An Elusive Hope: State Reform in Syria 2000―2007 (Studies on Modern Orient, 27)

384 Pages·2014·4.283 MB·English

by  Amer Nizar Ghrawi

Amer Nizar Ghrawi
An Elusive Hope
Studien zum Modernen Orient
herausgegeben
von Gerd Winkelhane
Studien zum Modernen Orient 27
Amer Nizar Ghrawi
An Elusive Hope
State Reform in Syria,
2000—2007
Bibliographic Information of Deutsche Bibliothek
Deutsche Bibliothek registers this publication in the
Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographical data
can be accessed at http://dnb.ddb.de.
Zugl.: Potsdam, Univ., Diss., 2014 u.d.T.:
Ghrawi, Amer: An Elusive Hope.
Public management reform in Syria 2000– 2007.
ةيرحلاو ةايحلل ونري بعش ىلإ
ةلذملاو توملا عبش بعش ىلإ
To the people who long for life and freedom
To the people who are weary from death and humiliation
Cover: Picture of an old Damascene Zokak,
showing the famous café “Al Noufara”. Pd
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction .....................................................................................................7
1.1 Research Background.......................................................................................8
1.2 Research Methodology..................................................................................16
1.3 Chapter Structure............................................................................................17
2 Public Management Reform Variables ..................................................19
2.1 Preface...............................................................................................................20
2.2 Definitions .......................................................................................................20
2.3 Drivers ..............................................................................................................34
2.4 Components and Patterns.............................................................................46
2.5 Actors and Implementation..........................................................................57
2.5.1 Domestic Actors..............................................................................................60
2.5.2 External Actors ...............................................................................................74
2.5.3 Reform Implementation.................................................................................87
2.5.4 Reform Dilemmas...........................................................................................92
2.6 MENA Authoritarian Regimes.....................................................................95
2.6.1 Public Management Reform in other Regions’ OECD Countries........95
2.6.2 Public Management Reform in MENA Region......................................103
2.7 Summary.........................................................................................................116
3 State Reform in Syria 2000–2007......................................................127
3.1 Syria.................................................................................................................129
3.1.1 Governance Indicators.................................................................................131
3.1.2 State Reform Influencing Actors...............................................................132
3.1.3 State Reform’s Three Dimensions (political, economic,
and administrative).......................................................................................135
3.2 Challenges to State Reform in 2000..........................................................145
3.3 Implementation of State Reform 2000–2007...........................................165
3.4 Summary.........................................................................................................191
4 Political Leadership ....................................................................................195
4.1 Nature and Influence Structure.................................................................196
4.1.1 Nature of the Political Leadership ...........................................................196
4.1.2 Connection with the Ba’ath Party............................................................202
4.1.3 Connection with Government...................................................................204
4.1.4 Connection with Society.............................................................................206
4.1.5 Connection with Domestic Pressure Groups.........................................207
4.1.6 Connection with Regional Geopolitics....................................................208
4.2 Motives............................................................................................................210
4.3 Influence on State Reform .........................................................................213
4.4 Summary.........................................................................................................219
5 Domestic Pressure Groups ......................................................................221
5.1 Actors and Interest Networks....................................................................222
5.2 Motives............................................................................................................236
5.2.1 Ba’ath Party Leading Members..................................................................237
5.2.2 Top Public Officials, in Civil and Non-Civil Sectors ............................238
5.2.3 Top Merchants and Industrialists..............................................................238
5.2.4 Public Sector Employees.............................................................................240
5.3 Influence on State Reform..........................................................................240
5.4 Summary.........................................................................................................247
6 Regional Geopolitics ..................................................................................249
6.1 Middle Eastern Politics ...............................................................................250
6.2 Motives............................................................................................................259
6.3 Influence on State Reform..........................................................................263
6.4 The Challenges of Regional Geopolitics..................................................276
6.4.1 Failed Peace and War Against Terror 2000–2002..................................277
6.4.2 Iraq 2003–2005 ..............................................................................................283
6.4.3 Lebanon 2005–2007......................................................................................288
6.4.4 Events’ Reflections on Political Leadership............................................299
6.5 Summary.........................................................................................................300
7 Conclusion.....................................................................................................303
Bibliography...................................................................................................322
List of Tables..................................................................................................343
List of Figures................................................................................................344
Acronyms........................................................................................................346
Annexes...........................................................................................................348
1 Introduction
1.1 Research Background
1 INTRODUCTION
S
ince the mid-1980s an ongoing transformation of public sector man-
agement had been taking place in developed countries. Later, the re-
form trend became a global one as it spread to developing countries
including those governed by authoritarian regimes. The main motive for
the authoritarian regime is to maintain stability that guarantees its rule.
The international community plays a certain role in affecting decisions of
the authoritarian regime, but the nature and extent of this role depend on
the particular geopolitics and the interests of powerful states. Influencing
domestic lobbies do as well exert influence on the authoritarian regime’s
decisions, though the nature of this influence is shaped by their interest to
maintain or even to increase patronages. In those cases in which trans-
forming authoritarian regimes into democratic systems is not an option, is
reform that aims at improving citizens’ standard of living possible, and if so,
to what extent?
1.1 Research Background
The pattern of state management in authoritarian developing countries is
different from the pattern of state management in developed countries or
even developing democracies. Most authoritarian developing countries are
managed through a ‘grey system’ which causes non-existent rule of law,
manipulated and poorly performing government institutions, fragile busi-
ness environment, mounting corruption, and lack of citizen participation in
public policy formulation. This ‘grey system’ is based on one single equa-
tion: loyalty for patronage. In the grey system, power and wealth are pro-
duced and transmitted through highly informal, yet resilient, interest-based
patronage networks.
Research question and hypotheses
In 2000, a new president came to power in Syria. The first presidential peri-
od of 2000–2007 serves as case study for state reform in an authoritarian
developing country. In his first presidential speech, Bashar al-Assad fo-
cused on reform as foundation of his vision for development. However,
when the first presidential period ended in 2007, improvements in public
management were limited. The problem at hand is to understand why so
little had actually changed. The main research question is: How did the in-
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1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND
terplay of domestic and external factors diminish crucial state reform in
Syria in the period of 2000–2007? The research builds on the following set
of hypotheses: Syria necessitated state reform in the three dimensions –
political, economic, and administrative –, which was however hampered by
an interplay of domestic and external factors. It will be argued that the
main influencing factors in the Syria during 2000–2007 were the political
leadership and domestic pressure groups (domestic factors) and regional
geopolitics (external factor). The motives and influences of these three
main factors are expected to be the following: The political leadership mo-
tives for reform are maintaining internal stability to remain in power,
maintaining its regional role to remain in power. As the political leadership
is dominant over the political system, the public administration system, the
law system, and the business systems, its motives are the only effective
drivers in public affairs. The political leadership motives diverge from im-
plementing sufficient state reform. The bigger the gap between the political
leadership motives and the requirements for sufficient state reform is, the
less appropriate and focused the implemented state reform will be.
The domestic pressure groups benefit from keeping state reform stag-
nant. Sufficient state reform will damage their interests. These pressure
groups are party elites, public officials elites, public sector employees and
business monopolists. The domestic pressure groups’ interests conflict with
state reform, as the latter changes their current profitable status. The more
influence the domestic pressure groups exert over public affairs, the less
likely it is for sufficient state reform to be implemented.
Regional geopolitics as external factor contributes indirectly in reduc-
ing the efficiency of state reform. The Syrian regional politics conflicts
with U.S.-interests in the region. The U.S. applies a punishment policy and
the Syrian leadership responds with a balancing policy. The more external
pressures the U.S. apply, the less fundamental state reform will be imple-
mented, as there is less political will for an internationally integrated econ-
omy and for changing the current stable administrative structures.
Research findings
In 2000, Syrian public management suffered from weak accountability and
equity in the public sector, a weak rule of law, a fragile role and size of the
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1 INTRODUCTION
public sector, a weak business environment, and mounting corruption. The
Syrian rent-based economy needed to change into a diverse and sustain-
able economy that finances the public sector and civil services with its
growth. The system of public management that operated until 2000, includ-
ing the rent-based economy, could not be maintained due to important so-
cio-economic changes: demographic change with a rapidly growing popu-
lation, the decrease of oil production and depleting oil reserves that used to
finance the rent-based economy, a stagnating economic growth rate that
did not cope with the demographic growth, and forecasted social turbu-
lences resulting from a decreasing standard of living. A comprehensive
state reform policy that contains the three dimensions of reform – political,
economic, and administrative – was crucial for facing these socioeconomic
changes. Implementing only selected reforms would create new complica-
tions. Partial economic reforms that promote better tax collection and a re-
duction of subsidies without reducing corruption and improving public ac-
countability were likely to produce social complications. Political reform
was stalled by the lack of political will. Administrative reform that would
have damaged power balances and shaken internal stability was conse-
quently reduced to modest scales that allowed improving the quality of ser-
vices and avoided tackling the public administration’s main deficiencies.
Controlling corruption and improving the rule of law did not take place.
The selective and limited economic reforms that were implemented during
the seven-year period are considered to be the major reason behind gener-
ating economic growth rates (GDP was -0.8% in 2000 and changed to 5.7%
in 2007) and revenues that substituted the decrease of oil related revenues
from 58% in 2001 to 21.6% in 2007. Still, Syrian public management in 2007
suffered from the same deficiencies like in 2000 and the rent-based econo-
my did not transform into a diverse and sustainable economy that can
tackle socioeconomic changes.
Improvements until 2007 were limited due to the interplay of the three
main influencing factors (political leadership, domestic pressure groups,
and regional geopolitics) that affected state reform negatively. Coinciding
with the aim to keep a tight grip on power, the political leadership’s main
motive of action is to sustain stability. Stability allowed only limited im-
provements in public services and a partial economic opening. The latter
10