And we'll all be free : the role of the press in the integration of the United States Army

284 Pages·1994·9.9 MB·English

by  Fried, Alan, 1950-

ANDWE’LLALLBEFREE:
THEROLEOFTHEPRESSIN
THEINTEGRATIONOFTH—EUNITEDSTATESARMY
1947 1950
( )
By
ALANFRIED
ADISSERTATIONPRESENTEDTOTHEGRADUATESCHOOLOFTHE
UNIVERSITYOFFLORIDAINPARTIALFULFILLMENTOFTHE
REQUIREMENTSFORTHEDEGREEOFDOCTOROFPHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITYOFFLORIDA
1994
UNIVERSITYOFFLORIDALIBRARIES
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Icametothisenterprisewithagreatdesiretoleammoreaboutthedevelopmentof
racerelationsintheUnitedStates,U.S.militarypolicies,thegrowthofgovernment/press
relationsandtheprocessesandmethodsofhistoricalresearch. Ihavelearnedmuch
aboutallthesetopicsandIoweagreatdebtofthankstoallthoseilluminatedthewayfor
me. Iwouldfirstliketothankthemembersofmydissertationcommittee,Dr.DavidOstroff,
Dr.WilliamMcKeen,Dr.RichardScher,Dr.DavidColburnandDr.RobertKendall. Each
contributedmightilytomyunderstandingoftheprocessofhistoryandpoliticalscience. I
wouldespeciallyliketothankthoselibrarianswhotaughtmewhereandhowtolookfor
information: DoloresJenkinsoftheUniversityofFlorida,whoobtainedamicrofilmsetofof
theFahyCommitteedocuments,andWillMahoneyoftheMilitaryHistoryDivisionofthe
NationalArchivesinWashington,DC,andDennisBilgeroftheHarryS.TrumanLibrary,
Independence,Missouri,whowereunstintingintheirkindnessandpatience. Ithank
authorsRichardDalfiume,MorrisMacGregorandLeeNicholswhofirstdevelopedthis
topic,IalsothankthestaffsoftheMilitaryHistorydivisionoftheArmyWarCollegein
CarlisleBarracks,theWisconsinStateHistoricalSocietyandtheLibraryofCongress
PersonalManuscriptsDivision. IappreciateallthosewhoputmeupwhileIwasdoing
researchincludingMatthewandSueDoddofMarysville,Pennsylvania:LarryEkinof
Washington,DC;Mrs.ArmandHelmofIndependence,Missouri;andmyuncleandaunt,
AdrianandBarbaraPelznerofReston,Virginia. Finally,IthankmybrotherArthurwho
taughtmetoreverehistoryandwhohasalwaysgivenmylifeanethicalbalanceandmy
parentsBernardandAnitaFriedforvirtuallyeverythingelse.Thegoodinthisstudy
comesfromthem;theerrorsaremyown.
8
TABLEOFCONTENTS
page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ii
ABSTRACT v
CHAPTERS
1 THEROLEOFPUBLICITYINGOVERNMENT 1
PublicityandthePoliticalElite 4
ABriefReviewofMilitaryDesegregation 12
Notes 15
2 CIVILRIGHTS,MILITARYREFORMANDTHE
TRUMANPRESIDENCY 1
CivilRightsandtheTrumanPresidency 22
MilitaryReformandtheTrumanPresidency 45
MilitaryDemocratizationthroughUnification 55
TrumanandthePress 62
Notes 69
3 MILITARYPOLICIES 80
GillemBoard 82
JamesForrestal 85
KennethRoyall 94
OmarBradley 108
J.LawtonColins 121
LouisJohnson 127
GordonGray 133
Conclusions 137
Notes 138
4 A.PHILIPRANDOLPHANDTHECOMMITTEE
AGAINSTJIMCROWINTHEARMY 155
RDaensdeoglrpehg'astiEoanrloyfMUilmittaryDesegrationCrusade... 116526
LeagueforNon-ViolentCivilDisobedience 170
Randolph'sInfluenceinMilitaryDesegregation... 176
Notes 178
iii
oagfl
5 THEFAHYCOMMITTEE 183
CharlesFahy — 186
SengstackeandtheDefenderTradi:ti;on 188
Firstmeeting 194
SEi.tWua.tiKoennAwnoarltyhsyis 220013
ReactiontoJohnson'sApril6Directive 207
RoyDavenport 210
Johnson'sSecondDirective 210
Johnson’sUsurpation 218
TheThreatofPublicity 226
Notes 235
6 CONCLUSIONS 248
WhytheBureaucratsSubstitutedthePressfor
PublicOpinion 252
HowtheBureaucratsViewedtheBlackPress 256
AcceptanceofTruman'sMandate 257
WhyStudytheHistoryofPressAccess? 260
Notes 262
BIBLIOGRAPHY 263
BIOGRAPHICALSKETCH 277
IV
AbstractofDissertationPresentedtotheGraduateSchooloftheUniversityOf
FloridainPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementsfortheDegreeofDoctorof
Philosophy
ANDWE’LLALLBEFREE:
THEROLEOFTHEPRESSIN
THEINTEGRATIONOFTHEUNITEDSTATESARMY
(1947—1950)
by
AlanFried
April 1994
Chairman,Dr.DavidOstroff
MajorDepartment:MassCommunications
WhenPresidentHarryS.TrumanconvenedthePresident’sCommittee
onEqualityofTreatmentandOpportunityintheArmedServicesin1949,he
directedtheirworkbedonewithaminimumofpublicity. Consistently,however,
thecommitteeandtheircounterpartsintheUnitedStatesArmyusedpress
exposureand,moreimportantly,thethreatofpressexposuretogainpolitical
advantage. Surprisingly,anumberofthekeyplayersinthisincident,including
theExecutiveSecretaryofthecommitteeandacommitteemember, were
journalists;thus,membersofthepresswereresponsibleformanagementof
government—pressrelations. Byexaminingthehistoryofthepresidential
directivetoraciallyintegratetheUnitedStatesArmy,wecang£nafresh
understandingofhowpublicityshapesandinfluencespolicy-making.
v
CHAPTER1
THEROLEOFPUBLICITYINGOVERNMENT
In1959,DouglassCateridentifiedatrendthatmightbeoneofthe
hallmarksof Americanpoliticallifeinthelasthalfofthetwentiethcentury.“We
havetodaywhatmightbecalledgovernmentbypublicity,”Caterwrote.Hesaw
theinfluenceofpublicitygrowingasmasscommunicationsandpublicopinion
pollingexpandedintoeveryphaseofAmericanlife.Cateridentifiedthistrendas
aforceuniquelyindispensabletotheAmericansysteminwhich
'cpoumbpliectiopnigniborna'nicshceaslloefdgoonvedarinlmyetnotarsbuiptrpaotseebdeltywseeepnartahteetawnod
coordinatewhatWoodrowWilsoncalledthe'literarytheory'ofour
Constitution.1
CommunicationscholarstendtoagreewithCaterandwithDan
Nimmowhosaidthatinformation-dispensingbygovernmentusuallyservessome
politicalpurpose.Governmentalbodiescraftpromotionalmessagestoexplainand
tojustifytheirpolicies;theythentransmitthemtoindividualcitizensandinterest
groups.2 Withintheenvironmentofseparatepowers,amarketplaceofideas
operatestoallowcompetitivepublicexplanationsofpolicytoviewithother
explanations.Asthefirstrecipientofpublicinformation,thepresshasbecomea
kindofcitizen'sprocuratordiscriminatingamongthemanymessages.Indoingthis
work,thepresshasbecomemorethanacountervailingfourthestateof
government;ithasbecomeaseparatepublicuntoitself.AsCaterhasnoted,the
1
2
creativepowerofgovernmentpublicityliesinitsfacilityforusingthepressto
short-cuttheclassicwaysofdemocracy.Caterwrote,
Inanageofcomplexandfast-breakingevents,themeasurementof
publicitycomestobetakenasacheapandconvenientsubstitute
forpublicopinion.Forthepoliticianandthebureaucrattheheadline
inchfrequentlyservesastheday-to-daymeasureofpublicopinion
onagreatnumberofissues.Bytheirresponsestothissynthetic
publicopinion,theystimulatefurtherpublicityandsocommencea
reflexivecyclethathasbeenknowntomovenewsstoriesfromthe
insidetothefrontpageandtoreshapepoliciesassurelyasif
publicopinionhadexerteditssovereignwill.3
Totesteater'sthesisthattheexpediencyofpublicitydrives(and
perhaps,obstructs)policymaking,wehavedecidedtoexaminetheextentto
whichtheseprocessesarepeculiartothe“ageofcomplexandfast-breaking
events."Forthisanalysis,weneedtowresttheprocessfromitscontemporary
connotations. Wearestilldefiningthepolicymakingprocessinaverytraditional
way,butwearesuggestingthatthedispositionofthatprocesshaschanged.
Thatis,operationally,wewouldacceptanyviewoftheprocessthatincludes(a)
problemidentification,(b)theformulation,legitimationandappropriationthat
compriseprogramdevelopment,(c)programimplementation,(d)program
evaluationand(e)programtermination.4Thedistinctionthatwearemakingisthat
thisprocesshasrundifferentlysincethetelevision-age.
Muchoftheacademicliteratureabouttheeffectsofpublicityonpolicy-
makinghasnaturallyfocusedoneventsthatoccurredafter1960.PresidentJohn
Kennedy’sabilitiesasatelegeniccommunicatorandthegraphic,publicqualityof
hisassassinationhaveforevertransformedthemedia.Relativelyrecentevents
suchasthe1960sCivilRightscrusades,theVietNamWarandtheWatergate
affair,andtheeventsthathaveoccurredintheiraftermathwerealsopowerful
naturallodestonesattractingtheeyeofthevideocameraandtheattentionofmost
3
politicalscientistsandcommunicationscholars.Yetthesedramaticeventshave,to
someextent,obscuredourunderstandingofthegovemment/publicityprocess.
RobertEntmanarguesthatfederalpolicymakerswerebetterableto
resolvedifficultmattersinternally,withintheWashingtonsystem,beforetheglaring
concentrationofintrusiveandjudgmentalnewscoverageimposedanextralayer
ofstrategiccomplexityontheirdecisions:
Presidentsandlegislatorscouldconcentratemoreonsellingthepartyelite
andlocalactivists,whounderstoodthecomplexityofpolicychoiceand
resistedthedemagogicmanipulationbytheopposingparty.Publicopinion
e(olppiietnreicsoenmi.vaeyBdebofreoramecotturhaele)attewltoeeuvnlitsdiivotenatgahgaaeln,oenbvgaeocrrktnowohtweh.nat.po.tlhBieteiyccaapleuprsaceretioivfeesthaheselmpdeudmbiloair,ce
power,apresident'simagebeyondthePotomaccouldbelessfavorable
thanhisprofessionalreputationinWashingtonandhecouldstilldominate
theWashingtonpowergame. Now,maintainingthatsituationismore
dapiusfbfliifciutclhts.euyNpaoprower,.tehMvaaesnnabgifeitcnhogemmpeuebdoliniaeciiosfmpntrohetesacsleinwotanrysasltottaubsnoklessdtoeifnr,pppreoerlsciietdiiecvnieatdnssaabnneddhaaoctvtheuearl
politicians.5
Entman’sconceptionhelpstonarrowthefocusofthisinquirybothintime
andineffect.Tounderstandtheconsequencesofpublicityonpolicy-making,we
needtoexamineincidentsthatoccurredbeforetelevisionpokeditsdisruptiveeye
intothepoliticalprocess.IfEntmanisright,thepublicitymachinehasmostaffected
the activitiesoftheelite.Whetherforgoodorforill,thisnewsensitivitybythe
elitestopublicitymayhavechangedthespiritofdecision-makinginourpluralistic
society.Toseeifthistrue,weneedtoexaminehowelitepolicymakersfunctioned
withoutpublicity,orbetteryet,howtheyfunctionedwhenpublicitywasnotas
problematic.
4
PublicityandthePoliticalElite
EversinceKatzandLazarsfeldtheorizedtheexistenceofatwo-stepflow
incommunication,6thepoliticalelitehaveusuallybeenseenasanintermediary
betweentheinformationgeneratedbythemassmediaandthepublicatlarge.
Althoughresearchershaveclearlyarticulatedandprovenempiricallythat atwo-
stepflowofcommunicationsoccursinmanysituations,theyhavebeenlessclear
inhowtheydefineelite.WewouldadoptV.O.Key’sdefinition,“Thatthinstratum
ofpersonsreferredtovariouslyasthepoliticalelite,thepoliticalactivists,the
leadershipechelonsortheinfluentials.”7 Althougheconomicstatusmaybea
determinantofwhois,andisnot,amemberoftheelite,BernardHennessysaid
onmostmattersofpublicconcern,therelationsbetweentheeconomicand
thepoliticalaremuchtoosubtletobecapturedbyanydeterminist
prescription,andmuchinterwovenbyothersocialandpsychological
forces. 8
PerhapsHennesydescribesitbestwhenhesuggeststhatpoliticalelites
arethosewhoseopinionsmatter.Thus,opinionleaderscaremoreintenselyabout
theendsandmeansofpublicpolicyandholdtheiropinionswithgreater
articulateness,self-consciousnessandwithgreaterpersistence.9WhereEntman
differsfromthesescholarsisinhisperspective;heseesthemediaasan
impedimenttothegoodworksoftheseelites.
Thenotionthatelitesdependuponthemediatomirrorpopularopinionhasbeen
widelyaccepted.10Thestructureandfunctionofthisfeedbackphaseofthetwo-step
flowbetweenthemediaandtheelitehasbeenwellanalyzed.Forexample,DorisGraber
hasinvestigatedhowthemediaaffectsdecision-making:
Publicitymaynarrowthepolicychoicesavailabletopublicofficials.Itmay
engenderactionwhennoactionmayhavetakenplaceotherwise.
5
Alternativelybymobilizinghostilepublicorinterestgroupopinions,itmay
forceahalttoongoingorprojectedpolicies.11
Wecontendthatmuchofthecurrentanalysismaybebasedon
misapprehensionsand symbolicprojection.Ifthepoliticalelitedorelyonthemediaasthe
voiceofthepeople,theyprobablyhavefalsenotionsofitsrepresentativeness.J.David
Kennemarnotesthatelitesoftenusethenewsmediaasasurrogateforpublicopinion
althoughthereisnoscientificevidencethatthenewsreflectsanythingmorethanone
measureofthepopularagenda.Inderivingthisinsight,theseelitesusenosystematic
meanstoshapetheseperceptions.Inholdingtheseunwarrantedassumptions,they
exhibitahighdegreeofpluralisticignorance.12
SamuelKemellblamestheintrusionofthepressintotheaffairsofpolicymakersfor
creatingasea-changeinournotionsofpluralism.He arguesthatmodempoliticiansare
caughtbetweenthestructureofinstitutionalizedandindividualizedpluralism,wherethe
formerischaracterizedbystablebargainingofallocatedresourcesbyanetworkof
coalitionsbasedonlong-termloyaltiesandwherethelatterischaracterizedby
independentnewtradersmoreinterestedinshorttermsuccesses.Thesecondpolitical
milieuisalsodistinguishedbygreatercommunicationfromWashingtontotherestofthe
country.PublicopinioncountsformoretodaybecauseWashingtonelitesarenecessarily
moresensitivetopublicandpressopinion.13
WalterLippmannsawthedangersofthisdivisionintheearly1950s.Hewrote,
Thepressisnosubstituteforinstitutions.Itislikethebeamofa
searchlightthatmovesrestlesslyabout,bringingoneepisodethen
anotheroutofthedarknessintovision.Mencannotdotheworkof
theworldbythislightalone.Theycannotgovernsocietyby
esptiesaoddyelsi,ghitnocfidtehenitrsoawnnd,etrhuaptttihoensp.reItssis,ownhleynwhtuernnetdheuypownortkhebmy,a
revealsasituationintelligibleenoughforapopulardecision.Itliesin
socialorganizationbasedonasystemofanalysisandrecord,andin
allthecorollariesofthatprinciple;intheabandonmentofthetheory