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The 1 Air Commandos in WWII
st
R. D. Van Wagner
SchifferMilitary/Aviation History
Atglen, PA
~.a.G.t':-.J>' :',."".;".:- - _II' _
Cover artwork by Steve Ferguson, Colorado Springs, CO: ntents
YANKEE AIR PIRATES ON BROADWAY-Thecover art depicts a pairof IstAirCom
mando P-51 Mustangsflown byFighterSection LeaderLieutenantColonel GrantMahony
and hisOperationsExecutiveMajorBobPetit(in"Mrs.Virginia")crossingoverC-47trans
Illustrations 4
ports descending upon their homeairstripcodenamed BROADWAY. Suppliedexclusively
by air at this remote airdrome far behind enemy lines, the Commandos employed their Preface 6
serviceweary fighter-bombers, andB-25 Mitchellcannon-armed mediumbomberstoexact
a horrendous toll oftargets at the farthermost reaches ofthe theater. Whetherestablishing
airsupremacyorinterdictingenemy supply lines, theselfprofessed "YankeeAirPiratesof hapter 1 Burma 8
Burma" accomplished their mission with distinction and established a new precedent in
hlpter 2 Wingate's Plan 14
total battlefield airbornesupport.
h,lpter 3 Project 9 21
th
hapter 4 5318 Provisional Unit (Air) 30
hapter 5 Operation THURSDAy 42
h,lpter 6 Air Power 58
hapter 7 Imphal and Kohima 73
In Memory ofMy Father hapter 8 Monsoons 81
hapter 9 Operation CAPITAL 94
"So that Broadway willneveragain become worthlessground."
hapter 10 The Irrawaddy River 106
hapter 11 The Devil's Noose 118
hapter 12 The Setting Sun 132
hapter 13 Exit 144
hapter 14 Legacy 150
Book Design by Ian Robertson. hapter 15- Sacred Ground 156
Copyright© 1998 by R. D. Van Wagner.
Library ofCongressCatalog Number: 97-80160 ppendixA Personnel Roster 12 April 1944 157
ppendix B- Personnel Roster 1 September 1944 161
All rights reserved. No part ofthis work may be reproduced or used in any forms or by
any means - graphic, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or .information Bibliography 167
storageand retrieval systems- withoutwritten permission from the copyrightholder.
Printed in China.
ISBN: 0-7643-0447-X
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Introduction
Preface
This work examines the 1stAir Commando Group ofWorld This study would not have been possible without the help of
War II-an experiment looking toward future air warfare. Em manyformermembersofthe 1stAirC,ommandoGroup. Iamgrate
ployed in the China-Burma-India Theater, the organization made ful toMajorGeneralJohnR.Alison,co-commanderoftheunit,for
military history byconductingthe firstAlliedall-aerial invasion his contribution and participation. I hold a great respect for him
Operation THURSDAY. Because of more glamorous campaigns and the accomplishments ofhis organization. I also was aided by
in Europe and the Pacific, Operation THURSDAYand the 1stAir the menofthe 1stAirCommandoAssociation. ParticularlyIwish
Commandos have been generally overlooked by military histori to express my appreciation to the association secretaries, Robel1
ans. This study calls attention to that lost piece ofair power his Moistand WilliamW. Johnson, Jr.,for theirtimeand information.
tory; however, it is notadefinitive work. Thatundertaking would Additionally,interviewswithWilliamS.Burghardt;ArthurBurrell;
beenormousconsidering thegroup neverpublished a unithistory, MaximoA. Cheng; WilliamT. Cherry,Jr., FrankClifford; Joseph
instead adopting the theme: "To hell with the paper work, go out Cochran; Andrew L. Cox; Lemuel Davis; John Derdak; Thomas
and fight." Therefore, this account focuses on the circumstances Doherty; Patrick Driscoll; Dr. Cortez Enloe; Paul Forcey; Duane
which brought about the requirement for and the employment of K. Fudge; Allen Hall, Ir.; Neville Hogan; John Hyland; Felix
the Ist Air Commando Group in Burma. Intended as a 6-month Lockman,Jr.; RolandR. Lynn;JosephLysowski;Rodney E. Petty,
excursion, the unit proved so valuable it was extended in the field Jr.; Stamford Robertson; Raymond Ruksas; Lloyd Samp; Howard
untiltheendofthewar. Byusingunorthodoxprocedures,thegroup Smith;TomTaketa; VincentUlery;F. H. Van Wagner; and Carl E.
serves as a model organization for use in both conventional and eigler, Jr. provided invaluable insights. Thei.r responses to my
unconventional conflicts today. questions and enthusiastic supportofthis endeavorwere an inspi
The primary impetus for this study ofthe 1stAir Commando ration. As I attempted to turn this collection ofanecdotes into a
Group is my father, Fred H. Van Wagner. Hejoined the air com seriousworkofhistory,JimLansdaleprovidedencouragementand
mandos after their deployment to India but before Operation direction. Iwould not have fini.shed without hisguidance.
THURSDAY. He remained in Burma through much ofthe 1944 I am indebted to the personnel of the USAF Historical Re
45 Dry Season Campaign. Greatly influenced by the events and searchCenter,HerbHuieoftheGraphicsArtsorganizationatMax
camaraderieexperienced inIndia, hepassedonhisacquiredvalues well AFB,Alabama,ChuckNoland, and to Mark Hanley, my pho
and philosophy concerning duty and love ofcountry to me. This tographer. I would like to formally thank my advisor, Lieutenant
study has beenwell worth thetimespent; ithashelped meto know Colonel Robert Gregory, for his encouragement, technical assis
my father better. Therefore, with warmth and love, I dedicate my tance, and advice. Finally,I would beremiss ifIdid notthank the
research to him. membersofmyfamily fortheirpatienceand understandingduring
this task. Many kind people have helped and encouraged me in
writing this account; I thank them all.
OppositePage: Map1-8outh-EastAsia,Circa1942
6
7
Burma
UI
1
Burma
III P/!""?:rJj~."..~ Mongolia
Bolsteredbyrecentsuccessful attacksonPearlHarborand the
Philippines,Japan's PrimeMinisterand WarMinisterHideki Tojo
announced his intention to invade the small country ofBurma on
23 December 1941.On thatdate, theJapaneselaunchedan airraid
on the key BurmeseportofRangoon. Thedamage inflicted by the
raid was questionable; the intentofthe Japanese action, however,
was welldefined and oftremendousstrategic impact. Fromthese
cure, sophisticated shores ofthe United States, the Emperor's at
tackwasnotwell publicizedandconsequently,scarcelyunderstood.
WhywouldtheNipponeseEmpirebeinterestedintheobscureland
Burma
ofBurma?ForthoseawareofthatsleepynationinSoutheastAsia,
the question posed was about the Burmese defensive capability.
What resistance would Emperor Hirohito's soldiers face as they
triedtotakesucharuggedandforeboding land?And finally, would
this British colony hold out against the might of Japan's finest Map2-China
troops?How thesequestions wereansweredduringtheinvasionof
Burma would affectfuture campaign strategy. provisions. Ifthe Japanesecould seizeCentral Burma and control MostimportantthoughwastheJapanesegrandstrategytoover
Thequestion ofwhy? was answered by theJapanesedesire to interior transportation lines, the deep horseshoe mountains along run India and link with a planned Axis push in Persia under the
useBurmaasawedge,aspringboard,andashield.Byappealingto the borderofIndia and China provided anatural barrierto conclu commandofGermanGeneral ErwinRommel. Burmawastheway
all these desires, Burma promised to be a vitally strategic trophy. sively seal offChina and starve her into submission. With Burma to people, industry,and apossiblestrategicunion. Indeed, thevery
FallingunderJapan'sGreaterEastAsiaCo-ProsperitySpherePro occupied, theJapanesecould stabilizeChina and releaseNippon's ideaofBurma broughta gleam ofcovetousness to the eyes ofthe
gram, Burmawas anatural extension ofPrimeMinisterTojo'sex continental forces for otherpotential conquests. Japanesegenerals.
pansionism started adecade earlier in China. In harmony with the TheChineseelementmay havebeen the impetusforthe inva As a pivot point, Burma offered China and India, butBurnla,
1927TanakaMemorial, theLandoftheRisingSun annexed Man sion, butJapan saw otherstrategic prizes in Burma. As well as es by itself,also beckonedtotheJapanese.Threereasons aregiven
churia in 1931, and in 1937, had begun a systematic march on tablishinga roadblockfor Chinese supplies, Burmaalso could be rice, natural resources, and natural defense. In 1940, the mainstay
China's major cities ofPeking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, and comethespringboard for an offensive into the riches ofIndia.The of Burma's internal and external economy was rice; almost
Hankow. Afteralmost 10 years offighting, theJapanese managed Japanese sensed an opportunity to take advantage ofcivil unrest, 12,000,000 acres were under cultivation. To Japan, Burma repre
to make the Chinese Nationalist government move its capital to stinedbyIndia'sMohandasK. Gandhi, toabsorb thegreatestBrit sented a rice bowl capable of producing nearly 8,000,000 tons of
Chungking and effectivelycutoffChinafrom the outerworld. By ishcolony inAsia.IfJapan invaded,theyanticipatedthesupportof thisstaplecrop. PrimeMinisterTojo believed Burma's riceexport
1941, the Japanese fundamentally closed the door on China, but Indian nationals to dislodge the British. of3,000,000tonscouldbere-channeledtohisalreadyoverextended
resistance soon was being met with the help ofa supply line, the India wascertainly aprize worth having, as great, ifnot more ImperialArmy.Additionally,Burmaofferedan abundanceofnatu
BurmaRoad.WindingthroughtheHimalayas,thisinadequateroad so,than China itself. WorldWarIhad givenastimulustocommer ral resources, primarilyoil and manganese. Finally,aJapanese-oc
extendedfromBurmatoKunming,asmallmountaintowninChina's TheBurmaRoad cialization inIndia. In 1941 sheoffered aneconomywith burgeon cupiedBurmawouldactasaban'ierorshieldfortheentireFarEast
BeforetheJapaneseslammedthedoor,virtuallyallsuppliestoChina
Yunnan province. ing industrial capability. Production ofcoal and cotton had begun territory.JapaneseoccupationofBurmawouldputdistancebetween
traveled theBurmaRoad. Its hairpincoursebeganatthe railheadof
AstheylookedatBurma,PrimeMinisterTojo'sstrategistssaw Lashio,Burma,andsnakedthrough the mountainstothestronghold in India before 1920, but since that time, the iron and steel, arms the Allies and Emperor Hirohito's new possessions ofthe Philip-
awedge-awaytostopChina'sflowofmunitions,equipment,and at Kunming, China. Courtesy ofHistoricalResearch Center, Maxwell and munitions, and chemical industries had emerged with gusto.
AFBAL
8 9
]SI Air Commando Group Burma
pine Islands, French Indochina, Siam, Singapore, and the Dutch smaller river systems. During the colonial period, British settlers whenGeneral Wavell acceptedChinesehelp,hisdecision included
EastIndies. depended on the largest, the Irrawaddy River, to such an extent it the realization that the American Volunteer Group, Colonel Clair
Forthequestionofwhy?therewasplentyofrationale.Withso wascalledthe"RoadtoMandalay."FedfromtheHimalayanMoun L. Chennault's famous Flying Tigers, was partofthe package.
manyreasonstoinvade-China,India,andBurma'sfoodandnatural tains to the north, theInawaddyflowed swiftlydown thecenterof Lackingequipment,aircraft, manpower,andtraining,themili
resources-the question of the unknown Burmese defense plans the country and wasjoined from the northwest by the next largest tary was clearly the weak link in theBurmadefense plan. General
waitedto beanswered.Theonlyway tofind outwastotry,andthat in size, the Chindwin River. Together these two mammoth rivers Wavell counted on India for possible reinforcements and was be
Japan decided to do in earnest when the new year, 1942, rolled and their tributaries provided over 15,000 miles of navigable wa ~ro ginning to mobilize for the fortification of Burma when Japan
around. ters to the neargeographiccenterofBurma.After it wasjoined by ~ dropped its first bombs on Rangoon. India Command hoped the
There were three factors that comprised the British defensive theChindwin,theIrrawaddyemergedfrom Burma'scentral valley China combination oftwo aspects, terrain and national defense, was suf
schemeforBurma.CollectivelytheJapanesehadtoovercomethem and emptied itself into the Bay ofBengal through a 9-arm delta ficient to impede any offensive until the arrival ofthe monsoons.
all. Separately, they posed no appreciable problem, but together, area just west ofRangoon. Farther east, the swift Salween River General Wavell believedwhen theoperation resumed in lateOcto
each contributed to a viable British plan for the defense ofBurma churned southward from its headwaters in China determining the ber, he would havea sufficiently strong army in placeto resist the
against the Japanese invasion. They wereas follows: border between Burma and Siam. Extending down the southeast Japanese. In matter of fact, General Wavell's hope proved to be
fingerofBurma,theunpredictableSalweentumbledfrom the inte groundless. Hisforces could noteven hold out until mid-May.
(1) The impactofBurma's rugged geography, riorofBurmanearthetownofMoulmein latertobeunleashed into Insystematicfashion,Japan'sairforceattacked firsttheweak
(2) Theeffectofthe Burmeseclimaticconditions, and theAndaman Sea. est link in the military infrastructure of Burma. Airplanes of the
(3) Thepreparedness ofBurma'sdefense. Because of the north/south top9graphy of Burma, choke RisingSun quicklyestablished airsuperiority, and began to harass
points-theconfluenceofrivers, roads, and railroads-werecom British attempts to reinforce with soldiers from Malaysia and
Geography and God's handiworkdivided Burma into several monplace. Under the circumstances, theBritish felt sure the Japa Singapore. OnlyChennault'sAmerican VolunteerGroup provided
zones.The8,000-footcrestsoftheChinHillsseparatedIndiafrom nesecould be held at bay by arelatively small force taking advan noticeable resistance to Japanese air attacks. The Nippon air raids
Burmaand protected"BurmaProper,"theoriginalsettlementarea. tageofthe natural contours and formation ofthe land. Herein was BayofBengal on Rangoon helped spread panic among the Burmese citizens;
Siam
The region was defined by the sunounding mountains and domi the defensivestrength ofBurma. movement came to a standstill when the roads and port facilities
nated by river valleys. Here was the agricultural heartofthecoun The British also felt time was on theirside in Burma because swelled with refugees seeking safety. This confusion proved ad
try.Becauseofdistinctivelydifferentclimatesand historicaldevel ofthe recurring monsoons. Rain! Probablythe mostdominantfea vantageous to the Japaneseand allowed theirground troops to be
opments, within this central belt dramatic differences existed be tureofBurmawas the monsoons. Lastingfrom mid-May until late ginaraceagainstthemonsoonstoovertaketheBritishandChinese
tween Upper and Lower Burma. Farther west between the Chin October, the monsoons limited all military operations to the dry Armies.
Hills and the graceful coastline along the Bay ofBengal were the season.Annual rainfallsvariedfrom about200inchesintheareaof Yet even before they dropped a bomb or set foot on Burma
isolatedislandsandsandybeachesoftheAnkan.Tothenorthalong Rangoon, 100inchesin theIrrawaddyDelta, 80inches in the hills, soil, Nippon's plans for the Southeast Asia region foreshadowed
the Sino-Burman border stood peaks and crouching subtropical and upto45 inchesinthedryzoneofNorthCentralBurma.Effects the demise ofthe British in Burma. The Army ofthe Rising Sun
gorgesintheKachinHillsanchored byHkakaboRazi,highestpeak of the rain created pools of ankle-deep mud and mire. The mo accomplished the first step in their plan, occupation ofSiam, after
Andamen Sea
in Southeast Asia. Known as the foothills of the Himalayas, the notonyoftheincessantdownpouralsohadapsychologicalimpact only eight hours offighting. By December 1941,Japan's war ma
Kachin Hills towered majestically to heights ofmore than 10,000 sapping the strength offighting men. The British hoped topogra chine converged on the Malay Peninsula and Britain's fortress of
feet. Along theSiam and French-Indochinaborder, European-type phy would slow the Japanese enough so the monsoons could de Singapore.EmperorHirohito's masterplancalledforthefall ofthe
climates and undulating contours characterized the Shan Plateau. liver the knockout punch. Key to British success was their ability citadel in 100days. Unfortunately for the British, on 15 February
Workingsouthward,theplateaufunneled intotheTenasserimcoastal to hold out until mid-May; this key was in the hands of General 1942,Japan took Singapore-70days after initiating action.
range still providinga natural banier between Burma and Siam. Archibald Wavell, Commander-iJ;-ChiefofBritish Forces, India. With thedefeatofSingapore,Burma lostits protectionfrom a
Physically, Burma resembled a watelfall. All the natural ele When the military responsibility for Burma transfened from sea invasion; the swiftness ofthe Japanese occupation ofthe vital
mentsthatcomposedthecountryparalleledeachother,runningfrom Singapore to India on 12 December 1941, General Wavell was Map3-PoliticalMapofBurma linksofSiamandSingaporeleftBurmanaked.GeneralWavellcould
north tosouth-hermountains, rivers, roads,central plain, valleys, greatly concerned by the extentofunpreparedness in Burma's de not react quickly enough to overcome the Japanese momentum.
andeven herrailwaysystem.Asaresult, travel inBurma from east fense. He did concede, however, it was understandable because able for the defense ofBurma were only partially trained and al Additional troops from the 16th Indian Brigade were still landing
to westwasan enterprisecontraryto the rules ofnature. Along the Burma was protected from sea invasion by Singapore and from mostwithoutartillery, signal equipment, and antiaircraftweapons. atRangoon when LieutenantGeneral ShojiraIida's 15thArmy be
Indo-Burman border,thecountry'ssuddenand irregularmountains landattackbythreefriendlyneighbors.AslongasSingapore,Siam, Theairforcewaspracticallynonexistent.Itconsistedofonefighter gan its moveon BUlma in strength.
isolated one ravine from another. The roads connecting these val Indochina, and India remained strong, there was no need for a squadron equipped with outmoded BrewsterBuffaloes. The British readied for a westward advance from Siam, but
leys snaked across the mountains and progress was always slow. .buildup in Burma. Toassistin the defenseofBurma, GeneralissimoChiangKai insteadtheJapaneseturnedsouthand moved intothetailofBurma.
Additionally, the mountainsides were covered with jungles thick This dependence on regional stability was reinforced by the shek's offer of the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies, complicated by After initially securing airfields along theTenasserim coast, Gen
enoughtoformanaturalcanopy.Hidingbeneaththisumbrellawere fact that the Burmese Army had only been activated since April demandsforseparatelinesofcommunication,finally wasaccepted eral Iida mounted hisattackontheportofRangoon itself. Lieuten
leeches, malaria-carrying mosquitoes, and diseases by the score. 1937.By late 1941,Burmahad twoBritish infantry battalions,two by General Wavell in February 1942. It must be stated, however, antGeneralT.J. Hutton wasplacedincommandoftheBurmaland
Therefore, it wasobvious for theBritish to assume thatan in Indiainfantrybrigades,eightbattalionsofBurmaRifles,fourmoun General Wavell questioned Chinese willingness to fight in Burma forces and he wasjoined byMajorGeneralJ. G. SmythinJanuary
vader would be confined to the meager road system, limited rail tain artillery batteries, and the equivalent ofsix battalions of the iftheirhomeland becamethreatened. Many attributed the problem 1942.General Smyth moved forward tocutofftheJapanesebefore
roads,orthegreatrivers.Ifgivenachoice,travelersgenerallyused BurmaFrontierForce. The latter mostly worked under the control to the internal struggle between General Chiang's loyalist, the they reached the supply sites ofCentral Burma. Establishing ade
the waterways because Burma possessed three major and two ofthe Civil Power and had little fighting value. The forces avail- Kuomintang, and Mao Tse-tung's Communist followers. In part, fensivepositionwiththeBilinandSittangRiversbehindhim,Gen-
10 JJ
]S' Air Commando Group Burma
eral Smyth's troops dug in to oppose the expected Japanese ad tion and artillery. With just a remnant ofan army, many without Gurkhas,fiercesoldiersfrom Nepal, in positiontoguardtherearof road virtually impossible and the Japanese slowly encompassing
vance. boots or rif1es, the dispirited British were unable to withstand the hiscolumns.Whenhebeganthecrossing,SlimlearnedtheGurkhas' his position, Stilwell abandoned his vehicles and set out for India
th
Unfortunately, theJapanese 17 Division soon turned the ad Nippon assaults on Rangoon. radiohadfailedandtheJapaneseforceswereoverrunningthebridge on foot. With the monsoons soon due to begin, he managed to get
vantages around and General Smyth became concerned about his Shortly after the Sittang Bridge tragedy, General Hutton was head.Thefighting intensified, butGeneralSlimcontinuedtodirect his men, now only numbering few more than a hundred, to the
troop's only meansofescape-theSittangBridge. Orderswere is replaced by General the Right Honourable Sir Harold Alexander. the decaying situation until all his men boarded the lastferry and Chindwin River. Here he made a perilous crossing and drove on
sued to begin a withdrawal at0800on 22February. Relayed in the His arrival in Burmacoincided with alull in thefighting and Gen made it to safetyon the otherside. across thesteep, forested mountains, finally arriving inImphal,In
clear, the Japanese intercepted the orders and began an all-out as eral Alexander held out hope the British Army could secure the Fortunately, the Japanese decided not to press the attack and dia, during a pouring rain on 19 May 1942. The monsoons had
saulttocapturethetrestle. Duringthefighting,GeneralSmythfaced area. But the respite was ShOl1 lived; the Japanese Army, having GeneralSlimfinally marchedintoIndiaon 16May. With him were abatedjustlongenough.TheInfantryGeneral summeduphisfeel
thepossibilityGenerallidawouldovelTunhistroopsandthebridge fought for a month withoutre-supply, had regrouped and restarted over 12,000troops; more important,he leftalmost 13,000men be ings while offering an outspoken challenge in this manner: "...we
wouldbecomeaJapanesethoroughfare. HeregretfullyorderedLieu itsoffensive. On 8March, General Alexanderfaced the agonizing hind.TheCommonerGeneral relinquished hishollowcommandto gota hell ofa beating. Wegot run outofBurma and it is humiliat
tenant BashirAhmed Khan to destroy the span before all British truth and was forced to abandon Rangoon. The loss of Burma's Lieutenant General N. M. S. Irwin of IV Corps. The long flight ingas helL Ithinkweoughtto find outwhatcaused it,gobackand
troops could cross. Of the 8,500 men who were isolated on the principal portgave littlehopeofre-supply or reinforcement to the across swollen rivers and up thesteep banks oftheChin Hills had retake it." (52:293-300)
Japaneseside, only 3,500 managed to rejoin theirunits on theeast troops fleeing into thejungle-clad interiorofBurmaortotheresis virtually finished BurmaCorps as a fighting force. Slim noted the As the monsoon season started in 1942, the Japanesejugger
bank. Additionally, General Smyth lost almost all his transporta- tance fighters in the mountainsofChina. With this action, General following as his battered, exhausted men shuffled intoIndia: naut had run the King's Own from the rice paddies and teakwood
Alexander set in motion the longestand most inglorious retreat in forests ofBurma.Japan hadcuttheoverlandroad toChinaand had
British military history. During this strategic withdrawal two per Onthelastdayofthat900-mileretreatIstoodonabank fortified her land conquests to the eastofBurma. India lay tempt
sonalities emerged: British Major Ge.neral William J. Slim and beside the road and watched the rearguard march into India. ingly to the west. The Japanese had overcome all the defensive
American Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell. From a tactical Allofthem,British,IndianandGurkha,weregauntandragged obstacles of Burma within the time of the impending monsoons.
perspectivetheirviewpointoftheroutshowedthechaosaridterror as scarecrows. Yet, as they trudged behind theirsurviving of Britain had failed to realize the advantagesofthebush; to thecon
ofthe tumultuous flight back to India. ficers ingroupspitifullysmall,theystillcarriedtheirarmsand trary, EmperorHirohito's AJTny had employed them to perfection.
General Slim, son ofa hardware store owner, had spent most kepttheirranks, they werestill recognizableas fighting units. Now the Japanese used the natural barriers ofBurma to establish
ofhiscareerintheIndianArmy;duringthe 1942campaignhecom They mightlooklikescarecrows,butthey looked likesoldiers theirdefense.TheLandoftheRisingSunthuswasfirmlyentrenched
China manded Burma Corps. Included under his control were the 17th too. (44:87) in Burma; her troops werefanned out in a borderdefense thatef
Indian Division and the 1st Burma Division. During the retreat, fectively barricaded the door toSoutheastAsia.
Chinese troops joined General Slim around Toungoo. For a time, ForGeneral Stilwell,the resultswerethesameand theperfor For the defeated British troops, there was despair. Not only
the Chinesefought well and stubbornly, but their operations were mance of the Chinese gave new currency to previous concerns. was this becauseofthe humiliating trek backto India, butalso for
uncoordinated. When General Iida invaded, the British were un StilwellwasoriginallyslatedtosupervisethedistributionofAmeli the memory ofencounters in the primeval rain forests ofBurma.
prepared for the speed ofthe Japanese advance. While the British can militaryaid,actastheCommanderofall theChineseForces in One soldier's account relates the dispirited emotion ofthe British
troops were roadbound and expected the Japanese to be also, the Burma, and serve as ChiefofStaffto Generalissimo Chiang Kai at that time:
truth was the opposite. The Nippon Army used thejungle to their shek. Upon arrival in Chungking two days before the fall of
advantage. They often divided into small units and bypassed en Rangoon, Stilwell immediately assumed the job of holding the Unlike thecampaigns in Italy and Normandy...the very
French
emy troop movements. Well behind the British lines, they would Sittang Valley and the railroad between Rangoon and Mandalay. nature of the country in Burma dictated that brutal hand-to
Indo-Chma
establish roadblocks byfelling trees and emplacing machineguns. General Alexanderplanned toestablish adefensive lineabout 150 hand clashes decided the outcome of countless encounters.
Although highly regarded as fighting men, General Slim's com miles northofRangoon to protectNorthern Burma. Seeingthedis Gloomilywesensedthat,inevitably,ourfuturelayinthejungles
BayofBengal mand was particularly vulnerable to this type ofattackas they had advantagesofthisstrategy,General Stilwell proposedacounterof of Burma and our nightmares contained grinning Japanese,
Siam th nd th
been trained for mechanized desert warfare. fensive using the Chinese 5 Army's 22 and 96 Divisions. ready toopen fire atus from cunninglyconcealedambush po
Using this hooking method, the Japanese continued to harass However, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek delayed approval; then sitions. Itwas to takeaconsiderable time beforeweceased to
General Slim by pushing the Burma Corps northward along the Major General Tu Yu-ming found excuses and finally refused to think of the Japanese soldier as a superman, ten feet tall...
lrrawaddy Valley toward the oil fields ofYenangyaung. Forced to fight. Hefeared the96thDivision mightlosetheonly field artillery (45:10,12)
liveon bully beefand biscuits, Slim's troops werestrafed byJapa in the ChineseArmy.
neseplanes,sufferedfrom lackofwater,and becameenveloped by Otherinstanceswere notedoftheChineselackofresolve, and Buteven as the laststragglers ofthe BritishArmy returned to
enemy troops. Under these conditions, on 15 April General Slim some had an apocryphal flavor. General Stilwell said that when India, aformer artillery officerwas alreadystudying the contours,
th
gave the order to blow up the oil fields and oil storage facilities attackedbyaJapaneseregiment,China's55 Divisioncompletely rivers, jungles, and situation in Burma to answer the challenge of
AndamenSea beforethey fell intothehandsoftheadvancinghorde.Almostwait vanished when they fled from an inferior Japanese force. Stilwell General Stilwell. To mount an offensive, he would have to over
ing too long, hejust managed to cuta path through thejungle and added that he accomplished his one bright spot, the retaking of cometheteITain,fear, andorganizational malaiseshownduringthe
escape. In doing so, the Commoner General lost most of his ve Taunggyi,onlyafterofferingtheChinesetroopsmonetaryrewards. Japanese conquest of Burma. Recognizing these facts, this lone
hicles and heavyequipment. Thattoo cameto naughtas theJapanesedetoured around the town figure's unorthodox mind began toschemeand conceiveofa bold
With nomorereasonstostayand fightinBurma,Slimbegana and droveon to Lashioand the Burma Road. and unprecedented operation. His plan would ultimately plantthe
..
general retreat.AttheChindwinRivernearthetownsofShwegyin Originally planning to retreat by raiI,·General Stilwell had to seed for the formulation ofa totally new concept in military his
and Kalewa, General Slim ordered his men to cross at the only start north in aconvoy becauseofatrain wreck. Finding travel by tory. To take back the wedge, springboard, and shield, he would
available point, the Basin-a natural site for ambush. He placed have to beattheJapaneseat their own game.
Map4-Topographical MapofBurma
12 13
Wingate's Plan
2
Wingate's Plan
BritishColonel OrdeC. Wingatearrived inIndiaon 19 March (1) The lightconcentration ofJapanesetroops in the coreof
1942and promptly plunged intoan intenseevaluationofthesitua Burma,
tion. He visited theBurmese front, began studyingthetrainingand (2) Useofsurpriseand mobility, and
tactics ofthe Japanese, religion and customs ofBurma and Japan, (3) Employmentofaerial firepower and re-supply.
climateandtopography,andeveryavailablereportonJapanesefight
ing in Burma. He agreed with India Command's assessment: the Simply stated, Wingate's theory ofLRP was to place highly
invincibleChin Hills and Japanese troopemplacements prevented mobileforces in theenemy's rearto harass Japanese linesofcom
a standard frontal attack. From India there were a numberofpos municationanddestroysupplies.ReminiscentofConfederateLieu
sible routes into Burma, but all were too fragile to sustain large tenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest's raids during the Ameri
scale military operations. Contrary to commonly held beliefs, can War Between the States, Colonel Wingate proposed an offen
though, Wingatefelt strongly British soldiers could equal Nippon sivebasedontheindirectapproach.Byinterceptingmunitions,food,
soldiersin therainforests becausetheywere moreflexibleand had and medical supplies, LRP sought to cutoffthe tail ofthe dragon
more imagination. so the main body becametoo weak to fight.
To overcome the enemy's stranglehold on Burma, Colonel TheJapanesedefensivepostureafterthe 1942offensivepointed
Wingate theorized the Japanese should never Imow British inten to thesoftunderbellyofthedragon. Wingatestatedtheenemywas
tionsorstrength.Additionally,hefelttheBritisharmyshouldpresent mostvulnerablefarbehindthe frontwhereJapanesetroopswereof
the Japanese with unconventional situations whenever possible. inferiorquality. Here,hereasoned,asmall forcecouldwreakhavoc
SlowlyheconstructedtheconceptofLong-RangePenetration(LRP) out of all proportion to its number. The size and composition of
in his mind. Atfirstjustacollection ofideas, laterWingate talked each group would vary with conditions, the governing principle
incessantly about organizing a force to employ hit-and-run tactics being strength enough to cause damage but small enough to slip
well behind Japanese lines in Burma. Although there were many through the enemy's l1et. LRP-trqined soldiers would conductop
disbelievers on India Command's staff, Colonel Wingate's ideas erations and movements during the day; if required to disperse,
caught the imagination ofGeneral Alexander. He liked the bold rendezvous would always be made afterdark.
nessofthe ideaanddirected Wingate to transform his theories into TheconsequenceofsuccessfulLRPwouldbewidespreadcon
acompleted plan. However, because it was innovativeand uncon fusion and uncertainty behind the enemy's forward areas. Cutting
ventional, Wingate's LRPtheory actuallyevolved in stages. offsupplies would lead to a progressive weakening and misdirec
Duringhis 1942studyofBurma,Wingateconcludedthecom tion ofGeneral Renya Mutaguchi's main forces. Colonel Wingate
bination of Burma's wilderness and Japanese perimeter defense insisted LRP units were not to fight on the front lines and must be
could notbeassaulted headon,yettheystill wereexploitable. Not used only in conjunction with a major campaign. Ifan offensive
ing Imperial troops were strung out with only a thin supply line did not occur, LRP would focus, not redirect, the Japanese forces
connecting them to the interior, Colonel Wingate proposed an of and thesmall LRP bands would beannihilated by the full force of
fensive to weaken Japan's grip on Burma. Employing an indirect the Nippon troops.
approach tooperations in Burma,Colonel Wingateconstructed his Wingate'sLRPunits were notstrong enough to withstand the ~Il\pS-Northern Burma,1943
LRP theory around three principles: main force; their greatest strength emerged from their abiIity to
maneuver. Each LRP group would strike, disappear, and turn up
somewhereelsewithouttheenemybeingabletofollow theirmove-
14 15
]SI Air Commando Group Wingate's Plan
mentsthroughthejungle.ThecommanderoftheLRPgroupwould a new road from Ledo would be built to connect with the Burma To seal his endorsement of Wingate's plan, in June General umn, use of light artillery, air re-supply methods, and dispersion/
th
dictate the choice of engagement. Whenever possible, the objec Road, thus reopening thesupply line to China. TheANAKIM op Wavell established the 77 Indian Infantry Brigade expressly for rendezvous procedures. At his Field Headquarters he had a small
tiveofLRPwastohittheconfluenceofsupplyandcommunication erational plan was as follows: LRPand promoted Colonel Wingate toBrigadierGeneral. InJuly, scalemapofenemy-heldtelTitoryplacedonthefloor.Withhiscom
lines. IfLRP units struck a railroad bridge at dawn and a supply General Wingateassembled his troops in thejungle region around mandersstandingonBurma,everyonepaddedaboutinsocksashe
dump in the afternoon, theJapanese would be unable to guess the (1) In mid-October 1942, XV Corps would mountan offensive Saugor and began preparing for the mission. His comnland, cer instructed strategy and tactics to thefinest detail.
truestrengthofthecolumns and probablyoverestimatetheir num into theArakan region to recapture the portofAkyab; tainly not hand-picked men, consisted ofthe folJowing units: Most important, he taught his soldiersthesecurity and shelter
bers. Furthermore, iftwo LRP units worked in unison, they could (2) AmphibiousstrikesatstrategicpointsalongtheArakancoast ofthejungle. He demonstrated with maps and aerial photographs
th
utterly confuse the enemy. Wingate wrote, "Long-Range Penetra would supplementthe XV Corps offensive; (I) 13 Kings Liverpool Regiment that closeness to the enemy did not automatically mean contact.
nd
tion affords greater opportunity ofmystifying and misleading the (3) Ultimatelyjoiningforces, theamphibiousunitsandXVCorps (2) 312 Gurkha Rifles Rather than an enemy, Wingate proposed thejungle, at the least,
nd
enemythan anyotherform ofwarfare." (79:I)Atthe rootofColo would continuetheirattack to Rangoon; (3) l42 CommandoCompany was neutral. Among those who learned the LRPlessons well were
nd
nel Wingate's theory of penetration was the value ofone fighting (4) In lateJanuary 1943,IV Corps, commanded byLieutenant (4) 2 BurmaRifles twocolumncomnlanderswithtotallydissimilarbackgrounds.Briga
man deep in the heartofenemy territory. General A. F. P. Christison, would launch an assaulton the (5) MuleTransportCompany dierMichaelCalveltoftheBUlmaBushWarfareSchoolandBriga
ColonelWingatefurthertheorizedtheonlylimittothenumber Burmesetowns ofSittaungand Kalewa; (6) RAP liaison officers dierBernardFergusson, previouslyofGeneralHeadquartersIndia,
offighting men and length oftheir operations was the availability (5) TheChineseRamgarh Force under General StilweU would (7) Officers from the Bush Warfare School atMaymyo, Burma would later play an importantrole in Wingate'sfuture plans.
ofsupplies. He called this the air support factor and he proposed movesouthacrossthePangsauPasstoengageJapaneseforces Just priorto thescheduled offensive in January 1943,General
using cargo and consumable airdrops as his flexible supply line. atMyitkyina, Bhamo, and Lashio; and LittledidGeneralWingateknowwhenheassembledhistroops WingatebrokecampatSaugarand movedhismenforward onfoot.
Incorporated into his theory ofwarfare, Colonel Wingate intended (6) TheLRPgroup would infiltrij.tethecentral portion ofBurma that he would be forced to compromjse his original LRP tenets. After hikjng 133 miles to the railway station at Jhansi, the men
to capitalizeon airre-supply capabilitydeveloped during theBrit to confuseand disruptJapanese lines ofcommunication. Because ofthe continuing disunity within General Wavell's com would travel by train to the railhead in Dimapur. Self-control and
ish withdrawal from Burma. Additionally, because LRP units re mand,GeneralWingatewouldexecutehisportionoftheANAKIM strict adherence to procedures were the order ofthe day. Column
quired too much mobility to manipulateartillery piecesbehind the plan without the primary requirement ofLRP-the presence ofa actions weredirected byfour prearranged silentsignals:
lines, Wingate had another usefor air power. Heanticipated using majoroffensive.
high precision bombing and strafing in the place of artillery and AsWingatepreparedtoturn adefeatedarmy intojunglefight (1) Prepare to March All men, equipment, and animals were
tanks. ers, he devised training methods that were physical, exacting, and to be formed up within 30 minutesof
Thisdeparturefrom recognized methodsofwarfarecalled for thorough. The program required all soldiers to move everywhere notice.
the use ofportablecommunications to maintain contactwith base on the double. General Wingatesettheexampleby sprinting from (2) OfficersReport Everyofficerreceived marchingorders
camps and detached columns. Wingate could not rely on normal oneviewpointtoanother.Theregimen wasdescribed byoneofthe from column commanders.
supply lines,soashecolorfullystated,"HavenoLinesofComnlu officers as follows: "Every movement, from stand to stand, was (3) March Columns moved out with precision to
nication on thejunglefloor. Bring in the goods likeFatherChrist done on the double....When he [Wingate] wished to move to an ward their objective.
mas, down the chimney." (22:164) The dropping ofsupplies was other viewpoint, he ran there, andjolJy fast too." (49:376) (4) Halt Ordergiven after90 minutes ofmarch
nothing new, nevertheless, the degree of accuracy required did At first, the strain of the intensive training program took its to afford men and animals a lO-mjnute
present problems. For this reason, he requested Royal Air Force toU.Before,during,andafterthemonsoons,GeneralWingate'smen rest.
(RAF) flying officers beassigned toeach ground unittodirectair were swimming rivers, marching long miles, navigating through
craft to drop zones and to mark targets in forward areas. This no thejungle,climbingtrees,andscalinghills. Within two months, up During the march, Wingate disciplined his men for depriva
tionwascomplicatedandtimeconsumingbecauseRAFprocedures to 70 percent ofthe troops had been in the hospital with real and tionsexpected inthejunglesofBurma.Each manwasallowedonly
did not allow direct outside communication with British pilots. imaginarycasesofmalaria,dysentery, andjunglesores. Wingate's 2.5 pintsofwateraday-1 pintbeforethemarch, 1pintatmidday,
FurtherlimitingtheeffectivenesswasthelackofBritishairsuperi reaction wasseverebutlogical.Heinstitutedstrictpunishmentsfor and .5 pint at the conclusion of the day's march. The men fully
ority overBurma. Even with this drawbackand thecomplex com imaginaryailments.Further,heeliminatedhospitalexcusesbyhav soaked canteen covers to producecool water.To providecolumns
munication scheme,ColonelWingatesubmittedan outlinetoGen ing all officers instructed on the treatment of illnesses. For those with food, Wingate adnunistered the lastoperational test. Depart
eral Alexander who approved the plan and forwarded it to India who collapsed from the heat, Wingate offered little more comfort ing without rations, he arranged for supplies to be dropped to his
Command. than a shady tree and a hand-held fan. He reasoned in thejungle, columns at prearranged sites after dark. After an 8-day march, he
Despitetheaudacityofthestrategy,GeneralWavell supported there would be no hospitalsand veryfew medics.Thecureslowly bivouacked outside the town ofImphal, still requiring the brigade
the plan totally. He included itas a partofacoordinated offensive showed results as the men hardened underthe discipline. toattendlongandconcenu'atedlectures.Theseclassroomexercises
calledANAKIM. Thefulcrum ofthe plan calledfor thecaptureof In addition to physical preparedness, General Wingate also proved necessary as General Wingate's mission was markedly
theairfieldatAkyabIsland.FromAkyab,theBritishcouldincrease trained his men inLRPprinciples.Hedid this byextensivelyusing changingeven at this latedate.
thesecurityoftheBayofBengal,thereby relievingthepressureon atechniquecalledTacticalExercisesWithoutTroops.Normallythis Little by little,thefabric ofANAKIM unraveled, leavingonly
th
Burma and China from the Nippon Navy and Air Force. Ifsuch involvedsandtablesmodeled into miniatureterrain maps.Wingate, the77 IndianBligadeasaparticipant.First,in lateOctober1942,
protectioncouId berealized,General WavelIcontendedthere-con insisting on extreme detajl, had huge 400-square yard pits dug so GeneraJ Wavell recommended movingANAKIM back to Novem
quest of alJ ofBurma was possible. The details of the ANAKIM thatallenemytroopstrengths,aswelJaspertinenthills,rivers,roads, ber1943andamoremodestplanbesubnutted.Thenewplan,caJled
plan involvedcoordination among avarietyofmilitary units, Brit OrdeC. Wingate and gun emplacements could be depicted to scale. For hours, the RAVENOUS, did not includean amphibiousoperation and itonly
ish and Chinese. Colonel Wingate's role in the plan would help Heconceived,plannedand commandedOperationLONGCLOTH officers practiced a spectrum ofscemuios envisioned by General soughtto retake Northern Burma. Next, IV Corps canceled its op
secureNorthernBurmafromtheJapanese.AstheBritishadvanced, theinfiltrationofCentralBurma.Courtesyof1"AirCommandoAsso Wingate: ambush, attack in position, attack while moving a col- eration in theLedoareabecauseoftransportationand road-miling
ciation
16 17
