Animal ethics and philosophy : questioning the orthodoxy

237 Pages·2014·3.037 MB·English

by  Elisa Aaltola & John Hadley

Animal Ethics and Philosophy

Animal Ethics and Philosophy
Questioning the Orthodoxy
Edited by Elisa Aaltola and John Hadley
London•NewYork
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Animalethicsandphilosophy:questioningtheorthodoxy/editedbyElisaAaltolaandJohnHadley.
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Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN978-1-78348-181-1(cloth:alk.paper)—ISBN978-1-78348-182-8(pbk.:alk.paper)—
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1.Animals(Philosophy)2.Animalrights.3.Animalwelfare.I.Aaltola,Elisa,1976–editor.
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Contents
Introduction:QuestioningtheOrthodoxy 1
JohnHadleyandElisaAaltola
PartI:IntrinsicValueandMoralStatus:RethinkingSentience 13
1 AMetalevelProblemforAnimalRightsTheory 15
JohnHadley
2 AgainstMoralIntrinsicalism 31
NicolasDelon
3 BeyondSentience:BiosemioticsasFoundationforAnimal
andEnvironmentalEthics 47
MortenTønnessenandJonathanBeever
4 AnimalAgency:WhatItIs,WhatItIsn’t,andHowItCan
BeRealized 63
ZipporahWeisberg
PartII:Epistemology:KnowingandSpeakingforNonhuman
Animals 81
5 EnchantedWorldsandAnimalOthers 83
WayneWilliams
6 “TheFleshofMyFlesh”:Animality,Difference,and
“RadicalCommunity”inMerleau-Ponty’sPhilosophy 99
JonathanD.Singer
7 TheProblemofSpeakingforAnimals 117
JasonWyckoff
8 DoingWithoutMoralRights 133
ElizabethForeman
PartIII:MoralPsychology:EmotionsandMetaethics 149
9 DisgustandtheCollectionofBovineFoetalBlood 151
RobertWilliamFischer
10 HumeonAnimalsandtheRestofNature 165
AngelaCoventryandAvramHiller
11 ThePoliticizationofAnimalLove 185
TonyMilligan
v
vi Contents
12 TheRiseofSentimentalismandAnimalPhilosophy 201
ElisaAaltola
FurtherReading 219
Index 223
NotesonContributors 227
Introduction
Questioning the Orthodoxy
John Hadley and Elisa Aaltola
InBourgeois Dignity:WhyEconomicsCan’tExplainthe ModernWorld,Uni-
versityofIllinoiseconomistDeirdreMcCloskeydrawsattentiontoadis-
tinction between, on the one hand, original research and, on the other
hand, innovative research.1 According to McCloskey, original research is
the application of existing knowledge to pressing problems and issues,
and innovative research is the creation of altogether new knowledge.
McCloskey’sthesisisthattheextraordinaryimprovementinlivingstan-
dardsbetween1800tothepresentdaycannotbeexplainedbythework-
ingsofmarketsalone;instead,progressistheproductofhumaningenu-
ity—that is, innovative research in a wide range of fields including the
artsandhumanities.
If McCloskey’s distinction between original research and innovative
research is sound, then there has been relatively little innovation in the
field of animal ethics. Indeed, even the most respected and widely cited
philosophersinthefield,suchasPeterSingerandTomRegan,havenot
producedgenuinelyinnovativeresearchtoanysubstantialdegree.After
all,SingerandReganare,respectively,utilitariananddeontologicalphi-
losophersfirstandanimalethicistssecond.Thatistosay,theyhaveeach
applied existing theories to the problem of human relations with other
animals but have not created new knowledge as such. In other words,
they have produced merely original research, and they have not pro-
ducedinnovativeresearch.
To say that a philosopher has produced merely original research, as
opposed to genuinely innovative research, sounds like casting asper-
sions.Butour pointisnottoslighttheconsiderableachievementsofthe
manydozensofphilosopherswhohavecontributedtoanimalethicsthe-
ory; rather, we aim to draw attention to the nature of the discipline and
the idea of progress within it. If McCloskey’s distinction is sound, very
few philosophers create new knowledge because we all, to some extent,
respondtowhatotherssayorwedisagreewithsomeoneelse’sinterpre-
tation of another theorist’s work. While it is true that there is a sense in
whichnewknowledgeiscreatedwhenweidentifyahithertooverlooked
1
2 Introduction
implication of an existing theory, the innovativeness in such cases re-
mains derivative of the initial creativity and, thus, more the product of
effortratherthaningenuity.
Of course, it is open to readers to reject McCloskey’s distinction, but
we think it is useful for thinking about the state of play in animal ethics
andthefutureofthediscipline.Itgoeswithoutsayingthattheeditorsof
thiscollectionareasguiltyasanyotherphilosophersofproducingwhat
McCloskeywouldsuggestismerelyoriginalresearch.
BEYONDEXTENSIONISM?
The creation of this volume was motivated by the nagging thought that
very little of what passes for innovative research in animal ethics is de-
serving of the label. As anyone familiar with the literature knows, the
fieldis,byandlarge,asitefor“moralextensionism”.Moralextensionism
is the extension of existing moral and political theory across the species
barrier to nonhuman animals. Research in animal ethics is invariably a
case of taking an established theory and applying it to the plight of ani-
mals:Singer takesutilitariantheoryandextendsittoallsentientbeings;
Regan extends deontological theory; Hursthouse extends virtue theory;
Rowlandsextendscontractariantheory;CochraneextendsRaziantheory;
DonaldsonandKymlickaextendsovereigntytheory,andsoon.Ineffect,
animalethicsphilosophersareinthebusinessofpointingoutthatprevi-
ousthinkershavemisunderstood,wronglyapplied,oroverlookedafea-
tureofanestablishedtheory.Inallsuchinstances,assumingthatthereis
someimportantinsightcapturedbyMcCloskey’sdistinction,researchin
animalethicsisnotgenuinelyinnovativebutinsteadmerelyworkswith
existing materials. An obvious question arises: Why do we need any
moretheoryofthiskind?
As well as an innovation deficit, another problem of extensionism is
that any theory that is spawned by it, however original it may be, is
ultimately vulnerable to the same problems as the established theory.
Thus, any utilitarian animal ethics theory faces the nearest and dearest
objections,suchasthescopeproblem,thatariseafterextendingthetheo-
rytononhumananimals.Similarly,anydeontologicalanimalrightstheo-
ry faces the familiar conflict of duties problem, and any virtue theory
approachtoanimalethicsfacestheconflictofvirtuesproblem.Whileitis
truethatthere are responsestotheseproblemsintheliterature,theyare
bynomeansdecisiveandtheseemingintractabilityoftheproblemscasts
a metalevel shadow over claims to authority in animal ethics, or more
broadly animal philosophy. Most proponents of moral extensionism,
withtheexceptionofTomReganinTheCaseforAnimalRights,2passover
metaphilosophicalproblemsquicklyorproceedasiftheseproblemshave
nobearingondebatesabouthumanandanimalrelations.Butclearly,itis