aristotelian virtue ethics and the self-absorption objection

163 Pages·2017·1.45 MB·English

ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE SELF-ABSORPTION
OBJECTION
ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE SELF-ABSORPTION
OBJECTION

BY JEFFREY D’SOUZA, M.A.

A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University © Copyright Jeffrey D’Souza, March 2017
McMaster University DOCTOR OF ARTS (2017) Hamilton, Ontario
(Philosophy)
TITLE: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and the Self-Absorption Objection
AUTHOR: Jeffrey D’Souza, M.A. (Ryerson University); H.B.A. (University of
Toronto)
SUPERVISOR: Professor Mark Johnstone
NUMBER OF PAGES: vii, 155

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Lay Abstract: In this dissertation, I advance a neo-Aristotelian account of moral
motivation that is immune from what I call the “self-absorption objection.”
Roughly, proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-
Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they wrongly prescribe that our
ultimate reason for acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an
attempt to sidestep this objection, I offer what I call the altruistic account of
motivation. On this account, the virtuous agent’s main reason for acting virtuously
is based on her desire to act in accordance with a particular conception of the
good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that it is good for her,
but rather good, qua human goodness.

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Abstract: Aristotelian eudaimonism – as Daniel Russell puts it – is understood as
two things at once: it is the final end for practical reasoning, and it is a good
human life for the one living it. This understanding of Aristotelian eudaimonism,
on which one’s ultimate reason for doing all that one does is one’s own
eudaimonia, has given rise to what I call the “self-absorption objection.” Roughly,
proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian
accounts of moral motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for
acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an attempt to
adequately address this objection, I break with those contemporary neo-
Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation that insist that the virtuous agent ought
to be understood as performing virtuous actions ultimately for the sake of her own
eudaimonia (enlarged, no doubt, to include the eudaimonia of others). On the
alternative neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation I go on to defend – what
I call the altruistic account of motivation – the virtuous agent’s ultimate reason for
acting virtuously is based on a desire to act in accordance with her particular
conception of the good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that
it is good for her, but rather good, qua human goodness. More specifically, on the
altruistic account of motivation I advance, the virtuous agent may be understood
as being motivated by human goodness, valuing objects and persons only insofar
as they participate in human goodness, and where all of the virtuous agent’s
reasons, values, motivations, and justifications are cashed out in terms of human
goodness – as they say – “all the way down.”

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Acknowledgements: I would like to thank everyone who has helped make it
possible for me to complete this thesis. This list includes more people than I can
mention here, but I am especially indebted to a few individuals, and I think that
the virtues of gratitude and honesty require me to explicitly recognize these
individuals here. First, I would like to thank Dr. Jo Kornegay for instilling in me a
passion and love for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Her teachings captivated me,
and helped me appreciate and understand the significance of Aristotle’s ethics, the
importance of moral character, and the value in studying what it means to live
well. Second, I would like to thank my 1st Reader, Dr. Violetta Igneski. Her
uncanny ability to always be able to put her finger on the contentious premise or
missing link in of one of my arguments, challenged me to refine my ideas, and
sharpen my criticisms. My project greatly benefited from being able to work
closely with her, and I am grateful for all of her help. Third, I would like to thank
Dr. John Hacker-Wright. His expertise of contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue
ethics challenged me to explore the thrust behind the self-absorption objection,
meaningfully grapple with extant neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation,
and helped me to develop my own positive view. He has been a remarkable
mentor and friend to me, and I feel very lucky to have had him serve as my 2nd
Reader.
My greatest debt is to my Supervisor, Dr. Mark Johnstone. His knowledge and
understanding of Aristotle’s ethics and moral psychology helped me immensely in
developing the structure, views, and arguments contained in this dissertation. I am
especially thankful for all of his comments, questions, guidance, patience,
support, and friendship, without which this dissertation would not have been
possible. I feel very blessed to have been able to work closely with such a brilliant
mind, and virtuous individual.
Finally, a special thanks to all of the faculty (especially Dr. Elisabeth Gedge),
administrators (Kim Squissato and Rabia Awan) and students in the Department
of Philosophy at McMaster University. The support, guidance, and friendship I
received from all of you made these past few years remarkable.

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I dedicate this dissertation to all of the virtuous individuals in my life. The
excellence that you have all displayed in living well has inspired me, and has been
a constant source of strength.

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Contents

Introduction... ………………………………………………………………….….1

1. The Self-Absorption Objection....……………………………………………..11
1.1. The Self-Absorption Objection: A Historical Overview.…………………...13
1.2. Contemporary Critiques …………………………………………………….22
1.3. The Test ……………………………………………………………………..34

2. The Self-Absorption Objection: Responses & Rejoinders ....……………...…38
2.1. Julia Annas’ Developmental Approach ………………………………….…40
2.2. Mark Lebar’s Two Standpoint Approach …………………………………..49
2.3. Christopher Toner’s Reconceptualization Approach ……………………….61

3. The Occurrent Motivation of the Virtuous Agent ...…………………………. 68
3.1. The Recognition View ……………………………………………………...69
3.2. In Defense of the Recognition View ………………………………………..78

4. Why A Neo-Aristotelian Need Not Adopt the Eudaemonist Axiom …………85
4.1. The Eudaemonist Axiom & Aristotle’s Ethics ……………………………..86
4.2. The Eudaemonist Axiom: Unsettling the Foundation ………………………90

5. An Altruistic Account of Motivation ……………………………………..…107
5.1. Altruism & Eudaimonism …………………………………………………109
5.2. Early Moral Education & Natural Virtue ………………………………….114
5.3. An Altruistic Account of Moral Motivation ………………………………118
5.4. The Altruistic Account of Motivation and Aristotle’s Ethics ……………. 130
5.5. The Virtuous Agent’s Account of Motivation: A Harmonious Account … 135
Conclusion.…………………………………………………………………..…139
Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………144

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Ph.D Thesis – Jeffrey D’Souza; McMaster University – Philosophy

Introduction

“Suppose, when wondering whether we really ought to act in the ways usually
called moral, we are told as a means of resolving our doubt that those acts are
right which produce happiness. We at once ask: ‘Whose happiness?’ If we are
told ‘Our own happiness’, then though we shall lose our hesitation to act in these
ways, we shall not recover our sense that we ought to do so.” (Prichard, “Does
Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”1912)

What matters, morally speaking, is not just what we do, but why we do it.
Following Immanuel Kant, we may think that actions performed in accordance
with duty, though not from the motive of duty, may be said to have absolutely no
moral worth.1 If this seems too strong, we may want to follow Aristotle, who
holds that voluntary actions performed in accordance with the moral virtues are in
some sense praiseworthy, but who nonetheless insists that a truly virtuous action,
must, mutatis mutandis, be performed for the right reason.2 Regardless, however,
of where we stand on the question of whether a motive can affect the moral
quality of an action, I take it that most will agree that when it comes to “character-
based” normative ethical theories – that is, those on which the assessment of one’s
character is taken to be primary – the evaluation of motives ought to play a central
role.3 This is because, as Bernard Mayo has correctly emphasized, virtue ethics
has to do with “being” – as opposed to “doing” – and, in order to get an accurate
sense as to what type of person someone is, we must pay special attention to the
inner qualities of the agent, including, and most importantly, one’s motivations.4
No doubt, some moral philosophers may wish to push back here, and insist
that we can get an accurate sense of what type of person someone is without
paying attention to the individual’s motivations. One might argue that we can get
a fairly good idea regarding the content of an individual’s character simply by

1 Take, for instance, Kant’s “sympathetic philanthropist” who acts beneficently toward others, but
only because he finds “an inner pleasure in spreading happiness” to others. For Kant, “an action of
this kind, however right and however amiable it may be has … no … moral worth.” Kant,
Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. H.J. Paton (1964) P. 66.
2 Aristotle writes “but for actions in accord with the virtues to be done temperately or justly it does
not suffice that they themselves have the right qualities. Rather, the agent must also be in the right
state when he does them. First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must
decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and, third, he must also do them from a firm
and unchanging state.” EN 1105a 29-35.
3 A notable exception here is Julia Driver. Driver argues that good motives are not necessary for an
adequate theory of virtue. She writes, “as is the case with good intentions, good motives – where
good motives are understood to be one’s having good objects – will not be necessary either.”
Driver, Julia. Uneasy Virtue. (2001) P. 57.
4 By “being” Mayo has in mind one’s character. Mayo writes, “when we speak of a moral quality
such as courage, and say that a certain action was courageous, we are not merely saying something
about the action. We are referring, not so much to what is done, as to the kind of person by whom
we take it to have been done. We connect, by means of imputed motives and intentions, with the
character of the agent as courageous.” Mayo, Bernard. Ethics and the Moral Life. (1958) P. 211.
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Ph.D Thesis – Jeffrey D’Souza; McMaster University – Philosophy

paying attention to her dispositions, habits, and actions. And, based on this – it
might be argued – we may be able to draw fairly reliable inferences regarding the
type of character an individual possesses without referring to motives. Now, while
such a view might sound plausible at first glance, and seems to avoid a wide array
of challenges – e.g., the problem of accessing what someone’s motivation actually
is – it is, I argue, unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory because while paying
attention to someone’s habits, dispositions, and actions may provide some insight
into an individual’s character, it does not provide us with sufficient insight to
make the everyday moral judgements and evaluations that we wish to make.5 In
other words, without having access to why an individual does what she does, we
cannot call someone “benevolent” or “generous” or “kind” with any degree of
certainty. For, as we know all too well, people may appear caring, generous, and
kind, when viewed based on their actions alone, but upon discovering what their
true motivates are, we may find out that they are not the wonderful people that we
thought they were.6 While I take it that we’ve all experienced situations such as
this, perhaps a more concrete example may help to illuminate what I have in
mind.
Imagine a world-renowned scholar, with a great gift for synthesizing and
analyzing complex global issues, such as poverty. Further imagine that while this
individual would prefer spending almost all of his time doing his own research
and working on his own publications, he spends a great deal of time performing
service work for his department and helping others with their research. Let’s say
that he takes seriously recruiting the best and brightest students to his university,
supervises and lends his expertise to others, is relentless in terms of securing
financial aid for all of the students under his tutelage, and so on. Based on these
actions alone, it appears that this individual may be said to be benevolent,
generous, and kind. Now, suppose, that we find out that this particular individual
performed all of the actions above, not because he wanted to, say, help promising
graduate students, but rather because he desired to put himself in a position where
he might be able to obtain sexual relations with female graduate students. That is,
suppose we find out that he recruited the best and the brightest, lent his expertise,
and helped to secure financial aid for the students under his tutelage primarily for
the sake of cultivating relationships with female graduate students, with the hope
that such relationships might go on to include a sexual component down the road.
Here, I take it that even if our world renowned scholar never goes on to have any
sexual relations with any of the students under his tutelage, the mere fact that he
performed all of these actions for the sake of his own sexual desires is enough, I
think, to rule out calling him benevolent, generous, or kind. Further, to attribute
such character traits to him, it seems, would be deeply misleading. What follows

5 What is missing, I contend, is access to the inner thoughts and motivations of the individual.
6 To be sure, my point here is not that if one pays attention to one’s motives, it necessary follows
that one will make reliable moral judgments regarding an individual’s character. Rather, my point
is only that by ignoring why one does what one does, we are unable to make character-based
judgments and evaluations with any degree of certainty.
2