Arcana Imperii: Roman Political Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action in the Mid ...

378 Pages·2016·6.95 MB·English

by  Sara Perley

Arcana Imperii: Roman Political
Intelligence, Counterintelligence,
and Covert Action in the
Mid-Republic

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The
Australian National University
Sara Perley
24th November 2016
© Copyright by Sara Perley 2016
All Rights Reserved
Cover Image: Gaius Fabricius Luscinus and Pyrrhus. Ferdinand Bol, 1656.
© Stichting Koninklijk Paleis Amsterdam
This thesis is solely the work of its author. No part of it has previously
been submitted for any degree, or is currently being submitted for any
other degree. To the best of my knowledge, any help received in
preparing this thesis and all sources used have been duly acknowledged.

SARA PERLEY
24th November 2016

Acknowledgements

It is a pleasure to acknowledge and thank the many people who made this dissertation
possible.
I would like to thank the chair of my supervisory panel, Paul Burton, first and
foremost for supplying me with coffee, but also for his expertise, understanding, and
endless patience. I appreciate his vast knowledge and skill, and his assistance in
transforming a somewhat bloated manuscript into a readable form. His efforts and aid
have been invaluable.
I must also acknowledge the support and encouragement from various members and
students of the Centre for Classical Studies and the School of Literature, Languages,
and Linguistics for engaging discussions and debates over the last three years.
I recognise that this research would not have been possible without the financial
support of an Australian Postgraduate Award and I am grateful that the Australian
National University, and specifically the College of Arts and Social Sciences,
recognised my potential in awarding me this scholarship.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends, without whose generous
encouragement and support throughout my life and this project in particular, I would
never have completed this dissertation. This is especially true for Laura, without whom
I would never have achieved so much.

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Abstract

The general scholarly conception of Roman military and political intelligence is
that it was so poor as to be virtually non-existent, that Roman armies and officials
blundered through their affairs and their world with little understanding or
appreciation of the utility and importance of intelligence about their friends, foes, and
neighbours. Some scholars who address the growth of the Roman empire make
assumptions about intelligence usage; those who investigate intelligence practices more
closely tend to focus on military intelligence or intelligence over long periods of
Roman history. The conclusion usually reached is that the Roman state valued and
practiced intelligence very poorly. There are no studies that focus specifically on
political intelligence, and none that focuses on a specific period of Roman history.
This study aims to illuminate the realities of Roman political intelligence for the
period of the mid-republic, and attempts to provide a more nuanced understanding of
Rome’s appreciation for and use of intelligence techniques in their international
relations. Analysis of ancient sources reveals that the Roman understanding of the
intelligence was neither as dire nor unsophisticated as current scholarly consensus
would have us believe. While political intelligence endeavours often failed or from
hindsight might appear inadequate, when examined in their historical context
intelligence efforts were in fact suitable for Roman needs. Roman officials protected
their state through counterintelligence, developed preliminary cultural dossiers
through foreknowledge, undertook concerted efforts to gain more specific intelligence
prior to major international interactions, and on occasion engaged in covert activities
to improve their position and ensure their national security. This is indicative of an
attitude toward the broader Mediterranean world they inhabited, and their place in
that world which was neither blindly aggressive nor defensive, that was neither passive
nor opportunistic, but that was considered, sophisticated, and appreciative of the
complexities of the Mediterranean international system.

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Table of Contents
i
Acknowledgements i
Abstract ii
Abbreviations iv

I – Introduction 1
The Literature 2
Approach 24
Chapter Outline 36
II - Contextualising Roman Intelligence 39
Logistical Problems 42
Socio-Cultural Constraints 57
Conclusion 76
III -Political Counterintelligence 80
The Control of Information 83
The Control of People 99
Political Deception 111
Conclusion 115
IV - Foreknowledge 119
Sources of Foreknowledge 122
Accessibility and Employment of Foreknowledge 141
Conclusion 165
V - Trust but Verify: The Roman Intelligence Cycle 168
5.1 - Collection 176
5.2 - We’ll look into it: Negligence or Verification? 206
5.3 - Intelligence and the Build up to the Third Macedonian War 241
VI - Intelligence and International Interference 263
6.1 Political Interference 268
6.2 Covert Diplomacy, Espionage, and Assassination 296
6.3 Concluding Observations 322
VII - Conclusion 328
VIII - Bibliography 341

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Abbreviations

Abbreviated references generally follow the conventions of The Oxford Classical
Dictionary, eds. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, rev. 4th edn., Oxford 2012.

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I – Introduction

Intelligence is the neglected child of international politics.1 If this is so,
then Roman intelligence is the downtrodden stepchild of Roman studies,
overawed by various (ugly) stepsiblings. There is little discussion about how and
what Roman officials, whether senators or military commanders, knew about
their friends and foes. But in the words of Robert Jervis, ‘even the most close-
minded decision-maker eventually needs to understand the world in which he or
she is operating’.2 Powers in the modern world have spent enormous amounts of
time and money developing organisations to discover information about others
to better understand them and make informed foreign policy decisions. As states
do not exist in a vacuum, to undertake decisive action in relation to other
powers, the leaders of one state need an understanding of the resources,
abilities, intents, and beliefs of neighbouring states. Unless we are to believe that
Roman officials simply blundered along, with no knowledge of anybody except
themselves, then intelligence must have played a role in their success.
In the period between the First Punic War in 264 and the final conquest
of Numantia in 133 Rome went from being a relatively small city-state to the
dominant power in the Mediterranean world.3 The causes behind this have long
been the subject of intense academic inquiry. Much ink has been spilled on
debates about the nature of Rome’s expansion. Arguments centre on whether
Roman ‘imperialism’ was essentially offensive or defensive, and most adopt a
purely metrocentric viewpoint.4 It is only in recent years that ancient historians
have begun to interpret the rise of the Roman Empire through modern
International Relations theory.5 How, if, and to what extent Roman officials

1 Sir Alexander Cadogan refered to intelligence as the 'missing dimension of most
diplomatic history'. Cadogan and Dilks 1971: 21. The idea was popularised by
Andrew and Dilks in 1984 and has since become something of a guiding assumption
for intelligence theorists; Andrew and Dilks 1984.
2 Jervis 2009: 71.
3 All dates are B.C. unless otherwise indicated.
4 On which, see below.
5 Henceforth IR indicates the discipline of International Relations, whereas the lower
case ‘international relations’ refers to the activities of states.
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knew about their neighbours has never been linked to the growth of their
empire, their foreign policy, or their international affairs. While some scholars
have argued that Rome sought control of material resources and profit, there has
been no discussion about how they knew a specific conquest promised enough
booty to outweigh the costs of war. Scholars who advocate defensive imperialism
provide no discussion as to how the Romans knew or perceived that other states
were threats to themselves or their allies. Mid-republican Romans did not
indiscriminately destroy everybody they came across. They conquered,
annihilated, and enslaved; they also traded, made alliances and treaties, and
mediated foreign struggles. They did not do this blindly with no knowledge as to
the resources, abilities, intentions, and beliefs of those with whom they
interacted. This thesis seeks to investigate the understandings, modes, and
methods of intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert actions employed by the
Romans in the mid-republic as an aspect of their pursuit of foreign policy. It will
consider the relationship between international relations, intelligence studies,
and Rome’s rise to dominance in the Mediterranean.
The Literature

Roman Intelligence
Specific studies of intelligence in the ancient world are rare; studies
focusing explicitly on mid-republican intelligence more so.6 Certain aspects of
intelligence activity, primarily with a military focus, have been touched upon in
studies of ancient warfare. These studies mention activities that are classified as
intelligence.7 But they rarely include discussion of how intelligence was gathered
and analysed, or attempts at counterintelligence or covert action, let alone
political intelligence.
The earliest works that deal with aspects of intelligence with any degree of
specificity discuss the transport and communication of information in the

6 For intelligence in ancient Greece see for example Starr 1974; Gerolymatos 1986;
Richmond 1998; Russell 1999.
7 The ways in which the term ‘intelligence’ will be used in this study will be discussed
in the next section.
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