does a thing's quiddity coincide with the particular
itself? 188
9.43 The special position of τά καθ' αυτά λεγόμενα 190
9.44 On the phrase κατ' άλλο λέγεσθαι 192
9.45 To deny the question of 9.42 leads to an infinite
regress 194
9.46 On the sameness of a thing and its particular
form 195
9.5 An intermezzo on the ontological implications of
becoming 197
9.51 On the composite of matter and form 198
9.52 Should matter be included in the definiens? 199
9.53 The composite is produced, neither matter nor
form by themselves 200
9.54 The summary of Z, chs. 7-9 found in Ζ 9 203
9.6 How to overcome some problems of definition 203
9.61 The 'thing-itself = quiddity' thesis discussed from
another angle 204
9.62 On the mental status of 'universal forms' 206
9.63 On the particular status of the immanent form 207
9.64 Again, should matter be included in the
definiens? 210
9.65 On the status of 'non-sensible' objects like
'mathematicals' 216
9.66 Aristotle's summary of the foregoing discussions .... 222
9.67 The 'first' or 'immediate' ούσία 223
9.68 What makes a definiens one definite thing? 226
9.7 No universal is ούσία 229
9.71 Aristotle's key problem concerning particular
forms 230
9.72 The case of the universal dismissed 231
9.73 On the communion of forms 235
9.74 No particular can be properly defined 236
9.75 On commonness as alien to true ousia 240
Chapter Ten : True ούσία Finally Defined as the Enmattered
Form 244
10.1 The ούσία = είδος thesis corroborated once more 244
10.2 A further assessment of matter as'material constitution' 249
10.3 On form, differentia, and actuality 252
10.4 Again, the problem of defining things properly 254
10.5 Some observations on the identification of material
constituents 263
10.6 The unity of the definiens finally stated 266
10.7 An excursus on three controversial issues in Met. Z-H 272
10.71 Again, the particular status of the immanent
form 273
10.72 The enmattered form as the principle of
individuation 280
10.73 The adoption of form and matter in the
definiens 282
10.74 Is a composite indefinable? 283
10.75 Two kinds of definiens to be distinguished 285
10.76 The role of γένος in the constitution of natural
things 287
10.8 Ancient and Medieval commentators on these issues 288
10.81 The Ancient commentators 289
10.82 The Arab commentators Avicenna and Averroes.... 291
10.83 Thomas Aquinas 292
10.84 John Buridan 297
Chapter Eleven : Actual and Potential Being. The Mathe-
maticals 302
11.1 On actuality and potentiality 304
11.11 Actuality and potentiality assessed 304
11.12 When can what is actually [x] be named
'a potential [y]'? 306
11.13 On a similar use of the έκεΐνο-έκείνινον device
in Met. Ζ 7 309
11.14 On naming something after its potential status 313
11.15 On naming something after its material
constitution 314
11.16 The actual thing's priority over its potential
counterpart 319
11.17 Some additional remarks about potentiality and
actuality 323
11.2 True and false as ontic properties 324
11.21 The proper subject of Θ 10 325
11.22 The ontic truth of σύνθετα 328
11.23 The ontic truth of άσύνθετα 329
