An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations

334 Pages·1987·31.37 MB·English

by  Barry Buzan (auth.)

AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES
Published by Macmillan in association with the International Institute
for Strategic Studies
Studies in International Security
Hedley Bull: HEDLEY BULL ON ARMS CONTROL
James Cable: GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY, 1919-1979
Donald C. Daniel: ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND SUPERPOWER
STRATEGIC STABILITY
Paul Dibb: THE SOVIET UNION: The Incomplete Superpower
Lawrence Freedman: THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY
Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (editor): ARMED FORCES AND THE WELFARE
SOCIETIES: Challenges in the 1980s
Hanns W. Maull: RAW MATERIALS, ENERGY AND WESTERN SECURITY
Adam Roberts: NATIONS IN ARMS: The Theory and Practice of Territorial
Defence
International Institute for Strategic Studies conference papers
Christoph Bertram (editor):
NEW CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND EAST-WEST SECURITY
PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s
THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
THIRD-WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 1980s
DEFENCE AND CONSENSUS: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security
Robert O'Neill (editor):
THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE 1980s
NEW TECHNOLOGY AND WESTERN SECURITY POLICY
DOCTRINE, THE ALLIANCE AND ARMS CONTROL
Barry Buzan
AN INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC STUDIES: Military Technology and
International Relations
Fram;ois de Rose:
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FRANCE
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An Introduction to
Strategic Studies
Military Technology and
International Relations
Barry Buzan
Senior Lecturer
Department of International Studies
University of Warwick
M
in association with the
MACMILLAN PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
PRESS
© International Institute for Strategic Studies 1987
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission
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First published 1987
Published by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
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Typeset by Wessex Typesetters
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Buzan, Barry
An introduction to strategic studies:
military technology and international
relations.-(Studies in international
security)
1. Security, International
I. Title II. International Institute for
Strategic Studies III. Series
327.1'16 JX1952
ISBN 978-0-333-36506-9 ISBN 978-1-349-18796-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-18796-6
To Deborah,
who wisely doesn't let the grass grow under her feet, and
whose partnership happily prevents me from letting it grow
too much under mine
Contents
List of Tables xii
List of Abbreviations xiii
Foreword XV
1 Introduction: Strategic Studies and International
Relations 1
1.1 Strategic Studies and International Relations 2
1.2 The Agenda of Strategic Studies and the
Organization of the Book 7
PART I MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
AND STRATEGY
2 The Revolution in Military Technology 17
2.1 The History of the Revolution 17
2.1.1 Firepower 19
2.1.2 Protection 21
2.1.3 Mobility 22
2.1.4 Communications 24
2.1.5 Intelligence 25
2.2 The Civil Foundations of the Revolution 26
2.3 The General Consequences of the Revolution 29
2.4 The Consequences of the Revolution for
Strategic Thinking 31
3 The Global Spread of Military Technology 36
3.1 The Interaction between Spread and Qualitative
Advance 36
3.2 The Mechanisms of Spread 39
3.3 The Historical Process of the Spread 42
3.4 The Current Position and the Outlook 47
3.5 The Arms Trade Literature and its Controversies 51
4 The Special Case of Nuclear Proliferation 57
4.1 The Process of Proliferation 57
4.2 Controlling Proliferation 62
vii
Contents
Vlll
PART II STRATEGIC RIVALRY AND MILITARY
TECHNOLOGY: THE ARMS DYNAMIC
5 Arms Racing and the Arms Dynamic 69
5.1 Controversies about the Term 'Arms Racing' 69
5.2 The Arms Dynamic: An Alternative Framework
for Analysis 72
6 The Action-Reaction Model 76
6.1 The Idiom of Action-Reaction 79
6.2 The Variables of Magnitude, Timing and
Awareness in the Action-Reaction Process 83
6.2.1 Magnitude 84
6.2.2 Timing 86
6.2.3 Awareness 89
6.3 Motives 90
7 The Domestic Structure Model 94
7.1 The American Case 95
7.2 How Applicable is the Domestic Structure Model
to Other Cases? 103
8 Completing the Picture 105
8.1 The Technological Imperative Model 105
8.2 Relating the Three Models 108
8.2.1 Technological Imperative 108
8.2.2 Action-Reaction 110
8.2.3 Domestic Structure 111
9 Problems in Studying the Arms Dynamic 114
9.1 Working with the Distinction Between Arms
Racing and the Maintenance of the Military
Status Quo 114
9.1.1 The superpowers: Arms Race or
Maintenance of the Military status quo? 116
9.1.2 Conclusion 120
9.2 Problems in Developing a Theory of Arms
Racing 121
9.3 The Level of Analysis Problem 125
9.4 Arms Production and the Arms Dynamic 128
9.5 Conclusion 130
Contents IX
PART III DETERRENCE
10 Introduction: Deterrence and Defence 135
10.1 Retaliation versus Denial in Deterrence
Strategy 135
10.2 Deterrence Theory as a Western Artifact 138
11 The Evolution of Deterrence: Theory and Policy since
1945 143
11.1 The First Wave 143
11.2 The Golden Age 144
11.2.1 The Coming of Bipolarity as the
Background to the Golden Age 144
11.2.2 The Central Ideas of Golden Age
Theory 147
11.2.3 The Problem of Extended Deterrence 151
11.3 After the Golden Age: a Third Wave? 155
11.3.1 The Relative Gain of Soviet Military
Power 155
11.3.2 Changes in Military Technology 159
11.4 The Future of Deterrence 161
12 The Logic of Deterrence 163
12.1 Basic Logic: What Produces Inaction in
Opponents? 163
12.2 The Impact of Nuclear Weapons: Is Nuclear
Deterrence Easy or Difficult? 167
12.2.1 The 'Easy' School 168
12.2.2 The 'Difficult' School 169
12.2.3 The Policy Implications of 'Easy'
versus 'Difficult' 170
12.3 Intervening Variables in Deterrence Logic 172
12.3.1 Polarity 173
12.3.2 Technology 177
12.3.3 Geography 180
12.3.4 The Deterrer's Political Objectives:
Core versus Extended Deterrence 182
12.3.5 Political Relations 190
12.3.6 Conclusions on Intervening Variables 192
12.4 Deterrence Logic and Deterrence Policy 193
Contents
X
13 The Debates about Deterrence 197
13.1 Deterrence versus Defence 197
13.1.1 The Issue of Ends and Means in
Warfighting Strategies for Deterrence 199
13.1.2 Defence as Escape from Deterrence:
SDI 203
13.2 The Method of Deterrence Logic: The
Assumption of Rationality 204
13.3 Deterrence and Ethics 210
13.3.1 The Ethical Strengths of Deterrence 210
13.3.2 The Ethical Weaknesses of Deterrence 212
13.4 Deterrence and the Arms Dynamic 215
13.5 Conclusions: Deterrence and Foreign Policy 222
PART IV RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM OF
MILITARY MEANS
14 Military Means as a Security Problem 227
14.1 Military Means as a Problem in Themselves 227
14.2 Disagreements About the Nature and
Seriousness of the Problem 229
14.3 Military Versus Political Approaches to the
Problem 234
15 Disarmament 237
15.1 The Military Logic 238
15.2 The Economic Logic 243
15.3 The Political Logic 245
16 Arms Control 252
16.1 The Military Logic 256
16.1.1 Reasons for Rivals to Co-operate 256
16.1.2 The Impact of Strategic Doctrine on
Arms Control 261
16.1.3 Dilemmas of the Technological
Approach 262
16.2 The Economic Logic 270
16.3 The Political Logic 271
17 Non-Provocative Defence 276
17.1 The Military Logic 280
17.2 The Economic Logic 284
17.3 The Political Logic 285