Appeasement in Crisis: From Munich to Prague, October 1938–March 1939

230 Pages·2007·1.121 MB·English

by  David Gillard (auth.)

Appeasement in Crisis
palgrave
macmillan
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Appeasement in Crisis
From Munich to Prague, October
1938–March 1939
David Gillard
palgrave
macmillan
© David Gillard 2007
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2007 978-0-230-50040-2
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To My Family
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Contents
Acknowledgments viii
1. Diplomacy by Guarantee 1
2. The Outlook from Whitehall 14
3. The Challenge of Barbarism 35
4. The Prospect of War 56
5. Resolving to Resist 74
6. Continental Commitment 95
7. The Challenge of Annexation 116
8. The Quest for Coalition 137
9. The Guaranteeing of Poland 157
10. Diplomacy by Drama 178
List of Abbreviations 188
Notes 189
Bibliography 201
Index 210
vii
Acknowledgments
I am grateful for the assistance afforded me by staff and the following
institutions, holding official and private papers.
Birmingham University Library
Bodleian Library, Oxford
Cambridge University Library
Churchill College, Cambridge
India Office Library
Kend Archives, Maidstone
National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh
National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh
National Maritime Museum
Public Record Office
Robinson Library, University of Newcastle
Every attempt has been made to contact copyright holders but if any
have inadvertently been overlooked, the publisher will be pleased to
make the appropriate arrangement at the first opportunity.
viii
1
Diplomacy by Guarantee
At the end of March 1939, those responsible for British foreign policy
took a decision which none of them had anticipated a fortnight earlier.
They committed their country to war in support of Poland if the latter
fought to preserve its independence. The commitment was public and
it was not hedged round by conditions offering an escape. Even what
cynical observers thought to be half-hidden escape routes had been
explicitly ruled out by ministers in private exchanges prior to the
announcement. One lay in the absence of any reference to the integrity
of Poland’s frontiers. Certainly, their eventual revision by diplomatic
means was still anticipated in London, but Neville Chamberlain told his
Cabinet that confining the guarantee thus to Poland’s independence
was not intended to limit its effect. If German military action against,
say, the disputed territory of Danzig was viewed by Polish leaders as a
threat to their country’s independence which they had to resist, the
British Government should accept that interpretation and go to
Poland’s aid.1Similarly, Lord Halifax had turned down the suggestion of
his Ambassador in Warsaw that only an ‘unprovoked’ action by
Germany should trigger British intervention. The Foreign Secretary told
Sir Howard Kennard that ‘the German technique of aggression is so var-
ied and so insidious that it might well be that Poland might in certain
circumstances be driven to commit a technical act of provocation’.2
This readiness to fight for Poland’s independence appeared to mark a
radical break with the traditions of British foreign policy. In the past,
British governments had been very sparing of pledges to fight, and then
only if the obligations could be met by direct use of military and espe-
cially naval power. Nor had they ever been at ease in using the ‘guaran-
tee’ as a diplomatic device. That particular unease had been manifest
only six months before during the Commons debate on the Munich
1