Table Of Content. . • being that is in created things cannot be
understood except as derived from divine being,
just as a proper effect cannot be understood
except as derived from its proper cause.
AN ELEMENTARY CHRISTIAN
- St Thomas Aquinas, De Pot., III, 5, ad lm.
METAPHYSICS
JOSEPH OWENS, C.Ss.R.
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto
CHRISTIAN CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY SERIES
GENERAL EDITOR
DoNALD A. GALLAGHER, PH.D.
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BOSTON COLLEGE
~CPS
THE BRUCE PUBLISHING COMPANY
The colophon for the CHRISTIAN CuLTURE AND PHILOSOPHY SERIES
consists of the Greek letters X and P, symbolizing Christianity, em MILWAUKEE
braced by C, a variant of ~. representing the Greek word sophia.
IMPRIMI POTEST:
GEORGE T. O'REILLY, C.Ss.R.
Provincial Superior
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ARMAND A. MAURER, C.S.B.
Censor librorum
Foreword
IMPRIMATUR:
v.
+FRANCIS ALLEN
Auxiliary Bishop ot Toronto
June 15, 1962
The following text is called an elementary metaphysics. Its aim is
confined to arousing and developing in rudimentary form a habit. of
mind that will equip the undergraduate student to approach metaphysical
subjects. The treatment accordingly is general in scope. It leaves further
investigation for specialized study, listing regularly bibliographical data
sufficient to open the field of source material for term papers and seminar
work. In the same spirit it avoids in the text detailed discussions of the
traditional controversies, mentioning them rather in footnotes along with
the bibliographical items required for their study. In so relegating them
to a secondary position, it does not at all impugn the value of the con
troversies for awakening interest and sharpening intellectual penetration.
Rather, it considers out of place in an elementary coverage the complicated
and exact historical knowledge without which even a preliminary or prac
tical understanding of the disputed topics is impossible. Likewise it
consigns to the footnotes the pseudo problems that clog the history of
metaphysics, limiting the text itself to themes of genuinely constructive
nature.
The work is also called a Christian metaphysics. The coupling of the
notion "Christian" with any branch of philosophy is still highly contro
versial, and has been understood in surprisingly various senses.1 In the
present context the title indicates merely the application of metaphysical
principles to issues that arise in a specifically Christian environment. It
implies a metaphysical investigation of the integral w'orld in which a
Christian lives.
Can this be done without stepping over into the paths of sacred
1 For a discussion of the controversy during the past few decades on the notion of
a "Christian philosophy," see Maurice Nedoncelle, Is There a Christian Philosophy?
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 63-11878 t:. Illtyd Trethowan (New York, 1960), pp. 85-114. In the present context, "Chris
© 1963 THE BRUCE PUBLISHING COMPANY han metaphysics" is not understood in any of the senses discussed by Fr. Nedoncelle.
It denotes rai:,'-r a metaphysical treatment of the actual world, a unified world that is
MADE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
kn?wn basically through the senses but in a further way through Christian faith. See
(li/Cil5) Etienne Gilson, The Philosopher and Theology (New York, 1962), pp. 175-199,
v
V1 FOREWORD FOREWORD vii
theology? Apriori, no reason to the contrary is apparent. Some things by a Christian philosopher? Do th.ey not bring to the fore specific p:ob
known through revelation, for instance the angels, may be investigated lems concerning substance and accrdent, nature and person, and the hke?
also in the light of principles obtained through metaphysical analysis of The Christian metaphysician is prompted by his religious belief to scruti
sensible things. Metaphysics need not have any means of demonstrating nize these notions more closely from definite angles. He is not thereby at
that angels really exist. Proof of their real existence, one can argue, may all trying to prove that revealed truths of this other type contain no
well pertain only to the sphere of revealed faith and sacred theology. But contradiction. He is not, in fact, making his inquiry bear upon either the
even if metaphysics accepts the existence of angels as proven only in sacred existence or the essence of these revealed truths in any way whatsoever.
theology, it has certain things to say about their nature. Traditionally in Rather, he is dealing with bona fide metaphysical notions only. Nor does
Aristotelian metaphysics, and certainly in the Averroistic interpretation, he in any way base his demonstrations on revealed premises. On the
the existence of immaterial substances was accepted from another science, strength of his own principles, obtained from knowledge of sensible
natural philosophy. The nature of the separate intelligences was then things, he is examining metaphysical notions in a special way because of
made the subject of metaphysical study. Accordingly, nothing prevents certain problems in them that have been suggested by his Christian
metaphysics from receiving for its own investigation things whose existence beliefs. He is thereby directed toward a specific set of problems somewhat
is established by other sciences. There should consequently be no objection as physical and chemical research during a cold war is directed to definite
to its investigating, always from the viewpoint of its own principles, some areas by military concerns. Because of belief in this second type of re
thing whose existence is accepted on faith or is demonstrated by sacred vealed truths a choice of problems may characterize a metaphysics as
theology. Without in any way using principles taken from revelation, Christian.
metaphysics may have much to demonstrate about the nature of im In a word, the present text envisages a metaphysical study not of any
material substances. Moreover, the possibility of demonstrating the exis abstract order but rather of the complicated universe in which a Christian
tence of one immaterial substance, God, is accorded by Christian tradition actually and existentially lives. By the same token it might be called also
to unaided human reason. With regard to another spiritual substance, the an existential metaphysics, with the reservation that the starting point of
human soul, may not both its existence and nature fall within the scope of its investigation is dominantly the existence of external, sensible, non
metaphysical inquiry? Does the fact that metaphysically demonstrable human things. Though it derives its inspiration and its guidance over
truths are first accepted on faith render them in any way less demonstrable? whelmingly from the reading of St Thomas Aquinas, it is nevertheless
Are not atoms and electrons, for instan€e, firmly believed in by the student quite hesitant in making claim to the title of a Thomistic metaphysics.
before he commences his course in physics? Correspondingly, meta In metaphysical contexts the term "Thomistic," particularly in regard to
physically demonstrable truths are not withdrawn from the domain of the all-pervasive theme of essence and existence, and consequent explana
metaphysics because they happen to have been divinely revealed. tion of the divine concurrence, has come to denote a type of thinking
That, however, is but one type of revealed doctrines. The great majority that has arisen in later Scholastic controversy and that is at variance with
of dogmatic truths believed in through Christian faith allow, on the other the metaphysics developed in the present book. TI1e interpretations of
hand, neither their nature nor their existence to be probed by metaphysics. St Thomas' metaphysical principles are in fact so widely divergent today
Yet even in some Scholastic circles where the notion of a specifically that any dogmatic claim to present faithfully the original Tiwmistic doc
Christian philosophy is rejected, does not one find quite often that trine must be regarded as presumptuous,' or at least premature. The
treatises on metaphysics and other philosophical sciences do not hesitate treatment in the present book, however, would direct the student to
to apply their principles to themes occasioned by transubstantiation, grace, approach reality under the guidance of original Thomistic texts. Perhaps
beatific vision, person and nature in the Trinity or Incarnation? Meta t~Je best explanation ever given of the role of a philosophy manual is
physics, of course, cannot undertake to show that there are no contradic VIgorously sketched by Etienne Gilson in his Marquette Aquinas Lecture.2
tions in revealed truths of this further type. That would be to establish There the function of a manual is shown to consist in leading beginners
the intrinsic possibility of the truths and so would be above the powers to .some great philosopher. It then allows the illuminating genius of the
of human reason. But does not belief in these mysteries raise certain ~Ilos~her lumself to give guidance to the first principles and causes of
questions regarding some genuinely metaphysical notions that are used 2 History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education (Milwaukee, 1948).
Vlll FOREWORD FOREWORD IX
things. The present treatment claims to be Thomistic just in the sense the name may be used, in a secondary sense, to denote a body of truths
that it uses the texts of St Thomas as its guide in the study of things. known through the metaphysical habitus, and to designate a treatise or
But the things themselves, directly known, are the source for the princi a course in which metaphysical thinking is communicated.5 In this latter
ples of the science. sense, natural language words like being, truth, goodness, form, or actu
The scope of metaphysics, as understood in the following pages, through ality can readily become technical metaphysical terms. They are in them
the exigencies of its principles includes not only a general investigation selves susceptible of the analogous and other partially equivocal uses
of beings but also the study of knowledge and of the divine nature and required to express metaphysical thought. Mathematical symbols, on the
attributes in the light of natural reason.3 The two latter topics are often other hand, are univocaL They are incapable of the extension that would
dealt with in separate courses entitled respectively "epistemology" and be necessary for them to function in the metaphysical order. Even in
"natural theology" or "theodicy." The reasons for including their subject regard to diagrams and schemata, considerable vigilance has to be exer
matter under the one science of metaphysics will become apparent from cised. They are visual aids for the learner in organizing his metaphysical
the ensuing "Historical Introduction" to the main treatment in this book. knowledge taken as a body of truths. There is ample authority and solid
Presupposed for the study is an acquaintance with the standard notions justification for their inclusion in books on metaphysics. They are truly
of Aristotelian logic, such as categories, substance, the different accidents, helpful for the moment in giving a view of a metaphysical notion from
genus and species, predicables, propositions, and demonstration. The one particular angle. In that way they contribute to the formation of a
notions of form and matter, act and potency, and principle and cause, arc metaphysical habitus. But if relied upon in permanent or stereotyped
also presupposed, preferably from natural philosophy; yet a technical fashion, they tend to fossilize the multiple vibrant and highly nuanced
knowledge of these notions should be familiar enough to anyone who has metaphysical conceptions. Left to the improvisation of the oral instructor,
had Aristotelian logic-e.g., genus is matter and potency to species as however, they can be controlled and kept changing in focus as much as
form and act, science is knowledge through causes, and the premises are their themes demand.
the cause of the conclusion. For the same reason formal and fixed definitions are given little empha
The teaching of metaphysics is meant first and foremost to develop in sis in the following text. They encounter difficulties in expressing multi
the student's mind a living habit of thinking (in the Aristotelian sense valent metaphysical notions, and their deceptive simplicity and rigidity
of habitus, the first subdivision of the category of quality). The presenta can sap the lifeblood of metaphysical thinking. Instead, properly meta
tion of its subject matter in a text fo1 college use should therefore keep physical terms are printed in boldface type the first time they occur in
that purpose unswervingly in view. Metaphysics is primarily a vital quality their technical sense. The meaning or meanings shown for them on that
and activity of the intellect, and not a collection or systematic organiza occasion become the basis for their subsequent use throughout the book.
tion of data either in print or in the memory. In its own nature meta In keeping things themselves steadily in mind rather than jejune formulae
physics exists solely in intellects, and not in books or writings/ though and definitions constructed in the human intellect's abstraction, the pur
suit of metaphysical wisdom throughout a college course will stand the
3 The coverage of the undergraduate course in which the present metaphysics best chance of developing its habitus in the individual student and of
was originally given had been outlined in General Announcement, Assumption Uni
versity of \Vindsor, 1960-1961, in these terms: "Metaphysics. The philosophy of playing its role in restoring metaphysics to her traditional place among
being. The concept and intuition of being; essence and existence; substance and acci the commonly accepted sciences.
dent; the transcendental attributes of being. The metaphysics of knowledge, epis
My deep debt to the interpretation of St Thomas given in Gilson's
temology. The existence of God, the divine attributes" (p. 140). With this general
conception of what an elementary course in metaphysics should cover, the author writings will be easily recognized in the pages that follow. Less obvious
found himself in entire agreement. The existence of God, however, has to enter the perhaps, except to those who know him personally, is the influence of
treatment in two different moments, as noted by George P. Klubertanz, "A Comment
Msgr. Gerald B. Phelan, whose unfailing patience I have often put to
on "The Intelligibility of Being,' " Gregorianum, XXXVI ( 19 55), 19 5. In the first
moment, it emerges solely from the study of being and appears as the nature in the severe tests with my problems. Neither of these trustworthy guides to
light of which the being of sensible things can be understood. In the second mo
ment, the study of intellection and volition has opened the way for the more explicit tion From an Abundant Spring, ed. staff of Tl1e Thomist (New York 1952) pp 427
study of the divine nature and attributes. 440-441. ' ' . '
4 On this topic, see Gerald B. Phelan, "Being and the Metaphysicians," in the collec- 5 See Chapter I, n. 9.
FOREWORD
X
the understanding of St Thomas' thought, however, is at all to blame
wherever I have failed to reach the genuine meaning of the Angelic
Doctor. I express my thanks also to my colleagues in the Pontifical Insti
tute of Mediaeval Studies and in the department of philosophy in the
University of St Michael's College for help and counsel on a number of
Abbreviations
different questions. Finally, may I express my gratitude to Dr. Donald
Gallagher for the invitation to contribute to the CHRISTIAN CuLTURE AND
PmLOSOPHY SERIES, of which he is the general editor, and to Mr. William
E. May for many helpful suggestions and improvements in his editing of
the manuscript. Translations, except where otherwise noted, are my own.
J. 0. A-T- Rene Descartes, Oeuvres, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery,
12 v. (Paris: L. Cerf, 1897-1910).
DK-Hermann Diels, Die Fragrnente der Vorsokratiker, ed. Walther
Kranz, 3 v. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1934-1937).
D.L.-Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers.
K R V-Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason.
P L-Patrologia Latina, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, 221 v. (Paris: Garnier,
1878-1890).
Greek philosophers are cited by the abbreviated titles in Henry George
Liddel and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: University
Press, 1940), I, xvi-xxxviii. The major works of St Thomas Aquinas are
referred to in the manner described by Vern on J. Bourke, Thomistic
Bibliography (St Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1945), pp. 5-6.
xi
Contents
Foreword . v
Abbreviations XI
Historical Introduction 1
PART ONE ... BEING
1. The Science of Beings as Beings 17
2. Being and Things 29
3. Apprehension of Being 43
4. Conceptualization of Being 57
5. Accidentality and Priority of Being 68
6. Subsistent Being 80
7. Participated Being 99
8. Transcendentals 111
PART TWO ... ESSENCE
9. Essence Absolutely Considered 131
10. Substance . 143
11. Accidents . 155
12. Absolutely Inherent Accidents 165
13. The Relative 179
14. Other Categories 191
xiii
xiv CONTENTS
PART THREE ... KNOWLEDGE
15. Cognition . 213
16. Intelligence 234
17. Knowledge of Truth . 248
18. Certitude . 260
19. Mediate Knowledge 276
20. The Sciences 293
PART FOUR ... SPIRIT
21. Spiritual Soul . 311 AN ELEMENTARY CHRISTIAN
METAPHYSICS
22. Spiritual Being . 323
23. Pure Spirits 330
24. Existence and God 335
25. Divine Essence and Attributes 353
Epilogue 365
Index 373
Historical Introduction
The term "metaphysics" is of Greek origin. It appears first among the
Peripatetics, members of a philosophical school inaugurated in the last
half of the fourth century B.C. by Aristotle of Stagira. Etymologically
the word is derived from a Greek title ta meta ta physica. With both
components in the neuter plural, the title means "what come after the
physical." It is certainly a vague enough expression when taken just in
itself. In the course of its long history it has been given various interpreta
tions. How is its proper meaning to be reached? Surely the first step is to
determine the original use for which the expression was coined. Did the
neuter plural "physical" refer to physical things, or to writings and dis
cussions on physical topics? Correspondingly, did the first ta in the Greek
title, a neuter plural article, mean things or treatises, or perhaps both?
In the translation just given, the vagueness of the Greek article is pre
served in the English indefinite "what." For a more literary rendition, a
noun has to be added to the article. Should it be the "things that come
after the physical," or the "studies (treatises, discussions) that come after
the physical"? According to the usage of the times, either signification
was possible. Could both perhaps have been meant? In any event, the
immediate meaning of meta is "after."
Actually, the term "metaphysics" is not found in Aristotle's own
writings. It seems to have been coined, however, among his immediate
disciples.1 It dates accordingly from an epoch when Greek philosophical
thinking had for some time reached its brilliant maturity and was still
able to probe its own structure with warm and sensitive fingers. As a title,
1 See H. Reiner, "Die Entstehung und Urspriingliche Bedeutung des Namens Meta
physik," Zeitschrift fiir Philosophische Forschung, VIII (1954), 210-237. Werner
W. Jaeger, Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles (Berlin,
1912), p. 180, placed it as far back as at least the second century B. C. See also
Ja.eger's Aristotle, tr. R. Robinson (Oxford, 1934), pp. 378-379. Paul Moraux, Les
Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote (Louvain, 1951), p. 314, traced it to within
~bout a centnry after Aristotle's death. Reiner, p. 235, going still farther back to the
n~mediate followers of Aristotle, suggests Eudemus of Rhodes as the pupil who
comed the term.
3
2 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
ta meta ta physica was used by the Peripatetics to denote a particular Toward the end of the eighteenth century, however, a German philo
group of Aristotelian treatises. They were treatises that outlined a science logist and historian of philosophy, Johann Gottlieb Buhle ( 1763-1821),
called by Aristotle himself "primary philosophy" or "theology," or simply published at the early age of twenty-five a forty-two page discussion on
"wisdom," in the sense of wisdom in its highest instance. The science the authenticity of the Aristotelian Metaphysics.3 In the course of that
treated of things that were separate from matter. These beings were in examination Buhle eliminated from the unity of the Metaphysics, mostly
consequence immaterial or supersensible. They were regarded by Aristotle on grounds of obvious failure to satisfy internal coherence, seven of its
as divine and as the primary causes of the sensible universe. 1l1ey were fourteen books. In his final paragraph (pp. 41-42), as though by way of
not, of course, immediately observable. Because supersensible, they could afterthought, he asked how such alien documents found their way into
not be seen or heard or felt. Only as the result of a long reasoning process the group of Aristotelian treatises on first philosophy, and replied that
could they be known by men. The reasoning process presupposed conclu this became clear from the history of their transmission. Repeating the
sions established in the Aristotelian natural philosophy. This natural phi traditional account he went on without any change in style to narrate,
losophy was a study of the sensible or physical universe, and was developed as though part of the tradition, some further details that purported to
in writings that Aristotle himself referred to as "the physical treatises." round off the story: Andronicus of Rhodes, the first century B.C. editor
As a scientific pursuit, then, the Aristotelian primary philosophy had to of the Aristotelian treatises, arranged the Physics as the last in order ac
come after the physical investigations of the universe in order to reach cording to his own systematic plan; but Andronicus still had a number
its own subject, the supersensible beings. of treatises left over that he did not know how to classify, and hence he
"Metaphysics," accordingly, meant in this setting a study of the super appended them to the collection under the general title of ta meta ta
sensible. It denoted a scientific investigation that in doctrinal order came physica, understood in the editorial sense of treatises placed after the
after the study of sensible - or, in the Aristotelian sense, physical physical ones!
things. These two aspects of the science, viewed against their historical Buhle offered no evidence or reasons or arguments for this assertion.
background, were but the obverse and converse sides of the same notion. Actually, there were none to offer.4 But his fantastic statement was taken
In Neoplatonic times the implication of going beyond the physical was up by encyclopedias and textbooks as it stood, and was universally ac
emphasized in the use of the title. In the middle ages, the notion of cepted almost without question until the middle of the present century.
somehow transcending the physical order was uppermost in the under Today it continues to be repeated, even though it is rejected unhesi
standing of the term as "transphysicM," though the aspect that the study tatingly on historical grounds by scholars who have carefully considered
comes in doctrinal sequence after the physical was not forgotten in the the evidence.5 It is an explanation that would render the term "meta
title.2 Down to the late eighteenth century the term "metaphysics" was physics" as doctrinally meaningless as the heading "appendices" over a
invariably given the doctrinal meaning of a science that transcended the nondescript group of documents unable to be absorbed into the regular
study of the sensible universe, or that followed in objective order upon sequence of a book.
the physical inquiries, or that exhibited both phases of the notion. That, however, is quite the way many philosophers today would like to
regard the subjects that have been treated through the centuries under the
2 "Therefore this science is called transphysicai: for since a certain nature deter title "metaphysics." In fact, the vicissitudes undergone by the term are
mined by quantity or contrariety does exist, it is grounded on the principles of
absolute being, which transcend the being thus called physical." Albertus Magnus, but a faint indication of those experienced by its subject matter. If you
Metaphysicorum Lib. XIII, I, 1, 1; ed. A. Borgnet, v. VI (Paris, 1890), p. 3b. "For I
these are found to be transphysical in the procedure of resolution, as the more com
mon after the less common." StThomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis, Proem, 3 "Uber die Aechtheit der Metaphysik des Aristoteles," in Bibiiothek der Aiten Lit
c. fin.; cf. In Boeth. de Trin., V, lc (ed. P. Wyser, Fribourg and Louvain, 1948), teratur und Kunst ( Gottingen), IV ( 1788) .
p. 26.31-39. See Reiner, "Die Entstehung der Lehre vom Bibliothekarischen Ursprung 4 See Reiner, art. cit. (1955), p. 85. Reiner takes into account the fact that in
des Namens Metaphysik," Zeitschrift fiir Philosophische Forschung, IX (1955), 78- 1571 Francesco Patrizi, the Italian Renaissance Platonist, had already named Andronicus
79. Cf.: "In Greek, 'beyond something' is expressed by the word meta. Philosophical of Rhodes as the one who coined the title "metaphysics"; but he shows that Patrizi
inquiry into the realm of being as such is meta ta physika; this inquiry goes beyond meant it as a doctrinal and not as an editorial designation.
the essent, it is metaphysics." Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics tr. 5 See abc. • ..:, n. 1. On the history of the practically universal acceptance of Buhle's
Ralph Manheim (New Haven, 1959), p. 17. Aristotle (Metaph., Z 4, 1029b12) ~otion, see Reiner, art. cit. (1955), pp. 85-99, and the instances cited in his preced
understood in this sense of trans the meta in metabainein, "to pass over." mg article (1954), pp. 211-213.
5
4 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
be and not be at the same time in the same respects. Features such as
look at any book on astronomy from the time of the ancient Greeks right
unity, sameness, equality, similarity, and their opposites, and all such
down to the present day, you will invariably find that it deals with the
aspects that exhibit definiteness and stability, came for the same reason
heavenly bodies. The agreement on positive subject matter is definite and
under its scope. Likewise it dealt with substance and the various kinds of
continuous through the centuries. But will you find anything comparable
accidents, for these are definite forms.8 All things, in fact, have stable
to such unanimity in regard to metaphysics? As coined by the Peripatetics
forms, and in this regard come under the aspect of being. The study of
the term "metaphysics" referred to the Aristotelian science of beings as
being as such, then, is the study of all things universally from the view
beings,6 that is, the study of things from the viewpoint of their being.
point of their being. In accordance with this doctrine Aristotle was able
An explanation of the cosmos from the standpoint of its being had
to state decisively that the study of separate substance was the primary
already been undertaken by Parmenides of Elea early in the fifth cen
science and that it was universal in its scope because it was primary.9
tury B.C. For that reason the great Eleatic thinker may be regarded as
For him the one science that had as its subject matter the supersensible
the actual founder of Western metaphysics long before the term itself
thereby treated of all things universally from the standpoint of their
had appeared.
being. It had as its object a particular type of being, the supersensible,
In the wake of Parmenides' reasoning, being came to mean what is
yet for that very reason it dealt with the general aspects of all things.
permanent and unchanging, directly in contrast to the ever changing
On both counts it was supreme among the sciences.10 It was indeed a
sensible world. Being was opposed to becoming. Against this background,
science, for it was knowledge of things through causes. It was the highest
Plato in the first half of the fourth century B.C. strove to ground on
science, because it explained things in the light of their highest causes.
eternal and unchangeable Ideas the being that is reflected in sensible
The troublesome tensions latent in this conception of the subject
things. In the Ideas alone was found true being. Sensible things were but
matter of metaphysics made themselves felt in the course of subsequent
shadowy and fleeting images of that reality. The study of the Ideas, called
history. That being as such was a plurality of objects led the Neoplatonists
by Plato dialectic, was accordingly the highest type of science, ranked by
to locate the supreme principle of things in a unity that ranked above
him above even the mathematical sciences.7 Following in this tradition,
the whole order of being. Confrontation with the ineffable God of scrip
Aristotle endeavored to show that the being of sensible things was derived
tural revelation posed difficulties for the view that the first cause of the
from immobile separate substances. Being wholly separate from matter,
universe was the subject of a merely human science. Avicenna, the
the supersensible entities were completely devoid of any principle of be
eleventh-century Arabian theologian, maintained accordingly that the
coming or of change. As entirely immaterial they were entirely being, in
most high God could not be the subject of this science.U The subject
the Parmenidean contrast of being with becoming. In understanding
of metaphysics, rather, was being insofar as it is being, understood in the
being, in this view, one explained whatever was definite and stable in
sense of being in general, namely the aspect of being that is in some way
things.
common to all things whatsoever and not proper to the supersensible
In studying the supersensible substances, consequently, one was study
substances. In this Avicennian acceptation, being as being was sharply
ing being simply as being. To that same study belonged therefore the
distinguished from the ultimate causes.12 Averroes, on the other hand,
investigation of all that was permanent and unchanging, for instance the
treatment of axioms such as the fundamental principle that a thing cannot
8 Metaph., r 2-3, 1003a33-1005bl.
are6, "qIuta isb ecilneagr. " thAernis ttohtalet, iMt iest atphhe. , wro rk2 , o1f 0o0n3eb ls5c-ie1n6c;e Oalxsfoo rtdo tsrt. udTyh et htee rtmhi n"gbse itnhga"t 19 0I bIbidid.,. , EA 12, , l908226aa4l0-b-3l02.; K 7, l064a33-bl4. 1
that follows the qua in this sentence translates a plural participle. When the whole 11 "Therefore let us inquire what the subject of this science is, and consider
formula is given in the singular as "being qua being," the first "being" has to be whether the subject of this science is the most high God Himself .... I say there
understood in its Aristotelian setting quite concretely as "that which is" (to on). In fore that it is impossible that God Himself be the subject of this science, for the
the course of its history, as will be seen, the formula has lent itself to a wide variety ~ubject of any science is a thing whose existence is conceded, and the science itself
of interpretations. ~nquires only about the dispositions of that subject ...." Avicenna, Metaph., I, lBC;
m Opera (Venice, 1508), fol. 70rl-2.
7 See Plato, Republic VI, 509D-511E, where dialectic is placed in the top section
of the divided line, with mathematics immediately below it. With Aristotle (Metaph., 12 "It will be necessary then that being in so far as it is being should be the
E 1 and K 7), metaphysics is likewise placed above mathematics. It was listed after subject. . . . Therefore the destruction of that opinion according to which the
the mathematical treatises; see Moraux, op. cit., p. 315. ultimate causes are the subject of this science has been made manifest. But you
