An Economic Approach to Adultery Law - Rasmusen

21 Pages·2001·0.08 MB·English

An Economic Approach to Adultery Law
February 16, 2001
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Abstract
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a.n wattain sldedansnpIearp
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lmth.2661/gro.sucer.www//:pttH [January 2000])
1. INTRODUCTION
When two people marry, they promise fidelity. Adultery occurs when one of them breaks this
promise, and it is generally believed that breaking promises, and breaking this promise in particular, is
.gnorw yrevE“ gnorw sah sti ”,ydemer ytiuqe desu ot .yas ehT tcejbus fo siht repap si hcihw foeht
dairym elbissop seidemer era elbatius rof .yretluda nI nredom .S.U ,wal eht lamrof ydemer si tahteht
degnorw ytrap nac elif rof ecrovid dna ecrof a noisivid fo eht .stessa sihT yllaer si ton a,ydemer
,revewoh ecnis rednu nredom tluaf-on ecrovid swal enoyna nac elif rof ecrovid ,yawyna onnosaer
being required. To the extent that divorce deters adultery, it does so simply as an extension of
adultery's tendency to displease the injured spouse. In the eyes of the law, adultery and complaining
about the other spouse's adultery are equally good reasons for divorce.
In the past, other remedies existed of which vestiges continue today. These include criminal
penalties, tort actions, and self-help. This chapter discusses remedies using the tools of law-and-
economics. The approach will be to view adultery law as a problem in efficient contracting, of setting
pu a lagel emiger ni hcihw egairram si derutcurts ot ezimixam eht ten tifeneb fo eht dnabsuh dna,efiw
with attention, where appropriate, to spillovers onto third parties. When such spillovers do not exist,
the simplest case, efficiency requires adultery law which replicates the marriage terms husband and
wife would choose if transaction costs were low. yretludA lliw eb dezylana ton sa a melborpfo
morals, order in society, patriarchal domination, or inalienable rights, but of the welfare of
individuals as seen by individuals.
.2 EHTLEDOM
2A. ASSUMPTIONS
tI lliw eb lufesu ot tes pu a labrev lamrof ledom ot yfiralc gnikniht no eht stsoc dna stifenebfo
adultery. roF ,yticilpmis tel su ekat eht tniop fo weiv fo a efiW ohw si gniredisnoc gnikamna
tnemtsevni hcus sa gninrael ot evol reh dnabsuH ,erom gnivig pu reh ,boj ro gnivom ot a tnereffid,ytic
na tnemtsev nhicihw si lufesu ylno rof eht ekas fo eht egairram dna hcihw ehs lliw terger gnikamfi
her Husband turns out to be unfaithful. 1 eW lliw llac eht s’dnabsuh rentrap ni yretluda eht"rehtO

1 e le aht”mto,“nyret l duyedbta p oemshseiwut oe phsstn “alee m ds ”oindmhintabs ut Had“hototsr e ddtelnIbu uohs
se eonmu 9ehtiers3b t etid,shnrtaeve w,onhe mn oadwhettp me e re n tto rsemamtaamohihdt sliawnoitnev ne.oh”cTesuops
2
."namoW emussA taht fi eht efiW seod ton tsevni ni eht ,egairram ehs lliw eb gnilliw ot ecrovideht
Husband upon catching him in adultery and this threat would be sufficient to deter him. If, however,
ehs sah detsevni ni eht ,egairram reh taerht ot ecrovid mih dluow ton eb ;elbiderc she would have too
much to lose. ehT dnabsuH osla seviecer a tifeneb morf eht s'efiW tnemtsevni fi eh ,lufhtiaf tub sih
tsom derreferp emoctuo si rof eht efiW ot tsevni dna rof flesmih ot timmoc.yretluda
ehT efiW yam tr egxneirotinom effort to increase the probability that she detects adultery. 2
The Husband incurs a cost ot dnif a namow htiw mohw ot timmoc yretluda dna ot laecnoc ,ti atsoc
which depends on the Wife's precautions. With some probability depending on these efforts, the Wife
detects the adultery if it exists. Such detection reduces the utility of the Husband and increases the
ytilitu fo eht ,efiW hguoht ton os hcum taht dluow tsevni ni na suoretluda egairram tsuj rofeht
pleasure of catching the Husband. This detection disutility for the Husband is a penalty independent
of the law and represents such things as his embarassment at being caught and the inconvenience of
his Wife knowing the identity of the Other Woman. ,ynaM spahrep tsom nem dna nemow dluoweb
derreted morf yretluda yb a hgih eulav rof noitceted disutility combined with a low benefit from the
adultery itself, just as shame and scruples deter most people from crimes such as burglary, but the law
is concerned with those people for whom social norms are insufficient. 3
nI siht ,ledom detcetednu yretluda struh eht efiW tub ehs stifeneb morf gnitceted ,ti nevigtaht
it occurs. Why should this be so? 4 A laitrap rewsna si taht eht efiW nac deduce that the Husband is
committing adultery even if she fails to detect it through her monitoring. Why, however, do people try
to learn the specifics of negative occurrences even if they know they become unhappy? We will avoid
the question by falling back on the economic idea of revealed preference and using the payoff function
to represent willingness to expend resources to obtain particular outcomes, not to represent

se saaicnig r,iyVtn uxoaCfriaF n de&e lnnliiAmaxe wyarletl u,dsaerut l dusncea mt i sttn oai.emh)r t 8al 9w lI9amge1aiw(nirB
hytri ewet clfnuoadtarop meivniu t ?aeylhgetor lyoriabnoitu l. soyynvlh oel ws(aeacheiTrrtem m nd yneedsemtna moaaswearht
gniro lhp t x lr)eel o?reywna wre mgmeoncranf er lefo goirnveatd a?eeshretgtutitsorp krowem aegrhnf ti e sdneulo bud,hoc cihw
s wcailrtemm yn se,ahstru ct casohdtna b ysyrubeht l d u fned dnoihntoae ktiodmsmn oe.wreu lt cle fi umnIttcoirnsaes eefrhopt
ylp ms ;iweftsahinlteic i dfelfbueow esnhu o tct o os.dttfete ibng edIiucjiff e enyr iea,hytretl umd oamr rf' aseher voinwgi
. esree thdaettSinU
2 mdoerrf rd enstaie bdees chu,ntHtirs o of hrf nteeeeizvvwie ty itssiiolpiba b so tirdahpehtmt uyslstaici l epIvmaih
na i.le lgiaLir r edanhemittse v t nsoeia nf heeifhcWitro vtfiaode r eyhyhrtbtetluda s'e f e tid hoaWeetthtmtseg gsruaeshiVeB
,teilpm a r,xtofenfiemtse vemn hoistrefit r h astoptotibfe negehnbtisaer c,nliuf eyslula i dcelo busyorcetl ut dntaer vo eforftpe
l ay g lde ellled uubayfomrhest l,uhdga ugo nnt oec sr e.i tsfsfsifeIhert iss’eddn ae bvoesithuttHn eytltlaau s gud nnefiutoesbisnoc
noitce rdi ods o isgnhtitro fsf’ee f eilhWetn n oasoshatc yrtoifli bgani illv uoy fm bd ee elerrserudanbooac amcm,ir t ts sesudajep
.s ree cvfnioergdi leghetn
3 edth aatn”h aw tIeyeafhlmlottnedneped nyiB“ e m eaeh sktla ltyitwla nyerpetlu gninr e ec e unsw rolo iaenacflhvit
t, tuysibrietl urydotafla negehnptisa e kr wefnc sahoinyalthiltla m .reyoWrnetluda gnitcet oe w r vaaepoallthbavi eocs nloac
ytla neetpav ieerhcptu dyelrlau tdcl auwee oahsh cltac ,cinrhie wgrni aew hoosthhe swvginwihs i snydubnpab ssuuhoretluda
.
e effsehiiicswhr o dvonitadb ssuuhoretl uegdhnatiw o ,lyrlboav as e lifmsefhooactshro vtilduaf -t,oudnbru ssbdan usoishT
.sr i ts a smurhfoiioecfohhbhuatatmob
4 eu sssiihT .,g o.ssetlxae t rns eoenhcsitiora ,egde lrwi o enthkutoh tsitwnei t sateps piagrol once eh nwayg elpoe.Pv
ikswokniM .m rlaahnim idrece d snetai raw deh lht teterh ru eeo,hhc)tw26 9 2.1d 3p(2.8p l A4a0C2
3
psychological well-being. Thus, the assumption that the Wife obtains a benefit from detecting the
Husband’s adultery is equivalent to her being willing to expend resources to detect it, rather than
saying anything about whether she feels happier afterwards.
B2SISYLANA
teL su tsrif redisnoctahw lliw neppah ni eht ecnesba fo lagel .seitlanep ehT efiW lliwkool
daeha dna ezilaer taht ehs sdeen ot rotinom fi ehs si ot reted eht s'dnabsuH yretluda retfareh
.tnemtsevni owT sgniht dluoc .neppah ,tsriF ehs thgim ediced ot ekam eht tnemtsevni dnarotinom
,ylluferac ni hcihw esac eht dnabsuH lliw ton neve yrt ot dnif eht rehtO .namoW ,dnoceS ehsthgim
decide that deterrence is too expensive and abandon investment in the marriage.
nI siht elpmis ,ledom yretluda reven ,sneppah esuaceb ti siderreted either by the Wife's
snoituacerp ro yb reh elbiderc taerht fo ecrovid nehw ehs sah ton detsevni ni eht .egairram erehTsi
nonetheless, a welfare loss, and potentially a very large welfare loss. This loss is created by the
ecnerreted ,flesti eht s'efiW noituacerp tsoc ro eht ssol ot dnabsuH dna efiW fi eht efiW seodton
invest. If we relaxed the assumption that the Wife knows the Husband's degree of temptation
ylesicerp , adultery could occur in equilibrium when the Wife underestimates the precautions she
needs to take. This would create two further costs, the direct loss to the Wife and the transaction costs
to the Husband of committing and concealing adultery.
gniddA a lagel ytlanep rof yretluda si gnidda a wenytlanep to the private detection
embarassment. To deter adultery efficiently, the penalty must be large enough that even if the Wife
spends nothing on monitoring, the Husband will find the expected payoff from adultery too low to
yfitsuj sti noitcasnart .stsoc nI taht ,esac eht dnabsuH lliw eb ,derreted eht efiW lliw leef erucesni
gnisu reh emit gnitsevni ni eht egairram dna ton ni ,gnirotinom dna laicos sulprus lliw eb.dezimixam
Both parties would be happy to accept the possibility of extraordinary penalties for adultery, ex ante;
eht dnabsuH dluow eb gnilliw esuaceb eh swonk taht fi eht seitlanep era ni ecalp eh lliw ebderreted
dna ton evah ot reffus.meht 5
It has often been noted regarding contracts generally and marriage in particular that long-term
spihsnoitaler era ylekil ot kaerb nwod without penalties for breach and that both parties will freely
agree to become liable to punishment. 6 ,deed ntIaht si eht yrev aedi fo a.tcartnoc yretlud Asi tsujeno

5 d)n7a8 9n1e( h,oeClpm a rx,oeefeS .e )h8T99 1s(enD - n ddoodentaifi dneltoabenmc deosmerp .yr eetl lbuadrareftIed
tdoln ueolcp oee mpto aseh utyrltl atseiir dt nh e ag ore uetury n abseefeycwhivrteetl ugdnaittim mm ooscrefvl etsnm eevhetrp
lse adeo odhtdmet nexaitiafropr o ntceaanbchit—evei lserbe hhtc oit, hutgwbb nuIiohdtemos—ytla nhet paeeehvdtie coetr
. hecgu nmd.ta ldohlunn c eoane d wbehy oets sTbdmhausonthhih owcsyre ubycrceot l tuyadthaitlibaborp
6 sA nailiL ewfcaonl e n s e ntedb,hoiuveaettoetmn iroepiVeB la u dtne uosemavbiv rnsuapscihsnoita lmerre t,-g nol
ser i.u )qs 4ei9r h9nT1e( sru em 5tsf pa odaRnehisC ssg uangc hins tii ihdnyrtwmweo m,ohsca ernroobfitail a stfteoarerht
tneiciffus .lu f eesorstsaur uhysoch iciw,hhwc a yeotrtiblibaren lluavu td,unrmaeve w,oehru tsenueh ifittt sr he atrypoebbtni
e dhsu carsuessne frfoo n riko m rfyooltwe kei rl eosrmtaae rlhatutuM eehr tedehnlwabatce tyeldtnat seehngrc iaaiuhgwnal
4
more example. Viewing the situation ex post, however, it is easy for commentators to see such
penalties as illegitimate infringement on the Husband’s liberty (see, for example, Note (1991)).
2C. EXTERNALITIES
oS raf ew evah dessucof no eht dnabsuH dna ,efiW ni ygolana ot tcartnoc .wal yretludAsah
spillovers, however— externalities, in economic terminology. For the Other Woman-, adultery is a
beneficial spillover. For other people, it is harmful. Parents and children dislike adultery, other
selpuoc yam eb deyamsid yb eht dab ,elpmaxe dna ynam elpoep ekilsid ti ni rieht ytinummocrof
reasons of religion, natural law, or aesthetics. Adultery interests outsiders just as much as pollution,
racial discrimination, environmental destruction, and new building construction. Adultery law is like
esu-dnalwal , regulation of how people live based on the idea that people in a community care about
what their neighbors are doing. Just as land-use law varies dramatically among different
communities, so we should expect adultery law to vary.
gnisU eht ,ledom fi eht mus fo eht stifeneb ot eht dnabsuH dna eht rehtO namoW eradedeecxe
by the cost to the Wife and other people, adultery will be inefficient. The Wife and the outsiders
would be willing, were it feasible, to pay the Husband and the Other Woman enough that they would
refrain from adultery. Transaction and organization costs prevent this, and so the adultery occurs. A
law that prevented adultery would then increase social surplus by leading to the result to which all
parties would agree if they could transact costlessly.
The point that other people's desires must enter a cost-benefit analysis is often resisted, so it is
worth clarification. The ideas of economic efficiency, wealth maximization, and Pareto optimality all
rely on taking people’s preferences as given, without the analyst judging their moral worth. If a
consumer says he likes chocolate, the chocolate-neutral analyst does not say that banning chocolate
would create no harm. Suppose the Husband and Other Woman would pay $50,000 and $40,000 for
the right to commit adultery, and the Wife and one hundred outsiders would pay $60,000 and $1,000
hcae ot tneverp .ti ehT yretluda si neht .tneiciffeni erehT si on deen ot ksa rehtehw eht sredistuoevah
“really been damaged " or whether the externality “really exists". If someone would pay $1,000 to
prevent an act, the act causes him damage, and the economist does not ask about motivation. 7

.n oitaila tree rtganlik sh it nrrtsoooiiwnssergsn ae rlm tg otnariiffseneb e hoettvital enroitaciduj dfte aos hhott cirweht esg iohtT
yhtrowts ueerrltap oe em ,po.nsso eittu i pd nsddIialdohes uro o htndfuieoomy a stmey srva ds aa weetyhhslhgrh iateuwlolca
t eesf,chooratcefv e,weolh p.eos sep nopiehhvtsEnoit aslse ere ngs iaans iiu, rbsnreiavmitn elcanii re ecft noan emenesvihbeta
skec vatibi t spnlsue aecfinni riioehnttarmow t rsgiunerihthtsilbatse reihtg nteple c dx;le u eonwo gynbinee r e csrrspooimhstruoc
. e snoedot bedgennik cs es e h ayrrcfltooicimc is nss hoe trgeca airre rw dae,nmfsadne i drsnfeailimaf
7 m rsa'hroivaheb sdiemtcet e e.dfl)noz 7uze9 uh9npT1e(sum se,aeeRslpicn ilrapr e nnefoehoigtssuc sr ierdhot Fruf
lufhti a dfsnniaub s.efueh IHrtnei hasgeasira n e,h tt?fotIn rcuihl b eu,shp titso enco id el th bsut uibsph e teed fsn eiahWt
e f eisnhWnotoitcnas ;fsila m yiotntl ae s ufe srosnecais ci er.u aese tsmeaiahisTrpo r tpeh pbgyairmetl uegdhnatizi criol fbup
lac i,egyhottll eduervcr e mssobsroefnip p m a yrshelainhnhuto eno yenza ielr a utnotue trbptoeter c nseoi zi ditslui al gooestl
5
Whether the outsiders’ objections are religious or material, for example, matters as little as the
motivations behind the Husband and Wife's desires. 8
A nommoc lanoitidart noitisop si taht elpoep dluohs care about a society’s virtue. A common
modern position is that people should not interfere in the private lives of others. 9 ehT tneserprepap
adopts a neutral position, in accordance with the economist’s usual pluralistic procedure of taking
tastes as given. The degree to which people care about adultery is a crucial empirical question, of
,esruoc hcihw dluow eb detcelfer ni hcus sgniht sa rieht seciohc ni gnivil ,noitacol ,sdneirfdna
,sesuops dna rieht ssengnilliw ni lacitilop gnillorgol ot edart setov no yretluda wal rof setov noxat
policy.
3. PENALTIES
3A. FEATURES OF PENALTIES
Having established that efficiency requires some sort of penalty for adultery, let u s consider the
.seitilibissop A rebmun fo seciohc deen ot eb.edam
(a) Who initiates punishmen ?t
enoemoS sah ytirohtua ot ekam eht noisiced ot etaitini eht lamrof .ssecorp nI a trot ,tiuswalsiht
si eht ;ffitnialp ni a lanimirc noitucesorp ti si eht dnarg yruj ro.rotucesorp
b( ) Is the penalty a fine, or does it destroy real resources?
ehT ytlanep thgim eb a yenomrefsnart , gnivlovni on laer ,secruoser ro ti thgim eb aytlanep
such as confinement that hurts the Husband without benefiting someone else by the same amount.
c( ) Who gets the fine or pays for inflicting the real-resource penalty?
If a fine is paid, someone receives the fine and benefits from the punishment. If the penalty
destroys real resources , someone must pay for that destruction, and bear a cost.

gnirr u rcsociiova het ehagbthntiw oenkkil so isedllap ot eas phm stete e ish s,atnecois br .ufnoOocitne tc ti sal tgboin utioprhbw
evtri eyslb lo na y e eufeortvtihdeoecthnawemos .seitl a lne aecfgpnoe eledesrnhb uatant aag mmn ntou,iirhcf uydle edrem
8 .etamiti g seeelrrl a ii etsmmaesohdistci tniaricratilitu- idtr naea dl onbetaahtrtse n, l ehu,sc vsrafiuoo orccpipmao neohcTe
oeh s wyonlhott h fgs oi inor fer.odpe rleuphbmT ar,xode foyolgla i ecsroiust rn oe,thsttsi dhagsu oeenr re ate fahsihtetil ptmIi
yoe ah sns wsoenihdo tretu habst hyst ai,she tst an.cers e eevnrheI ptw,oehri s neee dzvaiicgitirc s'dnabs uet H har thethtie
s'el pro eet edhpirefntfohiaoetWneb sruooigi lseerriu qe es rrefehoh ttgineiro n. gd dyIeelr rbu emo otonyhl rgtsufiidlaitusid
h .cowataol rcpipma oe ndfeo iohc e ste tkstsaauunhtootitaredi slnaoccihposolihp
9 efmo er h ohts jcia ai,mhww esi ivtfhnotenop orre p dlsn lliatoirMa unthSoJ nOytrebiL sek a. emH nred otm ar hawelc
.s e ioteTlba nl , ea s e lpgfsh cfaeoeciovlluvomrppa slia di n cfesoovesevorpp a t sea, nihhtoe dtodtsnftonemta elratgel
e kdd panasnlmaetoehih-f ln h erostsutih twgw ies smiifevhottaco v,dtanetsisnoc , fltia sigyielliran i t dsarriho otilvaa gheelbli
hgu on he,tv e eecsfsaiourha c t elnobaa ttn a ney netnoeretdddib resorefat adteS t siendnhirUt o.lsd enmv aoie L rtndfooamdb
nia h rtoeoitbiwva hleabu xdeesvei lte abehm ti, gyaerret l . uesf ds noeaanohcIst areer h r tmloooiaftht ny e nero ee tedryrfeaht
ylirani de rrt doeaynwhbawb sehuhs Hti d noe e utieffeeprhiihztsWtila ndelpu oyhcsa v eifrroe phsp’snosrep —lsan gaeelm
.h t d,ronsosarfet tl aa smgreeoclna ndilfohe s euntoiahre p goon oti, csmgu infhievrael
6
)d( Is the penalty determined before the offense, or afterwards?
The penalty can be set ex ante, before the harm occurs, or ex post, ecno eht egamadsi
measured. This is the difference between liquidated and compensatory damages in contract and the
difference between fixed and discretionary sentencing in criminal law. Ex ante penalties help the
dnabsuH ekam a erom demrofni noisiced dna era repaehc ot ,tnemelpmi tub yeht yam eb raf morfeht
damage in a particular case. 10
e( ) Can the wife alienate her rights, waiving the penalty?
tI yam eb taht eht efiW nac( )i pots eht ytlanep morf gnieb ,desopmi ro )ii( eerga ni ecnavdaot
do stop the penalty from being imposed. If the Wife initiates the penalty process, she certainly can
pots eht ytlanep morf gnieb ,desopmi ylpmis yb .noitcani tI si a tnereffid ,rettam ,revewoh rof rehot
eb elba to make a binding agreement to stop the penalty, something she may wish to do in exchange
rof snoissecnoc morf eht .dnabsuH ,oslA neve fi eht efiW seod not have the ability to initiate the
penalty process, it may be that she can stop it—by being given the authority to veto criminal
prosecutions, for example.
)f( ehd—te dnabshuHs i onshuiWp or the Other Woman, or both?
The penalty could be desopmi no rehtie ro both of the two adulterers.
An adultery law could be constructed using any combination of these features. Since there are
six of them, each with at least two alternatives, there are least 64 types of law (two to the sixth power).
ereH , we will discuss just three representative laws: civil damages, criminal penalties, and self help.
3B. CIVIL DAMAGES
Civil Damages. ehT efiW setaitini tnemhsinup fo a ,enif hcihw si diap ot eht efiw dna sielbairav
depending on the amount of damage. The Wife can alienate her right to initiate punishment, and it is
the Other Woman who is punished.
Tort and contract law exist to provide recourse for private injuries, when one person inflicts
damage on another. It would seem well suited to adultery: the Husband has breached his agreement
with the Wife, and the Other Woman cooperated in his breach and took actions which harmed the
Wife. The situation has elements of breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and
lanoitnetni trot .yllareneg nI eht txetnoc fo eht ,ledom eno mrof fo trot ytilibail dluow eb rof the
Other Woman to be liable to the Wife for compensatory damages, amount C+B . teL su emussataht
the Husband and the Other Woman can agree to cooperate in paying the penalty and other costs of
adultery, dna rof eht tnemom tup edisa eht ytilibissop fo eht efiW gnitaneila reh thgir ot.eus ehT

01 ehT xe/etna tre brooatRli mnsioisitcn ixtte s soipd t,ashit—”snoit c ”ndsane sac n“inoreipe t“wctnei btss’irdetooC
h tsiewitla nseupounit nrooc is,dv idna ede ahefl xehoaeh ibtchtgfstinwiy rdmanuvairbor pl pa gornnoiimk csaelitla nneepewteb
.m uirbor plpaorom etlubbari sr eosdiinvu ash werobenkka m neweehathtlawirpo rsepnrpoaait c tnsaaehs ut)g4r 8ar9e1t(ooC
.yretl uh m dte oedaiseetel wahbsuhctoc wi,hywli sm areeeahrhtus ateomnnac
7
efiW thgim rotinom rehtie ssel ro erom naht ehs dluow erew trot segamad ton .elbaliava nO ehteno
hand, the possibility of compensation means that adultery causes her less harm on net. If the detection
probability is relatively unresponsive to the Wife's effort , eht s’efiW niam nosaer ot rotinom dluoweb
to raise the cost to the Husband of finding the Other Woman enough to forestall adultery, but that
nosaer sraeppasid fi ehs si ylluf .detasnepmoc nO eht rehto ,dnah fi yretluda seod rucco dnaehs
stceted ,ti ehs nac tcelloc .segamad nI rehtie ,esac eht efiW si erom ylekil ot tsevni ni eht,egairram
esuaceb eht rehtO s'namoW ytilibail secuder eht ssol ot eht efiW morf tnemtsevni dewollofyb
adultery.
One advantage of civil actions when the Wife can alienate her right to sue by agreeing to a
,tnemelttes ro gniviaw reh thgir ni ecnavda fo eht yretluda si taht fi eht dnabsuH dna rehtOnamoW
tifeneb erom morf yretluda naht eht efiW ,sesol yeht lliw ekam a .laed ehT efiW dluow lles rehthgir
to sue, and all parties would save on the transaction costs of detecting or concealing the adultery. This
is a disadvantage, however, if spillovers on outside parties are large , ecnis yeht era ton trap foeht
deal; in the example earlier, the Husband and Other Woman would be willing to pay the Wife
000,16$ rof reh ,noissimrep tub taht seod gnihton ot etasnepmoc rof eht 000,001$ ssol ot.sredistuo
A key practical disadvantage is that the defendant may be judgement-proof. If the Other
Woman cannot afford to pay damages, the Wife’s right to sue is irrelevant. Since many, perhaps
most, people lack the wealth to pay damages substantial enough to compensate for a wrecked
,egairram ro spahrep neve rof eht tsoc ot eht efiW fo gnirih areywal , livic stius yam raeppasid sana
effective penalty altogether. This is a standard economic argument for why civil damages and fines
era ton desu rof eht suoirav sroivahebsim ew llac lanimirc ees( Posner, 1998 ., Section 7.2). A
problem special to adultery is that the Husband and efiW era yllaicnanif .tnednepedretni nevE fieht
Other Woman paid the entire penalty, much of its deterrent effect would be nullified if the Husband,
sa trap fo eht ,dlohesuoh erew ot eviecer flah eht .ytlanep ,rO fi eht dnabsuH sdia eht rehtO namoWni
paying the judgement, the household ends up paying damages to itself.
Another general disadvantage of civil suits is the cost of determining the size of the damage. fI
the plaintiff gives 1/3 of his judgement to compensate his lawyer, the defendant spends about the same
,tnuoma dna ereht si a evititepmoc tekram rof ,sreywal neht ti tsum eb taht eht tsoc fo gnihsilbatsedna
gnirusaem ytilibail si tuoba 3/2 fo eht ezis fo eht egamad .flesti ehT tnemerusaem melborpsi
ylralucitrap ereves rof na yrujni hcus sa yretluda esohw egamad si ton ;yratenom rof ,yretluda foorpfo
liability may be relatively easy compared to typical tort and contract suits, but proof of damages is
relatively difficult. It is not necessary that civil judgements be variable, of course. They could be
fixed, like workmen’s compensation for the loss fo a ralucitrap ydob .trap ehT melborp dluowneht
arise of plaintiffs choosing to sue even if the true damages are small, knowing that the court has
committed itself to positive error in the damage award (see Rasmusen,1995).
8
Civil damages are, however, the remedy most often used in the area of commercial law closest
ot :egairram .pihsrentrap sA eromveL )5991( ylecin syal tuo gnisu eht ytilibail/ytreporp krowemarffo
iserbalaC & Melamed (1972), the common law remedy in partnership disputes has been dissolution of
the partnership followed by civil litigation over prior misbehavior. He notes that the requirement of
dissolving the partnership first creates difficulties, and has gradually been eroding in partnership law,
tub taht ni egairram ,wal ot hcihw eh serapmoc ,ti eht tnemeriuqer sniamer hcum regnorts dnaeht
seitilibissop rof retal tiuswal era .rekaew ,etoN ,oot taht lanimirc seitlanep era osla elbaliavarof
roivahebsim ni pihsrentrap fi eht noitaloiv fo yraicudif ytud si ereves.hguone
3B. CRIMINAL PENALTIES
Criminal Penalties . ehT etats setaitini tnemhsinup ni eht mrof fo a laer ,ytlanep esohw tsoc si diapyb
the state. The penalty is fixed, independent of the damage. The Wife can block the punishment and
nac etaneila reh thgir ot od ,os dna htob Husband and Other Woman are punished.
lanim iwraCl si desu rofp seitlane rof ynam sdnik fo lanoitnetni .seirujni evitinuP segamadera
used for the same purpose in civil suits, but punitive damages are never fixed ex ante and the person
injured initiates the penalty process and receives its benefit. Criminal law is often used for offenses
hcus sa epar dna yrebbor hcihw era deredisno csuoires dna evah hgih latnem stsoc ot ehtmitciv
even if the out-of-pocket costs are small,. This suggests taht lanimirc wal thgim eb elbatiusrof
adultery also.
en Omrof aimirc lan wal thgim ekat si for adultery to be prosecuted at the discretion of the
county prosecutor, on complaint by the Wife, with a sentence of five years in the state prison. If this
ecnetnes si gnol ,hguone eht dnabsuH dluow eb derreted neve fi eht efiW did ton trexe laicepstroffe
ot rotinom mih dna eht rehtO namoW erew gnilliw ot etasnepmoc mih pu ot reh nwo tifeneb morf
adultery. This achieves the efficient outcome: the Wife can safely invest in the marriage, and neither
she nor the Husband incurs transaction costs.
ytilibaneilA semoceb tnaveler fi eht yretluda si tneiciffe morf eht tniop fo weiv fo ehteerht
.seitrap sselnU eht s’efiw thgir ot otev noitucesorp si ,elbaneila fi eht lanimirc ytlanep siegral
yretluda lliw ton rucco neve fi ti .t nseiici ffe fI tie lsbianeila , ,revew onheht on mra hstluse rnevefi
the state has set eyhttlanep extremely high. The penalty will not be imposed anyway, because the
efiW lliw otev ti ni egnahcxe rof ,noitasnepmoc dna eht ytlanep sevres ylno sa eht gnitrats tnioprof
bargaining between her and the Husband. 11
Alienability does have two disadvantages. First, if there are externalities to the public, these
lliw eb derongi yb eht Wife when she accepts payment from the Husband and Other Woman to

11 esvenanohituce syorrept lnyuihdawa lsp pxslepeah hsriehpT . sywra elet clfnuoedla a evetehir tpp,sneo d mnrmeeoevcb
.esu ospusoretl uem dhosatrnfoissec ntocca r dtol xtedeil wueoscu odpesru jet yn h aslitt,e anutraobnhattr o ywepeaahmbmlTi
.de s do oeptedtemobl ninusoewitla ns,etepisop rs uidphetv rwete ahastlthnte teoxhTet
9
tolerate the adultery. This problem shows up in many areas of criminal law. smitciV referp ot eerf
the criminal to commit crimes against others rather than forego extracting concessions from him; an
employer, for example, would rather be reimbursed for embezzlement than stop his criminal
eeyolpme gnilaets morf a erutuf .reyolpme ehT dnoces egatnavdasid si taht alienability prevents
strategic precommitment. ehT ytlanep si ylekil ot eb yltsoc ot eht efiW sa llew sa eht,dnabsuH
esuaceb fo cilbup emahs ro ssol fo eht s'dnabsuH gninrae .rewop ,suhT ehs thgim otevnoitucesorp
because it hurts the household. She might actually benefit from not being allowed to veto prosecution
because then the threat of punishment becomes credible and the Husband would be deterred. This
xodarap si ton ylerem ;laciteroeht ti si eht noitacifitsuj rof eht ”ecnarelot-orez“ selur won nommocrof
spousal assault. 12 nI ,sn oyintacmi dfsiiruj a efiw sllac eht ecilop rof pleh nehw reh dnabsu hstih,reh
fi eht ecilop ediced taht eh sah deedni tih ,reh eht lanimirc ssecorp lliw deecorp neve fi ehtefiw
objects.
The Model Penal Code, proposed by the American Law Institute in 1962 and a strong influence
on U.S. state criminal codes, deliberately decriminalized adultery, saying, "private immorality should
eb dnoyeb eht hcaer fo eht lanep "wal traP( ,II elcitrA ,312 etoN" no yretludA dna .)"noitacinroF tI
said that adultery laws were rarely enforced anyway, that it would be costly to enforce them, dna taht
an act should not be illegal "simply because such behavior is widely thought to be immoral." While
gnizingocer taht yretluda swal erew ralupop htiw sretov dna taht eht emirc si ton ,sselmitciv ehtILA
regarded these as unimportant points.
Non-enforcement is a red herring. Many crimes exist which are rarely prosecuted. A notorious
elpmaxe si eht .S.U ydarB""lliB , , hcihw sekam stpmetta yb snolef ot yub s.nluaggelli sihTsi
much easier to prosecute than adultery, since the government has in its hands written evidence that the
nolef ekorb eht .wal teY ni eht owt sraey ro os fo stiecnetsixe , the government claimed to detect
emos 000,681 ,snoitaloiv fo hcihw ti esohc ot etucesorp tsuj ,7 tuoba 1 ni.000,02 13 hncenuvasE
uncontroversial crime as burglary is rarely prosecuted. In 1994, only about 1.4 percent of burglaries in
eht detinU setatS del to conviction and 0.8 percent to incarceration. 14 erehT ,si ot eb ,erusa
qualitative difference between the precisely 0 percent prosecution rate for adultery in many states
dna eht 500.0 tnecrep etar rof ydarB ,secneffo tub ti si ton raelc yhw taht ecnereffid dluohs.rettam
yM noisserpmi si taht eht laer melborp rof eht naciremA waL etutitsnI saw taht sti srebmem did ton
think adultery was really immoral, since they offer no grounds to differentiate adultery from other
criminal behavior. The same issue arises with respect to laws against cruelty to animals (see Beirne,

21 ",seruta lms uintgin eens Lmile oalscMGiuiBbtAsemoD" lanru owJ alLanoit aeNhT , namre heSiroR y l9, . ,uA4pJ(
1994).
31 t roe oth"pt ,entRociAtne veecrnPe lnouigV d ynn daofeaHiohrttBatnemel p:m sIs h"nn toi7ni1otmu ce s7orp
22-69-DGG /,OsAeGvitatnes ee r sfp .uoe,SoRy.HrUai ce ienedtohuttJi m,demenhotatC a .n,Sey.SrUai ce ienedtohuttJimmoC
e teart iSrp emdtEefzAinit u srlwcoaSrLtnoC- n:usG h" t t s s8nltner2oacihimgatf e0l0l0i ,.6 68y91r9a1 u,nlaoJr tnnuoGC
"n,ogRnitoohS Scherer, ro teicn noneMaiictS seihrThC . 3,.7 p9,y97r12aur b,eF
41 nagnaL dna tfnoec r 6e,.pd0n a.l ) g d9nn s9n2IE,e1a 8 gn9ao 9pt1g(nirraF nd o2nsi.aet0i c rdi aavolentglorcub
.noitar e-- c-- 1rt 0nan 0iceo5nctirep
10