Table Of ContentStudies in Public Choice
Rick Stapenhurst
Rasheed Draman
Brooke Larson
Anthony Staddon Editors
Anti-
Corruption
Evidence
The Role of Parliaments in Curbing
Corruption
Studies in Public Choice
Volume 34
Series Editor
Randall G. Holcombe, Florida State Univ., Tallahassee, FL, USA
Founding Editor
Gordon Tullock, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6550
Rick Stapenhurst • Rasheed Draman
Brooke Larson • Anthony Staddon
Editors
Anti-Corruption Evidence
The Role of Parliaments in Curbing
Corruption
Editors
Rick Stapenhurst Rasheed Draman
McGill University African Centre for Parliamentary Affairs
Montreal, QC, Canada Accra, Ghana
Brooke Larson Anthony Staddon
Culver City, CA, USA University of Westminster
London, UK
ISSN 0924-4700
Studies in Public Choice
ISBN 978-3-030-14139-4 ISBN 978-3-030-14140-0 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0
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Preface
International organizations like the World Bank and United Nations Development
Program and bilateral aid agencies such as the UK’s Department for International
Development (DFID) have traditionally had high expectations regarding what par-
liaments can do, including playing a bigger role in poverty reduction (Stapenhurst
2002), curbing corruption (Stapenhurst et al. 2006; Stapenhurst et al. 2014), build-
ing post-conflict societies (O’Brien 2005), and promoting democracy (Fish 2006;
Morlino 2001, 2005; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2012).
These expectations, and their underlying propositions, have been well tested
through large-scale global and regional statistical studies, which concluded that par-
liamentary oversight is enhanced by the formal oversight powers assigned to the
legislature (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979), the institutionalization of oversight
bodies (Jacobs et al. 2007), the resources made available to the parliament (Rawlings
2006), the importance of the issues under investigation, political will and the non-
partisan functioning of oversight bodies (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2006, 2007), and
the oversight bodies’ ability to publicize the findings of their investigations (McGee
2002). Jacobs et al. (2007) posit that audit institutions created by a constitutional
disposition are more effective than when they are established by legislation (although
Rawlings (2006) argues that the opposite is true in the Pacific). McGee (2002) iden-
tified the dissemination of oversight bodies’ reports as one of the key determinants
of these bodies’ successful performance.
Imbeau and Stapenhurst (2019) have confirmed the importance of these issues
and have found that francophone parliaments are generally weak in the transparency
of the budget and public engagement in oversight than are Westminster parliaments,
but strong in terms of formal powers and mandate.
In short, there is a wealth of knowledge documenting both current and emerging
global good practice. These findings have been translated into practical guidance for
parliamentarians (e.g., Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption’s
Parliamentary Handbook on Oversight 2009, and Improving Democratic
Accountability Globally 2013; SADC Parliamentary Forum’s Handbook for Members
of PAC 2005) published as case studies (e.g., Kroon and Stapenhurst 2011; KPMG
2006; Wehner 2003), articles (e.g., O’Brien et al. 2012; Pozer 2012; Chohan 2013;
v
vi Preface
Stapenhurst and Hamalai 2014), and as briefing notes for parliamentarians (The
Parliamentarian 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008, 2009). The findings have also been
incorporated into parliamentary strengthening curricula and used by such organiza-
tions as the World Bank and the UNDP as well as McGill and Laval universities.
A fundamental error in these applications is an implicit assumption that one size
fits all (Stapenhurst et al. 2014); parliaments have been guided by global and (to a
lesser extent) regional research, which has generally ignored contextual factors, and
social trust in parliament and supporting factors such as staff support and research
services (Stapenhurst 2011). Also missing is the application of current research
findings into policy advice for curbing corruption and the integration of the strength-
ening of parliamentary oversight into broader anti-corruption strategies which
include, inter alia, civil society and the media.
The British Academy’s Anti-Corruption Evidence program, funded by the DFID,
comprised an initial seven research projects, one of which was examining the Role
of Parliaments in Curbing Corruption. The objectives of the latter were to address
the gap in existing knowledge regarding the role of parliament in curbing corruption
and to develop practical policy advice for parliaments and for anti-corruption assis-
tance agencies such as DFID, particularly in the light of the recommendations from
the House of Commons International Development Committee that DFID includes
the role of the national parliament in each of its country-level anti-corruption strate-
gies. This book presents our research findings.
This book comprises 12 chapters. In Chap. 1, we summarize our research design
and its conceptual underpinnings; we also include our primary survey instrument to
facilitate other researchers to extend our analyses. In Chap. 2, we present the evolu-
tionary development of our Parliamentary Oversight Capacity Index (POCI), which
enables the cross-country comparison of oversight capacity and an analysis of the
causal relationship between stronger oversight and lower corruption.
In Chaps. 3–8, we consider the role that parliaments play in curbing corruption
in seven countries: Ghana (Chap. 3), Nigeria (Chap. 4), Uganda (Chap. 5), Tanzania
(Chap. 6), Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada (Chap. 6), and Myanmar (Chap. 7).
While each country is unique, certain common problems and issues have
emerged. In particular, the lack of political will of some parliamentarians to under-
take oversight is widespread. This topic is examined in detail in Chap. 9. Low public
trust in parliament was common across all seven countries. Chapter 10 considers
how public trust might be strengthened and focuses in particular on improving com-
munication and collaboration between parliament and civil society and the media.
All but one of the seven countries had significant mining and oil and gas industries.
Chapter 11 reviews how oversight of extractive industry revenues and operations
might be enhanced.
Chapter 12 recaps major conclusions.
Montreal, QC, Canada Rick Stapenhurst
Accra, Ghana Rasheed Draman
Culver City, CA, USA Brooke Larson
London, UK Anthony Staddon
Preface vii
References
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in the Management of Government Revenues Sourced from Extractive Industries? (Working
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Contents
1 Theory and Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Rick Stapenhurst
2 Towards the Development of a Parliamentary Oversight Index . . . . 35
Rick Stapenhurst
3 Weakening Parliamentary Oversight, Increasing Corruption:
Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Rasheed Draman
4 Nigeria’s National Assembly Seen as Part of the Problem . . . . . . . . . 69
Anthony Staddon
5 The Ugandan Parliament: Greater Interaction Between
MPs and Civil Society Is Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Agnes Titriku
6 External Oversight Agencies Need Protecting:
The Role of the Tanzanian Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Rasheed Draman
7 Parliamentary Oversight and Corruption in the Caribbean:
Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada Compared . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Anthony Staddon and Rick Stapenhurst
8 Myanmar: Initial Improvements Facing Setbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Anthony Staddon and Gabriela Thompson
9 Motivation of MPs and Political Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Gabriela Thompson and Anthony Staddon
ix
