Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics

362 Pages·2006·1.08 MB·English

by  Master Clark

Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft9t1nb5xk&chunk.id=0&doc.v...
Preferred Citation: Anagnostopoulos, Georgios. Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness
of Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1994 1994.
http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft9t1nb5xk/
Aristotle on the Goals and
Exactness of Ethics
Georgios Anagnostopoulos
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley · Los Angeles · Oxford
© 1994 The Regents of the University of California
To Myrtali, Mariana, Andreas, Thalia, and Apollo
figure
Preferred Citation: Anagnostopoulos, Georgios. Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness
of Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1994 1994.
http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft9t1nb5xk/
To Myrtali, Mariana, Andreas, Thalia, and Apollo
figure
Acknowledgments
The various topics on exactness and its relation to ethics that I discuss in this book have
been debated by philosophers at least since the time of Socrates. A number of thinkers
have articulated the problems, drawn the boundaries of the debate, and propounded
important philosophical theories about these topics. For this reason, any contemporary
discussion of exactness inevitably owes much to the work or ideas of many others. In
my case, I owe much to the work of those who have produced translations or offered
interpretations of Aristotle's texts throughout the centuries. In particular, the justly
famous commentaries on Aristotle's ethical treatises that were written at the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century have been invaluable
guides. Recent years have seen a renaissance of interest in Aristotle's thought which
has also resulted in a number of new translations and interpretations of Aristotle's
works. Several distinguished philosophers and scholars have produced translations of or
studies on Aristotle's texts which have aspired to the highest philosophical and scholarly
standards and have thrown much light on the work of one of the great philosophers. I
owe much to their work, even when I express disagreement with their views or propose
views that they may find unacceptable.
As great as my debt is to the many students of Aristotle's thought who in a sense
are remote in space or time, it cannot equal the debt I owe to those who are near to me
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in space and who share my time. Without them this work would not have been possible,
nor would it be what it is. I am grateful to Professor Marianne McDonald for her
perceptive comments on chapter 4 and for her constant encouragement. Professor
Gerasimos Santas has discussed with me some of the issues I focus on in this study and
has offered invaluable advice and constructive criticism; I am deeply grateful to him,
especially for his support. I also owe thanks to several
― xii ―
others: to my colleague Professor Avrum Stroll for his comments on chapters 2 and 4
and for the overall interest he has always shown in my work; to Professor Charles
Young for his insightful and constructive criticisms of some of the main ideas of the book
at the University of California, Irvine, Conference on Scepticism; to Stephen Scales for
suggesting numerous stylistic changes that resulted in a more readable text and for
forcing me, with his persistent questions, to clarify some of my thoughts; to two
anonymous referees from the University of California Press for their careful reading and
evaluation of my manuscript; and to Dr. Edward Dimendberg, Stephanie Emerson,
Rebecca Frazier, and Michelle Bonnice at the University of California Press for all their
efforts toward the publication of my manuscript.
I find it most difficult to express in words what I owe to the members of my family.
Of course, each one of them has been a source of support to me and has helped in his
or her own way. I am deeply grateful to them all: to my wife Myrtali for being there and
for reminding me, perhaps not often enough, that no project is perfect and that every
project must come to an end; to my daughter Mariana for showing an interest in
Aristotle and for suggesting some stylistic changes; to my son Andreas for also giving
me some advice on matters of style, listening and puzzling over my questions, and
seeing a humorous side even in a subject as dry as exactness; to my daughter Thalia
for being my guide in matters of spelling and for giving me constant encouragement;
and lastly, to Apollo, a constant companion with a most independent mind, for helping
me to see things in their proper perspective and for showing me that Aristotle's ethical
treatises can be used in quite different ways. But this is not all they have done for me. I
hope that what I have failed to state or express here I can convey by dedicating this
book to them.
― xiii ―
Abbreviations of Aristotle's Works
Anim. de Anima
Ath. Athenian Constitution
Aud. de Audibilibus
Cael. de Caelo
Cat. Categories
E.E. Eudemian Ethics
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G.A. de Generatione Animalium
Gen. et Corr. de Generatione et Corruptione
H.A. Historia Animalium
Interp. de Interpretatione
M.M. Magna Moralia
Mem. de Memoria et Reminiscentia
Met. Metaphysics
Meteor. Meteorology
Mund. de Mundo
N.E. Nicomachean Ethics
P.A. de Partibus Animalium
Phgn. Physiognomica
Phys. Physics
Poet. Poetics
Polit. Politics
Post. Anal. Posterior Analytics
Pr. Anal. Prior Analytics
Probl. Problems
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Protrept. Protrepticus
Resp. de Respiratione
Rhet. Rhetoric
Somno de Somno et Vigilia
Top. Topics
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One
Introduction
The Problems
Students of Aristotle's thought have, from antiquity to the present, pointed out that he
is quite frequently concerned with questions about exactness or inexactness. Aristotle
often speaks, for example, about the level of exactness his own investigations attain,
the level that is desirable, or the level that is possible in a certain kind of investigation
or discipline. At other times his concern is with the exactness/inexactness of the subject
matter a discipline investigates and its relation to the exactness/inexactness of the
discipline itself. At yet other times his attention is directed to different questions: Can
inexactness be eliminated from the accounts a discipline gives of a certain subject
matter? What epistemological consequences does inexactness have? Does it, for
instance, affect the demonstrative character of a discipline?
Remarks that touch on issues pertaining to exactness/inexactness are to be found in
all of Aristotle's works. But they figure most prominently in the treatises on conduct,
especially in the N.E. Commentators have invariably argued that the remarks in the N.E.
, unlike those in other Aristotelian treatises, say something quite important about
Aristotle's conception of the nature of ethical inquiry or its epistemological character. To
some, these remarks assert or imply that ethics is an inexact inquiry, a discipline that
fails to attain that ideal of exactness we associate with the most pure and rigorous
disciplines. To others, they assert or imply something even stronger: namely, that
ethics is not a demonstrative discipline at all, that it cannot even be one of the
demonstrative sciences that Aristotle recognizes.
These claims made by the commentators regarding the meaning and
― 2 ―
epistemological implications of Aristotle's remarks on exactness in the N.E. may contain
some truth. It may very well be that some types of inexactness in a discipline or its
subject matter imply that the discipline cannot be as demonstratively pure or rigorous
as some other disciplines. It may even be the case that certain types of inexactness in a
discipline imply that the discipline is not demonstrative at all. However, other types of
inexactness may have no such implication, or they may have only minor implications
with respect to the epistemological character of a discipline.
In other words, it is difficult to say whether there is any truth in these general claims
about the implications of Aristotle's remarks on exactness. The problem lies in part in
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the fact that he identifies several quite different types of exactness—and, therefore,
inexactness—and he attributes exactness/inexactness to various domains that may
consist of things that are not necessarily of the same logical type. The term Aristotle
uses most often when he speaks of exactness signifies a variety of things; the term is, if
you like, inexact. Indeed, as we shall see, Aristotle uses a variety of terms to signify
exactness or inexactness, and not all of them mean the same thing. The things that
Aristotle is willing to characterize as exact/inexact are not necessarily the sorts of things
we are willing to designate as such. Aristotle seems to have no difficulty in applying his
terms for exactness/ inexactness to just about anything.
We tend to think of exactness/inexactness as being primarily features that can
characterize our language or any system we use to describe, explain, or represent the
world. The ancients, however, thought that some of these features could characterize
many other things that may not necessarily be systems of representation. They may, for
instance, characterize the world itself or the objects we aim at representing.
It is important, then, to recognize not only that the ancients designated a variety of
features as being features of exactness/inexactness but also that they took these
features to apply to things other than our systems of representation. The last point is of
some significance. For, although the same feature may characterize both the object
represented and the system by which it is represented, the reason why the feature
characterizes the system could be that it characterizes the object. At times, our
representations may be inexact because the things they represent are inexact. At least,
the ancients, and especially Plato and Aristotle, thought so. This assumption on their
part—namely, that a certain relation of congruence holds between the
exactness/inexactness of the world and that of our systems of representation—may in
part explain why they thought that certain types of inexactness could not be eliminated
from our accounts of the world.
If it is true that Aristotle designates a variety of features as inexactness (exactness)
and considers some to be features of our representations of
― 3 ―
the world, others of the world itself, while still others of both our representations and
the world, then it is quite possible that the epistemological consequences of inexactness
themselves vary. It is possible that while some types of inexactness have important
epistemological consequences, others do not. Indeed, as I shall argue below, in some
cases the epistemological consequences that have been of concern to students of the
N.E. are consequences of exactness rather than of inexactness.
My focus in this study will also be on Aristotle's remarks on exactness/ inexactness
in the N.E. Despite their importance in the scholarly tradition, these remarks from the
N.E. and the rest of the treatises on conduct have not been identified in their entirety.
They are collected here for the first time and form the data of the present
investigation.[1] The investigation is, thus, data-driven; it is guided by the
methodological principle of systematically collecting the relevant data and using them as
the basis for any conclusions to be drawn about the issues pertaining to exactness. An
additional methodological principle guiding the present investigation is that of providing
the strongest textual support possible for any thesis attributed to Aristotle in the course
of this discussion. As a consequence, I often give many references from Aristotle's
works in support of a claim, thus assuring as much as possible that the claim is an
incontrovertible component of Aristotle's thought. For, as students of Aristotle's writings
know, it is often quite easy to misconstrue his intentions by relying on isolated textual
evidence from his works.
I will, of course, use in my discussion remarks on exactness made by Aristotle in his
works that are not concerned with matters of conduct. They will be very useful in the
effort to explicate the meaning of Aristotle's remarks in the ethical treatises. In addition,
what Aristotle says about exactness/inexactness in treatises other than those dealing
with matters of conduct is of importance when determining why he takes inexactness to
be more problematic for the disciplines dealing with matters of conduct than it is for the
other kinds of disciplines.
I wish, nonetheless, to make clear at the outset that I shall not discuss in detail all
the remarks Aristotle makes in his writings on exactness/ inexactness, nor shall I be
concerned with every issue the ancients associated with exactness. My concern will be
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almost exclusively with the kinds of questions I have raised above. I will be focusing,
then, primarily on those questions that are of the greatest philosophical interest—that
is, questions about the various types of exactness/inexactness, the sources of
inexactness, the kinds of things that can be exact/inexact, the relation between the
exactness/inexactness of a thing and of the means we use to describe or explain or
represent it (e.g., linguistic expressions, concepts, propositions), the epistemological
consequences of inexactness, the elimi-
― 4 ―
nability of inexactness from our accounts or other means of description or
representation, and so forth.
It is evident, however, that these are not the only issues the ancients associated
with the features of exactness/inexactness. To them, these matters had a significance
that went beyond the philosophical concerns listed above. They had, for example,
political significance. Thus, Xenophon associates exactness or accuracy with the
aristocracy, implying perhaps that, in contrast to democracy and those who advocate it,
the aristocrats are guided by a clear or exact vision of the moral and political ideals and
do not deviate in their actions from such a vision.[2] In this sense, exactness seems to
be a trait of character, a quality that has moral and political significance. As we shall see
below, both Plato and Aristotle at times see the pursuit of exactness in certain contexts
as indicative of an undesirable quality in a person. In the hands of the tragic poets
exactness even acquires a tragic dimension. Thus, Euripides in the Hippolytus has
Phaedra's nurse urging her not to set standards that are too exact and therefore difficult
to realize; and he contrasts the chorus of women (who wish not to have an accurate
opinion about what is the proper thing to do in the situation in which the protagonists of
the play find themselves) to Phaedra and Hippolytus who have accurate
opinions—opinions that prove in the end catastrophic.[3]
These political, ethical, or even tragic dimensions associated with exactness by the
ancients are by no means unimportant. On the contrary, they are of considerable
importance, and perhaps deserve a study of their own. Such aspects, however, need to
be distinguished from the strictly philosophical ones, enumerated above, that I will focus
on in the present study.
In addition to the kinds of philosophical problems I listed above—the kinds of
problems that Aristotle himself recognizes—there are a number of other questions that I
will be concerned with in this study. There are questions, for example, about (1) the
philosophical significance of Aristotle's views on exactness, (2) the place of these views
in the context of the philosophical tradition that forms the background to Aristotle's own
thought, and (3) the truth or plausibility of Aristotle's claims about exactness.
With regard to questions of the first kind, we shall see that Aristotle's observations
on exactness are of considerable philosophical importance. Many of them are not very
different from the observations of some contemporary philosophers, and the problems
in response to which he develops some of his views on exactness are at the center of
many contemporary philosophical discussions. This is especially true, for example, of
Aristotle's discussion of the indefiniteness or vagueness of matters of conduct, of the
supposed failure of propositions about certain domains to be
― 5 ―
universally true, of the problem associated with constructing explanations or
demonstrative syllogisms with premises that are inexact, or of his proposal for a
pragmatic account of some types of inexactness. The discussion of some of these
problems forms an almost continuous thread in the Western philosophical tradition that
extends from Plato and Aristotle to Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, and more recently
to Gareth Evans and Saul Kripke.
In general, Aristotle's observations on exactness in ethics constitute some of the
most important criticisms of an ideal of ethical knowledge that has fascinated
philosophers from Plato to Spinoza, to some of the utilitarians, and to Rawls. The ideal,
of course, is the one embodied in the view that ethics is or can be as exact a discipline
as those that are considered to be the paradigms of exactness and demonstrative rigor:
the mathematical disciplines. Indeed, as we shall see, some philosophers even think
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that ethics can be more exact and rigorous than the mathematical disciplines. Although
Aristotle himself espouses this ideal as strongly as anyone in relation to some domains
or disciplines, his observations on the exactness of the subject matter and accounts of
ethics provide us with some of the most perceptive criticisms of this ideal of ethical
knowledge.
With regard to the second kind of question, I shall argue that Aristotle's remarks on
exactness raise some fundamental questions about certain views that are central to the
philosophical tradition which he inherited or accepted. In some of them Aristotle is
questioning some of the deepest and most pervasive assumptions in Socrates' and
Plato's as well as his own thought—for example, that essentialism can be extended to all
domains, or that rigorous knowledge is possible in certain domains, or that such
knowledge is needed for practical purposes.
In connection with questions of the third type, we are all aware that determining the
truth or plausibility of any philosophical thesis is, of course, not an easy matter. In some
cases there are obvious counterexamples to a thesis. In others the task may prove
more difficult. But often what is of philosophical interest in a thesis are the assumptions
that lie behind it, the assumptions that motivate it. Although I will be critically assessing
the various claims Aristotle makes, often my main concern will be with uncovering the
assumptions that lie behind some of these Aristotelian claims.
An Overview
The remainder of the book is divided into nine chapters, each dealing with some aspect
of exactness or a related topic. The argument of each chapter is at times lengthy and
complex, as is the overall argument of the book.
― 6 ―
The brief overview that follows is offered in the hope that it will be of use to the reader.
The following chapter is devoted to an account of the philosophical background to
Aristotle's thought, my aim being to isolate those features that are necessary for
understanding Aristotle's remarks on exactness. The philosophical background in this
case is, of course, the thought of Socrates and Plato. Socrates makes certain
assumptions about the metaphysical character of matters of conduct or of the objects
he is trying to define, about the nature and role of definitions, and about the nature of
knowledge. These assumptions are also accepted by Plato, who considers the Forms
that are related to matters of conduct to be some of the most perfect or exact objects,
to be the sorts of things about which there can be knowledge of the most rigorous kind.
Aristotle himself at times, especially when he speaks as a logician, embraces some of
these assumptions—for example, the one concerning essentialism. But in some of his
remarks on exactness, Aristotle questions whether essentialism of the kind advocated
by Socrates, Plato, and at times himself obtains in the case of matters of conduct.
Some, or perhaps all, matters of conduct lack a fixed and invariable essential structure;
they are indefinite. In general, I argue here that many of Aristotle's remarks on
exactness are aimed at some of these assumptions about the metaphysical character of
things, the definability of certain things, or the possibility of exact knowledge in certain
domains.
In chapter 3, I explore the nature of the goals Aristotle ascribes to ethical inquiry.
This matter is of importance in part because Aristotle claims that some types of
inexactness in ethics are due to the nature of its goals. There has been much dispute in
the Aristotelian scholarly tradition about this matter, with some scholars claiming that
the goals of ethics are purely cognitive and others claiming that they are almost
indistinguishable from practice. I argue here that the strategy often used by Plato to
eliminate certain goals—that is, the appeal to the transitivity of desires and
goals—cannot be used to eliminate the cognitive goals of ethics. Aristotle himself
accepts the transitivity of desires, pursuits, or goals, but he does not think that it can be
used to eliminate the cognitive goals of ethics. The proper goals of ethics, like those of
medicine or of any other discipline, are cognitive, although its ultimate goals are,
according to Aristotle, practical. Aristotle, despite what he at times appears to be
saying, assumes that ethics is an inquiry with certain cognitive objectives that are
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subordinate to practical objectives. This supposed subordination of the cognitive goals of
ethics to practical objectives is, according to Aristotle, the source of some types of
inexactness in ethics. It also raises a question about the extent to which such
subordinate cognitive objectives resemble the objectives of the theoretical disciplines. I
argue here that in some respects they do, but not in all.
― 7 ―
In chapter 4, I examine in depth some general issues about exactness/ inexactness that
are presupposed by the discussion in the remaining chapters. I discuss in some detail
the various terms Aristotle uses to designate the features of exactness or inexactness
he identifies, and I argue that not all these terms signify the same thing, that there are
different features of exactness or inexactness. I also show that Aristotle attributes
exactness/inexactness both at the level of the subject matter a discipline studies and at
the level of the discipline itself. I then explore the various sources of inexactness at the
level of the discipline itself, seeking to identify types of inexactness which, on account of
the sources that generate them, can be eliminated. I also formulate and explore
Aristotle's thesis that some kind of congruence holds between the
exactness/inexactness of the two levels. Although I argue against this Aristotelian
thesis, I give some reasons that might have motivated Aristotle's belief in such a thesis.
I also show that in many cases Aristotle thinks that the inexactness of ethical accounts
cannot be eliminated—that is, that any accounts of matters of conduct, not only his
own, will be inexact.
In chapter 5, I explore the kind of inexactness Aristotle refers to as being in outline
or lacking in detail. I show that this is a kind of inexactness that can characterize only a
discipline; it is only formal. I further show that, although this type of formal inexactness
has many sources, its primary source is the goals of ethics. Aristotle's conception of the
(ultimate) goals of ethics as practical and his belief that practice deals with particulars
lead him to the conclusion that, if ethics is to realize its goals, it has to reach the
particulars. But this, Aristotle argues, cannot be done. Therefore ethical accounts are
essentially inexact; their inexactness cannot be eliminated. With regard to the
epistemological consequences of this type of inexactness, I argue that, contrary to what
commentators have always assumed, what proves more problematic is the exactness
Aristotle thinks ethics should achieve rather than the inexactness he is ultimately
required to accept. If the exactness Aristotle thinks is required by the practical goals of
ethics were to be attained, it would introduce propositions that could not function as
premises in Aristotelian syllogisms.
In chapter 6, I discuss the kind of inexactness Aristotle characterizes as fluctuation
or "being for the most part." This type of inexactness can apply to both the subject
matter of a discipline and to the accounts the discipline gives of its subject matter.
Aristotle argues that just as the subject matter of ethics fluctuates or is for the most
part, so are the propositions about it true for the most part. I examine the scope of this
kind of inexactness, according to Aristotle, and discuss the contrasts Aristotle draws
between the necessary, that which is always, that which is for the most part, and the
fortuitous. I argue here that Aristotle takes the for the most part to be contingent, but
"being for the most part" does not simply mean
― 8 ―
"contingent." The fortuitous is also contingent, as is what occurs by chance. What is for
the most part is, according to Aristotle, a part of the causal regularities of nature, and
therefore can be the subject of explanation or scientific understanding.
In chapter 7, I examine whether and how demonstration of what is for the most part
is possible. Many scholars have, for a variety of reasons, argued that there is no
demonstration of what is for the most part, that this type of inexactness implies that the
disciplines whose subject matter is for the most part fall outside the class of
demonstrative disciplines. I argue here that this is not so, that the disciplines whose
subject matter is for the most part may not be demonstrative for many reasons, but not
necessarily on account of the fact that their subject matter is for the most part. I give
evidence that shows Aristotle did not infer that a discipline is nondemonstrative from
the fact that its subject matter is for the most part. On the contrary, he insists that
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there is demonstration of what is for the most part.
The problem is, of course, to show how demonstration is possible in domains that
are for the most part. That there is a problem with demonstration in domains that are
for the most part was recognized by the ancient commentators, and the problem has
never been solved. This problem is of importance not only in relation to ethics but also
in relation to all the disciplines investigating nature, since most of nature is, according
to Aristotle, for the most part. I identify here Aristotle's way of dealing with the problem
of the validity of for-the-most-part syllogisms and assess its viability.
I argue first that Aristotle enlarges the conception of demonstration to include, in
addition to the absolute or strict demonstration that he and Plato associate with certain
disciplines and domains, some weaker forms of demonstration. Aristotle accepts as
demonstrations proofs that consist of syllogisms whose premises are not necessary. I
then explain how Aristotle construes for-the-most-part syllogisms in order to deal with
the problem of validity. I argue that he assimilates such syllogisms into those that he
considers to be unproblematic with respect to their validity—namely, the syllogisms that
are about what is always or necessary—and relies on some nonformal means for
reminding us that syllogisms about what is for the most part are deficient or inexact;
they are not as good as those that are about what is always or necessary. Aristotle's
way of dealing with the problem of the validity of these nonstandard syllogims has, as I
point out, its limitations.
But the condition of validity is not the only one that demonstrative syllogisms have
to meet. I argue that there is no reason why syllogisms whose premises are true for the
most part cannot meet the other conditions Aristotle requires of demonstrative
syllogisms. If they do meet these con-
― 9 ―
ditions, then they are demonstrations of the weaker or less exact kind. This weaker or
less exact kind of demonstration is not empty; it is the kind that, according to Aristotle,
we encounter in our explanations in the domain of nature. An explanation, therefore, of
how Aristotle conceives of demonstration in the domain of conduct is of the greatest
importance—it is at the same time an explanation of how he conceives of demonstration
in the domain of nature and the disciplines dealing with it.
Finally, I examine whether the kind of inexactness that generates the above
problems with demonstration in certain domains can be eliminated from ethical
accounts. I consider here two techniques Aristotle employs for eliminating this type of
inexactness from accounts of natural phenomena—that is, the technique of restricting
the scope of the logical subject of a proposition that is true for the most part and the
technique of seeking exceptionless causal explanations; I assess the effectiveness of
these techniques when applied to propositions that are about matters of conduct.
In chapter 8, I discuss another type of inexactness Aristotle attributes to matters of
conduct, namely, that of vagueness or indefiniteness. This type of inexactness
characterizes, according to Aristotle, the domain of nature as well. But matters of
conduct are supposedly affected much more by this kind of inexactness than natural
phenomena. They lack a fixed and well-defined nature or structure. I show here that
Aristotle, in insisting that matters of conduct are vague or indefinite, is questioning
Socrates' and Plato's assumption that strict essentialism obtains in every domain.
Indeed, this is an assumption that Aristotle himself often accepts, especially when he,
as a logician, attempts to explain the nature of definition and to determine the
conditions that must be met by anything that is to be defined.
Now the feature of vagueness, whether it characterizes the world or our language,
has always been considered to give rise to serious problems. Aristotle, of course,
attributes the feature to both the world and to our accounts of it. He also recognizes the
problems the feature generates, namely, the difficulty of defining vague or indefinite
things or demonstrating with premises that are vague. Aristotle, however, does not go
as far as Russell and Frege when they claim that the world cannot be vague, that vague
concepts are not concepts at all, or that logic does not apply to anything that employs
vague symbols. Finally, I explore here some techniques Aristotle employs elsewhere for
dealing with vagueness, techniques that seem to be successful in avoiding to some
extent vagueness in our definitions of natural phenomena. I show here that there are
some reasons for being, as Aristotle is, less optimistic about the success of these
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techniques when applied to ethical accounts than when they are applied to accounts of
natural phenomena.
In chapter 9, I discuss Aristotle's attempt to link some types of inex-
― 10 ―
actness to the goals of a discipline. Aristotle's attempt to do so parallels the recent
attempts to link explanation to some pragmatic considerations. I explore the similarities
and differences between the two attempts and show that the way Aristotle conceives of
the goals of a discipline to which he relativizes exactness is quite different from the way
neopragmatists conceive of the goals or purposes to which they relativize explanation.
Aristotle takes the goals of a discipline to be fixed, to be part of the essence of a
discipline. He also thinks that only a certain well-defined level of exactness will satisfy
the goals of each discipline. Thus, exactness itself cannot be relativized to any individual
interest or purpose but only to those that define the discipline. Given these assumptions
on Aristotle's part, we can understand why he insists that in any discipline we must seek
only that level of exactness required by the discipline. And given the assumption
Aristotle makes about ethics being practical, we can see why he thinks that the
exactness Plato demands of ethics is not required. But I argue that there are several
problems with some of Aristotle's claims. It is difficult, for example, to fix the
appropriate level of exactness for a discipline. More importantly, and in agreement with
Plato, I argue that there are cases where practice may demand the utmost exactness,
even more than required by the most rigorous theoretical disciplines.
In the last chapter I discuss in more detail whether Aristotle, given the kinds of
inexactness he attributes to matters of conduct and to our accounts of them, leaves any
place for universality or generality and truth in ethical theory. I argue here that,
contrary to claims by some recent philosophers, Aristotle does not eliminate the role of
universality or truth in ethical theory. Ethical theory must aim at the universal and at
truth, but it must also, because of its ultimate practical goals, reach down to the
particular and recognize that its propositions are not as true as the propositions in some
other domains presumably are.
The Question of Method
Several of the issues I discuss in this study to some extent bear on the question
regarding Aristotle's conception of the method of ethics. This is, as is well known, a
rather perplexing question in Aristotelian scholarship. There is considerable
disagreement among scholars as to what method Aristotle himself uses in his ethical
investigation or advocates as the appropriate one for ethics.
Some interpreters of Aristotle's writings claim that Aristotle uses the demonstrative
method. Others claim that he relies on the inductive method. Still others argue that he
uses or advocates the dialectical method.[4] Interest in the last method has increased
considerably in recent years as a result of the work of G. E. L. Owen, who has argued
that the dialectical
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method encompasses not only the use of established opinions in any inquiry but also a
form of conceptual analysis or investigation.[5] There is no doubt that the dialectical
method is important to Aristotle. Whether it is the method Aristotle himself uses in his
ethical investigations or one that he identifies as the method of ethics are matters that
have yet to be settled.[6] For, as Owen points out, all of Aristotle's treatises, including
the scientific ones (e.g., the Phys. and the biological treatises), rely to some extent on
an examination of established opinions or of ordinary concepts; they use to some extent
the dialectical method. Aristotle himself in the Top. advocates the dialectical method as
the method by which the basic principles of all sciences are obtained or justified. How,
then, does ethics differ from the rest of the disciplines?
However, my aim in this study is not to determine the method Aristotle uses or
advocates in ethical inquiry. Rather, my concerns are the ones I listed earlier: namely,
the nature of the exactness/inexactness in ethics and their epistemological
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