Table Of ContentAn Introduction to
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY
OF MOTIVATION
WALTER TOMAN
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
WALTHAM, MASS.
PERGAMON PRESS
OXFORD · LONDON · NEW YORK · PARIS
1960
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1960
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Publisher's Preface
THIS book has been written from a number of backgrounds. The author has
lived and worked professionally in Europe and in the United States. He has been
trained in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis at the Vienna Institute of
Psychoanalysis, and in general and child psychology as well as in the philosophy
of science at the University of Vienna. He has been in clinical practice as psycho-
analyst, psychotherapist and counsellor, has done research also in the fields of
perception and cognition before he finally turned to the areas of motivation and
personality, and has taught general psychology, chM psychology, clinical
psychology and psychoanalytic theory at the University of Vienna, Harvard
University and Brandeis University. Apart from writing a number of articles for
professional American and German journals he is the author of two psychological
texts, Einführung in die moderne Psychologie and Dynamik der Motive, as
well as of three books of short stories, Die eigenwillige Kamera, Busse's
Welttheater, and Λ Kindly Contagion. He has also written a book of poetry
{Distelvolk), and a short novel (Das Dorf mit dem Drachen).
The present book is a kind of a confluence of all these interests, experiences and
talents. It is theoretical as well as clinical and practical, rigorous in essence as
far as the subject-matter permits and, at the same time, more rigorous probably
than other treatises available, but also sensitive, intuitive, and diplomatic. It is
objective, yet of a certain personal appeal, instructive and constructive, fairly
easy to read and yet difficult enough to forbid a glib or purely scanning contact.
The reader may get the full benefit only after re-readings and second checks.
It is comprehensive and broad, yet in a sense merely opening the subject-matter.
To the extent that it does so, however, the reader will perhaps find himself
enlightened enough to further pursue the subject independently, whether in
everyday life including his own, in clinical work or in his readings. Some experts
may be hesitant at first to "buy" certain aspects of the conceptual introduction,
but if they do go on with it and even enter the second part, namely the "Theory at
Work", they will probably not regret it.
On the college level this book may be useful as supplementary reading in
courses such as child development, educational psychology and abnormal
psychology, whereas in more advanced courses or seminars on motivation,
personality, projective techniques, clinical interviewing or psychoanalytic theory,
it could be used more thoroughly and as a major text.
vii
Author's Preface
WITH this book I have tried to do something not too common among writers
on the subject. I have tried to keep allegiance to two masters. One is Sigmund
Freud and the other is the theoretical system which he has proposed. Freud
changed his mind on several issues of his system in the course of his ingenious
work of fifty years, and he has left some confusion behind him which his dis-
ciples have tried to clear up only with trepidation and an almost irrational, though
understandable, adherence to the letter of his writings. But he has also left a
theoretical system with enough cohesion so that remaining confusions and ob-
scurities could, in principle, be dispelled by careful reading from its system-
properties. The strange thing about his theoretical system is, however, that its
best accounts are perhaps not so much to be found in the psychoanalytic litera-
ture, but, unspelled-out, in the minds of practising psychoanalysts and psycho-
analytically orientated psychotherapists. This has at least become my strong
impression through the years of work and professional discourse. One might
say that an essential part of psychoanalytic theory has not yet been handed down
in writing. By general standards of science and scientific pursuits this would be a
deficiency which certain critics of Freud have assailed with some justification.
The present book is an attempt to ameliorate that condition to an extent. It
intends to convey to the reader at least a portion of what is commonly conveyed
mainly in the course of psychoanalytic training and elaborate supervision of the
trainee's own psychotherapeutic work. This seems possible to me because
psychoanalysis or psychotherapy, whether exercised or experienced "patients",
i.e. as a "patient", is not altogether different from practices and experiences that
everyone may encounter and has encountered in his daily life. The differences
are of degrees rather than in kind, although of degrees in a number of dimensions.
This book does not try to accomplish anything like a psychoanalytic training or
treatment of the reader. That could not possibly succeed. The contention is,
though, that many people are ready to understand more about peoples' lives
including their own and capable of dealing more intelligently with them than
they are often given credit for by clinicians, and that some of these people
may well be able to benefit from a book of this kind. Also that psychoanalytic
theory contains more common sense than one might at first be led to expect.
Maybe the earlier accounts of psychoanalytic findings and conclusions had to be
over-dramatized in order to be noticed at all. But that might have obscured
ix
χ AUTHOR'S PREFACE
issues, sometimes antagonised audiences (and even a few patients) unduly, and
severed some of its connections to everyday life. This book tries to establish
better "diplomatic relations", mainly by bringing out the very general character,
indeed, of Freud's theoretical system.
The comment I would like most to elicit is that I have presented psycho-
analytic theory and its implications; that I have not hesitated to clarify and
elaborate wherever it seemed to contribute to the conceptual consistency without
violating the original spirit; that I have drawn on a broad area of data, preferably
clinical and from everyday life, while continuing to convey something beyond
data: the click of a theory; and that the didactics was not bad in spite of some
initial hardships and apparent ramblings. Perhaps one might also say that I hold
a middle line between authors on the subject who, on one extreme, prove little
more on ever so many pages than that they have read and can quote, and those,
on the other extreme, who convey little more in ever so many words than that
they are psychoanalysts or psychotherapists and have seen it all.
Psychological Forces
THE undefined elements of psychoanalytic theory are psychological forces,
drives or desires. The psyche, mind or personality, is a system of desires in which
three sub-systems can be distinguished: Id, Ego and Superego.
* * *
Psychoanalytic theory is a theory of the mind or the psyche or of personality
in a technical sense. More specifically, it is a theory of man's psychic or psycho-
logical forces and of the ways in which these forces come about and interact with
each other as well as with the givens of the world, whatever they are.
Forces cannot be seen. Yet they are observable in their effects. They can be
identified from the behavior we see. In fact, we cannot even see behavior without
hypothesising forces. If a person is lifting one leg from the ground and thrusting
it forward while pulling the opposite arm back, and then lifting the other leg
from the ground and thrusting it forward too while pulling the other arm back,
and doing so before the first leg has reached the ground, then lifting the first one
again, etc., we are seeing the complicated effects of something that we can name
very easily as running. We cannot even help seeing it as that. Yet by saying
that he is running we are postulating a force. We seem to imply that he desires
to get from one place to another fast. What is more, we seem to imply that he
will get up again and continue running if, e.g. he should happen to stagger over
the curb of the sidewalk; and if the wind blows his cap away, he may run after
it and catch it wherever he can, but then he will resume the old direction. As a
matter of fact, he can run in different ways, slowly or quickly, with large or small
strides, with skips, jumps or occasional somersaults inserted. Many aspects of
behavior involved in the execution of a force are interchangeable. They are not
irrevocably tied to the force. Which implies that given aspects of behavior may
also be in the service of different forces. It is such implications that make it
particularly worthwhile to postulate forces. The observer sticking strictly to
behavior may still be trying to describe how our runner managed to come to a
halt and it may have escaped his notice altogether that his hat flew away, while
we, postulating a force, have plenty of time to look, will not miss the hat incident
and can assume what will happen thereafter long before he has caught it again.
The concept of "force" comprehends not only impulse, drive, need, motive,
3
4 PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES
desire, wish and striving, but even such specific concepts as intentions or plans,
and such broad concepts as attitudes, interests and values. Let us single out the
term desire to stand for psychological force in general, but I will not promise
that the other terms, especially drives, motives and wishes, will not sneak in
here and there, if for no other than aesthetic reasons. They will always mean the
same as desire or psychological force. The attribute "instinctual" is unnecessary.
We shall see that all desires and all their derivatives would, in principle, deserve
the attribute. So we might as well save ourselves some trouble. Intentions, plans,
attitudes, interests and values are more complex terms. They manifest com-
pounds of desires, although one or a few specific desires can usually be recog-
nised as the strongest of their determinants.
My preference for the term "desire" stems from its connotation of a full and
active experience. It concerns something we do indeed want. One may hurry to
ask: "But to use your term, are there not desires that are active against our will,
desires that we would rather not have but we cannot help having ?" Yes, pre-
cisely. We shall see, however, as we go on, that there are no desires in a person
that have not at one time been full and active experiences that had his conscious
support. Otherwise they could not even have formed.
If psychological forces or desires interact with each other and the "givens"
of the world in more than one distinguishable way, we are dealing with a system.
The psyche, the mind or personality, is a system of forces or desires. At least
that was among Freud's first major postulates (Freud, 1900).
What more can one say about that system ? Freud, after some revisions, postu-
lated that it is made up of three sub-systems which he finally called Id, Ego and
Superego (Freud, 1923). These sub-systems are also systems of forces or desires.
In addition, however, they ought to have properties of their own. What are
these ?
The Id is the system of primitive, unorganised and unspecific desires. They
cannot usually be satisfied in reality. Eating up somebody beloved would be
such a desire. Usually we cannot and do not do that. However, we may hear a
lady say of a little boy: "He is so cute. I could eat him up." Which indicates that
there is such a desire, although in the subjunctive. Or we may find Christians
of various denominations eating the beloved son of God in the form of the holy
wafer. Killing an opponent even over a trifle would be another such desire.
We manage ordinarily to abstain from doing so, although somebody may find
himself whispering with clenched fists: "I could kill you!" when his boss would
not have it any other way than his narrow own, or when a policeman stops the
traffic just when that person is coming along in a hurry.
The Ego is that system which has undertaken to organise the primitive desires
and to attune them to each other as well as to specific conditions of reality so that
they can be satisfied in reality. In another, briefer, though somewhat contra-
dictory version we could say that the Ego simply is the system of complex,
organised and specific desires. Our lady will not eat up the cute little boy, but
PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES 5
she will, perhaps, kiss him passionately and eat many other things, steak and
spinach, bread, apples, etc. The pious Christian mentioned will eat a small piece
of wafer and know that it "means" communion with Christ. The rebel against
the boss's narrow ways may be able to get his will after a little detour. He may
prove his point in figures and not only persuade him to it, but even get a salary
raise instead of a death sentence, had he really killed him. Finally even the
malicious policeman can be handled otherwise, but let us rather leave him alone
altogether. One never knows. Besides he may not even really be malicious.
The Superego, finally, is the system of desires that have been taken over from
other people or, more indirectly, from the social system in which the person
lives. The first, most powerful and most influential suppliers of such desires are
the parents of the person's infancy and childhood. To eat and drink properly, to
be dressed and clean in the presence of other people, to keep order among one's
things and to treat them gently and carefully, to share with brother and sister,
to respect their "property", to say "please" and "thank you", etc., are examples
of such desires. They could also be phrased as "Don'ts". "Do not spill and smear
food!" refers to the same desire as "Eat and drink properly!" although the first
one may be a more primitive and archaic version of it, and the second an ad-
vancement. More about that later (see p. 91).
Well, these descriptions do not tell us very much yet. We need to know more.
Above all we need to know how these systems form in the first place and how they
interact. Let us look at the Id and the Ego first. How does the Ego manage to
organise primitive desires so that they can be satined in reality? Or more
generally speaking: How does control come about?
Control of Desires, Derivative Desires,
Cathexis and Object-Formation
DESIRES form by the process of control, which is a function of the process
of formation of derivative desires, which, in turn, is a function of the process of
cathexis of conditions under which desires can be satisfied. Cathexis is the major
"operator" in psychoanalytic theory. It is learning in a general sense. It goes on
all the time as long as the individual is satisfying desires, and it is cumulative.
It builds up knowledge in a general sense, knowledge of objects and knowledge
of the world, which includes oneself. One may say that cathexis is a function of
the Ego by which a person learns about or "cathects" the world, which implies:
forms derivative desires, which, in turn, implies : gains control over his desires
that, otherwise, might stay primitive or never even form.
* * *
Take a very primitive and ancient desire such as sucking. The infant has a
chance to satisfy this desire for the first time soon after birth. He finds he can
do it, although it is a great struggle at first. If something touches his mouth, he
will surround it with his lips and suck, and if some fluid can be extracted that
way and fills his mouth, he will swallow it.
However, his sucking depends entirely on the actual stimulation of the mouth.
He does not see or hear it come, although his mother is already rushing around
and could be seen and heard doing so, if only our infant could see and hear such
things. He does not even feel the approach of the event, when mother lifts him
out of the basket and carries him to a place where he can be fed. What is worse:
the infant has already started screaming like mad, and mother guesses that he is
hungry, but he does not know it yet himself. Something in him registers that
something is wrong, but he does not know what. Although he can suck and
swallow, he is entirely dependent upon the world to provide the conditions. He
cannot even suck his fist as a substitute, because he does not know yet how to
move his arm so that the fist will end up in his mouth, and he does not know
how to keep it there, if, quite accidentally or by external help, it should already
be there.
Obviously our infant cannot go on like that for ever. We find that before too
6
CONTROL OF DESIRES, CATHEXIS AND OBJECT-FORMATION 7
long he does recognise that being lifted and carried brings a feeding. How do
we know he recognises ? Well, he stops screaming at that point, when before
only the breast's or bottle's nipple filling his mouth would stop him. Or he
screams particularly hard at this point, demanding impatiently that the world
hurry on, whereas before he would just go on screaming as if nothing had
yet changed. Then he begins to recognise steps, the noise of a closing door,
then the sight of some colors, mother's dress and a fair patch on top of it—her
face. Besides, his fist will reach his mouth with some reliability. Finally he
can distinguish his desire for feeding from other things such as being freed when
caught accidentally in the corner of his crib, wishing to be changed or just
wanting the window shades to be lifted in the morning. He can even distinguish
between one drink and another, between a sweet one and one into which mother
has sneaked castor oil or a bitter medicine. He takes one rapidly and the other
with hesitation. He may even spit it out.
The infant has learned a little more about the conditions under which his
ancient desire can be satisfied and he has also learned to satisfy it in different
ways, rapidly, slowly, or not at all, with a certain kind of food, munching a lot
or just a little, etc. He has gained more control over sucking.
Take another example, walking. We find that around one year of age the child
begins to make his first steps without support. He could crawl places and stand
without support before, and he could walk along the railing of the play pen or
while pushing a light chair before him. Now, with all his concentration, he is
able to set one foot before the other a few times all by himself. Then he falls to
the floor, is delighted over the accomplishment and will try it soon again. Gradu-
ally he can walk longer stretches, walk and carry something in his hands, walk
rapidly or slowly, take sharp turns around corners, run, etc. He can do all kinds
of walking, can do it under all kinds of conditions and may be doing it even for
other purposes.
The same trends can be demonstrated for something like bicycle riding or
driving a car, for drawing, reading, skiing, public speaking, practising law and
many, many other desires. In fact, there is no desire that would not tend to
develop that way. An individual controls more and more conditions under which
his desires can be satisfied and his desires can be satisfied in an increasing num-
ber of ways, whereby control comprehends the slightest inkling of anticipation of
an event, judgment of a given condition as inappropriate, anticipation of appro-
priate potential conditions all the way up to direct and active manipulation of
given conditions.
There may be a misunderstanding. We have distinguished conditions under
which a desire can be satisfied, and ways in which it can be satisfied (under given
conditions). This distinction is somewhat arbitrary, although convenient. Strictly
speaking, different ways of satisfying a desire are different conditions too, just
as different conditions require different ways of satisfaction. If an infant wants to
hold the bottle himself, when before his mother held it, he is changing his way
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