Table Of ContentAmerican Conspiracy Theories
American Conspiracy Theories
JOSEPH E. USCINSKI
AND
JOSEPH M. PARENT
1
1
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CONTENTS
List of Figures and Tables vi
Acknowledgments ix
1. A Theory of Conspiracy 1
2. But Is It True? 23
3. Where Our Facts Come From 54
4. Who Are the Conspiracy Theorists? 73
5. The Ages of Conspiracy 105
6. Conspiracy Theories Are for Losers 130
7. Conspiring for the Common Good 154
Notes 167
References 197
Index 215
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figures
1.1 The Conspiracy Dimension 19
4.1 Is News Deliberately Slanted? 77
4.2 Will the Elections Be Cancelled? 77
4.3 Do Secret Groups Control Events? 78
4.4 Measures of Conspiratorial Predispositions 80
4.5 Trust in Government and Conspiratorial Predispositions 81
4.6 Secret Groups Control Events and Conspiratorial
Predispositions 81
4.7 Gender and Conspiratorial Predispositions 83
4.8 Race and Conspiratorial Predispositions 84
4.9 Generation X and Conspiratorial Predispositions 85
4.10 Education and Conspiratorial Predispositions 86
4.11 Political Ideology and Conspiratorial Predispositions 89
4.12 Partisanship and Conspiratorial Predispositions 89
4.13 Which Groups Are Conspiring? 90
4.14 Electoral Fraud and Conspiratorial Predispositions 91
4.15 “Other” Parties and Conspiratorial Predispositions 94
4.16 Non-Registration and Conspiratorial Predispositions 95
4.17 Voter Participation in 2012 and Conspiratorial
Predispositions 95
4.18 Political Behavior and Conspiratorial Predispositions 96
4.19 Presidential Choice and Conspiratorial Predispositions 97
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES vii
4.20 Acceptance of Violence Against the Government
and Conspiratorial Predispositions 98
4.21 Income and Conspiratorial Predispositions 101
4.22 Stock Ownership and Conspiratorial Predispositions 102
4.23 Area of Employment and Conspiratorial Predispositions 103
5.1 Time-Series of Conspiracy Letters 110
6.1 Proportion of Villains in Sample 138
6.2 Proportion of Villains by Party of President 139
6.3 Proportion of Right/Capitalist and Left/Communist Villains
by Party of President 139
6.4 Divided and Unified Government During Republican
Administration 141
6.5 Divided and Unified Government During Democratic
Administration 141
6.6 Proportion of Foreign Villains During Elevated Threat and
Non-Elevated Threat 143
6.7 Proportion of Foreign Villains Compared to Left, Right,
Capitalist, and Communist Villains 144
Tables
3.1 Sample of Conspiratorial Plots 59
3.2 Sample of Conspirators 63
3.3 Sample of Conspiratorial Plots by Category 67
5.1 Time-Series Regression Results 114
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
You might think that we are ace conspirators. After four or so years of
studying stratagems, subterfuge, and schemes—real and imagined—one
could be expected to acquire a practical facility with such arts. Alas, the
truth must out: we are deplorably deficient in this regard. Events have re-
peatedly mocked our master plans, we labor quite openly for the common
good, and the present work is not remotely the product of a small group.
While this may handicap our credibility as conspirators, we flatter our-
selves to think it improves our objectivity as scholars. In any case, it cer-
tainly incurs a lot of debts.
There are so many extraordinary people to thank, and we are but two
regular Joes. At the top of that list are our esteemed chairs, Fred Frohock
and Jonathan West, who bent over backward to secure desperately needed
research funding. At our home institution, many colleagues provided ter-
rific advice and criticism, in particular Matthew Atkinson, Casey Klofstad,
and Greg Koger. At other institutions, our gratitude to Adam Berinsky,
Matthew Dentith, Brendan Nyhan, and Paul Herrnson for their com-
ments and support. More than 60 research assistants endured long and
grinding hours collecting data; we are forever grateful to them. Deserving
special commendation are Alexander Ades, Alexander Alduncin, Marlon
Baquedano, Ryden Butler, Jing Chen, Ali Jessani, Josephine Makrush,
Bethany Torres, and Reid Wilcox. Dave McBride at Oxford University
Press championed the project early on and was an unimprovable editor
