Anxious Uncertainty and Reactive Approach Motivation (RAM)

15 Pages·2010·0.13 MB·English

PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Anxious Uncertainty and Reactive Approach Motivation (RAM)
Ian McGregor, Kyle Nash, Nikki Mann, and Curtis E. Phills
YorkUniversity
In4experimentsanxiousuncertaintythreatscausedreactiveapproachmotivation(RAM).InStudies1
and2,academicanxiousuncertaintythreatscausedRAMasassessedbybehavioralneuroscienceand
implicitmeasuresofapproachmotivation.InStudy3theeffectofarelationalanxiousuncertaintythreat
onapproach-motivatedpersonalprojectsinparticipants’everydayliveswasmediatedbytheidealismof
those projects. In Study 4 the effect of a different relational anxious uncertainty threat on implicit
approachmotivationwasheightenedbymanipulatedsalienceofpersonalideals.ResultssuggestaRAM
accountforidealisticandideologicalreactionsinthethreatanddefenseliterature.Speculativeimplica-
tions are suggested for understanding diverse social and clinical phenomena ranging from worldview
defense,prejudice,andmeaningmakingtonarcissism,hypomania,andaggression.
Keywords:threat,anxiety,uncertainty,ideals,approachmotivation
To relieve anxiety some animals tenaciously run, lick, and bite. reactionsinhumans(andinotheranimalsthatshareouruncertainty-
Indeed,someratsreacttoanxietybyrunningsoeagerlyonawheel linkedneuropsychologyofanxiety;Gray&McNaughton,2000).Our
thattheystarvetodeath,andsomedogslickthemselvestothepoint starting premise is that RAM effectively provides insulation from
ofskinlesions.Suchcompulsive“displacementbehaviors”canseem anxious uncertainty through a kind of motivated tunnel vision that
bizarrebecausetheyhavenoobviousinstrumentallinktotheeliciting shieldstheimpactofgoal-irrelevantanddissonantinformation(Gable
anxiety(Antelman,Szechtman,Chin,&Fisher,1975;Berridge,Mit- & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009; Harmon-
ton,Clark,&Roth,1999;Rappaport,Ryland,&Kriete,1992;Rout- Jones&Harmon-Jones,2002;Harmon-Jones,Harmon-Jones,Fearn,
tenberg & Kuznesof, 1967; Uchiumi, Aoki, Kikusui, Takeuchi, &
Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008; Klinger, 1975; Shah, Friedman, &
Mori,2008).Hereweproposeareactiveapproachmotivation(RAM)
Kruglanski,2002).Accordingtoourpalliativeaccount,thedomainof
accountofrelatedreactionsinhumans.
RAM may thus be wholly unrelated to the eliciting threat because
Hypomania, smoking, and aggression have been viewed by psy-
RAMmerelyneedstoprovideanalternativefocusforeagerabsorp-
choanalytictheoristsascompulsivedisplacementstorelieveanxiety
tion.Theelicitinganxietieswillfeellessbothersomebecausetheyare
(Dollard, Dobb, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Fenichel, 1945).
mutedbythenewgoalfocus.
Janis(1958,pp.140–141),forexample,noticedthatintheanxious
For humans, thinking about cherished ideals may serve as an
weeksleadinguptotheirsurgeries,patientsseemedtoshowakindof
efficient and reliable focus for RAM. Ideals are self-defining,
“surface euphoria”—a “forced hyperactivity” or “pseudo elation”
abstract goals that guide more concrete goals (Carver & Scheier,
beliedbyagitation—ofteninvolvingfantasiesofunlimitedpersonal
powerandpotential(seealsoFenichel,1945,pp.407–411).Theidea 1998; Higgins, 1996, 1997; Powers, 1973). Ideals can therefore
thatpeoplemaskanxiousuncertaintyandmotivationalconflictwith serveasaccessiblealternativegoalstoapproachwhenfocalgoals
idealizedextremesofconfidenceintheselforasocialidentityisa arecompromised(Rogers,Kuiper,&Kirker,1977).Humanscan
cornerstoneofneoanalytictheoriesofdefensivepride(Horney,1950), eagerly approach meaningful ideals, at least in part, by simply
self-superiority (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956), and authoritarian heightening imagined commitment to them (McGregor & Little,
hostility (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; 1998).Privateconvictionforidealsisalsorelativelyfreefromthe
Fromm,1941). risks of failure or critique that can hamper more temporal goals.
Inthepresentlaboratoryresearch,weinvestigateabasicmotiva- Beyondtheirefficiencyandreliability,idealsarealsoresistantto
tional mechanism that might account for such eager displacement disillusionment and habituation because they can never be fully
attained (Klinger, 1977). Promoting ideals as a means for RAM
maythereforebeanappealinghumanresponsetoanxiousuncer-
IanMcGregor,KyleNash,NikkiMann,andCurtisE.Phills,Depart- tainty.1
mentofPsychology,YorkUniversity,Toronto,Ontario,Canada.
This research was supported by grants from the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada. Thanks to Denise Marigold,
JordanPeterson,andMikePrenticeforhelpfulcomments. 1Hypomanic episodes arising from anxious uncertainty and conflict
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ian havebeendescribedinpsychoanalytictermsasbeingcharacterizedbya
McGregor, Department of Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele self-perceivedunificationoftheegowithsuperegoideals(Fenichel,1945;
Street,Toronto,OntarioM3J1P3,Canada.E-mail:[e-mail] seealsoHorney,1950).
JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,2010,Vol.99,No.1,133–147
©2010AmericanPsychologicalAssociation0022-3514/10/$12.00 DOI:10.1037/a0019701
133
134 MCGREGOR,NASH,MANN,ANDPHILLS
Anxious Uncertainty Brower, 1987). In doing so, we target anxious uncertainty in
contrasttobenignuncertaintyorotherunpleasantbutunconflicted
Pharmacological,behavioral,andlesionstudiesonhumansand negative arousal states (e.g., mere informational uncertainty with
other animals reveal a basic goal-regulation process that begins less bearing on personal goals in Studies 3 and 4 or aversion to
withtheexperienceofanxiousuncertainty(Gray&McNaughton, dentalpaininStudy1).
2000). Anxiety arises when an animal is approach-oriented but
simultaneouslyexperiencespunishmentcues,evidenceoffrustra-
tivenonreward,uncertainty,orthreateningnovelty.Theessential From Anxious Uncertainty to RAM
anxiogenic predicament thus arises from the uncertainty of an
Acardinalfeatureofanxietyisheightenedvigilancearoundthe
approach–avoidance conflict. Even approach–approach conflicts
domainofthethreat,whichpreparestheanimalforthepossibility
among equally compelling alternatives, or novel circumstances,
of a transition to fight or flight, should it become necessary.
can become approach–avoidance conflicts to the extent that ap-
Vigilancealsohelpstheanimalnoticealternativeroutesformore
proaching one alternative implies frustration of others (Lewin,
viable goal pursuits. Once a viable alternative is identified, the
1935). According to Gray and McNaughton (2000), the brain’s
anxious animal can surge toward it, restore clear approach moti-
septo-hippocampalsystemrespondstosuchmotivationallyuncer-
vation, and thereby relieve the uncomfortable symptoms of anx-
tainpredicamentswithanxiety;directbehavioralinhibitionofthe
iousuncertainty.Withanxiousuncertaintyandvigilancerelieved,
focal goal; and iterative, negative biasing of all goals. These
uninhibitedapproachofafocalgoalpromotesthereturntoakind
responses are adaptive when they facilitate disengagement from
of single-mindedness characteristic of committed approach-
predicamentsthatrendergoalsuncertainandengagementinmore
viable alternative goals. When the septo-hippocampal system is motivation whereby goal-irrelevant stimuli become less motiva-
lesioned, animals lose the capacity to extricate themselves from tionally salient (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones &
goalconflicts(Gray&McNaughton,2000). Gable, 2009; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002; Harmon-
Intheircomprehensivereviewofanimalandhumanresearchon Jonesetal.,2008;Klinger,1975;Shahetal.,2002).Suchsingle-
the neuropsychology of anxiety, Gray and McNaughton (2000) minded states allow goals to be powerfully approached without
were clear in emphasizing that anxiety essentially arises from distraction—obstacles to action and alternative perspectives be-
uncertainpredicaments(seealsoPeterson,1999)—fromcuessig- comelesssalientasone’sownimpulsesandperspectivespredom-
nalingpossible(butnotcertain)impedanceofanactive,approach- inate(cf.Cs´ıkszentmiha´lyi,1990;Galinsky,Magee,Inesi,&Gru-
motivatedgoal.Thiscoretenetoftheneuropsychologyofanxiety enfeld, 2006; Guinote, 2007; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson,
highlightsapivotaldistinctionbetweenanxietyandothernegative 2003).
butnonconflictedstates,suchaspanic.Incontrasttouncertainty- Thecapacitytotenaciouslylockandloadonanalternativegoal
rootedanxiety,whicharisesfromsimultaneouslyactiveapproach canbeadaptivewhenitfacilitatesappropriategoalswitchingand
andavoidanceimpulses,panicarisesfromclearandunambivalent maintainsviablegoalpursuit.Thepremiseofthecurrentresearch,
avoidancemotivation. however, is that tenacious absorption in an alternative goal can
Gray and McNaughton (2000) illustrated this distinction with also be engaged for merely palliative purposes. In the face of
findingsfromresearchonhungrymiceapproachingfoodincages anxious uncertainty, RAM focused on any compelling goal (or
smearedwiththescentofacat.Themicewillcontinuetohaltingly ideal) may be immediately rewarding insofar as it insulates the
approach—butwithanxiousuncertaintyandperiodicrearingupto individualfromtheelicitinganxieties.RAMmaythusbeengaged
scan for a possible cat to avoid. In contrast, if a cat actually simplyforreliefofdistresswithoutregardforlongertermconse-
appears, the mice react with distinct and purely avoidant (panic- quences.
related)fight-or-flightreactions.Lesionandpharmacologicalstud- Themotivationaltunnelvisionassociatedwithactiveapproach
ies show that different brain regions uniquely mediate anxiety motivation may partially account for why neural markers of ap-
versus fight-or-flight reactions (i.e., septo-hippocampal vs. peri- proachmotivationaresorobustlyassociatedwithwell-beingand
aqueductalgray,respectively;Gray&McNaughton,2000). decreased reactivity to threatening or risky stimuli (Elliot, 2008).
In the present research, we focus exclusively on experimental Relative left frontal brain activity is a robust indicator of both
threats designed to elicit anxious uncertainty. We use the term dispositional and situational approach-motivation tendencies
anxious uncertainty to distinguish it from merely informational (Elliot, 2008), and approach-related brain activity induced by
uncertaintythatdoesnotthreatenpersonalgoalsorcauseanxious biofeedback has been found to inhibit goal conflicts (Harmon-
or ideological reactions in the threat and defense literature Jones et al., 2008). Approach-related brain activity also predicts
(McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2009; Van den Bos, 2009; cf. happiness and meaning in life (Urry et al., 2004) and lower
Sorrentino&Roney,2000;Wilson,Centerbar,Kermer,&Gilbert, reactivity to risky and noxious stimuli (Gianotti et al., 2009;
2005). To do so we use face-valid manipulations of anxious Jackson et al., 2003). Moreover, two recent studies demonstrate
uncertaintyinthecontextofnormativelyimportantpersonalgoals. that approach-motivated patterns of electroencephalographic
Importantgoalsaremorepronetoanxietythanaretrivialones (EEG) activation are significantly correlated with less anxious
becausereluctancetosimplydisengagefromthemwhentheyare reactivityintheanteriorcingulatecortex(whichregistersconflict
impeded maintains the uncertainty of approaching the goal and and uncertainty) after Stroop-task errors (Nash, McGregor, &
avoiding the impedance. In the present research, therefore, we Inzlicht, 2010). Behavioral neuroscience markers of relative left
operationalizeanxiousuncertaintyindomainsofourundergradu- cerebral hemisphericity similarly predict vigorous, powerful, and
ate participants’ most important normative life tasks (relational robustapproach-motivation-relatedmoodstates(Drake&Myers,
and academic/career; Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal, Langston, & 2006).Thereisthusconvergingtheoretical,experimental,neural,
REACTIVEAPPROACHMOTIVATION 135
and behavioral neuroscience precedent for the expectation that Such idealistic reactions to anxious uncertainty do not result
RAMshouldbearewardingresponsetoanxiousuncertainty. after other kinds of negative arousal states or after reminders of
merely informational kinds of uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009).
Dozens of studies, for example, have shown that being reminded
Ideal Approach
of the experience of dental pain causes as much generalized
From the RAM perspective, when faced with anxious uncer- negative affect as does being reminded of mortality salience.
tainties people would be expected to turn to their ideals, ideolo- Dental pain reminders do not, however, cause the ideological
gies, meanings, and worldviews with heightened tenacity and reactionsthatexperientialmortalityoruncertaintyreminderscause
vigor (cf. Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Hogg, 2007; McGregor, (McGregor&Jordan,2007;Solomonetal.,2004).
Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Peterson, 1999; Van den Bos, Recently researchers further compared the effects of conflict-
Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005). Doing so related aversive experiences with serious but non-conflict-related
couldservethesamedisplacementfunctionasotheranimals’more aversive experience (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2009). Partic-
concrete reactive compulsions, but with little expenditure of re- ipantswererandomlyassignedtodescribehowtheyfeltabout(a)
sources. Ideals are abstract goals (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Hig- “animportantgoalyouarepursuingthatisnotgoingverywelland
gins, 1996), and merely thinking about them can activate the is impeded by a frustrating obstacle or obstacles,” (b) “a current
pattern of left-frontal cerebral hemisphericity that characterizes situation in which you feel torn in deciding between similarly
approach motivation (Amodio, Shah, Sigelman, Brazy, & promisinggoals,butreallyyoucanonlyaffordtopursueone,”or
Harmon-Jones,2004).Idealsmaythusprovideaparticularlyeffi- (c)“abigproblemthatiscurrentlymakingyouseriouslyreassess
cient and reliable focus for RAM because ideals are relatively whoyouareasaperson,yourvalues,and/orhowtheworldworks
impervioustotemporalfrustrationsandcanbereadilypromotedin around you” (a topic at least as aversive as the others but less
theprivacyofone’sownimagination,freefromfailureorcritique. conflictedbecausetheindividualhasdisengaged).Thedependent
As Lewin (1935, pp. 56, 103, 145, 178–179) observed, conflicts variable was a five-item scale that assesses the extent to which
among “simultaneously present psychical tensions” can cause participants were “looking,” “searching,” and “seeking” “mean-
“flightintounreality”or“fantasy,”to“unrealplanesofhopesand ing,” “purpose,” and “mission” in life (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, &
dreams” where there are no reality checks on the goals one Kaler,2006,p.93).
constructs.Becomingidealisticmaythereforebeanattractiveway Results showed that the goal-conflict conditions ([a] and [b])
forhumanstoactivateRAMandgainreliefinthefaceofconflicts each caused significantly more meaning seeking than did the
anduncertainties.2 nonconflicted serious problem condition (for similar reactive
Past research has shown that anxious uncertainties do indeed meaning-seeking findings see McGregor et al., 2001, Study 4).
causepeopletopromotetheiridealsandmeanings.Forexample, Goal conflict is one of the predicaments that can reliably put
in a study by McGregor et al. (2001), participants reacted to people in a motivationally uncertain and therefore anxious state
personaldilemmasorexistentialuncertaintiesbycleavingtomore (Gray&McNaughton,2000).Thus,previousresearchspecifically
idealistic and meaningful values, identities, and personal projects links predicaments related to anxious uncertainty with idealistic
intheirlives(Studies2and4);theyalsoreportedastrongerdesire and meaning-seeking reactions. The main novel purpose of the
to find meaning in life (Study 4) and to eagerly defend their presentresearchistoprovideanintegrativeframeworkforunder-
consensual worldviews (Studies 1 and 3; see also, e.g., Hogg, standing such idealistic reactions—from meaning seeking and
2007;Landau,Greenberg,&Sullivan,2009;Landau,Greenberg, value conviction to ideological extremism and worldview de-
Sullivan, Routledge, & Arndt, 2009; Proulx & Heine, 2008; Van fense—that are currently explained by competing theories in the
den Bos et al., 2005). Past work has also shown that salient literature.
uncertainties lose their sting if participants are given a chance to
expresstheirideals,values,convictions,identifications,andmean- Overview
ings(McGregor,2006b;McGregor,Haji,&Kang,2008;McGre-
InfourexperimentswetesttheRAMhypothesiswithface-valid
gor & Marigold, 2003, Study 4; McGregor, Nail, Marigold, &
manipulations of anxious uncertainty that have caused anxious
Kang,2005,Study4;McGregoretal.,2001,Study1).
Dozensofstudiesinspiredbyterrormanagementtheory(TMT)
havesimilarlyfoundmortalitysaliencetoheightenconvictionfor 2Theprivacyofidealsandmeaningsmayalsoprotectthemfromreality
cultural, worldview, and positive-self ideals (reviewed in constraintsandallowthemtogravitatetowardunrealisticconvictionand
Solomon,Greenberg,&Pyszczynski,2004;seealsoGreenberget utopianextremes.Extremesmayprovideparticularlyreliablesolaceinthe
al.,2003,andVandenBosetal.,2005,forevidencethatitisthe faceofanxiousuncertaintybecauseconflict-relateddistressisexperienced
anxiety and uncertainty associated with mortality salience that to the extent that the conflicting elements have equally strong valences.
causestheworldviewdefense).Evensubtleanxiety-inducingnov- Themathematicalformulathatbestpredictstheamountoffeltdiscomfort
eltycuesintheenvironmentcancausesimilarworldviewdefense arisingfromcognitiveconflictisthesquareofthevalenceoftheweakerof
theconflictingelementsdividedbythestrongeroftheconflictingelements
reactions,whichdisappearifanxietycanbequelledinsomeother
(Newby-Clark,McGregor,&Zanna,2002).Amplifyinganextremeposi-
way (Proulx & Heine, 2008). Other research has linked anxious
tion in either direction exponentially increases the denominator of the
uncertaintytotheneedforarigidideology(Jost,Glaser,Kruglan-
ambivalence formula and accordingly decreases distress. Approach of
ski,&Sulloway,2003)andtoheightenedconvictionforpersonal
ideological extremes, then, might be a particularly reliable avenue for
values, ideals, and religious orientations (McGregor & Marigold, RAM.Notonlyareidealsreadilyavailableandefficient,butideological
2003; McGregor et al., 2005; McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, in extremesarealsoreliablefocithatarethemselvesstructurallyimmuneto
press;McGregoretal.,2001). anxiousuncertainty.
136 MCGREGOR,NASH,MANN,ANDPHILLS
experience,ideologicalextremes,andworldviewdefensesinpast tically controlled. In addition to being a poignant anxious uncer-
research. Studies 1 and 2 assess whether anxious uncertainty- taintythreat,thismanipulationalsoreliablycausesparticipantsto
threatswillcausebehavioralneuroscienceandimplicitevidenceof become more ideologically extreme. It has caused more extreme
RAM. Study 3 tests whether the effect of anxious uncertainty on and fervent conviction for personal and political values, more
personal project approach motivation is mediated by idealism. zealous religious commitment, and even willingness to support
Study4assesseswhetheranexperimentallymanipulatedfocuson religiouswarfare(McGregor,Haji,Nash,&Teper,2008;McGre-
ideals will augment the effect of anxious uncertainty on the im- gor & Jordan, 2007; McGregor et al., 2005; McGregor et al., in
plicitmeasureofapproachmotivationusedinStudy2.TheRAM press).
accountwouldbesupportedifthreatsthathavecausedideological Themodal3-minwaittimeaftertheanxiousuncertaintymate-
extremesinpastresearchalsoheightenapproachmotivation,me- rialsservedastheshortdelaythathasbeenfoundnecessaryinpast
diatedandmoderatedbysalienceofideals. research to allow time for uncertainty-related threats to reemerge
afteraperiodofproximalthreatsuppression(seeWichman,Brun-
ner, & Weary, 2008; cf. Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon,
Study 1
1999). At the end of the study, participants were fully debriefed
We manipulated anxious uncertainty about academic aptitude andassuredthatthethreatmaterialshadnoactualbearingontheir
andthenassessedabehavioralneurosciencemeasureofapproach ownabilities.Thetrackrecordofthisanxiousuncertaintymanip-
motivation. This measure has correlated significantly in past re- ulationincausinganxiousuncertainty,andalsoincausingreactive
search with approach-motivation-related affect (Drake & Myers, idealism, makes it a good initial candidate for testing our novel
2006) and with the precise pattern of EEG activity in the dorso- hypothesisthatthesamethreatsthatcausedefensiveideologywill
lateralprefrontalcortexthatischaracteristicofapproachmotiva- alsocauseRAM.
tion(Nash,McGregor,&Inzlicht,inpress). Relative left cerebral hemisphericity. Links between left-
frontal asymmetry and approach motivation were first noticed in
patientswithfocallesionstotheleftorrightcerebralhemisphere,
Method
which tended to result in depressive or manic symptoms, respec-
Thirty-sixsecond-yearpsychologystudents(sevenmale;mean tively (Elliot, 2008). More recently, in dozens of studies relative
age(cid:1)21years)completedallmaterialsduringthehalf-timebreak left-frontal EEG activity has consistently been associated with
in a 3-hr personality psychology lecture. Participants first com- approach motivation and related constructs—such as behavioral
pletedtheexperimentallymanipulatedanxiousuncertaintyorden- activation, risk taking, positive mood, and anger (Elliot, 2008)—
talpaincontrolconditionmaterials.Afterwaitinguntiltheslowest and with a tenacious focus on goal-related phenomena and inhi-
participant was finished (modal wait time of 3 min), all were bition of conflicting cognitions (Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009;
instructedtoturntheexperimentalmanipulationmaterialsupside- Harmon-Jonesetal.,2008).
downontheirdesk,andthebehavioralneurosciencemeasurewas In the present study we used the line bisection task to assess
distributedandcompleted. relativeleftcerebralhemisphericity.Participantsmadetickmarks
Anxiousuncertaintymanipulation(academic). Theanxious at what they perceived to be the center point on each of 14
uncertaintymanipulationwasdesignedtoinduceuncertaintyinthe staggeredlinespresentedonahorizon-viewsheetofpaper.Each
domain of participants’ important academic goals. Participants linewasapproximately24cmlong.Estimationerrorstotheright
randomly assigned to the anxious uncertainty condition were re- reflect an overnoticing of the right visual field characteristic of
quired to summarize an extremely difficult, one-page statistics relative left cerebral hemisphericity (Jewell & McCourt, 2000).
passage on LISREL, structural equation modeling. It was pre- Thus, we computed the index of relative left cerebral hemisphe-
sentedasapopulartoolforanalyzingdatainpsychology,andwe ricity by subtracting each participant’s number of left-of-center
claimed to be interested in assessing how well they could under- ticks from right-of-center ticks. Experimentally elicited active
stand and summarize it in 5 min. The passage was taken out of approach motivation has been associated with relative left hemi-
context and included complicated formulae, statistical terms, and sphericity on a similar measure in past research (Friedman &
mathematicalsymbols(fromPedhazur,1982,pp.639–640).Key Forster,2005,Study3).Rightwarderrorsonthelinebisectiontask
sentences were also deleted to make it even more confusing. arealsosignificantlyandspecificallycorrelatedwiththepatternof
Participants in the dental pain control condition were instead relativeleft-frontalEEGactivationcharacteristicofapproachmo-
randomlyassignedtowriteabouttheexperienceofdentalpainat tivation(i.e.,atfrontalF7vs.F8sites;Nashetal.,inpress.
the dentist. Although highly aversive, thoughts about dental pain Variousfactorssuchasthetendencyofpeopletoreadfromleft
donotarouseuncertaintyaboutgoalpursuit. to right and to write with their right hands make it difficult to
Previousresearchhasshownthattheprimaryaffectivereaction interpretlinebisectiontaskresultsasanindexofabsolutediffer-
totheLISRELmanipulationofanxiousuncertaintyisspecifically ences in hemispheric activation (e.g., McCourt, Freeman,
uncertainty-related (McGregor, Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008). For Tahmahkera-Stevens, & Chausee, 2001). For our purposes, how-
example, this same anxious uncertainty manipulation caused sig- ever, the line bisection task serves adequately for measuring
nificantlymoreuncertain,frustrated,andconfusedfeelings(inthat changes in relative left cerebral hemisphericity caused by the
orderofeffectmagnitude;ps(cid:2).001)thaninacontrolcondition. randomly assigned anxious uncertainty threat (we accordingly
It also caused threatened participants to feel less good and suc- report standardized results). To reduce error variance we con-
cessful(ps(cid:2).005)thanparticipantsinthecontrolcondition,but trolled for dispositional differences in participants’ line bisection
thespecificeffectonfeelingsofuncertaintyremainedsignificant tendencies by including as a covariate in our main analysis the
even when the other negative and positive adjectives were statis- same measure of relative left cerebral hemisphericity assessed
REACTIVEAPPROACHMOTIVATION 137
under neutral conditions 1 week later. Six participants did not approachIATdependentvariable.Thisdelayalsoallowedtimefor
returnfortheTime2linebisectiontaskreassessment,whichleft defensestoemerge(Wichmanetal.,2008).
30 participants for the main analysis (five male; mean age (cid:1) 21 Approach IAT. We presented participants with a version of
years). theIATthatmeasuredtherelativestrengthsofassociationbetween
the self and approach-related words versus avoidance-related
words.Participantswererequiredtocategorizestimuluswordsthat
Results
appearedinthecenterofthescreenaccordingtothecategoriesof
The line bisection task measure of relative cerebral hemisphe- approach versus avoidance or self versus other. In the critical
ricity was reliable, with a test–retest correlation of r(30) (cid:1) .71, self–approachblockoftrials,thecategorywordsselfandapproach
p (cid:2) .001. An analysis of covariance controlling for Time 2 line appeared together in one upper corner, and the category words
bisection scores revealed significantly more relative left cerebral otherandavoidanceappearedtogetherintheotheruppercornerof
hemisphericity(i.e.,morerightwarderrors)intheanxiousuncer- the computer screen. Participants were required to use the same
taintycondition(Z(cid:1).27)thaninthecontrolcondition(Z(cid:1)–.30), key to categorize words related to the self (I, me, mine, self) and
F(1, 27) (cid:1) 5.45, p (cid:2) .05. This encouraging behavioral neuro- approach (advance, pursue, forward, reach) and another key to
science evidence is necessary but not sufficient support for the categorize words related to other (them, they, their, other) and
RAM hypothesis. Studies 2–4 were conducted for multimethod avoidance (retreat, withdraw, flee, reverse). In contrast, in the
convergence. othercriticalblockofself–avoidancetrials,thecategorypairings
werereversed,andthecategorywordsselfandavoidanceappeared
together in one upper corner, and the category words other and
Study 2
approachappearedtogetherintheotheruppercorner.Eachcritical
Study2wasdesignedtoprovideimplicitsupportforthebehav- block consisted of 60 trials. The order of the critical blocks was
ioral neuroscience evidence of RAM found in Study 1. For the counterbalancedbetweenparticipants.
implicitmeasureofRAMweassessedthestrengthofassociation Participants were told to respond to stimuli as quickly as pos-
between the self and the concepts of approach versus avoidance siblewhileremainingasaccurateaspossible.Aftermakingcorrect
followingthesameacademicanxiousuncertaintymanipulationas responses on a trial, participants were presented with a blank
in Study 1. To do so we created a self-approach version of the screen for 1,000 ms before the next trial. After making incorrect
implicitassociationtest(IAT).TheIAThasbeenadaptedinpast responses on a trial, participants were presented with a blank
research to measure the strength of association between the self screenfor100msfollowedbyaredXinthemiddleofthescreen
and various concepts including social categories (e.g., Devos & for 800 ms and then another blank screen for 100 ms before the
Banaji, 2005; Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002; Pinter & nexttrial.Foreachcriticalblockoftrialsweaveragedthelatency
Greenwald, 2004), stereotypes (e.g., Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, of participants’ correct responses. We computed approach IAT
2001), academic constructs (e.g., Kawakami, Steele, Cifa, Phills, scoresbysubtractingthemeanlatencyofcorrectresponsesinthe
& Dovidio, 2008; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002), and self- self–approach block of trials from the mean latency in the self–
esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). We predicted that the avoidance block. Higher scores, in ms, thus represent higher im-
uncertainty threat manipulation would cause participants to more plicit approach, that is, participants’ relative facility with self–
readilyassociatetheselfwithapproachrelativetoavoidance. approachversusself–avoidancejointcategories.
Manipulation check. During the manipulation check at the
end of the study, participants were asked to recall the anxious
Method
uncertaintymanipulationmaterialstheyhadcompletedandtorate
Seventy-five undergraduates (gender undisclosed; mean age (cid:1) howtheyhadmadethemfeelonascalerangingfrom1(notatall
20years)completedanonlinestudyinexchangeforcoursecredit. ...) to 5 (extremely ...) concerning the following adjectives:
Uponloggingintothestudywebsite,participantsreadthatthefirst Good, Happy, Smart, Successful, Likeable, Meaningful, Frus-
studywouldassesstheirabilitytounderstandstatistics.Afterthey trated, Confused, Uncertain, Empty, Anxious, Insecure, Lonely,
wererandomlyassignedtheanxiousuncertaintyorcontrolcondi- Ashamed,andStupid.
tionmaterials,adaptedfortheInternetfromStudy1,participants
readthatthesecondstudywouldassesscognitiveprocesses.They
Results
then completed the dependent variable that assessed implicit as-
sociationsbetweentheselfandapproachversusavoidance—what Manipulation check results revealed that participants in the
wewillrefertoasanapproachIAT. anxious uncertainty condition felt significantly worse than did
Anxiousuncertaintymanipulation(academic). Participants those in the control condition on the following adjectives: Con-
randomlyassignedtotheanxiousuncertaintyconditionweregiven fused(M(cid:1)3.65vs.M(cid:1)2.76,respectively,p(cid:1).002),Uncertain
2 min to process the confusing one-page passage about statistics (M(cid:1)3.43vs.M(cid:1)2.73,p(cid:1).02),Ashamed(M(cid:1)2.37vs.M(cid:1)
from Study 1. After 2 min, the screen advanced and they were 1.79, p (cid:1) .03), and Stupid (M (cid:1) 2.29 vs. M (cid:1) 1.76, p (cid:1) .04).
given 2 more min to summarize what they had read. Participants Differences between conditions on all other adjectives were non-
randomly assigned to the control condition completed similar significant.
materials but with reference to a simple paragraph about why TheabsenceofsignificancefortheAnxiousitemmayreflectthe
statistics are useful in science. After this manipulation of the notoriouslypoorreliabilityofself-reportedanxietyafterthreaten-
independentvariable,forapproximately3minallparticipantsread ing experiences that has inspired research relying on indirect
instruction screens to set up the second study assessment of the methodstodemonstratethatanxietydrivesdefensivereactionsto
138 MCGREGOR,NASH,MANN,ANDPHILLS
anxiety-related predicaments (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2003; Kay, the extent to which participants’ personal goals were approach-
Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010; Proulx & Heine, 2008; Zanna & motivated.
Cooper,1974).Giventheclosetheoreticallinksbetweenaversive, Anxious uncertainty manipulation (relationship dilemma).
experientialuncertaintyandanxiety(Gray&McNaughton,2000; Participants randomly assigned to the anxious uncertainty condi-
VandenBos,2009),however,itseemswarrantedtoconcludethat tionweregiventhefollowinginstructions,whichrequiredimmer-
in the present study, anxious uncertainty was likely aroused and sionincurrentconflictsanduncertaintiesabouttheirinterpersonal
not just a pleasant or benign uncertainty that would not be ex- goals in life (adapted from McGregor et al., 2001, and Taylor &
pectedtocauseRAM(McGregor,Prentice,&Nash,2009;Wilson Gollwitzer,1995):
etal.,2005).
Pleasetakeaminutetothinkofanunresolveddilemmainyourlife
For the main analysis, outlier latencies less than 300 ms and
thathassomethingtodowithyourinterpersonalrelationships.You
greaterthan2,000ms(3.01%)wererecodedto300msand2,000 arenotyetsurewhethertoleavethingsastheyareormakeachange.
ms, respectively, and all incorrect answer trials (6.4%) were ex- You feel very uncertain, but haven’t yet decided what to do. The
cludedfromanalysis.Resultsrevealedhigherimplicitapproachin dilemmashouldbecomplexandshouldtaketheformof“ShouldI
theanxiousuncertaintycondition(M(cid:1)174.19)thaninthecontrol make a change ... or not?” Please briefly name your interpersonal
condition (M (cid:1) 60.56), t(71) (cid:1) 3.80, p (cid:2) .01. This finding dilemma. What personal value makes you want to make a change
fromthewaythingsarerightnow?Whatpersonalvaluemakesyou
conceptually replicates the behavioral neuroscience results from
wanttonotchangeanything,andleavethingsastheyarerightnow?
Study 1 with a radically different, implicit measure of approach
How does this dilemma make you feel? List any possible future
motivation. Studies 3 and 4 were conducted to provide further
consequencesthatcouldresultifyouoptedforchangingthings.List
convergentevidenceforRAMafteranxiousuncertaintythreatsin possible future consequences that could result if you left things the
relationalratherthanacademicdomains. waytheyareanddidnotmakeachange.
Participantswhowererandomlyassignedtothecontrolcondi-
Study 3 tionansweredthesamequestionsbutaboutadilemmathatafriend
was facing. In past research this uncertainty threat specifically
We designed Study 3 to conceptually replicate the results of causedfeelingsofanxiousuncertainty(e.g.,“bothered,”“uneasy,”
Studies 1 and 2 and to directly investigate the proposed link “uncomfortable,” “torn,” and “of two minds”) but not general
between reactive idealism and RAM. For further multimethod negative or positive affect (McGregor et al., 2001, Studies 1 and
convergence, we manipulated anxious uncertainty about personal 2). It also caused participants to react with idealistic conviction
relationships (instead of academics as in Studies 1 and 2) and about value-laden opinions and intergroup attitudes (McGregor,
measured RAM in the context of participants’ most self- Haji, Nash, & Teper, 2008, Study 2; McGregor et al., 2001,
characteristic personal projects. We focused on personal project Studies1and2).
dimensions related to eagerness and tenacity, which are central Personalprojectapproach. Forthepersonalprojectsanaly-
qualitiesofapproachmotivation(Carver&Scheier,1998;Drake sis materials, participants were given 2 min to list all the current
&Myers,2006;Elliot,2008;Keltneretal.,2003). personalprojectsintheirlivesthattheycouldthinkof.Theythen
In addition, we also measured personal project dimensions re- selected the four projects that were most representative of them-
lated to participants’ guiding ideals, values, and meanings selves and rated each using a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10
(McGregor & Little, 1998; McGregor et al., 2001). Doing so (extremely) on five dimensions theoretically linked to approach
allowed us to probe our hypothesis that for humans, reactive motivation (Drake & Myers, 2006; Elliot, 2008; Higgins, 1997;
idealism is a normative mechanism that mediates engagement in Keltneretal.,2003):Approach(“Towhatextentdoesitfocuson
RAM.Wefurthermeasureddimensionsrelatedtoavoidancemo- approaching something positive?”), Promotion (“To what extent
tivation to determine the extent to which anxious uncertainty doesitfocusonpromotionofgoodthingsthatyouhavehighhopes
specifically arouses RAM and not just reactive motivation more for?”), Determination (“How firmly determined are you to com-
generally. Finally, we measured the agentic and communal do- pleteit,evenifitrequiressacrifices?”),Outcome(“Howlikelyare
mains of participants’ personal projects to assess the extent to you to ultimately succeed at it?”), and Competence (“To what
which RAM is a basic, domain-general response to anxious un- extentdoyoufeelcompetentandabletopursueit?”).Asinpast
personalprojectsresearch(McGregor&Little,1998;McGregoret
certainty.WedidnotexpectRAMtobedomain-specific,because
al., 2001; Palys & Little, 1983), we relied on participants’ self-
inouraccountRAMismerelypalliative.
ratingsbecauseweassumedthattheywerethemostdiscriminating
judgesofthepersonalmeaningandfunctionoftheirownprojects
Method (Little,1983,1993;Littleetal.,2007).
Inapilotstudywith109participants,thisfive-dimensionmea-
A total of 158 undergraduates (24 male, 34 undisclosed; mean sure of personal project approach was unifactorial and internally
age(cid:1)22years)completedallmaterialsduringthehalf-timebreak consistent (Cronbach’s (cid:3) (cid:1) .79). Its validity as a measure of
in a 3-hr personality psychology lecture. The uncertainty threat approachmotivationwassupportedbyitssignificantcorrelations
materials were followed by the same delay as in Study 1, with a (ps(cid:2).01),withpersonalitytraitstheoreticallyrelatedtoapproach
modal wait time of 3 min while participants waited for the last motivation: behavioral activation (Carver & White, 1994),
participant to complete the experimental materials. Next, for the r(109)(cid:1).28;actioncontrol(Kuhl,1994),r(109)(cid:1).25;promotion
dependentvariableweadaptedpersonalprojectsanalysismaterials focus(Lockwood,Jordan,&Kunda,2002),r(109)(cid:1).36;purpose
(Little,1983,1993;Little,Salmela-Aro,&Phillips,2007)toassess inlife(Crumbaugh&Maholick,1964),r(109)(cid:1).44;purposeand
REACTIVEAPPROACHMOTIVATION 139
personalgrowth(Ryff,1989),rs(109)(cid:1).37and.40,respectively; approachmotivationonthreatcompletelyeliminatedthesignificant
self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), r(109) (cid:1) .34; and narcissism personalprojectapproachbeta,reducingitfrom.20to0.
(Raskin&Hall,1979),r(109)(cid:1).27.Consistentwithourpalliative There was less support for the reverse mediational possibility.
view of RAM, this measure of personal project approach was Includingpersonalprojectapproachasacovariateinaregression
negativelycorrelatedwithself-reportedlifestressonthePerceived of personal project idealism on threat only partially reduced the
Stress Scale (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983), r(109) (cid:1) idealismbeta,from.25to.09,whichapproachedsignificance(p(cid:2)
–.29. Finally, personal project approach was not correlated with .06). These mediational analyses provide some statistical support
socialdesirability(Crowne&Marlowe,1960),r(109)(cid:1).02,ns. fortheprimacyofreactiveidealismasaleverforRAM.Study4
Personal project idealism. Participants also rated their per- returns to this question with an experimental design to more
sonalprojectsonfivedimensionsrelatedtotheextenttowhichthe adequatelytestthecausalassumptionsuggestedbythemediational
goals reflected the most meaningful ideals or values that guided analysesinStudy3.
theirlives:ValueCongruence(“Towhatextentdoesitreflectthe Finally,additionalanalysesrevealedthatthesignificantsurgein
most important values that guide your life?”); Conviction (“How idealistic RAM was specific to approach but not avoidance. The
certain do you feel that this is a project that you want to devote effectofanxiousuncertaintyonpersonalprojectavoidancemoti-
yourself to?”); Self-Identity (“To what extent does it reflect the vation was nonsignificant (|t| (cid:2) 1). Moreover, RAM was not
kind of person you really are, at your core?”); Ideals (“To what constrained to either communal or agentic pursuits. There were
extentdoesitfeellikesomethingyoutrulyandideallywanttobe null effects of the anxious uncertainty manipulation on the per-
doing, regardless of what you feel you should be doing?”); and sonalprojectdimensionsofTogethernessandWork(both|ts|(cid:2)1),
Personal Choice (“To what extent did you choose it, i.e., not consistentwithourassumptionthatRAMcanbemerelypalliative
dictated to you by other people or circumstances?”). In the same and not necessarily aimed at restoring any particular threatened
pilot study as mentioned in the previous section, an index of goal.
personalprojectidealismfromthemeanoftheseratingswasalso In sum, Study 3 demonstrates that the RAM effects found in
unifactorialandreliable(Cronbach’s(cid:3)(cid:1).79). Studies 1 and 2 are domain-general. They can result from either
Personalprojectavoidance. Threedimensionsassessingper- academic or relational anxious uncertainty, and they are relieved
sonal project characteristics related to avoidance motivation byasurgeingeneralidealismthatdoesnotappeartobedomain-
gauged the extent to which the anxious uncertainty manipulation specific. The involvement of ideals in RAM processes is poten-
specifically stimulated RAM and not just reactive motivation in tiallyimportant,becauseitcouldprovidethebasisforunderstand-
general:Avoid(“Towhatextentdoesitfocusonavoidingsome- ing a wide range of enigmatic idealistic and ideological
thing negative?”); Prevention (“To what extent does it focus on phenomena (to be discussed in the General Discussion section).
preventing bad things from happening?”); and Should (“To what Study4accordinglyprobestheroleofidealswithanexperimental
extent does it feel like something that you SHOULD be doing, methodtoallowmoreconfidentconclusionsaboutthecausalrole
regardlessofwhatyouwouldideallyliketobedoing?”). ofidealsasaleverforRAM.
Personal project agency and communion. Finally, two di-
mensionsmeasuredtheagenticandcommunaldomainsofpartic-
Study 4
ipants’ personal projects to assess the extent to which RAM is
domain-generalratherthan-specific.GivenourviewofRAMas TheresultsofStudy3revealedacloseempiricallinkbetween
averybasic,domain-generalprocess,weexpectedageneralized, idealsandRAM.Study4wasdesignedtoreplicatethatassociation
nonspecific response, with null effects on the following domain- with the implicit measure of RAM used in Study 2 and with an
specificdimensions:Togetherness(“Towhatextentareyoudoing experimental manipulation of ideals. If focus on ideals mediates
ittofeelclosetootherpeople?”)andWork(“Towhatextentisit the effect of anxious uncertainty on RAM, then priming partici-
focusedonaccomplishinggoalsatschoolorwork?”). pantswithafocusonactiveidealsshouldfacilitateRAM(seethe
Spencer,Zanna,&Fong,2005,recommendationforusingexper-
imentalmoderationtoestablishmediation).
Results
Asinthepilotstudy,thepersonalprojectapproachandidealism
Method
measures were again unifactorial and reliable, and each had a
Cronbach’s alpha reliability of .83. As predicted, participants in Sixty-fourundergraduates(genderundisclosed;meanage(cid:1)20
the anxious uncertainty condition reported significantly higher years) in an introductory psychology course completed an online
personalprojectapproach(M(cid:1)8.38)thandidparticipantsinthe study for course credit. The experimental manipulation of ideal
control condition (M (cid:1) 7.95), (cid:4) (cid:1) .20, t(157) (cid:1) 2.51, p (cid:1) .01. salience preceded the anxious uncertainty manipulation, which
Theyalsoreportedsignificantlyhigherpersonalprojectidealismin was followed by the implicit approach dependent variable, as-
the anxious uncertainty condition (M (cid:1) 8.30) than in the control sessed as in Study 2. Upon logging in to the study website,
condition(M(cid:1)7.74),(cid:4)(cid:1).25,t(157)(cid:1)3.18,p(cid:2).005.Consis- participants read that the first study would involve recalling as-
tent with the hypothesis that people turn to idealistic goals as a pects about themselves from the past and that the second study
reliableandeconomicalwaytoactivateapproachmotivation,the wouldinvolverecallinginstancesofrelationships.
effect of the anxious uncertainty manipulation on personal project Idealsaliencemanipulation. Intheidealsaliencecondition,
approachwasentirelymediatedbypersonalprojectidealism.Personal participants were randomly assigned to complete a promotion
projectapproachandidealismwerehighlycorrelated,r(158)(cid:1).80, focus exercise. It required them to write about current hopes and
p (cid:2) .001, and inclusion of the idealism term in the regression of aspirations they would ideally like to accomplish and how these
140 MCGREGOR,NASH,MANN,ANDPHILLS
differedfromtheidealsthatguidedthemwhentheywerechildren. lience control condition, manipulated anxious uncertainty had no
Intheidealnonsaliencecondition,participantsinsteadcompleted effect (|t| (cid:2) 1). The other simple effects revealed that, in the
apreventionfocusexercisethatrequiredthemtowriteabouttheir anxiousuncertaintycondition,approachIATscoreswerehigherin
currentdutiesandresponsibilitiesthattheyoughttoattendtoand the ideal salience condition (M (cid:1) 155.38) than in the ideal non-
how these differed from those they had as young children (Hig- saliencecondition(M(cid:1)34.59),t(33)(cid:1)2.32,p(cid:1).03.Intheno
gins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Participants were given 4 anxiousuncertaintycondition,however,therewasnoeffectofthe
minforthistask,afterwhichthescreenautomaticallyadvanced. idealsaliencemanipulation(|t|(cid:2)1).
Anxiousuncertainty(troubledrelationship). Intheanxious
uncertainty condition, participants identified a troubled relation- General Discussion
ship in their lives that had an uncertain prognosis and were then
askedto(a)“Describethekindsofproblemsanddifficultiesyou Four anxious uncertainty threats caused evidence of RAM. In
arehavingwiththisperson”and(b)“Describeyourthoughtsand Study 1, academic anxious uncertainty caused behavioral neuro-
feelingsregardingthepossibilityofthisrelationshipcontinuingto scienceevidenceofRAM;inStudy2,thesamethreat(butwitha
go poorly or perhaps even getting worse.” Each question was different control condition) caused implicit RAM; in Study 3, an
presentedseparatelyonthecomputerscreen,andparticipantswere anxiousuncertaintythreatinthecontextofarelationshipdilemma
given 2 min for each question. Participants in the no anxious causedpersonalprojectRAM;inStudy4,anotheranxiousuncer-
uncertainty condition identified a friend’s relationship and re- tainty threat in the context of close relationships caused implicit
spondedtotwosimilarquestionsabouttheirfriend. RAM as assessed in Study 2. The convergent evidence across
Identical and similar anxious uncertainty manipulations in the diverseanxiousuncertaintythreatsandwithimplicit,explicit,and
context of close relationships have specifically heightened self- behavioral neuroscience measures of approach motivation pro-
reportedanxiousuncertainty(andnotgeneralnegativeaffect)and videsthefirstcomprehensiveevidenceforRAM.
ideological conviction (McGregor & Marigold, 2003, Study 3; ThehypothesisthatidealsmediateRAMwasalsosupported.In
Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2010, Study 1; McGregor et al., in Study 3, RAM in participants’ personal projects was entirely
press).Forexample,inonestudyparticipantscompletedthisexact mediated by personal project idealism. In Study 4, manipulated
anxious uncertainty manipulation (after having first completed a salienceofidealsenhancedtheeffectoftheanxiousuncertaintyon
relationshipgoalprime)andthenratedtheextenttowhichitmade implicitapproachmotivation.Together,thesemediationandmod-
them feel “good,” “happy,” “smart,” “successful,” “likeable,” erationfindingswithrespecttotheroleofidealsprovidepromis-
“meaningful,” “frustrated,” “confused,” “uncertain,” “empty,” ingsupportforaparsimoniousandintegrativeaccountofdiverse
“anxious,”“ashamed,”“insecure,”“lonely,”“stupid,”and“outof idealistic and ideological phenomena in the social psychological
control.” The anxious uncertainty manipulation significantly literature.Theysuggestthatreactiveidealismandideologyinthe
heightened anxiety and uncertainty but had no significant effects faceofthreatmayservetoactivateRAM.
onanyoftheotheritems(Nash,McGregor,&Prentice,2010).
ApproachIAT. Theimplicitmeasureofapproachwasthesame Toward an Understanding of Idealistic and Ideological
as in Study 2. Again, IAT scores were calculated such that higher
Defenses as RAM
scoresrepresentedgreaterstrengthofself-approachassociations.
Gordon Allport (1943) coined the term fluid compensation to
Results refer to the curious tendency of humans to cope with thwarted
drivesbybaskinginanysuccess,evenwithnoclearrelationtothe
As predicted and shown in Figure 1, there was a significant threat.“Happiness,itseems,doesnotdependuponthesatisfaction
interactioneffect,F(1,62)(cid:1)3.98,p(cid:1).05.Amongparticipantsin ofthisdriveorthatdrive,itdependsratheruponthepersonfinding
theidealsaliencecondition,thoseintheanxiousuncertaintycon- someareaofsuccesssomewhere”(Allport,1943,p.466).Avast
dition had higher approach IAT scores (M (cid:1) 155.38) than did amountofempiricalsocialpsychologicalevidencefromdifferent
thoseinthenoanxiousuncertaintycondition(M(cid:1)62.56),t(34)(cid:1) research paradigms supports Allport’s claim. Indeed, fluid com-
2.29,p(cid:1).03.Incontrast,amongparticipantsintheidealnonsa- pensation effects appear even more fluid than Allport imagined.
Variouspsychologicalthreatsnotonlymotivatestrivingsforcom-
pensatory success toward self-worth ideals (e.g., Baumeister &
160 Jones, 1978; Dunning & Beauregard, 2000; Tesser, Crepaz, Col-
No Anxious Uncertainty lins, Cornell, & Beach, 2000), but they also motivate compensa-
h
oac 120 Anxious Uncertainty tory conviction, idealism, ideology, worldview defense, group
pr identification,andthesearchformeaning.
p
plicit A 80 sucThhedrieveisrsleivfelluyiddecboamtepienntshaetilointereaftfuercetsc.oSnocmereninthgehooriwststoheaxvpelainin-
m
I 40 vokedbroad,superordinatemotivessuchasself-integrity(Steele,
1988),meaning(Heine,Proulx,&Vohs,2006),symbolicimmor-
0 tality (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997), or security
Ideals Not Salient Ideals Salient (Hart, Shaver, & Goldenberg, 2005), which varied threats under-
mine and diverse fluid compensation reactions are thought to
Figure 1. Effect of manipulated anxious uncertainty and ideals on im- bolster. Other theorists have argued for restoration of other psy-
plicitapproach. chological currencies, such as self-esteem (Aronson, Cohen, &
REACTIVEAPPROACHMOTIVATION 141
Nail, 1999), certainty (Van den Bos et al., 2005), or identity orthogonaldispositionalinclinationstowardvulnerabilityandap-
(Hogg,2007)asthemotivationforthedefensivereactions.These proach motivation combine to catalyze RAM. In three experi-
theories are generative insofar as each continues to produce new ments,lowimplicitself-esteem(adispositionrelatedtoexperien-
evidenceforfluidcompensationeffectsafterdiversethreats.The tial vulnerability; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, &
RAM account may hold promise, however, for illuminating an Correll, 2003; McGregor & Jordan, 2007) and high explicit self-
integrativerootprocessrelatedtothebasicgoalregulationmech- esteem (disposition related to approach motivation; McGregor,
anismsdescribedbyGrayandMcNaughton(2000). 2006a; McGregor et al., 2007) interacted to predict ideologically
Indeed,sixrecentgoal-primingstudiessupportthepremisethat defensive reactions to uncertainty-related threats (McGregor &
RAM reactions to the anxious uncertainty manipulations in the Marigold, 2003, Study 3; McGregor et al., 2005, Study 1;
present research are essentially reactions to goal conflict. Nash, Schmeicheletal.,2009,Study3).
McGregor,andPrentice(2010)foundthattheacademicandrela- McGregor et al. (in press) drew a similar distinction between
tionship threats used in the present research aroused particularly vulnerability to anxiety and propensity toward RAM in research
strong RAM when preceded by domain-relevant implicit goal showing that high uncertainty aversion (disposition related to
primes. For example, academic anxious uncertainty inductions anxiousvulnerability)andhighself-esteem(andothertraitsrelated
aroused the strongest RAM when preceded by a word search toapproachmotivation)eachpredictreligiouslyzealousreactions
puzzle with words such as achieve, succeed, and compete. Con- tothreat.Thus,themostdefensivelyreactiveindividualsappearto
versely, relational anxious uncertainty inductions aroused the bebothdispositionallyvulnerabletoanxiousuncertaintyanddis-
strongest RAM when preceded by a word search puzzle with positionallyapproach-motivated.Insomecases,highdispositional
words such as love, friend, and belong (see Bargh, Gollwitzer, approach motivation may itself be an adaptation to experiential
Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001, for evidence that the word vulnerability, as in the case of narcissism (cf. Foster & Trimm,
searchpuzzlesprimedomain-specificgoals).Thedependentmea- 2008) or hypomania (Harmon-Jones, 2003; Harmon-Jones et al.,
sureofRAMinthatresearchwastheextenttowhichparticipants’ 2002).Indeed,peoplewhoreportbeinghighlysensitivetoanxiety
personalprojectswereself-ratedasmoreapproach-motivatedand and who have the most pronounced neural aversion reactions to
promotion-focused than avoidance-motivated and prevention- stressors (i.e., immediate situational deflections toward relative
focused. right-frontal cerebral hemisphericity) are particularly high in
Ourbasicgoal-regulation-basedRAMaccountofidealisticde- chronic relative left-frontal cerebral hemisphericity, suggesting
fense is consistent with other research showing that people with chronicapproachmotivation(Heller,Nitschke,Etienne,&Miller,
approach-motivation-relatedpersonalitiesareparticularlyinclined 1997).
towardidealistic,ideological,andapproach-motivatedreactionsto
various threats. High self-esteem is significantly correlated with
Self-Affirmation and TMT
various approach-motivation-related dispositions, such as promo-
tionfocus,behavioralactivationsystemdrive,andactionorienta- TheRAMaccountofspontaneousidealisticreactionstothreats
tion (McGregor, Gailliot, Vasquez, & Nash, 2007, Study 2; see may help inform self-affirmation and TMT research. Self-
also Heimpel, Elliot, & Wood, 2006), and each of these scales affirmationresearchdemonstratesthatidealisticaffirmations(usu-
similarly moderates ideological reactions to threat (McGregor et ally of participants’ highest values) prevent closed-minded, hos-
al., in press). Specifically, the catalyzing effect of dispositional tile, partisan, and worldview defensive responses to threatening
self-esteemonreligiouslyzealousreactionstoanxiousuncertainty experiences and information (McGregor et al., 2001, Study 1;
threats replicated with three dispositional variables related to ap- Schmeichel & Martens, 2005; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). From a
proach motivation in place of self-esteem (McGregor et al., in RAMperspective,idealisticvalueaffirmationsshouldbeexpected
press).Inallcases,aswithself-esteem,threatenedhighsweremost torelievesuchdefensivereactionstothreatsbecausetheidealistic
zealous.Highself-esteemalsopredictsRAM-relatedbrainactivity and meaningful aspects of self-affirmations should preemptively
(McGregor,Nash,&Inzlicht,2009)andasurgeinpersonalproject consolidatetheapproach-motivatedstatesthatthedefenseswould
approach motivation (McGregor et al., 2007, Study 3) after anx- have provided (Amodio et al., 2004; Carver & Harmon-Jones,
iousuncertaintythreats.Moreover,highself-esteeminclinespeo- 2009;Urryetal.,2004).
pletowardself-idealizationandheightenedvalue,ideological,and TheRAMaccountmaysimilarlyhelpexplaintherelatedissue
religious conviction after threats (Dunning & Beauregard, 2000; ofwhymanipulatedself-esteemanddispositionalself-esteemdif-
McGregor et al., 2007, Study 1; McGregor & Marigold, 2003; ferentiallymoderatedefensivereactionstothreats.Aswithsitua-
McGregoretal.,2005;McGregoretal.,inpress;Schmeicheletal., tionalmanipulationsofidealisticvalues,situationalaffirmationsof
2009). Other researchers have also found that among high self- stateself-esteemtendtoreducedefensivelyidealisticreactionsto
esteem participants, threats to romantic relationships arouse not threats(Steele,1988).Incontrast,however,andasreviewedinthe
onlyrelationshippromotiveideals(e.g.,Murray,2005)butalsoa previous section, dispositional high self-esteem predicts the most
generalized risky shift and self-reported approach motivation defensively idealistic reactions to threats. This paradox may be
(Cavallo,Fitzsimons,&Holmes,2009;seeLandau&Greenberg, informedbythepronouncednegativeskewinexplicitself-esteem
2006, for similar self-esteem moderation of risky reactions to scores in North America (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama,
mortalitysaliencethreats). 1999), which suggest that North Americans’ self-esteem may be
Suchdispositional-approachmoderationsupportstheRAMhy- moreareflectionofidentificationwithself-idealsthananexpres-
pothesis but might raise the question of why such empowered sionofobjectiveself-worthiness(Baumeister,Campbell,Krueger,
individuals (i.e., high in approach motivation) would experience &Vohs,2003).Situationalaffirmationsofself-worth,thus,likely
anxiousuncertaintyinthefirstplace.Theanswerappearstobethat affirm such self-worth ideals and provide the same kind of
142 MCGREGOR,NASH,MANN,ANDPHILLS
approach-motivation-derivedinsulationfromdistressasdovalue- presented here, however, there are limitations that should be
ideal affirmations. As described in the previous section, the link probed in future research. Perhaps foremost is the link to action.
betweendispositionalhighself-esteemandmorepronouncedide- AlthoughwedemonstratethelinkbetweenRAMandgoalinten-
alismafterthreatappearstobedrivenbythelinkbetweendispo- tions in Study 3, future research with behavioral dependent mea-
sitional self-esteem and an inclination to respond to threats with sures could help to more clearly ground the RAM account in the
approach motivation. This interpretation is consistent with EEG suggestedgoalregulationprocesses(Gray&McNaughton,2000).
research showing a relative surge in left-frontal (approach- After anxious uncertainty threats, the relative draw of idealistic
motivation-related) brain activity after threat among individuals (e.g.,religious)RAMopportunitiescouldbepittedagainstenticing
with high but not low explicit self-esteem (McGregor, Nash, & temporal RAM opportunities (e.g., toward chocolate, gambling,
Inzlicht,2009). pornography,orotherincentivestoapproach).4
TheRAMaccountmayalsoprovideaparsimoniousaccountfor Further, given the unreliability of self-reported anxiety, in the
results in the TMT literature. Dozens of studies have found that future researchers could further highlight the role of anxiety in
mortalitysalienceheightensadherencetobothidealisticsourcesof RAM processes in experiments with a misattribution of anxious
meaning (worldviews, romantic relationships, political and reli- arousalcondition.Theopportunitytoattributeanxiousarousalto
gious norms) and self-enhancement. Such findings are consistent aplacebowouldbeexpectedtoeliminateRAM.Empiricalassess-
with the TMT view that worldviews and self-esteem are twin ment of palliative RAM assumption could also be assessed with
pillars of an “anxiety buffer” against anxiety. From the present self-reportedsubjectivesalienceoftheelicitinganxiousuncertain-
perspective,worldviewandself-enhancementreactionstomortal- ties (as in McGregor, 2006b) or through neural assessment of
ity salience would interchangeably activate the insulating effects anxious reactivity in the anterior cingulate cortex (as in Inzlicht,
ofRAM.TheRAMinterpretationisthusentirelyconsistentwith McGregor,Hirsch,&Nash,2009).
TMTresearchfindingsbutmaybemoreparsimonious,asitdoes Future research could also further investigate conditions under
notrequirethatdefensivereactionstomortalitysaliencebeinter-
which RAM serves a merely palliative function, much like dis-
preted as quests for symbolic immortality. The parsimony of the
placement behaviors for other animals, or whether under some
RAM account is particularly clear when interpreting heightened
circumstancesRAMmayinsteadhelprestorethethreatenedgoal
tenacityandrisk-takingreactionstomortalitysalience,whichhave
or a more general goal that the threatened goal was serving
clearlinkstoapproachmotivation(e.g.,Gianottietal.,2009)but
(Kruglanski et al., 2002). It appears that, on the basis of the null
more seemingly convoluted links to the concept of symbolic
results for domain specificity in Study 3, RAM may at least
immortality (Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 1999; Landau &
sometimesbemerelypalliative.Indeed,themediation/moderation
Greenberg,2006;McGregoretal.,2007).TheRAMaccountcould
byidealsinStudies3and4suggestsageneralprocessthatseems
economicallyallowfortheconceptofsymbolicimmortalitytobe
to reflect an attempt to transcend temporal conflicts rather than
droppedfromTMT.
repair them. This palliative interpretation could provide an eco-
The RAM account may also help clarify an aspect of TMT
nomical explanation for the sometimes remarkable distance be-
related to self-esteem. Dozens of studies have found that people
tween the domains of threats, reactive extremes, and antidotes in
tend to strive for self-enhancement after mortality salience (re-
viewed in Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel,
2004). These findings are consistent with the TMT view of self- 3Incontrast,highimplicitself-esteemseemstofunctionaspredictedby
esteemaspartofananxietybufferandalsowithourRAMaccount the dispositional self-esteem hypothesis forwarded by TMT (i.e., as an
ofideals(inthiscaseabouttheself)asawaytoactivateRAMfor anxiety buffer that makes people less defensively reactive to mortality
insulationfromdistress.TMTfurtherposits,however,thatdispo- salience).Thus,justasisfoundinresearchwithothermanipulatedanxious
sitional self-esteem should be associated with less worldview uncertaintythreats,themostreactivelydefensiveindividualsarethosewho
defense after mortality salience because people with high self- aredispositionallyvulnerabletotheexperienceofanxiety(e.g.,thosewith
lowimplicitself-esteemorhighuncertaintyaversion)andthosewhoare
esteem should be buffered by their dispositional esteem (Pyszc-
alsopredisposedtoapproachmotivation(seeSchmeicheletal.,2009,for
zynski et al., 2004). Consistent with our approach-motivation-
empirical evidence of differential joint moderation of mortality salience
facilitating view of high explicit self-esteem, however, the
effects by implicit and explicit self-esteem; see McGregor & Marigold,
preponderanceofresearchhasindicatedthathigh,notlow,explicit
2003,andMcGregoretal.,2005,forthesamepatternwithotheranxious
self-esteem predicts more worldview defense after mortality sa- uncertaintythreats;seeMcGregoretal.,inpress,forconvergingevidence
lience(Baldwin&Wesley,1996;McGregoretal.,2007,Study1; ofdifferentialmoderationwithotherdispositionalmeasuresofvulnerabil-
Schmeichel et al., 2009; cf. Harmon-Jones et al., 1997, for a ityandapproachorientation).
reversed pattern using an unusual measure of self-esteem). Mor- 4ArecentdemonstrationofthefluidityofRAMfromourlabassessed
tality salience also causes a surge in approach-motivation-related specificcorrelatesofanxiousuncertaintyfollowingaprolongedstrikeata
personalprojectsamongparticipantswhoarehighbutnotlowin majorCanadianuniversityduringwhichstudents’coursesweresuspended
explicitself-esteem(McGregoretal.,2007).3 (McGregor,2010).Resultsindicatedthatanxiousuncertaintywasspecif-
icallycorrelatedwithundergraduateextremesofappearance,eating,par-
tying,relationships,andspecialgroupinvolvement(neithernegativenor
Limitations, Future Directions, and Speculations positiveaffects,norboredom,norfreetimepredictedtheextremes).These
resultsareconsistentwiththeviewthatanxiousuncertaintycausesRAM
The present research suggests that many of the idealizing and
toward whatever alternative ambient goals or ideals are salient. Future
ideological extremes of pride and conviction found in the threat workshouldprobetheextenttowhichRAMprocessesmighthelpexplain
and defense literature might be fruitfully understood through the otherformsofeagerextremismineverydaylife(e.g.,addictiontowork,
lens of goal theory. Despite the promising convergent results fantasy,orgambling).