Analyticity (New Problems of Philosophy)

335 Pages·2009·2.57 MB·English

by  Cory Juhl

ANALYTICITY
Analyticity, or the ‘analytic–synthetic’ distinction, is one of the most im-
portant and controversial problems in contemporary philosophy. It is also
essential to understanding many developments in logic, philosophy of lan-
guage, epistemology and metaphysics. In this outstanding introduction to
analyticity, Cory Juhl and Eric Loomis cover the following key topics:
(cid:129) The origins of analyticity in the philosophy of Hume and Kant
(cid:129) Carnap’s arguments concerning analyticity in the early twentieth century
(cid:129) Quine’s famous objections to analyticity in his classic ‘Two Dogmas of
Empiricism’ essay
(cid:129) The relationship between analyticity and central issues in metaphysics,
such as ontology
(cid:129) The relationship between analyticity and epistemology
(cid:129) Analyticity in the context of the current debates in philosophy, includ-
ing mathematics and ontology.
Throughout the book the authors show how many philosophical controver-
sies hinge on the problem of analyticity. Additional features include chapter
summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary of technical terms,
making the book ideal for those coming to the problem for the fi rst time.
Cory Juhl is an Associate Professor at the University of Texas at Austin. His
papers have appeared in Philosophy of Science, Synthese, Analysis, Philosophical Studies,
The Monist, The Journal of Philosophical Logic, and the book Reading Putnam (Black-
well, 1994).
Eric Loomis is an Associate Professor at the University of South Alabama.
His papers have appeared in Synthese, Theoria, Logical Analysis and History of Phil-
osophy, and Pacifi c Philosophical Quarterly.
New Problems of Philosophy Series
Series editor: José Luis Bermúdez
The New Problems of Philosophy series provides accessible and engaging surveys
of the most important problems in contemporary philosophy. Each book
examines either a topic or theme that has emerged on the philosophical
landscape in recent years, or a longstanding problem refreshed in light of
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in the series are excellent starting- points for undergraduate and graduate
students wishing to study a single topic in depth. They will also be essential
reading for professional philosophers. Additional features include chapter
summaries, further reading and a glossary of technical terms.
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Mark Schroeder Don Ross and Tadeusz Zawidzki
Perceptual Consciousness Semantic Externalism
Adam Pautz Jesper Kallestrup
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ANALYTICITY
Cory Juhl and Eric Loomis
This edition published 2010 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ox14 4rn
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, ny 10016
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009.
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© 2010 Cory Juhl and Eric Loomis
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form
or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission
in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Juhl, Cory.
Analyticity / by Cory Juhl and Eric Loomis.
p. cm. — (New problems of philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Analysis (Philosophy I. Loomis, Eric. II. Title.
B808.5.J84 2009
146'.4—dc22
2009006638
ISBN 0-203-87257-6 Master e-book ISBN
isbn10: 0–415–77332–6 (hbk)
isbn10: 0–415–77333–4 (pbk)
isbn10: 0–203–87257–6 (ebk)
isbn 13: 978–0–415–77332–4 (hbk)
isbn 13: 978–0–415–77333–1 (pbk)
isbn 13: 978–0–203–87257–4 (ebk)
CONTENTS
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xv
Chapter 1 Conceptions of Analytic Truth 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Hume’s Fork 1
1.3.1 Kant and the Analytic–Synthetic Distinction 4
1.3.2 Synthetic A Priori Propositions 8
1.4 Bolzano and Analyticity 11
1.5 Analyticity in Frege 13
1.6 Russell’s Paradox and the Theory of Descriptions 16
1.7 The Vienna Circle 18
1.8 Carnap and Logical Empiricism 22
1.9 Chapter Summary 26
1.10 Further Reading 28
Chapter 2 Carnap and Quine 30
2.1 Introduction and Overview 30
2.2.1 Demise of the Aufbau 31
2.2.2 Philosophy as Logical Syntax 34
2.2.3 Logical and Descriptive Languages 36
2.2.4 Physical Languages 40
vi CONTENTS
2.2.5 Analyticity in Syntax 45
2.3 Carnap’s Move to Semantics 49
2.4 Explications 55
2.5 Analyticity in a Semantic Setting 57
2.6 Eliminating Metaphysics: Carnap’s Final Try 60
2.7 W. V. Quine: Explication is Elimination 64
2.8 Behaviorists Ex Offi cio 69
2.9 Analyticity in the Crosshairs 73
2.10 Chapter Summary 74
2.11 Further Reading 77
Chapter 3 Analyticity and Its Discontents 79
3.1 Introduction and Overview 79
3.2 Questioning Analyticity 82
3.3 Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ 83
3.4 Objections to the Intelligibility of ‘Analytic’ 84
3.5 Quine’s Coherence Arguments: Carnap’s Reply 96
3.6 Other Responses to the Coherence Objection: Grice and
Strawson on Quine 101
3.7 A Second Dogma of Empiricism 109
3.8 Responses to the Existence Objections to Analyticity 114
3.9 Analyticity by Convention 119
3.10 Quine’s Developed Attitude toward Analyticity 123
3.11 Chapter Summary 125
3.12 Further Reading 127
Chapter 4 Analyticity and Ontology 129
4.1 Introduction and Overview 129
4.2 Quine’s Naturalized Ontology 130
4.3 The Indeterminacy of Translation 137
4.4 Some Consequences of the Indeterminacy Arguments:
Ontological Relativity and Analyticity 142
4.5 Responses to Quine’s Indeterminacy Arguments 146
4.6 Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’ 152
4.7 Some Quinean and Other Responses to ‘Empiricism, Semantics,
and Ontology’ 158
4.8 Some Recent Connections between ‘Conceptual Truths’ and
Ontology 163
CONTENTS vii
4.9 Quine’s Criterion of Ontological Commitment, Causality, and
‘Exists’ 164
4.10 Eli Hirsch and Ted Sider on Mereological Principles 166
4.11 The ‘Canberra Project’: A Resurrection of Carnap’s Aufbau? 167
4.12 Chapter Summary 171
4.13 Further Reading 173
Chapter 5 Analyticity and Epistemology 174
5.1 Introduction and Overview 174
5.2 Analytic Truths and their Role in Epistemology: The ‘Classical’
Position 175
5.3 Objecting to the Classical Position 179
5.4 BonJour on Moderate Empiricism 187
5.5 Quine’s ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ 195
5.6 Quine and Evidence: Responses to Circularity 199
5.7 Kripke on Apriority, Analyticity, and Necessity 205
5.8 Chapter Summary 209
5.9 Further Reading 210
Chapter 6 Analyticity Repositioned 212
6.1 Introduction and Overview 212
6.2 The Best Cases: Stipulations and Mathematics 214
6.3 One Type of Statement that Might Be Reasonably Called ‘Analytic’ 214
6.4 Aside on ‘Two- Dimensionalism’ 216
6.5 Analyticity* and T- Analyticity 218
6.6 How Analyticity* Avoids Many Common Objections to
Analyticity 221
6.7 Some Brief Comments on Two Other Approaches to Analyticity 239
6.8 Mathematical Claims as T- Analytic 245
6.9 A Further Potential Application: Pure and Impure Stipulata 257
6.10 Some Methodological Remarks 258
6.11 Chapter Summary 264
6.12 Further Reading 267
Glossary of Philosophical Terms 269
Notes 287
Bibliography 299
Index 309

PREFACE
This work is an introduction to the problem of analyticity, or the analytic–
synthetic distinction. Analyticity is a notion that has been central to the
development of analytic philosophy, and yet to our knowledge, there is no
introductory level text on the topic. In fact, we know of only one other
book- length treatment of analyticity, and it appeared only very recently. We
intend this book to be accessible to undergraduate philosophy students who
have some prior exposure to philosophy, perhaps through a metaphysics
or epistemology course, and who want to explore this important topic in
more detail. However, we also include material that should be of interest to
graduate students and professional philosophers, for many of the arguments
that we present throughout the book are relevant to contemporary philo-
sophical pursuits.
In current philosophical usage, a sentence or statement is analytic if it is
true solely in virtue of meaning. Behind this simple formulation lies a long
and complex history, one that involves both the defi nition of the term itself,
and also the role of analyticity within philosophical theories. As we will
show, much of the contemporary philosophical landscape has been shaped
by this history.
Yet analyticity has been largely neglected for the past few decades. Why?
One reason may be that a common contemporary attitude toward analy-
ticity stems from the belief that Willard V. Quine, along with others such as
Gilbert Harman, conclusively showed that there is no such thing as analytic
truth, or that if there is such a thing, it is of no philosophical relevance. For
such philosophers, analyticity loses its relevance when one gives up on the