Andrew Hamilton PhD Thesis

262 Pages·2010·10 MB·English

THE SELF AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
Andrew J. Hamilton
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews
1988
Full metadata for this item is available in
Research@StAndrews:FullText
at:
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2704
This item is protected by original copyright
THE SELF AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
by
ANDREW J. HAMILTON
M.A., M.Phil.
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts of the University of
St. Andrews in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.
March 21st. 1987
i
"The door flew open and X, alias 'Baldy', fell out on the road. We
pulled up at once, and then he said 'Did anybody fallout?' or 'Who
fell out?' I don't exactly remember the words. When told that
Baldy fell out, he said 'Did Baldy fallout? Poor Baldy!'"
(William James, 'The
Principles of Psychology',
1890)

iii
In submitting this thesis to the University of St. Andrews I
understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available
for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library
for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the
work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title
and abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be
made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker.
iv
ABSTRACT
It is the aim of this thesis to consider two accounts of
1st-person utterances that are often mistakenly conflated - viz.
that involving the 'no-reference' view of 'I", and that of the
non-assertoric thesis of avowals. The first account says that in a
large range of (roughly) 'psychological' uses, 'I' is not a
referring expression; the second, that avowals of 1st-personal
'immediate' experience are primarily 'expressive' and not genuine
assertions.
The two views are expressions of what I term 'Trojanism'.
This viewpoint constitutes one side of a 'Homeric Opposition in the
Metaphysics of Experience', and has been endorsed by Wittgenstein
throughout his writings; it has received recent expression in
Professor Anscombe's article 'The First Person'. I explore the
ideas of these writers in some depth, and consider to what extent
they stand up to criticism by such notable 'Greek' contenders as
P.F. Strawson and Gareth Evans.
I first give neutral accounts of the key-concepts on which
subsequent arguments are based. These are the immunity to error
through misidentification (IEM) of certain 1st-person utterances,
the guaranteed reference of 'I', avowal, and the Generality Const
raint. I consider the close relation of Trojanism to solipsism and
behaviourism, and then assess the effectiveness of two arguments for
that viewpoint - Anscombe's Tank Argument and the argument from IEM.
Though each is appealing, neither is decisive; to assess Trojanism
properly we need to look at the non-assertoric thesis of avowals,
which alone affords the prospect of a resolution of the really
intractable problems of the self generated by Cartesianism.
In the course of the latter assessment I consider the
different varieties of avowal, broadening the discussion beyond the
over-used example 'I am in pain'. I explore Wittgenstein's notion
of 'expression', and discuss how this notion may help to explain the
authority a subject possesses on his mental states as expressed in
avowals. My conclusion is that an expressive account of avowals can
v
provide a satisfactory counter to the Cartesian account of authority
without our needing recOurse to a non-assertoric or even to a non
cognitive thesis.
Discussion of self-consciousness is implicit in discussion of
the Homeric Opposition, but there is in addition a short chapter on
the concept itself.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My first and most important debt of gratitude is to my
Supervisor, Professor Crispin Wright, without whose tireless support
and patient criticism this thesis could not have been produced.
There can be few research students who have been so fortunate in
their choice of Supervisor. If there is a definite attitude and
approach towards philosophical questions displayed herein, it is
largely the product of his teaching over a number of years. My
appreciation is due also to Roger Squires, who took over supervision
temporarily in Professor Wright's abscence. His cautions against
the dangers of theorising in philosophy have often served to awaken
me from my more dogmatic slumberings.
The research of which this thesis is the product has been
funded principally by the University of St. Andrews, and also by the
Humanitarian Trust, the Sir Richard Stapley Educational Trust and
the Gilchrist Foundation. To these my gratitude is due.
Many thanks also to Mary Taylor and Mark Stringer, for typing
under some pressure the first and final drafts respectively.
I have received much support, philosophical and moral, from
friends and family in the course of the work. Two friends in
particular helped at a time when it seemed the thesis would never be
completed - Catherine Wright and Anne Currie. I am also very
grateful to my mother, whose patient forbearance and support in the
face of an incomprehensible and seemingly interminable project have
been out of the ordinary.
The thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father.
Andrew Hamilton
St. Andrews.
vii
CONTENTS
Page
Abstract iv
Acknowledgements vi
Introduction x
CHAPTER ONE
1.1) Immunity to Error through Misidentification (IEM) (I) 3
(i) The literary background
(ii) Argument to 'no-reference' view of 'I'; neutral
characterisation of IEM
.(iii) Baldy's error
1.2) IEM and Guaranteed Reference 10
(i) Anscombe's conflation
(ii) Formulation of 'guaranteed reference'
(iii) Status of the phenomenon
1.3) Avowal 16
(i) A neutral characterisation
(ii) The relationship of IEM and avowal
1.4) IEM (II) 23
(i) Avowals are IEM
(ii) Are demonstrative jUdgements IEM?
1.5) The Generality Constraint 27
CHAPTER TWO
2.1) Historical Account and Definition of 'No-Reference' View -
Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Remarks' 33
(i) What is Trojanism?
(ii) The 'Philosophical Remarks' account
(iii) The danger of 'covert behaviourism'
2.2) Solipsism and the 'No-Reference' View 41
(i) Epistemological and metaphysical solipsism
(ii) The connection between Trojanism and solipsism
(iii) Wittgenstein on 'what the solipsist wants'
2.3) Arguments against Trojanism: from the Generality Constraint
et al. 49
(i) Militant and moderate Trojanism and the 'continuous ability'
challenge
(ii) Evans' argument: 1st-person undecidable propositions
(iii) Trojan response and deficiencies
2.4) Anscombe's Tank Argument (I): The Self-Reference of 'I' 57
(i) Introductory
(ii) Qualifying the self-reference principle
(iii) 'A'- and 'I'-reflexives; circularity
(iv) Discussion of non-self-conscious self-reference
viii
2.5) Anscombe's Tank Argument (II): Presentation of the Argument 64
(i) Prolegomenon
(ii) The Tank Argument of the first part of Anscombe's dialectic
(iii) A fallacious false start
(iv) Climax of the Anscombian dialectic
2.6) Anscombe's Tank Argument (III): Assessment 74
(i) Three Greek options
(ii) Kenny on 'The First Person'
(iii) The argument from pragmatic self-defeat
(iv) A better line of argument
2.7) Trojan Arguments from IEM (I): The Unique Guarantee for 'I' 87
(i) 'No unnoticed substitution' of the object of self-reference
is not the 'unique guarantee', and is empty
(ii) The unique IEM guarantee and the substantial Trojan case
(iii) Parfitian considerations
2.8) Trojan Arguments from IEM (II): The Wittgensteinian Route
to the 'No-Reference' View 100
(i) Two Trojan arguments
(ii) 'If you can't be wrong, you can't be right either'
(iii) A first Greek response: Identification can be 'passive'
(iv) A second Greek response: 'Active' identification can be
infallible
CHAPTER THREE
3.1) Nozick on 'Reflexive Self-Reference' 113
(i) 'Self-reference' and 'auto-reference'
(ii) A muddle over IEM and 'reflexive access'
(iii) The self-synthetic 'tour de force'
3.2) 'Fortuitous' and 'Aware' Self-Reference; the Circularity of
the Self-Reference Principle 126
(i) Anscombe's 'striking phenomenon'
(ii) Is the self-reference principle circular?
(iii) The consequences of circularity
3.3) IEM and Self-Consciousness 136
CHAPTER FOUR
4.1) The Problem of Avowals 143
4.2) Avowals of Belief 148
(i) The categories of avowal
(ii) Sources of error in avowals of belief: Identification and
attitude
(iii) Sources of error: Propositional element
(iv) Evans' account of 'belief self-ascription'
(v) Wittgenstein's account: 'Moore's paradox'
(vi) What does Evans' account show? Qualified avowals defined
4.3) Avowals of Desire 165