Table Of ContentA N T I - C H A N CE
A Reply to Monod's
Chance and Necessity
by
E. SCHOFFENIELS
Professor of Biochemistry, University of Liège
translated by
Β. L. REID
Queen Elizabeth II Research Institution,
The University of Sydney
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First English edition, 1976
Translated from the second edition of VAnti-Hasard
published by Gauthier-Villars. First edition © Bordas, 1973
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Schoffeniels, Ernest.
Anti-chance.
(Pergamon international library of science, technology,
engineering, and social studies)
Translation of L'anti-hasard.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Biology—Philosophy. I. Title.
QH331.S35213 1976 574'.01 76-18269
ISBN 0-08-021009-0
ISBN 0-08-021008-2 pbk.
Printed in Great Britain by A. Wheat on & Co., Exeter
Le mot hasard n'exprime
donc que notre ignorance
sur les causes des phénomènes
que nous voyons arriver et
se succéder sans aucun
ordre apparent.
Laplace (1782)
Ne sait-on pas, d'ailleurs,
que le mot hasard
n'exprime que notre
ignorance des causes.
Lamarck
ν
FOREWORD TO THE
ENGLISH EDITION
It is unthinkable that the French-speaking world could be privy to con-
tention between leading men of science involving ideas concerning mat-
ters of such profundity as to how we humans and the biological world
around us got here. It is thus inevitable following the appearance of
Monod's book Le Hasard et la Nιcessitι in an English edition that
Schoffeniels's deep concern, expressed in his book LAnti-Hasard, at some
of the ideas propounded by his French colleague should also find its way
into English. In this way questions such as the chance or the inevitability
of it all, the sites and sizes of the knowledge gaps and as to whether they
will be filled with physics and chemistry on the one hand or seasoned with
metaphysics on the other, will be exposed to a wider body of knowledge
and opinion represented by the English-speaking world. For if it is true
that the opinions of wise men are but knowledge in the making, then to
present to a cosmopolitan public, scientist and layman alike, the opportun-
ity for further opinion and chaffer on these compelling issues in a field for
so many centuries the sole province of the Latin-speaking theologian can
be as salutary in general as it is rewarding to the translator in particular.
Rapport between author and translator has been sufficiently close as to
guarantee that each nuance of meaning, particularly in those portions of
the subject-matter of most subjectivity, has been passed on with the
greatest fidelity consistent with fluency.
Sydney B. L. REID
ix
A.C. A*
PREFACE TO THE
FIRST FRENCH EDITION
It is astonishing that, at the end of the twentieth century, the evolution of
biological systems can still be viewed in the light projected throughout
the nineteenth century by the sagacity of the two great naturalists, Lam-
arck and Darwin. If it is true that Lamarck placed the accent on the
importance of the environment and that Darwin published for the first
time in the history of biology a convincing book on the reality of evolu-
tion, it is also true that neither of these authors proposed an explanatory
mechanism which has been retained to the present. Darwin was the first
serious Lamarckist and so great was his confusion that in the sixth edi-
tion of the Origin of Species he added a chapter explaining evolution by
the inheritance of acquired characteristics (which contrary to general
opinion is not Lamarckism!). Other than recognizing in an historical
context the penetration of their view, deference to these giants of biology
today is naive and senseless idolatry. Further, we do not solve anything
with neo-Darwinism which shares only its name with Darwin.
Two groups of important discoveries nourish the thinking of biologists
today. For the one part, the astonishing progress since Fritz Lipmann in
the domain of bioenergetics and for the other, the impetus which ther-
modynamics has assumed under the fertile impulse of the genius of Prigo-
gine. We are led thus to relegate the panoply of classic concepts as
accessories and to re-think biological facts from the viewpoint of the
thermodynamics of open systems. The task is not easy and the most
advanced specialists in the field of thermodynamics are still far from
home.
xi
xii PREFACE TO THE FIRST FRENCH EDITION
Most urgently we can cease feeding ourselves on an obsolete vocabu-
lary by casting aside the concepts of function, finality, teleonomy, gratu-
ity, organ, finalized mechanism and of . . . chance! because we know
today that chance does not occur in biology, that evolution is not an
irreproducible historic phenomenon and that biological systems are not
finalized mechanisms.
A real knowledge of the human can only be based on a very profound
knowledge of general biology. And it is in the field of human biology that
the true solution to the problems of peace and liberty can be hopefully
sought after. An examination of the diverse modes of thought proposed
by man very rapidly shows that it is the absence of fundamental biologi-
cal parameters which explains, for example, the evolution of concepts of
choice and of liberty and their inadequacy for our modes of social life.
Only the consideration of man in his biological context, his restoration
into an evolutionary perspective founded on the most real documentation
of phylogeny can automatically bring to bear radically different ideas on
the organization of society, on the definition of a new ethic and most
certainly on the problems of choice, liberty and peace.
However our mind is poorly prepared for a scientific approach to
human behaviour. The situation is certainly evolving and this is fortun-
ate. It is always necessary to recall the scandal raised by the publication of
the first Kinsey report on the sexual behaviour of man. The study was
received first of all with derision even amongst the most uncommitted in
the scientific environment. At that time I had undertaken with J. Leclercq
and C. Jeuniaux a study of the causes of declining birthrates in industrial
regions. Our aim was also to evaluate the social and economic impor-
tance of pollution and the role of environmental protection. I have before
me criticisms which had been published in the most influential daily or
weekly newspapers. It is, to say the least, astonishing that in 1952, to state
that man is an animal who had to be studied according to the methods of
biology could have occasioned such passionate argument. We have been
dragged through the dirt because our argument amounted to a proposal
to study the rate of reproduction of the human species according to the
norms of the experimental method. It was thus apparent that the ideas
which we had tried to promote were accepted with difficulty by the major-
ity of our fellow citizens. For us, they were evidence which rested on
PREFACE TO THE FIRST FRENCH EDITION xiii
solidly established scientific facts. This study taught me that one can only
speak of things which one can measure.
As I have mentioned above, the problem of choice can only be ap-
proached in a reasonable and effective manner by the introduction of the
most fundamental biological facts about human behaviour which, we
must recognize, represent constants which are difficult to modify by reli-
gious, moral or social constraints. Many behavioural and personality
problems find their origin in a strict observance of taboos founded on
fancies. At the group level they find their expressions in violence, in racial
conflict, in emotional dissatisfaction of young generations and in
women's liberation movements.
Transposing man to his biological context has for me the profound
significance of restoring him to his evolutionary context. Solutions
proposed in the nineteenth century appear to me to carry little conviction
because they considered the problem of evolution at a level of organiza-
tion where the impact of evolutionary factors was least felt. The attentive
perusal of the little red book of Marcel Florkin, U Evolution biochimique^
has persuaded me that, to be valid, all attempts at solution of the problem
must be looked for at the molecular level. Being fascinated by adaptation,
more particularly by that of aquatic animals, I have developed the convic-
tion that to study the problem of adaptation is to study the problem of
evolution. This conviction became more firmly established in the course
of my researches.
Placing man in his evolutionary context also means research amongst
his closest relatives, the primates, who present an outline of the most
characteristic behaviour of our species. This has led me to study pictorial
productions of monkeys and to organize an exhibition of paintings by
monkeysj which did not pass without violent critical reaction, notably
from amongst artists who seemed frustrated at seeing their own picture
rails occupied by what they considered uninteresting daubs. The aim of
my experiment was, however, to investigate the common denominator
between the gesture of our better artists and that of several monkeys of
genius whose work we exhibited.
t Masson et Cie, Paris, 1944. English translation by S. Morgulis, Academic Press, New
York, 1949.
t Congo, Mano, Pablo, Julia, Lotte, Sophie: pictures by monkeys. Exhibition organized
by the Association for Intellectual and Artistic Progress in Wallonia, from 29 October to 17
November 1966, 16 Place du 20 août, Liège.
xiv PREFACE TO THE FIRST FRENCH EDITION
Man does not descend from the monkey. In such a concept, firmly
established by recent progress in comparative biochemistry, it is con-
sidered that man and the anthropoid apes are derived from a common
ancestor, which could have produced other radiations which have disap-
peared today.
If human intelligence is manifestly unique, it is quite demonstrable that,
as in the case of the rat or monkey, its basis is molecular. That which we
differentiate in our " inferior brothers " is more a question of quantity and
not quality resulting directly from the liberation of the prehensile fore-
limb and the development of speech. Considering the preceding asser-
tion, two chimpanzee brains put together can never make a human brain.
But the most recent findings of neurophysiology and neurochemistry do
not allow the contention that the functioning of the rat brain is fun-
damentally different from that of the human. The metabolism of mamma-
lian neurons and glial cells, neuronal interrelationships and the control of
electrical activity of neuronal aggregates, all have identical molecular
bases. In this evolutionary vein, artistic potentialities and aesthetic sense
bordering on that of man had not been demonstrated in animals. The
wonderful bodily expression of the monkey and the choreography of the
chimpanzee are well known but such examples were only considered as
relevant to the field of artistic expression by biologists and some en-
lightened aesthetes.
However, aesthetic sense and intelligence, which according to some
opinion depend on certain higher centres escaping the laws of physics, are
present in monkeys. This is the reason for the demonstration that a
monkey is capable of marking a sheet of paper, or completing a geometric
form or composing within the limits defined by the investigator, is offen-
sive to certain egocentrics. One could object that monkeys in the wild
state do not devote themselves to pictorial activity. Such an assertion
requires demonstration when one recalls the number of individuals who
have explored caves without noticing or even worse have covered with
graffiti engravings dating back to the later Paleolithic. One could also
explain pictorial activity in captivity by the fact that his fundamental
needs being satisfied (food, housing, security), the monkey is able, just like
man under similar circumstances, to devote himself to gratuitous playful
activity. If it is true that the pictorial productions of monkeys are allied
more to the art of our best action painters than those of Siennese or
Florentine artists, one can discover in it, nevertheless, those fundamental
PREFACE TO THE FIRST FRENCH EDITION XV
characteristics from which man's artistic production has diversified into
the rich florescence of those masterpieces which have accumulated since
the Pre-Magdalenian. The pictorial expression of the monkeys possesses
aesthetic qualities which are incontrovertible for the sentient man. For
the monkey also, because he derives pleasure foreign to any conditioning
from the very act of painting.
The study on declining birthrate in industrial and civilized regions has
had an important consequence in sustaining my deep conviction that
human activity in any form profoundly asserts itself in the life of the
community concerned, especially the activity of its scholars.
It is trite to recall the use of atomic energy for warlike ends and how the
responsibility of the physics is evidenced by all the repercussions felt since
the Oppenheimer case and the problems encountered by Joliot-Curie in
the last years of his life as a researcher. Equally insistently, the problem
was posed in May 1968.| It is certain that a new ethic must be developed
not solely in the light of the most recent discoveries of human biology and
their impact on the life of man but also as a corollary to the realization by
intellectuals and artists of the repercussions of scientific discovery on
daily life and on the rapport existing between societies. It is clear that
today, more than at any other moment in the history of humanity, the
scientist pledges his work, his responsibility as a man, to his fellow cit-
izens. Pure science and art for art's sake remain meritorious things and
the most beautiful jewel of all human societies worthy of the name, but a
new dimension is imposed on us by a more and more enlightened popula-
tion, which supports research but which demands in equal measure due
regard for the utilization of the money which it distributes, and examines
the consequences of our discoveries on the future of mankind. And the
latter is a novel fact which propels intellectuals to the heart of the prob-
lem, which very few of them are inclined to recognize. However, it is also
my deep conviction that a new ethic inexorably sweeping aside values
engendered by the misunderstanding of biological reality will be founded
under the influence of the most revolutionary concepts emerging from
progress in biology. The life of the scholar is intimately mixed with that of
his work. That is why, faced with the menace of obscurantism, it is surely
not out of place to struggle for a more profound humanity by a merciless
denunciation of myths.
t The author refers to the student upheavals that occurred all over the world in 1968 and
more specifically in Paris in May 1968.
xvi PREFACE TO THE FIRST FRENCH EDITION
The idea of expressing at long last certain of these reflections which
have not ceased to interest me since I frequented medical school was
instigated following animated discussions I have had with my colleagues
and my students on the subject of the recent work of Jacques Monod.t
According to the author, the work is an essay on the natural philo-
sophy of modern biology. In fact, it is a very elegant tableau of
nineteenth-century biology seasoned with several piquant spices which
ornament the biochemist's shelves. And this is a pity because, with a
brilliant past as a researcher, who better accredited in France than
Monod to present a truly modern view of biology with its realities, decep-
tions and hopes?
On the contrary, in a vigorous, well-muscled and minutely detailed
style, the author proposes certitudes which appease the anguish of our
contemporaries. With the severe austerity and puritanism of a pastor, he
announces propositions which assume the force of dogmas, giving the
impression to the uninformed reader that fundamental problems in bio-
logy are solved and that the ideas formulated are the only ones compa-
tible with the objectivity of science. Presented in this way, the work
achieves a character of completeness whose insidious charm dulls slug-
gish or uncritical spirits: is it illusory to entertain the hope of attending
on the outgrowth of new researches which will force us to revise our
conception of biology? Is it possible that the mysteries of life are for ever
solved ?
Jacques Monod's book is deceiving because it leaves the reader eager.
With an eloquent style which borders on the pathetic and which certainly
would not be abjured by our great romantics, the argument unfolds
according to an extremely simple logic. The concepts of chance and
necessity, central themes of the work, are always far from adequately
analysed. And it is here that confusion and ambiguity arise. One comes
away from reading the work frustrated since one knows not whether, in
the mind of Jacques Monod, life is the result of coincidence of diverse
independent chains of causality or, on the contrary, whether it obeys the
more fundamental concept of chance as proposed by the Danish School
of physicists. Lastly, problems of evolution and finality in biology are
juggled in consoling reference to largely diffuse and yet quite debatable
ideas, formulated since the beginning of this century.
t Le Hasard et la Nιcessite, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1970. English translation: Chance
and Necessity, Collins, London, 1972.
