Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations

353 Pages·2008·2.28 MB·English

by  Roger Z. George

A N A L Y Z I N G
INTELLIGENCE
Additional Praise for Analyzing Intelligence
‘‘At last . . . a comprehensive compendium of thought and insights on the pro-
fession of analysis! A must read for anyone interested in intelligence reform,
analytictransformation,andforthefiftypercentofintelligencecommunityana-
lystswithlessthanfiveyearsexperience.’’
—TimothyR.Sample,president,IntelligenceandNationalSecurityAlliance
andformerstaffdirector,HousePermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligence
‘‘Themost wide-rangingintroductionto thevital craftof American intelligence
analysisthathaseverbeenpublishedforthegeneralaudienceofpeers,scholars,
and students. As editors, George and Bruce both exemplify and advance the
professional standards they preach. Readers will find plenty of healthy self-
criticismandrecognitionofproblems.Yetreadersmayendupquestioningsome
preconceptions of their own as they encounter essays that knock down some
caricatures and corrosive myths that too often dominate contemporary discus-
sionofintelligenceissues.’’
—PhilipZelikow,WhiteBurkettMillerProfessorofHistory,Universityof
Virginia,andexecutivedirectorofthe9/11Commission.
‘‘Analyzing Intelligence offers a sophisticated overview of the history, perform-
ance, and practice of intelligence analysis. The contributors explore why good
analysisisextraordinarily difficultandhowchangingthreats,technologies,and
expectationsareshapingtheintelligenceprofession.’’
—JamesJ.Wirtz,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,California
A N A L Y Z I N G
INTELLIGENCE
ORIGINS, OBSTACLES, AND INNOVATIONS
ROGER Z. GEORGE
JAMES B. BRUCE
Editors
In cooperation with the Center for Peace and Security Studies
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
Georgetown University Press
Washington, D.C.
GeorgetownUniversityPress,Washington,D.C.www.press.georgetown.edu(cid:2)2008by
GeorgetownUniversityPress.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedor
utilizedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronicormechanical,includingphotocopyingand
recording,orbyanyinformationstorageandretrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwriting
fromthepublisher.
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Analyzingintelligence:origins,obstacles,andinnovations/RogerZ.George,JamesB.
Bruce,editors;incooperationwiththeCenterforPeaceandSecurityStudies,EdmundA.
WalshSchoolofForeignService,GeorgetownUniversity.
p.cm.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN-13:978-1-58901-201-1(alk.paper)
1.Intelligenceservice—UnitedStates—Methodology. 2.Militaryintelligence—United
States. 3.Nationalsecurity—UnitedStates. I.George,RogerZ.,1949– II.Bruce,
JamesB. III.GeorgetownUniversity.CenterforPeaceandSecurityStudies.
JK468.I6.A843 2008
327.1273—dc22
2007031706
(cid:3)(cid:2)
Thisbookisprintedonacid-freepapermeetingtherequirementsoftheAmericanNational
StandardforPermanenceinPaperforPrintedLibraryMaterials.
15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Firstprinting
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the authors and do not
reflecttheofficialpositionsorviewsoftheCIAoranyotherU.S.governmentagency.Nothing
inthecontentsshouldbeconstruedasassertingorimplyingU.S.governmentauthentication
ofinformationoragencyendorsementoftheauthors’views.Whereappropriate,thismaterial
hasbeenreviewedbytheCIAtopreventthedisclosureofclassifiedinformation.
Tothreepathfindersfortheprofessionofintelligenceanalysis
Sherman Kent
Richards J. Heuer, Jr.
Jack Davis

Contents
Preface ix
Introduction:IntelligenceAnalysis—TheEmergenceofaDiscipline 1
James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George
Part One: The Analytic Tradition
1 TheEvolutionofIntelligenceAnalysis 19
John H. Hedley
2 TheTrackRecord:CIAAnalysisfrom1950to2000 35
Richard J. Kerr
3 IsIntelligenceAnalysisaDiscipline? 55
Rebecca Fisher and Rob Johnston
Part Two: The Policy–Analyst Relationship
4 ServingtheNationalPolicymaker 71
John McLaughlin
5 ThePolicymaker’sPerspective:TransparencyandPartnership 82
James B. Steinberg
6 IntelligenceAnalysis:Between‘‘Politicization’’andIrrelevance 91
Gregory F. Treverton
Part Three: Enduring Challenges
7 TheArtofStrategyandIntelligence 107
Roger Z. George
8 ForeignDenialandDeception:AnalyticalImperatives 122
James B. Bruce and Michael Bennett
9 U.S.MilitaryIntelligenceAnalysis:OldandNewChallenges 138
David Thomas
vii
viii (cid:3) Contents
Part Four: Diagnosis and Prescription
10 WhyBadThingsHappentoGoodAnalysts 157
Jack Davis
11 MakingAnalysisMoreReliable:WhyEpistemologyMattersto
Intelligence 171
James B. Bruce
12 TheMissingLink:TheAnalyst–CollectorRelationship 191
James B. Bruce
Part Five: Leading Analytic Change
13 ManagingAnalysisintheInformationAge 213
John C. Gannon
14 IntelligenceinTransition:AnalysisafterSeptember11andIraq 226
Mark M. Lowenthal
15 TheNewAnalysis 238
Carmen A. Medina
Part Six: New Frontiers of Analysis
16 Computer-AidedAnalysisofCompetingHypotheses 251
Richards J. Heuer Jr.
17 PredictiveWarning:Teams,Networks,andScientificMethod 266
Timothy J. Smith
18 HomelandSecurityIntelligence:Rationale,Requirements,and
CurrentStatus 281
Bruce Berkowitz
Conclusion: The Age of Analysis 295
Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce
Glossary of Analysis Terms 309
Contributors 321
Index 325
Preface
THIS BOOK PRESENTS an exposition and critique of U.S. intelli-
gence analysis. A single author could not have written it as authoritatively or
completely. When we decided to produce this kind of volume on intelligence
analysis, we made two critical decisions at the outset: first, to commission new
chapters,becausewhatwewereseekingwassimplynotavailableinthecurrent
literature; and second, to recruit the most qualified experts to write these origi-
nalcontributions.Wealsosoughttobringthesefreshperspectivestogetherina
way thatwould yielda whole thatis truly greaterthan thesum of itsparts. We
hopewehavesucceededinthesedauntingcollaborativetasks.
Collaborationismorethancooperationtowardacommongoal.Forthisproj-
ectithasbeenacareer-longsharingofideasonhowtomakeintelligenceanaly-
sis a true profession. In a sense, it took more than two decades of contact
between the editors to produce this volume, as we constantly crossed paths in
our professional lives. Both of us studied international relations theory and
political sciencebefore joiningthe intelligencecommunity. Ouranalytic careers
bothbeganattheNationalIntelligenceCouncilandconvergedagainattheCen-
tralIntelligenceAgency’s(CIA’s)DirectorateofIntelligence,OfficeofEuropean
Analysis. In these rather different organizations, we became well acquainted
with how intelligence analysis is conducted at both the intelligence community
andagencylevels.Herewewerefirstexposedtothetalentsofsuchphenomenal
analysts as Hal Ford, a vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council and
mentor of national intelligence estimates writers like ourselves. And we also
encountered Jack Davis, at the time a national intelligence officer and later a
career-longdeveloper andteacher oftradecraft.Later,wewereagainprivileged
to serve at the National Intelligence Council, drafting and managing national
intelligenceestimates,wherewewereabletoseetheimpressiveskillsofsomeof
the best analysts in the U.S. government—and some of the frailties of the esti-
matingprocess.
Inthese assignmentsand others,wehad ourshare oftriumphs andsetbacks,
along theway observing howintelligence analysis worksin practice andhow it
might be made to work better. Seasoned by firsthand contact with intelligence
at both its best and worst, we could not avoid developing ideas regarding how
toimproveanalysis.
Thesecombinedexperienceshavetaughtustobehumblebutalsotobemore
demanding of intelligence. We came to believe that ‘‘lessons learned’’ must be
shared with others; otherwise, changes in the analytic habits of others will not
ix