Table Of ContentPergamon Policy Studies on
Internationai Poiitics
Amo8 The P.LO.: Organization of a Nationaiist Movement
Cannlzzo International Arms Transfers: Politics and Policies
Close Europe Without Defense? 48 Hours That Could Change
the Face of the World
Feld Comparative Regional Systems: West and East Europe,
North America, The Middle East and Developing Countries
Feld Western Europe's Global Reach: Regional Cooperation
and Worldwide Interests
Foreign Affairs America and the World 1978
Freedman World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Hahn/Pfaltzgraff Atlantic Community in Crisis: A Redefinition
of the Transatlantic Relationship
Leitenberg/Sheffer Great Power Intervention in the Middle East
LIndberg Inflation and Political Change
LInk/Feld The New Nationalism: Implications for Transatlantic
Relations
PERGAMON
POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
STUDIES
Arab-Israeli
Military/Political
Relations
Arab Perceptions
and the Politics
of Escaiatlon
John W. Amos II
Pergamon Press
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC Pergamon Press GmbH, 6242 Kronberg/Taunus,
OF GERMANY Pferdstrasse 1, Federal Republic of Germany
Copyright © 1979 Pergamon Press Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Amos, John W 1936-
Arab-lsraell political/military relations.
(Pergamon policy studies)
Includes Index.
1. Jewish-Arab relatlons-1967-1973. 2. Israel-Arab
War, 1967—Influence and results. 3. Israel-Arab War,
1973-lnfluence and results. 4. Arab countries-
Politics and government. 5. Arabs—Psychology.
I. Title.
DS119.7.A666 1979 327.6694O17'4927 78-31869
ISBN 0-08-023865-3
This woric was completed with α number of ooileogues and students
from the Naval Postgraduate School. Many of the Ideas herein were
clarified with their inteliectuai insight and criticism. It follows of course
that any errors or shortcomings are solely the author's. In addition, it
should be made clear that the views expressed are those of the author
and do not In any way represent the opinion or policy of either the
Naval Postgraduate School or the U.S. Navy.
All Rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means:
electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise, without permission in writing from the
publishers.
Printed in the United States of America
To my wife, who does not approve of wars
Note on Transliteration
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
Normally the rendering of Arab words follows their actual written
nomenclature. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this
practice because of the multiplicity of sources used:
(a) Names of persons or places that occur in translations are spelled
as they occur in the original source. For example, "Nasir" is
usually rendered "Nasser" in Western sources.
(b) The names of authors footnoted are spelled as they are set down
in the title of the book or article. This may differ from their
spelling in the text.
(c) Place names that have generally accepted spelling in the West
are so rendered. For example, Golan instead of al-3awlan.
(d) Certain Arab proper names that have been anglicized are so
spelled.
(e) Some Arabic names or terms which have doubled consonants have
been shortened because the doubling of these consonants
confuses the Western eye: al-Qadhafi, for example, rather than
al-Qadhdhafi.
(f) Although Arabic does not utilize capital letters, proper nouns
have generally been capitalized in conformity with English usage.
(g) The silent "h" on some nouns has not been transliterated: al-
sa'iqa, for example, rather than al-Sa'iqah.
IX
List of Abbreviations
ALF Arab Liberation Front (Iraq)
al-Sa'iqa Shock Forces (Egypt)
al-Sa*iqa The Thunderbolt: Vanguards of the Popular
War of Liberation (Syria)
ASU Arab Socialist Union (Egypt)
Ba'th Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Syria
and Iraq)
BSO Black September Organization
Fatah Palestine National Liberation Movement
Frolinat Front for the Liberation of Chad
IDF Israeli Defense Forces
OAU Organization of African Unity
PDF Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation
of Palestine
PDRY People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
(South Yemen)
PELOAG Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
and the Arabian Gulf
XI
Xll List of Abbreviations
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLA Palestine Liberation Army
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
Polisario Popular Front for the Liberation of Sequia
el-Hamra and Wadi al-Dhahab
RCC Revolutionary Command Council (Egypt)
UAE United Arab Emirates
UAR United Arab Republic (Syria and Egypt,
1958-1961, but usually refers to Egypt
alone)
UNEF UN Emergency Force
UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Force
The Israeli Army defeated militarily the Arab armies in 1967. If the
enemy withdrew without a fight, this constitutes, in my opinion, the
greatest insult to Arab militarism, because the enemy who stripped
us of our land by force, insulted our pride....and desecrated our
shrines, should not, under any condition, get out without punish-
ment....
Mustafa Talas Armed Struggle Facing
the Israeli Challenge 1972
So let us together regain the glory of Arabism and prove to the
whole world that we are men of war, who either live proudly or die
honorably....
Sa'ad al-Din Shadhili Address to Arab
Chiefs of Staff Conference November
1971
You should know that we are facing an enemy that is beginning to
set little store by us, thinking we are not capable of fighting, which
makes him rampage in the region without fear of being repelled or
punished....
Ahmad Isma'il 'Ali Directive to the Egyp-
tian Armed Forces October 1972
It doesn't matter if the Israelis eventually counterattack and drive
us back. What matters is that the world will no longer laugh at us
when we threaten to fight. No longer will it dismiss our threats as a
lot of bluff and bluster. It will have to take us seriously.
Arab 3ournalist October 1973
1
A Perspective
on October 1973:
Arabs, Israelis,
and War
This is a study of the escalatory patterns of Arab-Israeli relations.
As such it is concerned with the preconditions, conditions and ultimate
precipitants of wars (conflicts characterized by increasing intensity and
scope) which have broken out with some repetitiveness in the Middle
East. In addition, it is concerned with the impact of the latest of these
wars, the October 1973 War, on the United States interests in the
Middle East.
The October War, known as the Yom Kippur War, or the War of the
Day of Judgment (1) in the West, and the Ramadan War in Arab
countries, contained in its brief duration a good many surprises. The
armed forces of Egypt and Syria were able to organize and execute an
attack which achieved near complete strategic and tactical surprise.
These forces then conducted themselves during the conflict with an
unexpectedly high degree of discipline and determination. Throughout
the war Arab governments inaugurated and carried out a coordinated
diplomatic and economic policy vis-a-vis Western nations; a policy
whose sophistication in concept and implementation was likewise
completely unexpected.
The 1973 War will no doubt be studied for years to come and its
various aspects analyzed from different perspectives. Studies of the
war have multiplied and range from highly technical accounts of the
military aspects to emotional assessments of the war's political
impact. (2) However, even granting the existence of this literature,
some attempt should be made to put it in historical and political
perspective. This war marks a significant alteration, even a reversal,
from commonly accepted ideas of Arab political/military behavior in
the following respects.
Arab governments initiated large-scale military action against
Israeli forces. In all previous wars (19^8, 1936, and 1967) Arab forces
responded (unsuccessfully) to Israeli initiatives. In 1936 and 1967
especially, Arab forces were in defensive positions, dug into static
emplacements with few units deployed for offensive purposes. In each
1
2 Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations
case these forces were overwhelmed by Israeli units utilizing the tactics
of surprise and mobility.
In 1973 the governments of Egypt and Syria coordinated an attack,
forcing the Israelis to fight a two-front war. In all previous conflicts
Arab countries operated without any apparent cooperation. This
allowed the Israelis to defeat them on a sequential basis, and permitted
the Israelis to exploit their interior lines by rapidly mobilizing and
sequentially concentrating forces against selected Arab units.
In 1973, Egypt and Syria managed to conceal their true purpose in
building up forces along Israeli borders. Their attack was launched
swiftly and with preponderant advantage in forces deployed along the
ceasefire lines. In previous engagements, especially in 1967, Arab
communications security was remarkably ineffective. The Israelis were
able to gather extremely accurate intelligence concerning the
deployment and probable missions of Arab forces. This gave them
sufficient warning and time to mobilize their reserves and to attack
under conditions of ádvíantage.
In 1973, Arab forces aggressively attacked Israeli units, in many
cases voluntarily taking heavy casualties, and maintained a surprisingly
high level of discipline. In all previous conflicts Arab military units
(with some exceptions, notably Jordan's Arab Legion) broke off contact
with Israeli units after relatively brief exchanges of fire. During the
1967 War, in particular, some Egyptian and Syrian units either retreated
or surrendered to Israeli forces without offering significant resistance.
In 1973, a considerable degree of political/diplomatic coordination
between Arab governments, combatant and noncombatant, was effect-
ed. A coordination that was all the more impressive because of the
obvious disarray of Western governments against whom it was directed.
The heretofore dominant pattern had been that of each Arab
government seeking its own interests without seeming to concern itself
with the problems of its allies. Until the 1973 oil embargo, Arab oil
stoppages had been both short lived and piecemeal, broken as the
interests of each Arab government dictated. (3)
During the course of the 1973 conflict, Arab reportage of military
actions was remarkable (relative to earlier war reportage) for its
accuracy and low keyed approach. Instead, the Israelis produced the
bombast with early statements by high officials to the effect that the
Israeli forces were going to "crush the bones" of Arab armies, or that
Arab forces were retreating everywhere, etc., etc. In the three earlier
wars the Arab media was noted for its semihysterical threats and anti-
Western statements, its incredible inaccuracies, and its general lack of
touch with reality. W
In sum, then, the 1973 War presents a change from previous Arab
behavior, both military and political. It is thus a difficult problem for
Western analysts. How did numbers of Arabs, elite and mass, manage to
alter their behavior to an unexpected, even incredible extent? What are
the implications of this newfound ability to control heretofore semi-
anarchic behavior? What are the longterm consequences of the 1973
War? Does it represent a permanent shift «η Arab-Israeli, intra-Arab,
and Arab-Western power relationships? Or is it an aberration on an
