Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia

226 Pages·1995·11.95 MB·English

by  T. D. J. Chappell

Aristotle and Augustine on
Freedom
Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and
Akrasia
T.D.J. Chappell
ARISTOTLE AND AUGUSTINE ON FREEDOM
This page intentionally left blank
Aristotle and
Augustine on
Freedonl
Two Theories of Freedom,
Voluntary Action and Akrasia
T. D. J. Chappell
Lecturerin Philosoplly
UniversityofEastAnglia
©T. D.J.Chappell1995
Allrightsreserved.Noreproduction,copyortransmissionof
thispublicationmaybemadewithoutwrittenpermission.
Noparagraphofthispublicationmaybereproduced,copiedor
transmittedsavewithwrittenpermissionorinaccordancewith
theprovisionsoftheCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988,
orundertheternlSofanylicencepermittinglimitedcopying
issuedbytheCopyrightLicensingAgency,90TottenhamCourt
Road,LondonW1P9HE.
Anypersonwhodoesanyunauthorisedactinrelationtothis
publicationInaybeliabletocriminalprosecutionandcivil
claimsfordamages.
FirstpublishedinGreatBritain1995by
MACMILLANPRESSLTD
Houndmills,Basingstoke,HampshireRG21 2XS
and London
Companiesandrepresentatives
throughouttheworld
Acataloguerecordforthisbookisavailable
[rolntheBritishLibrarv.
ISBN0-333-62537-4
Transferredtodigitalprinting1998
02/780
PrintedinGreatBritainby
AntonyRoweLtd,Chippenham,Wiltshire
FirstpublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica1995by
ScholarlyandReferenceDivision,
ST.MARTIN'SPRESS,INC.,
175FifthAvenue,
NewYork,N.Y.10010
ISBN0-312-12467-8
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Chappell,T. D.J.(TimothyD.].)
Aristotleand Augustineonfreedom: twotheoriesoffreedom,
voluntaryaction,andakrasia / T.D.}.Chappell.
p. em.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesand index.
ISBN0-312-12467-8
1.FreewiHanddeterminism. 2.Aristotle-Viewsonfreewill.
3.Augustine,Saint,BishopofHippo-Viewsonfreewill.
B105.LASC45 1995
123'5'0922-dc20 94-38184
CIP
In memoriam
GillianPatriciaeChappell
30.4.1937
13.12.1989
Quiafeeisti nosad Te
et inquietumestcornostrum
donee requ;eseat in Te
This page intentionally left blank
Byliberty, then,wecanonlymeanapowerofactingornotacting,
accordingtothedeterminationsofthewill;thatis,ifwechooseto
remain at rest, we may; ifwechoose to move, wealsomay. Now
thishypotheticallibertyisuniversallyallowedtobelongtoevery
one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject
ofdispute.
DavidHume: An Enquiryconcerning
Human Understanding (1775), VIII.l
It does not seem to be self contradictory to suppose that [the
acceptanceofdeterminismcould lead tothedecayorrepudiation
of participant reactive attitudes]... But I am strongly inclined to
think that it is, for us as we are, practically inconceivable. The
human commitment to participation in ordinary inter-personal
relationshipsistoothoroughgoingandtoodeeplyrootedfor usto
take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction
might so change our world that, in it, there were no longer any
such things as interpersonal relationships as we normally under
stand them.
PeterStrawson: 'Freedomand Resentment',
ProceedingsoftheBritishAcademy, 1962
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Preface xi
PartI Aristotle
1 TheLimitsoftheVoluntary 3
1.1. 'Positive'and 'Negative'TheoriesofFreedom 3
1.2. Compulsion,Duress,PersuasionandFreeAction 6
1.3. TheVarietiesofIgnorance 18
1.4. Irrationality 25
2 Freedom,Abilityand Knowledge 32
2.1. Function,ProcessandAbilitytoDoOtherwise 32
2.2. Aristotle'sEpistemology 47
3 PracticalReasoning 55
3.1. Proairesis 56
3.2. TheDifferencebetweenActiononProairesis and
.VoluntaryAction 61
3.3. Deliberation 66
3.4. PracticalReasoningand the 'PracticalSyllogism' 71
3.5. Conclusion 86
4 TheVarietiesofAkrasia 88
4.1. How toSolvethe ProblemofAkrasia 88
4.2. Aristotle'sAccount 98
4.3. TheVarietiesofAkrasia 112
PartII Augustine
5 Voluntarinessand ResponsibilityinAugustine 121
5.1. Introduction 121
5.2. TheLinkingofVoluntarinessandResponsibility 122
5.3. TwoofAugustine'sConditionsofVoluntaryAction 125
5.4. Ignorantia and Difficultas 130
5.5. FromtheEarliertothe LaterTheory 134
5.6. Conclusion 139
ix