An Externalist Approach to Epistemic Responsibility: Intellectual Norms and their Application to Epistemic Peer Disagreement

237 Pages·2019·2.571 MB·English

by  Andrea Robitzsch

Synthese Library 411
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,
and Philosophy of Science
Andrea Robitzsch
An Externalist
Approach to
Epistemic
Responsibility
Intellectual Norms and their Application
to Epistemic Peer Disagreement
Synthese Library
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,
and Philosophy of Science
Volume 411
Editor-in-chief
OtávioBueno,UniversityofMiami,DepartmentofPhilosophy,USA
Editors
BeritBrogaard,UniversityofMiami,USA
AnjanChakravartty,UniversityofNotreDame,USA
StevenFrench,UniversityofLeeds,UK
CatarinaDutilhNovaes,VUAmsterdam,TheNetherlands
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Andrea Robitzsch
An Externalist Approach
to Epistemic Responsibility
Intellectual Norms and their Application
to Epistemic Peer Disagreement
123
AndreaRobitzsch
UniversityofOsnabrück
Osnabrück,Germany
SyntheseLibrary
ISBN978-3-030-19076-7 ISBN978-3-030-19077-4 (eBook)
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ToAlexander,
toourdaughterMathilda,
ourlittlestarinthesky,
andtooursonKarl,
whomakesuslaugh everyday.
Acknowledgments
This book is based on my doctoral thesis. I could not have completed this book
without the support of many different people. First and foremost, I would like to
thank the supervisor of my doctoral thesis, Heinrich Wansing, for his thoughtful
andthoroughcommentsonmanypartsofthisbookandforhisphilosophicalsupport
throughout my philosophical studies. I would also like to thank Sanford Goldberg
forhiscriticalfeedbackonmanyphilosophicalideaswhichhavebeendevelopedin
thisbook.
AspecialthankyougoestoAmyFlowerree,AnneMeylan,ShaneRyan,Dunja
Sˇesˇelja,andChristianStraßerwhoseenthusiasticandcriticalfeedbackonmywork
encouragedmeenormouslyandhelpedmetodevelopmyideasmorethoroughly.
Manyotherpeopleenrichedthisthesisbytheirfeedback.Iwouldliketothank
ThomasGrundmann,NikolaKompa,CharlesLowe,SebastianSchmoranzer,Daniel
Skurt, Matthias Steup, and Caroline Willkommen for their astute comments on
writtenpartsororalpresentationsofsomeoftheideasfromthisbook.
IthankClaudiaSmartandCormacBreenforproofreading.
Finally, I want to thank my husband, Alexander Robitzsch; our daughter,
Mathilda;andourson,Karl,towhomthisbookisdedicated,aswellasmyparents
fortheircontinuoussupport,forbelievinginme,forgivingmethefreedomtofollow
mydreams,andforteachingmewhatreallymattersinlife.
vii
Introduction
Normative epistemology has long focused solely on epistemic evaluations of
doxastic attitudes, such as assessments of epistemic justification and knowledge
assessments, and on the epistemic norms which govern these evaluations. Some
epistemologists,suchasFeldman(2000)andDougherty(2012),haveevenclaimed
that epistemic normativity is solely determined by epistemic reasons. Others have
characterized the realm of epistemic normativity more broadly, with the help of
certain epistemic goals, epistemic aims, or epistemic value claims. However, even
with a broad understanding of epistemic normativity, the main focus of normative
epistemology was still restricted to matters concerning epistemic justification and
knowledge, besides a few exceptions such as Goldman (1978), Kornblith (1983),
and Hookway (2006). I do not doubt that epistemic justification and knowledge
belongtothekeyconcernsofepistemologicalresearchingeneralandofnormative
epistemology in particular. However, I think that normative epistemology should
also be concerned with other topics such as epistemic melioration, epistemic
responsibility assessment, intellectual norms, and intellectual conduct. This book
isanattempttoshowthatsuchtopicsmatterfornormativeepistemology.
The aim of this book is to show that belief-influencing actions and omissions
areepistemicallysignificant(atleastundercertainconditions).Iwillargueforthis
claim by presenting an approach to epistemic responsibility assessment which is
groundedinindirectdoxasticcontrol.Agentsexerciseindirectdoxasticcontrolby
performingcertainbelief-influencingactionsandomissions.Throughoutthisbook,
Iwillassumethatepistemicresponsibilityassessmentandassessmentsofepistemic
justification are independent epistemic evaluations. The approach to epistemic
responsibility assessment which I present in this book evaluates the intellectual
conduct of an agent with respect to holding a certain doxastic attitude. The
intellectualconductofanagentinacertainsituationreferstothewayinwhichthe
agentexercisesindirectdoxasticcontrolinthatsituation.Assessmentsofepistemic
justification evaluate whether a certain doxastic attitude has certain features, such
as being in accordance with or well-based on the evidence the agent possesses or
beingthedoxasticoutcomeofareliablebelief-formingprocess.Moreover,Idoubt
thatthereisanydirectconnectionbetweentheepistemicresponsibilityassessment
ix
x Introduction
which I present in this book and the analysis of knowledge. That is why this
book is concerned neither with the analysis of epistemic justification nor with the
analysis of knowledge. The topic of this book belongs to the area of meliorative
epistemology. The aim of meliorative epistemology is “to regulate and guide our
intellectual activities” (Goldman 1978, p. 509). This branch of epistemological
researchinvestigatesthefoundationsandpossibilitiesofintellectualguidance(i.e.,
guidanceofdoxasticandepistemicendeavors)andseekstoanswerquestionssuch
aswhatanagentcandotoimproveherdoxasticandepistemicendeavorsandwhat
anagentcandotoimproveherepistemicsituation.
The book is dealing with questions of meliorative epistemology in general
andwithquestionsconcerningdoxasticresponsibilityandepistemicresponsibility
assessmentinparticular.Theexpression“responsibility”isusedinvariouswaysin
oureverydaytalkbutalsoinphilosophicalresearch.Theexpression“responsibility”
is used in an agentive sense, in an evaluative sense, or in a prescriptive sense in
philosophicalresearch.Onecanapplytheexpression“responsibility”toindividual
agentsortocollectiveagents.Throughoutthisbook,Iwillonlybeconcernedwith
individualresponsibility.Agentiveresponsibilityreferstocontroloragencyofsome
sort,anditisconcernedwiththeconditionsunderwhichanaction,anomission,a
doxasticattitude,orastateofaffairs1 canbetracedbacktotheexerciseofagency
of an agent. Evaluative responsibility refers to responsibility assessments such as
blameworthiness,praiseworthiness,oraneutralevaluation.Itisoftenassumedthat
responsibility assessment requires agentive responsibility. For example, it is often
assumedthatanagentisblameworthyforanaction,onlyiftheagentisagentively
responsibleforthataction,whichmeansthattheagenthadcontrolovertheactionor
theagentperformedtheactionfreely.Thatiswhyonecanalsocharacterizeagentive
responsibility as the freedom-relevant component or as the control component
of evaluative responsibility. Two notions of evaluative responsibility have to be
distinguished. The first notion of responsibility assessment assesses an agent for
anaction,anomission,adoxasticattitude,orastateofaffairs.Thesecondnotionof
responsibilityassessmentassessesthecharacteroftheagentortheagentasawhole.
Whenwespeakaboutresponsibleagents,weareusingtheexpression“responsible”
as evaluative responsibility in the second sense. Throughout this book, I will
use evaluative responsibility or responsibility assessment only in the first sense.
Prescriptiveresponsibilityreferstoobligationsorrequirements.Responsibilitiesof
an agent are the obligations or requirements which are incumbent on the agent.
Note, throughout this book, I will use the expression “responsibility” to refer to
agentive responsibility; I will use the expression “responsibility assessment” to
refer to evaluative responsibility (in the first sense); and I will use the expressions
“obligation,”“requirement,”and“prohibition”torefertoprescriptiveresponsibility.
Thefirsttwochaptersofthisbookareconcernedwithagentiveresponsibilityfor
doxasticattitudes.Inthefirstchapter,Iintroducethreeintuitiveassumptionsabout
our pretheoretical notion of doxastic responsibility. I use these three assumptions
1Thislistisnotsupposedtobeexhaustive.
Introduction xi
togetherwithintuitivecasejudgmentstoshowthattherearenoviableapproaches
to doxastic responsibility which are based on direct doxastic control. I conclude
fromthisthattherearenoviableapproachestodirectdoxasticresponsibilitywhich
capture the three intuitive assumptions about our pretheoretical notion of doxastic
responsibilityanddealwithcertaintestcasesinanintuitiveway.
In the second chapter, I present an approach to indirect doxastic responsibility.
According to this approach, doxastic responsibility is responsibility for doxastic
consequences.IemployMeylan’sidea(2013,chapter4)toapplyFischerandRav-
izza’s reasons-responsiveness approach to responsibility for consequences (1998,
chapter 4) to the doxastic domain. I show that this approach to indirect doxastic
responsibility captures the three assumptions about our pretheoretical notion of
doxastic responsibility and deals with the test cases from the first chapter in an
intuitiveway.Iconcludefromthediscussionofthefirstandthesecondchapterthat
ourpretheoreticalnotionofdoxasticresponsibilityisbestcapturedwithanapproach
toindirectdoxasticresponsibility–andsoIconcludethatourpretheoreticalnotion
ofdoxasticresponsibilityisbasedonindirectdoxasticcontrol.Sinceagentsexercise
indirect doxastic control by performing belief-influencing actions and omissions,
Chaps.1 and 2 establish that belief-influencing actions and omissions matter for
doxasticresponsibility.
The third chapter concerns evaluative doxastic responsibility and prescrip-
tive doxastic responsibility. I discuss intellectual norms, and I propose a rule-
consequentialistapproachtoepistemicresponsibilityassessment.Intellectualnorms
arenormswhichhavebelief-influencingactionsandomissionsastheirobjects.They
guide the exercise of indirect doxastic control and govern responsibility assess-
∗∗
ments. I introduce reliability, strong meta-reliability, and weak meta-reliability
ascriteriatodistinguishbelief-influencingactionsandomissionswhichconduceto
produceepistemicvaluefromthosethatdonotconducetoproduceepistemicvalue.
Intellectualnormswhichrequireorpermittheperformanceofreliable,strongmeta-
∗∗
reliable, or weak meta-reliable belief-influencing actions and omissions, as well
as intellectual norms which prohibit the performance of belief-influencing actions
and omissions which are unreliable, not strong meta-reliable, or not weak meta-
∗∗
reliable ,willbeintroducedasnormsofreliableintellectualconduct.Iwillshow
that norms of reliable intellectual conduct are epistemic norms because to comply
withthesenormsconducestoproduceepistemicvalue.Withthehelpofthenorms
of reliable intellectual conduct, I will present a rule-consequentialist approach to
epistemicresponsibilityassessmentwhichisgroundedinindirectdoxasticcontrol.
Sinceanagentexercisesindirectdoxasticcontrolbyperformingbelief-influencing
actions and omissions, belief-influencing actions and omissions matter for the
presentedapproachtoepistemicresponsibilityassessment.
In the fourth chapter, I will show that consideration of epistemic responsibility
assessment and norms of reliable intellectual conduct are important to capture the
epistemic significance of epistemic peer disagreement comprehensively. My argu-
ment for this relies on the assumption that the epistemic significance of epistemic
peerdisagreementconsistsinthefactthatanagentwhohasrecognizedthatsheis
inacaseofepistemicpeerdisagreementgetsanopportunityforepistemicimprove-