Aquinas, Education and the East

201 Pages·2013·1.86 MB·English

by  T. Brian Mooney

Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy
of Traditions and Cultures 4
Thomas Brian Mooney
Mark Nowacki Editors
Aquinas, Education
and the East
Aquinas, Education and the East
Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy
of Traditions and Cultures
Series Editors
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The University of Melbourne, Australia; University of California, Berkeley CA, USA
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Maryville College, Maryville TN, USA
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Thomas Brian Mooney (cid:129) Mark Nowacki
Editors
Aquinas, Education
and the East
Editors
Thomas Brian Mooney Mark Nowacki
School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
Singapore Management University Singapore Management University
Singapore, Singapore Singapore , Singapore
ISBN 978-94-007-5260-3 ISBN 978-94-007-5261-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5261-0
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Foreword
It has been a commonplace of various fashionable intellectual movements in fl uenced
by hermeneutics, linguistic theory, and anthropology to insist upon the relativity of
concepts, values, and modes of thought, even to the point of arguing that intercul-
tural comparison is impossible. Set in sharp opposition to this, however, is the
thought that if we are to regard the behaviour of others as expressive of beliefs and
values then i pso facto we must be able to make sense of it, not simply in the respect
of being able to translate it, but to the extent of seeing it as intelligible and even
reasonable, which is to say reasonable by reference to a common set of beliefs and
values.
If the fi rst, relativist idea seems extravagant and disregarding of the extensive
practices of translation and comparative studies, the second, t ranscendentalist one
seems unduly rationalistic. In fact both are somewhat a prioristic, announcing ante-
cedent to empirical enquiry what cannot or must be the case. Leaving to one side
general philosophical presuppositions about the possibilities of interpretation, and
considering what we know about the diversity of human societies, we might expect
to encounter both strangeness and commonality, con fi rming that while human forms
of life may differ in time and place, insofar as they are forms of human life they are
also expressions of a common nature.
That very thought may then be looked for among the diverse human cultures
and traditions, and sure enough it is to be found in one form or another in re fl ective
writings from the ancient world in both Western and Eastern societies. In the
Histories , for example, Herodotus provides descriptions of the beliefs, legends, and
moral codes of various peoples defeated in Persian conquests and of others from
further a fi eld. Often his examples are meant to strike his readers as absurd or shock-
ing, but on re fl ection several points emerge. First, Herodotus uses the fact that such
diverse beliefs are strongly held by some and also fi rmly rejected by others, to suggest
the formative and enduring in fl uence of c ustom . He writes: “If anyone, no matter
who, were given the opportunity of choosing from amongst all the nations in the world
the set of beliefs which he thought best, he would inevitably—after careful conside-
ration of their relative merits—choose that of his own country” (H istories , III).
v
vi Foreword
Second, however, the point is made in terms that presuppose the possibility of
close comparison. Third, differences are chosen in relation to a common theme, as
when he reports Darius inviting Greeks and Indians to consider one another’s treat-
ment of the dead (burning and eating, respectively). The universality of custom, the
possibility of considered comparison, and the commonality of underlying interests
all point to the idea of a common human nature. This idea runs through the history
of ideas from antiquity into recent centuries and continues to be presupposed even
when it is apparently rejected, such is the pragmatically self-refuting character of
universal relativism.
Moving from general assumptions of a common human nature to the content of
particular conceptions of that nature, certain elements are central and recurrent
within the range of traditions; for example, identi fi cations of intellect, desire, and
will; of reason and sentiment; and of self-regarding and other-regarding disposi-
tions. Two millennia before Adam Smith in his T heory of Moral Sentiments built
upon Hume’s account of the inverse relation between the strength of moral feeling
and the distance of its objects. Mencius observed that while the primary and proper
focus of benevolence is upon one’s parents “a benevolent man extends his concern
from those he loves to those he does not love” ( Mencius IV, B. 1.). Similarly, the
Kantian idea that a condition of right conduct is that it should pass the test of
universalisability is anticipated in the A nalects of Confucius, as well as in Greek
philosophical and near-Eastern religious and legal traditions.
Central also to the moralities of major cultures is the idea of virtue, that is, of
dispositions of thought and feeling expressed in actions and reactions. An interest-
ing and regrettable consequence of restricting discussions of historical treatments
of virtue to those originating in Greek ethics is the relative brevity of the list, prin-
cipally, of course, the cardinal four: justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude.
Reading through the A nalects , by contrast, I count at least 70 virtues identi fi ed for
respect and emulation, including attentiveness, circumspection, decency, empathy,
determination, dignity, discernment, fi liality, generosity, graciousness, hopefulness,
humour, loyalty, moderation, modesty, patience, piety, resolution, re fi nement,
resourcefulness, sagacity, simplicity, sincerity, and trustworthiness.
Of course, these dispositions have been identi fi ed via English translations of
Chinese characters—in this case the translations of Edward Soothill, an English
Victorian-cum-Edwardian missionary, educationalist, and Professor of Chinese at
Oxford. In the process, Western and speci fi cally Imperial British attitudes will have
had some in fl uence, and at one point, Soothill quotes Confucius as saying that “A
wise man in regard to what he does not understand, maintains an attitude of reserve.
If terms be incorrect, then statements do not accord with facts” ( Analects VII, III
4–5). As it happens, however, Soothill was a great admirer of what he recognized to
be a code of gentlemanliness in traditional Chinese culture not so very different
from that prevailing in his own society, and this opened him to Confucius’s fi ne-
grained classi fi cation of cognitive, affective, and executive virtues.
The Western code that informed Soothill’s reading was itself developed in part
out of medieval chivalry traditions which enjoyed a marked revival during the reign
of Queen Victoria, and were consciously introduced into re fl ections on the aims of
Foreword vii
education. In their original and revived forms, these traditions sought to embody the
four cardinal and three theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity), but alongside
them ran other traits that were thought to be natural accompaniments, either as
expressions of or as aids to the principal virtues.
In this connection it is interesting to read Thomas Aquinas’ short letter to Brother
John De modo studendi —‘On how to study’, and to note the points of resemblance
to Confucian instruction. Aquinas writes as follows:
Since you asked me, my dearest in Christ Brother John, how you should study in order to
acquire the treasure of knowledge, I offer you this advice on the matter: Do not wish to
jump immediately from the streams to the sea, because one has to go through easier things
to the more dif fi cult. Therefore the following points are my warning and your instruction.
I command you to be slow to speak, and slow to go to the conversation room. Embrace
purity of conscience. Do not give up spending time in prayer. Love spending much time in
your cell, if you want to be led into the wine cellar. Show yourself amiable to all. Do not
query at all what others are doing. Do not be very familiar with anyone, because familiarity
breeds contempt, and provides matter for distracting you from study. Do not get involved at
all in the discussions and affairs of lay people. Avoid conversations about all any and every
matter. Do not fail to imitate the example of good and holy men. Do not consider who the
person is you are listening to, but whatever good he says commit to memory. Whatever you
are doing and hearing try to understand. Resolve doubts, and put whatever you can in the
storeroom of your mind, like someone wanting to fi ll a container. Do not spend time on
things beyond your grasp. Following such a path, you will bring forth fl owers and produce
useful fruit for the vineyard of the Lord of Power and Might, as long as you live. If you
follow this, you can reach what you desire.
Confucius, meanwhile, is credited with the following:
The scholar who in his food does not seek the grati fi cation of his appetite, nor in his dwell-
ing is solicitous of comfort, who is diligent in his work, and guarded in his speech, who
associates with the high-principled, and thereby directs himself aright, such a one may
really be said to love learning (I, xiv). …
He who knows the truth is not equal to him who loves it, and he who loves it is not equal to
him who delights in it (VI, xviii). …
The scholar who becomes widely versed in letters and who restrains his learning within the
bounds of good conduct is not likely to leave the track (VI, xxv). …
Learn as if you were not reaching your goal, and as though you were afraid of missing it
(VIII, xvii).
I have spent the whole day without food and the whole night without sleep in order to think.
It was of no use. It is better to learn (XV, xxx).
Separated by seven and a half centuries, fi ve thousand miles, and the idea of
monotheism, there are nonetheless signi fi cant points of resemblance between these
re fl ections on the demeanour and aims appropriate to learning. From the point of
view of philosophy of education the signi fi cant difference between the authors is
that Confucius’ aphorisms stand apart from any theoretical account of epistemol-
ogy, metaphysics, and value theory, while these latter fi elds more naturally charac-
terise the work of Aquinas than do words of wisdom. Among the reasons for this is
that whereas Confucius was a sage, Aquinas was a philosopher-theologian.
viii Foreword
This suggests a way of studying Aquinas and Eastern sage traditions as
complementary, for the focus of the writing of Confucius and Mencius, as those of
Lao Tzu and Zhu Xi, is upon the guidance of conduct through the cultivation and
internalization of certain habits and ritual practices; whereas Aquinas gives his
attention to the analysis of action and cognition and the identi fi cation of the modes
of causality involved in these. The effort to read Confucius in light of an analysis
of material, formal, ef fi cient and fi nal causation, or by reference to the distinction
between innate and acquired dispositions, or in connection with an account of the
good as pertaining to the realization of nature, is neither dif fi cult nor unrewarding.
It is not something, however, that he invites, and certainly his own methods are not
theoretical.
Today, across the world but especially in the West, thinking about education moves
uncertainly between different sets of aims. On the one hand talking about the impor-
tance of p ersonal growth and civic virtue; on the other emphasizing the need to develop
future-oriented skill-sets and adaptability to a knowledge-economy. A natural response
to such stated aims is to doubt that they have much in the way of real content, noting
that they leave unaddressed, let alone resolved, the more fundamental issues of the
modes and ends of growth, the substance and objects of virtue, the value of the
purposes to which skills might be directed, and the relation between the intrinsic
and instrumental value of knowledge. In the East meanwhile there is a corresponding
contrast between the traditional modes of formation directed towards cultivating
fi ttingness of demeanour in the face of the contingencies of the human condition, and
the development of skills adapted to technological and economic progress.
The way in which I have introduced these different aims may suggest acceptance
of some of the familiar ways of opposing them, but in fact it seems an open question
as to whether they need be in tension. Resolving that question is in part a task for
the social sciences but at a more fundamental level it is also a challenge for philoso-
phy of education. What Aquinas shows very clearly is that while practical questions
call for practical answers they also raise, through a series of further questions related
to the successive ends implied in chains of practical reasoning (why do this? so as
to get those; why aim for those? in order to attain that? etc.), issues about the nature
and value of various goals and their relationship to the agents who pursue them.
These belong to the metaphysics of value, and to other parts of theoretical philosophy,
and progress in them is impossible without engaging with notions of truth and
objectivity, substance and causality, and agency and intention.
It is to the study of these notions that Aquinas has most to contribute to the
philosophy of education, and to the integration of systematic enquiry and sapiential
guidance, and thereby to a dialogue between the speculative orientation of Western
philosophical thought and the sage traditions of Eastern cultures. Here I leave to
one side the further fie lds of theology: scriptural, systematic, and spiritual, as these
have developed in Jewish, Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, and Jainist
thought—not as irrelevant, but as engaging a whole further dimension (in which, of
course, Aquinas was again a giant).
Brian Mooney and Mark Nowacki have been active and also effective in nurturing
such enquiries. First, in conceiving and convening the conference in which many of
Foreword ix
the following diverse and very interesting chapters originated. Second, as scholars
on their own account studying, in some part translating, and providing insightful
commentaries on three major fi gures in the Western Christian tradition of re fl ection on
the nature and ends of education: Augustine (D e Magistro ); Newman (T he Idea of a
University ) and again Aquinas (D e Magistro ). Armed with this present volume on
Aquinas, Education and the East , and with Mooney and Nowacki’s U nderstanding
Teaching and Learning: Classic Texts on Education (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011),
we are well placed to engage the scholarly and practical issues involved in bringing
Western and Eastern thought on education into fruitful exchange. Participating in the
original conference, then reading these chapters, I sense the beginnings of future work
that could have real practical as well as intellectual bene fi ts.
University of St Andrews John Haldane