Andreas Umland THE FASCIST THREAT IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA An Investigation into the ...

140 Pages·1999·1.13 MB·English

Andreas Umland
THE FASCIST THREAT IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA
An Investigation into the LDPR-Ideology 1990-1993, and Some Tentative
Suggestion on the Appropriateness of the
`Weimar Russia' Metaphor
Contents
Abbreviations
Part I: Fascist Tendencies in Zhirinovskii's Writings in the Newspaper Liberal
1. The Research Framework and Political Context of the Chapter
Right-Wing Extremism and Peace Studies
Zhirinovskii versus Gaidar
2. The `Whys' of Studying Fascism in Russia
2.1. The Significance of Zhirinovskii's Political Ideas
The LDPR's Direct Influence on Russian Politics
The LDPR's Indirect Influence on Russian Politics
2.2. `Fascism' - a Redundant Label?
2.3. `Fascism' in Post-Soviet Russia
`Fascism' vs. `Right-Wing Extremism'
The Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre
`Fascism' as a Legal Term
`Fascism's' Pre-Eminence
3. Identifying Fascism
3.1. Some Methodological Problems of Empirical Fascist Studies in Russia
`Fascism' a Special Notion in Russia?
Zhirinovskii a Fascist?: Pros and Cons
My Approach to Zhirinovskii's Fascism
The Procedure of this Inquir
3.2. Some Problems of a Theoretical Conceptualization of Fascism
Generic Fascism as a Sub-Type of Right-Wing Extremism
Concepts of Fascist Ideology
1
3.3. An Operational Definition of Fascism
Griffin's `Fascist Minimum'
A Note on Contemporary Russian Political Terminology
4. Palingenetic Ultra-Nationalism in Zhirinovskii's Articles in Liberal
4.1. The Newspaper Liberal
4.2. Zhirinovskii's Articles in Liberal
Number 2-3, 1990
Number 4-5, 1992
Number 6-7, 1992
Number 8-9, 1992
Number 10, 1992
Number 1 (11), 1993
Number 2 (12), 1993
Number 3 (13), 1993
4.3. The Last Dash to the South a Mere Propaganda Trick?
The Last Dash as One Among Several LDP Agendas
The Last Dash as a Non-Issu
The Salience of International Affairs
The `South' as a Recurring Issu
Part II: Weimar Russia': Misleading Catch-Phrase or Pertinent Metaphor?
1. Introductio
The Rationale of the Paper's Second Part
The Focuses of Part II
The Paper's Omissions
The Limits of Comparing Economic Data
Part II's Structur
2. Controlling for Politics: Some Important Similarities in the Party Spectra, Intellectual
Discourses, and Organizational Resources of Inter-War Germany and Post-Soviet Russia
2.1. Political Parties
2.2. Right-Wing Extremist Contaminations of the Democratic Regimes
2.3. Ultra-Nationalist `Social Capital'
2.4. Para-Military Organizations
2.5. Conclusions
3. Sketching the Paradigm: Some Basic Characteristics of the Political Culture, Economy,
Society and International Environment of Weimar Germany
3.1. A Holistic-Institutional Interpretatio
2
3.2. Some Further Variables and Intervening Factors
The Rise of Nationalism
New Demographic Development
The Disillusionment with `American-Style' Modernism
The Failure of the Welfare State
The Unrefomred Agriculture
The Political-Institutional Variable
Economic Crises
4. Comparing the Cases: Some Notable Similarities and Dissimilarities Between Post-Soviet
Russia and Weimar Germany
4.1. The Simultaneity Problem and Hangover Effects in Germany and Russia
The Simultaneity Problem
The Persistence of Old Elites
4.2. Socio-Economic Conditions and Institutional Defects in Weimar Germany and
Post-Soviet Russia
The Salience of Russian Nationalism, and Russia's International Environment
Further Destabilizing Social and Institutional Factors
5. Conclusions
Bibliography
Abbreviations
3
AiF Argumenty i fakty
AO Aktsionernoe obshchestov (stock corporation)
AP Associated Press
APR Agrarnaia partiia Rossii (Agrarian Party of Russia)
AZiP Assotsiatsiia zakonnosti i poriadka (Assciation for Lawfulness and Order)
CDPSP The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press
CNN Cable News Network
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CPS Communist Party of the Soviet Union
D Den' (Moskva)
DemRossiia Demokraticheskaia Rossiia (Democratic Russia)
DK Devichii kal (A Virgin's Excrements)
DN Deutsche Nationalzeitung (München)
DPR Demokraticheskaia partiia Rossii (Democratic Party of Russia)
DS Demokraticheskii soiuz (Democratic Union)
DT Daily Telegraph
DVU Deutsche Volksunion (German People's Union)
EKh Ekspress-Khronika (Moskva)
ELDP Evropeiskaia liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia (European Liberal-Democratic Party)
FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
G The Guardian
Gazprom Gazovaia promyshlennost' (Gas Industry)
GKChP Gosudarstvennyi komitet chrezvychainnogo polozheniia (State Committee of Emergency)
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (Private Limited Company)
GMM Global Money Management
GRU Glavnoe razvedovatel'noe upravlenie (Main Intelligence Administration)
I Izvestiia
IABLoko Iavlinskii-Boldyrev-Lukin-Bloc (iabloko = apple)
IHT International Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine)
In Inostranets
IuG Iuridicheskaia gazeta
Ispolkom Ispolnitel'nyi komitet (Executive Committee)
ITAR-TASS Informatsionnoe telegrafnoe agenstvo Rossii - Telegrafnoe agenstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza
(Informational Telegraph Agency of Russia - Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
KGB Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopastnosti (Committee of State Security)
KDP-PNS Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskaia partiia - partiia narodnoi svobody (Constitutional-
Democratic Party - Party of People's Freedom)
Kolkhoz Kollektivnoe khoziaistvo (Collective Farm)
Komsomol Kommunisticheskii soiuz molodëzhy (Communist Union of Youth)
KPRF Kommunisticheskaia partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Communist Party of the Russian Federation)
L Liberal (Moskva: LDP)
LG Literaturnaia gazeta
LDPB Liberal-Democratic Party of Bulgaria
LDPR Liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia Rossii
LDPS Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union
LR Literaturnaia Rossiia
ME Megapolis-Express (Moskva)
MAFC Moscow Anti-Fascist Centre
MGIMO Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi institut mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii (Moscow State Institute of
International Relations)
4
MID Ministerstvo innostrannykh del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MM Moscow-Magazine
MN Moskovskie novosti
MK Moskovskii komsomolets
Mosgorspravka Moskovskaia gorodskaia spravka (Moscow City Inquiry Office)
MP Member of Parliament
MUR Moskovskii ugolovnyi rozysk (Moscow Criminal Investigation Department CID)
natsmeny natsional'nye menshinstva (national minorities)
NBP Natsional-bol'shevistskaia partiia (National-Bolshevist Party
NDR Nash dom Rossiia (Our Home is Russia)
NEG Novaia ezhednevnaia gazeta
NG Nezavisimaia gazeta
NKVD Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennykh del (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs)
NORD Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe russkoe dvizhenie (Russian National Liberation Movement)
NPSR Narodnaia partiia Svobodnaia Rossiia' (People's Party `Free Russia')
NRPR Natsional'no-respublikanskaia partiia Rossii (National-Republican Party of Russia)
NRS Novoe russkoe slovo (New York)
NSDAP/AO Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands/ Auslandsorganisation (National-Socialist
Workers Party of Germany / Foreign Division)
NTV Nezavisimoe televidenie
NV Novoe vremia
NZZ Neue Züricher Zeitung
O Ogonëk
OG Obshchaia gazeta
OMON Otdel militsii osobogo naznacheniia (Special Tasks Police Department)
OMRI Open Media Research Institute
P Pravda
PER Politicheskii ekstremizm v Rossii: Informatsionno analiticheskii biulleten' (Moskva: Fond
`Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo')
PES Partiia ekonomicheskoi svobody (Party of Economic Freedom)
PKD Partiia konstitutsionnykh demokratov (Party of Constitutional Democrats)
Politizdat Politicheskoe izdatel'stvo (Political Publisher)
PRES Partiia rossiiskogo edinstva i soglasiia (Party of Russian Unity and Accord)
PZh Pravda Zhirinovskogo (Moskva: LDP)
RAU Rossiisko-amerikanskii universitet (Russian-American University)
R Rossiia
Rbls Roubles
RF Rossiiskaia federatsiia (fomerly: Nardodnyi deputat)
RG Rossiiskaia gazeta
RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Libert
RKhDD Rossiiskoe khristiansko-demokraticheskoe dvizhenie (Russian Christian-Democratic Movement)
RKP Rossiiskaia kommunisticheskaia partiia (Russian Communist Party)
RLP Rossiiskaia liberal'naia partiia (Russian Liberal Party)
RLDP Rossiiskaia liberal'no-demokraticheskaia partiia (Russian Liberal-Democratic Party)
RNF Rossiiskii narodnyi front (Russian People's Front)
RNS Russkii natsional'nyi sobor (Russian National Assembly)
ROL Radical Opposition Leaders (Moskva: What the Papers Say)
ROS Rossiiskii obshchenarodnyi soiuz (Russian All-People's Union)
RSDRP Rossiiskaia sotsial-demokraticheskaia rabochaia partiia (Russian Social-Democratic Labou
Party
RSFSR Rossiiskaia sovetskaia federativnaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika (Russian Soviet Federal
Socialist Republic)
5
RSPP Rossiiskii soiuz promyshlennikov i predprinimatelei (Russian Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs)
RV Rossiiskie vesti
S Segodnia
SI Sotsiologicheskie issledovnaiia
SED Sozialistische Enheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
Sovkhoz Sovetskoe khoziaistvo (Soviet, i.e. State, Farm)
Sp Der Spiegel (Hamburg)
SR Sovetskaia Rossiia
SS Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron)
St Stolitsa
SZh Sokol Zhirinovskogo (Moskva: LDP)
taz die tageszeitung (Berlin)
TsK KPSS Tsentral'nyi komitet Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo soiuza (Central Committee of the
CPSU)
TVO Treuhand-, Verwaltungs- und Organisations-GmbH (Trust-, Administration- and Organization-
Private Limited Company)
WWW World Wide Web
Z Die Zeit (Hamburg)
Za Zavtra (Moskva)
Part I: Fascist Tendencies in Zhirinovskii's Writings in the Newspaper Liberal
6
1. The Research Framework and Political Context of Part I of This Paper
`I am not a fascist, am I?'
Vladimir Zhirinovskii at a juridical hearing
concerning allegations against him that he
is a fascist. (Z, 5 August 1994, 2)
Right-Wing Extremism and Peace Studies
The political circumstances of Chechnia's invasion by Russian troops in December 1994 have
shown that a recent proposal by Berlin's politologist Ulrich Albrecht concerning research into
contemporary ethno-social wars is of relevance for the study of Russian politics too. The specific
character of these new conflicts in Europe is, according to Albrecht, that they can be neither
conceptualized as intra-state or civil wars for control over a country; nor can they be described as inter-
state wars. Instead, these conflicts appear as `pluri-ethnic' identity conflicts which are settled by militar
means. In their extreme forms they arise as secessionist or anti-regime wars which have so far onl
been observed in the Third World. For an adequate consideration of this new type of confrontations,
which can be also conceptualized as `ethno-religious conflicts1', Albrecht proposes to approach them in
a novel way. He suggests to combine war, conflict and peace studies with international extremism
studies (Albrecht 1994).
In the case of Russia the close connection between these two directions in political research has
recently been demonstrated with textbook-clarity. The victory of the LDPR in the December 1993
parliamentary elections and the subsequent changes in the Russian political agenda should be seen as
important determinants, if not necessary preconditions, of th Chechnia adventure of the `party of war'
in the El'tsin administration.2

1 Though one has to add that, in Europe and the post-Soviet geographical space, religion plays more important a
role as a factor which defines national identity, communal belonging and ethnic demarcation than as a basis of a
politicized religious fundamentalism. On the ethno-religious conflict on the Balkans, see, for instance, the
insightful study of Calic (1995).
2 This was exemplified by the fact that, on 5 April 1995, 44 of the 56 State Duma deputies who voted against
the Federal Law `On measures for a Political [i.e. non-military] Regulation of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic'
came from the LDPR faction, and two more (V.A. Marychev, L.S. Maksakova) had been elected to the State Duma
on the LDPR list (AiF, no. 15, 1995). After the results of this voting were demonstratively published in the popula
weekl Argumenty i fakty (Arguments and Facts), the LDPR did not take part at a second voting on this Law, and
thus contributed to preventing it from becoming a Constitutional Law which could not have been vetoed by El'tsin
(AiF, no. 16, 1995).
The above explanation for the start of the Chechen war has been also proposed by the leading Russian
democrat Grigorii Iavlinskii in the TV news programme Itogi (NTV, 18 December 1995), and by the Russian
emigres Elena Klepikova and Vladimir Solovyov in their book on Zhirinovskii (1995, VII). To be sure, there had
been already changes toward a more `patriotic' line in Russian domestic and especially foreign policies before the
electoral victory of Zhirinovskii (Crow 1994, 1-6). Yet, if Egor Gaidar and other democrats had remained members
of government after December 1993, and the State Duma had taken a more explicitly negative stance on the
military option to solve the Chechnia problem, it would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, for the so
called `war party' in the Russian government to have their way. On this so called `Lobov-Grachëv-Korzhakov-
Group', see Christian Schmidt-Häuer in: Z, 6 January 1995. The major representatives of the `party of war' in the
Russian executive had left the government by the end of 1996. They included the Security Council Secretary Oleg
7
The focus of the following investigation will be an especially aggressive form of right-wing
extremism: fascism. In line with Albrecht's proposal to regard international extremism studies as an
early warning device for specific public addressees (1994), I shall show in this case study that there are,
at least, two relatively consistent lines of thought in a particular series o Zhirinovskii's publications
which should, in view of the relevant theoretical literature on comparative fascism, be classified as
being essentially `fascist'.3 Among the addressees of such a message would be above all those Russian
courts which, during the last years, forced several Russian newspapers and democratic politicians to
publicly apologize to Zhirinovskii, and even to pay him high compensations for comparisons of him and
his party with inter-war fascisms.
Zhirinovskii versu Gaidar
Zhirinovskii's major juridical confrontation on whether it is legitimate to call him a `fascist' or
not, and the trial to which I am referring here in the first instance was the one with former Prime-
Minister and leading liberal-democratic politician Egor Gaidar. In April 1994, Gaidar had written a
brilliant polemic against Zhirinovskii called `A Stake on Rotters' for the daily Izvestii in which he
called the LDP-leader, among others, a `populist fascist' and `the most popular fascist leader of Russia'
(1994). Zhirinovskii took Gaidar to court in summer 1994. In spite o Gaidar's lawyer Genri Reznik's
demonstration of the presence of essential characteristics of fascism by comparing Zhirinovskii's major
writing The Last Dash to the South (1993a) to Hitler's Mein Kampf, two of the three members of the

Lobov, late Chief of Presidential Administration Nikolai Egorov, Minister of Defense Pavel Grachëv, Head of
Federal Service of Security (forme KGB) Mikhail Barsukov, Chief of Presidential Security Guard Aleksand
Korzhakov, and the First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets. Current Minister of Interior Kulikov seems to be
the only belligerent militarist and racist left in the highest echelons of the El'tsin administration.
3 Characteristically, it was in the last issue of Liberal, the LDP newspaper with (as I shall show) fascist
tendencies under consideration here (L, no. 3 [13], 1993, 6), that the LDP Press Service boasted that Zhirinovskii
had taken to court the newspape Moscow Guardian (a subsidiary of the weekl Kommersant'' edited by Bill
Rogers) for slanderous remarks on the Liberal-Democratic Party, i.e. for, among others, comparing it with classic
fascism, in one of its issues (no. 41, 1992). This action was apparently the most successful of its kind. In late 1993,
the Moscow Guardian was sentenced to pay Zhirinovskii 10 Million Roubles (then approximately DM 15,000)
after which the newspaper had to close (N.N. 1994, 109; Lester 1994, 27; Plekhanov 1994, 35).
Further periodicals which Zhirinovskii, mostly more or less successfully, took to court for alleged libels
(among them, comparisons of him to Hitler) included Rech', Moskovskaia pravda, Stolitsa, Moskovskie novosti, a
Helsinki-based Swedish-language newspaper, and the major German tabloid BILD. Following Zhirinovskii's
denouncement one court, for instance, forced the weekl Stolitsa to pay to Zhirinovskii Rbls. 5,000, and to
apologize for having printed a collage showing together one half of Zhirinovskii's face, and one half of Hitler's
physiognomy (Plekhanov 1994, 35). Zhirinovskii has also protested against the presentation of his person by a
Finish theatre, and the Moscow press agenc Postfaktum. See, IuG, no. 14, 1991, 9; St, no. 36 (42), 1991, no. 44,
1991, 5, and no. 5, 1992, 8-9; SR, 14 April 1992; St, no. 17, 1992, 1; ITAR-TASS, 31 May 1994; DNZ, 4 March
1994; N.N. 1994, 91, 109.
In early 1991, the LDP Juridical Department Head V. Nedoshever boasted that the party is preparing 200
information for Russian courts (IuG, no. 11, 1991, 14), whereas he in autumn 1992 announced that there wer
denunciations, and another 123 in preparation ( Rabochaia tribuna, 2 November 1992). In March 1994,
Zhirinovskii's lawyer Sergei Beliak stated that `Zhirinovskii has already laid approximately forty times information
[against various institutions and persons], and won practically all [processes].' (as quoted in N.N. 1994, 109)
Timtschenko detailed that Zhirinovskii had instituted legal proceedings against six newspapers and journals - all of
them successful (1994, 72).
8
Tver Inter-Municipal Court (L. Bykovskaia and V. Toropov) ruled that both, Gaidar and Izvestii had
in each case to pay Zhirinovskii the equivalent of approximately US$250, and to publicly apologize for
the above labelling (S, 9 September 1994). One of the Court's justifications of this decision was that
[n]one of the researchers studying the nature of fascism to whom the advocate [Reznik] of the
author [Gaidar] referred in the juridical hearing has come to the conclusion that the ideology o
Zhirinovskii is fascist. (as quoted in I, 16 November 1994, 2)
However, oddly neither the judges or prosecutor, nor the defense had asked for such a conclusion. To
Gaidar and his advocate that seemed then simply unnecessary.
Of course, Reznik filed an appeal against this ruling to the Moscow City Court. In view of the
above statement, Reznik this time enclosed to his motion a supporting analysis of the ideology o
Zhirinovskii by Aleksandr Galkin, Professor of History and a leading Russian expert on fascism, and I.
Levinskaia, Candidate of Science in History. However, the Moscow City Court refused leave to
appeal, and argued, among others, that Galkin's and Levinskaia's statement represents their personal
opinion (I, 16 November 1994; RV, 18 November 1994).4
Thus it is one of the intentions of this study to question the justness of those rulings of Russian
courts in which it is declared that it is in principal not legitimate to use the term `fascism' to characterize
Zhirinovskii and his party.
Besides such practical considerations, as I shall argue, more general arguments in favour of the
purpose of this study can be put forward.
2. The `Whys' of Studying Fascism in Russia
2.1. The Significance of Zhirinovskii's Political Idea
If one acknowledges that the study of ideology is of importance to the explanation and
understanding of politics in general, that does not by itself answer the question whether Zhirinovskii's
ideology is sufficiently relevant to Russian politics to warrant its in-depth study, i.e. to justify an
investigation which goes beyond the above tentative, grounded, non-systematic interpretation of the
major LDPR-documents (Umland 1994b; Koman 1996 Umland 1998, Part II). This question is, o
course, a mere component part of the larger issue concerning the overall significance of th
`Zhirinovskii Phenomenon' in post-Soviet Russian society.5

4 For more details and references on this trial, as well as on a similar (but for the LDP unsuccessful) juridical
conflict between the LDP organisation of Vologda and the local DemRossiia activist Iurii Nekrassov, Doctor of
Science in History, see Umland 1994b, 1130-1131. A further analogous important trial between Zhirinovskii and
the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev has been apparently abandoned because Zhirinovskii
refused to turn up to the hearings (R, no. 11 [225], 2 May 1995, 3; PZh, no. 9 [56], 1995; I, 21 December 1995;
The Moscow Times, 21 December 1995).
5 I have tried to deal in more depth with this question in Umland 1998. The two parts of the present paper
constitute the larger parts of Parts III (Classifying the Documents) and IV (Evaluating the Evidence) of this
dissertation. Certain selected arguments of the below analysis of Zhirinovskii's talk and behaviour build upon
9
The LDPR's Direct Influence on Russian Politics
I will distinguish here between direct and indirect influences o Zhirinovskii's and his party's
ideologism on Russian politics (as opposed to the impact of the LDP's opportunism and pragmatism).
To start with, Zhirinovskii has the possibility to directl influence Russian politics via his party's
presence in the lower house of the parliament, the State Duma, and through its participation in
elections as well as appearances in national media.
First, in the Fifth and Sixth Russian State Dumas, Zhirinovskii's major leverage was and is that
the support of his faction is important or even pivotal in the adoption of those laws which had or have
the support of only one of the two major voting coalitions. This refers to those moves which have the
backing either from the oppositional communist-patriotic - sometimes misleadingly called `left-wing' -
alliance (KPRF, APR and Nikolai Ryzhkov's `Power to the People!' Bloc), or, on the other side, from
the more or less consistently pro-government and democratic factions or groups (Chernomyrdin's
NDR, Russian Regions, Iavlinskii's Iabloko, `Russia's Choice', etc.) which are often deludingly
positioned on the `right' part of the political spectrum (see my `Introduction'). The LDP won 22.92%
on the party list, and was victorious in five one-mandate districts in December 1993 which gave it 64 o
the 450 Duma seats. This number shrank because of death and defection of some deputies to 58 (or
13.1% of the seats) in mid-1994, and rose to 59 (or 13.4% of the seats) in January 1995 (Schneider
1995a, 24 Vlast'... 1994 [1995], 4th vol., 99).
In the December 1995 elections, the LDP won only 11.18% on the party list and secured only
one-mandate district. However, nearly half of the votes given in these elections' voting for the 225
Duma seats allocated proportionally were given to parties which did not pass the 5%-barrier. Thus the
remaining ca. 50% of the votes given to those four bloc which did collect over 5% determine
exclusively the distribution of those half of the lower house allocated for proportional representation of
all-federal parties. In Russia in December 1995, the idea of `proportional representation' led because o
an unimaginative electoral law to `disproportional representation'. This meant that the LDPR secured,
in spite of its significantly worse performance, only a little less influence in the Sixth Stat Duma than in
the Fifth State Duma - 51 seats (Orttung 1996).
In sum, however, the LDPR faction had only a small numerical strength in th Duma; the major
reason for this was that it turned out to be a politically impotent force with regard to the voting for the
225 seats allocated to candidates from the single-mandate districts. Yet, the LDPR faction's occupies a
peculiar position between the anti- and pro-reform groups - i.e. the democrats, such as the IaBLoko-
faction, and reformist centrists such as `Our Home is Russia', on the one side, and the ultra
conservative communists, agrarians and their allies, on the other side. As far as neither of these to
major force commands an absolute majority, Zhirinovskii had and has, especially in the Sixth State
Duma, a high bargaining capacity for influencing political processes. This peculiar constellation o
forces, and the LDPR faction's location in it reminds somewhat the critical or even `king-maker' role
the (fundamentally different) German Free Democratic Party FDP has played in the case of stalemates

knowledge of activities of Zhirinovskii between until December 1993 listed and analyzed in the first two parts and
Appendix I of the dissertation. Especially, the in-depth interpretation of Zhirinovskii's pivotal writing, the first
edition of his book The Last Dash to the South (1993a), in Part II of the dissertation (Umland 1998) complements
the classificatory investigation of Part I of this paper (or Part III of the dissertation respectively).
10