Architects of Political Change: Constitutional Quandaries and Social Choice Theory (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

335 Pages·2006·2.14 MB·English

by  Norman Schofield

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ARCHITECTS OF POLITICAL CHANGE
This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison’s argument
inFederalistXof1787,usingideasfromsocialchoicetheoryandfromthe
workofDouglassNorth,MancurOlson,andWilliamRiker.Itsfocusisnot
on social choice theory itself, but on the use of this theory as a heuristic
device to better understand democratic institutions. The treatment adapts a
formalmodelofelectionstoconsiderrapidconstitutionalchangeatperiods
whensocietiesfacesocialquandaries.Thetopicsexploredinthebookinclude
Britain’sreorganizationofitsfiscalsystemintheeighteenthcenturytopros-
ecuteitswarswithFrance;theColonies’decisiontodeclareindependencein
1776; Madison’s argument about the “probability of fit choice” during the
Ratificationperiodof1787–8;theargumentbetweenHamiltonandJefferson
in1798–1800overthelong-runorganizationoftheU.S.economy;theDred
Scottdecisionof1857andtheelectionofLincolnin1860;LyndonJohnson
andthe“criticalrealignment”of1964;andKeynes’srejectionoftheequilib-
riumthesisin1937andthecreationoftheBrettonWoodsinstitutionsafter
1944.
Norman Schofield is the William Taussig Professor of Political Economy at
WashingtonUnivesityinSt.Louis.HehasservedasFulbrightDistinguished
Professor of American Studies at Humboldt University Berlin in 2003–4,
a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at
Stanford in 1988–9, and Sherman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the
CaliforniaInstituteofTechnologyin1983–4.ProfessorSchofieldistheauthor
ofMathematicalMethodsinEconomicsandSocialChoice(2003),Multiparty
Government(coauthoredwithMichaelLaver,1990),andSocialChoiceand
Democracy(1985).HereceivedtheWilliamRikerPrizein2002forcontribu-
tionstopoliticaltheoryandisco-receipientwithGaryMilleroftheJackL.
WalkerPrizeforthebestarticleonpoliticalorganizationsandpartiesinthe
AmericanPoliticalScienceReviewfor2002–4.
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political economy of institutions and decisions
SeriesEditor
StephenAnsolabehere,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
FoundingEditors
JamesE.Alt,HarvardUniversity
DouglassC.North,WashingtonUniversity,St.Louis
Otherbooksintheseries
AlbertoAlesinaandHowardRosenthal,PartisanPolitics,DividedGovernment,
andtheEconomy
LeeJ.Alston,Thra´innEggertsson,andDouglassC.North,eds.,Empirical
StudiesinInstitutionalChange
LeeJ.AlstonandJosephP.Ferrie,SouthernPaternalismandtheRiseofthe
AmericanWelfareState:Economics,Politics,andInstitutions,1865–1965
JamesE.AltandKennethShepsle,eds.,PerspectivesonPositive
PoliticalEconomy
JosephineT.Andrews,WhenMajoritiesFail:TheRussianParliament,
1990–1993
JeffreyS.BanksandEricA.Hanushek,eds.,ModernPoliticalEconomy:Old
Topics,NewDirections
YoramBarzel,EconomicAnalysisofPropertyRights,2ndedition
YoramBarzel,ATheoryoftheState:EconomicRights,LegalRights,andthe
ScopeoftheState
RobertBates,BeyondtheMiracleoftheMarket:ThePoliticalEconomy
ofAgrarianDevelopmentinKenya,2ndedition
CharlesM.Cameron,VetoBargaining:PresidentsandthePolitics
ofNegativePower
KellyH.Chang,AppointingCentralBankers:ThePoliticsofMonetaryPolicy
intheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanMonetaryUnion
PeterCowheyandMathewMcCubbins,eds.,StructureandPolicyinJapan
andtheUnitedStates:AnInstitutionalistApproach
GaryW.Cox,TheEfficientSecret:TheCabinetandtheDevelopment
ofPoliticalPartiesinVictorianEngland
ContinuedonpagefollowingIndex
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ARCHITECTS OF POLITICAL
CHANGE
Constitutional Quandaries and
Social Choice Theory
NORMAN SCHOFIELD
WashingtonUniversityinSaintLouis
v
cambridge university press
Cambridge,NewYork,Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,Singapore,SãoPaulo
Cambridge University Press
TheEdinburghBuilding,Cambridgecb22ru,UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Informationo nthi stitle :www.cambri dge.org/9780521832021
© Norman Schofield 2006
Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisionof
relevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplace
withoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.
Firstpublishedinprintformat 2006
isbn-13 978-0-511-21965-8 eBook(EBL)
isbn-10 0-511-21965-2
eBook(EBL)
isbn-13 978-0-521-83202-1 hardback
isbn-10 0-521-83202-0 hardback
isbn-13 978-0-521-53972-2 paperback
isbn-10 0-521-53972-2 paperback
CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyofurls
forexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication,anddoesnot
guaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain,accurateorappropriate.
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Contents
ListofTablesandFigures pagexi
Preface xiii
1 ConstitutionalQuandariesandSocialChoice 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 BalancingRiskandChaos 3
1.3 PreferencesandJudgments 11
1.4 The“InstitutionalNarrative”oftheBook 17
2 PowerandSocialChoice 23
2.1 Introduction 23
2.2 TheWorldToday 24
2.3 DemocraticDilemmas 30
2.4 TheLogicofEmpire 34
2.5 SocialChoiceTheory:AutocracyandRisk 44
2.6 SocialChoiceinBritain:1625–1776 49
2.7 TheAgrarianEmpireinNorthAmerica 58
2.8 TheEndofEmpireinBritain 64
2.9 ConcludingRemarks 68
3 FranklinandtheWarofIndependence 71
3.1 Introduction 71
3.2 TheQuandaryoftheDeclarationofIndependence 73
3.3 TheDecisiontoDeclareIndependence 80
3.4 Appendixes 85
3.4.1 TheQuebecAct,October7,1774 85
3.4.2 DeclarationandResolvesoftheFirst
ContinentalCongress,October14,1774 90
3.4.3 DeclarationofIndependence,July4,1776 94
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Contents
4 Madison,Jefferson,andCondorcet 98
4.1 TheRatificationoftheConstitution 98
4.2 TheConflictoverUnionandConfederation 100
4.3 SocialChoiceandConstitutionalTheory 113
4.4 LandandCapitalinNorthAmerica,1756–1800 117
4.5 TheInfluenceofCondorcetonMadisonandJefferson 120
4.6 OriginsoftheTwo-PartySysteminthe1790s 125
4.7 ConcludingRemarks 128
4.8 Appendix 132
4.8.1 SpeechbyBenjaminFranklintothe
ConstitutionalConventionon
September17,1787 132
5 LincolnandtheCivilWar 135
5.1 Introduction 135
5.2 TheIntersectionalPartyBalance 136
5.3 DredScottandtheSupremeCourt,1857 146
5.4 TheIllinoisElectionof1858 149
5.5 LincolninNewYorkandNewHaven 155
5.6 ThePresidentialElectionof1860 158
5.7 ConcludingRemarks 163
6 JohnsonandtheCriticalRealignmentof1964 166
6.1 Introduction 166
6.2 PartisanRealignmentsfrom1896to2000 167
6.3 PartyCompetitioninTwoDimensions 170
6.4 EquilibriuminCandidateCompetition 174
6.5 PartyActivistEquilibrium 176
6.6 AJointModelofActivistsandCandidates 178
6.7 ThirdParties 182
6.8 SummaryoftheModel 183
6.9 PartisanStrategies 185
6.10 Choices,CredibleCommitment,andPathDependence 194
6.11 ConcludingRemarks 195
7 KeynesandtheAtlanticConstitution 200
7.1 Introduction 200
7.2 OrderingthePoliticalEconomy 201
7.3 ProphetsofChaos 207
7.4 PoliticalandEconomicBeliefsintheConstitution 212
7.5 TheCollapseofHegemonyinthe1970s 217
7.6 KeynesandtheQuandaryofthe1930s 223
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