Table Of ContentAMBIGUITY IN PSYCHOLINGUISTICS
Pragmatics & Beyond
An Interdisciplinary Series of Language Studies
Editors
Herman Parret Jef Verschueren
(Belgian National Science Foundation, (Belgian National Science Foundation,
Universities of Antwerp and Leuven) University of Antwerp)
Editorial Board
Norbert Dittmar (Free University of Berlin)
David Holdcroft (University of Warwick)
Jerrold M. Sadock (University of Chicago)
Emanuel A. Schegloff (University of California at Los Angeles)
Daniel Vanderveken (Unversity of Quebec at Trois-Ri vieres)
Teun A. van Dijk (University of Amsterdam)
Editorial Address
Department Germaanse
University of Antwerp (UIA)
Universiteitsplein 1
B-2610 Wilrijk
Belgium
II:4
Joseph F. Kess and Ronald A. Hoppe
Ambiguity in Psycholinguistics
AMBIGUITY IN PSYCHOLINGUISTICS
JOSEPH F. KESS & RONALD A. HOPPE
University of Victoria
AMSTERDAM/JOHN BENJAMINS B.V.
1981
© Copyright 1981 - John Benjamins B.V.
ISSN 0166 6258 - ISBN 90 272 2514 1
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint
microfilm or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
0. Introduction 1
1. -Issues in Ambiguity Research 3
2. Production of Ambiguity 11
3. Ambiguity in Linguistic Theory 13
4. Acoustic Cues: Oral Disambiguation 19
5. Multiple Reading Hypothesis 29
6. Single Reading Hypothesis 47
7. Single Reading By Clause End 51
8. The Ordered Access Approach 55
9. The Role of Context 59
10. Lexical Ambiguity as a Special Class 77
11. Theme Constraints 89
12. Bias 95
13. Differences Between Levels 101
14. Individual Differences 109
References 113
ν
0. INTRODUCTION
Recent psycholinguistic findings have often found that there are
differences in the processual strategies employed in dealing with sen
tential structures which are ambiguous at tne lexical, surface structure,
and deep structure levels. borne studies have even suggested that there is
a hierarchy of ordering in the processing of ambiguity at these different
linguistic levels. These findings revolve around the contrast made be
tween ambiguous and unambiguous sentences, insofar as psycholinguistic
differences have been reported for the processing of the two sentence
types. The basic question comes down to a theoretical dispute between
whether individuals process one meaning for a given ambiguous sentence
(the single-meaning approach) or compute both meanings of an ambiguous
sentence (the double-or multiple-meaning approach), despite their being
unaware of the ambiguity. Inherent in the single-meaning approach is
the importance of context, either pragmatic, syntactic, or semantic.
The crucial question has dealt with how ambiguous sentences are resolved.
Future studies in ambiguity may well concentrate on the detailed con
ditions under which ambiguous sentences are or are not resolved, and
the degree of facility with which the resolution takes place, but for
now the basic issue of ambiguity resolution is one which requires syn
thesis.
To date no study has undertaken to survey and synthesize the psy
cholinguistic status of ambiguity in the processing of natural language.
While there have been many experimental studies, there is no single over
view treatment of ambiguity. This volume is an attempt to fill this gap,
providing an overview of the research results in the field of psycho-
2 AMBIGUITY IN PSYCHOLINGUISTICS
linguistics of the last two decades, and where possible, attempting to
provide some resolution of the processing questions raised by the e-
quivocal results often presented by such studies. It also presents a
discussion of the ways in which such thematic constraints may operate
in discourse processing to make the comprehension of ambiguous sentences
parallel to unambiguous sentences. A comprehension model which will do
much to explain the seemingly weak effects of context in previous psy-
cholinguistic experimentation, suggesting some ways in which thematic
constraints may even account for the biasing.of ambiguous sentences in
isolation as well as for those embedded in longer units of discourse.
1. ISSUES IN AMBIGUITY RESEARCH
The study of ambiguity has been a central issue in the formulation
of linguistic theory, and has consequently been an area which serious
psycholinguistic study has also focussed upon in the past two decades.
However, the results are equivocal in that a reading of the experimantal
evidence provides no easy answer as to whether ambiguous sentences make
for differences in processing and comprehensional strategies (see Kess
and Hoppe, 1978, 1979). Many psycholinguistic studies have noted that
sentences which are ambiguous will exhibit processing differences in
a variety of tasks. For example, they may differ from normal unambiguous
sentences in such tasks by usually taking longer to process or deal with
in the manner prescribed by the experimental task. The implication that
arises from such results is that ambiguous sentences are more difficult
to deal with, and like negative sentences, this may be ascribed to the
fact that they are inherently more complex in some cognitive sense.
Ultimately, all inquiry into ambiguity is germane to the general
nature of sentence processing, but specifically deals with whether or
not ambiguous sentences differ from unambiguous sentences when being
processed. It is, in part, a continuation of the investigational para
digm which inquired into whether the processual strategies employed for
certain sentence types differ in any specific way from their unmarked
counterparts. While this type of inquiry is suggestive of the largely
disowned derivational theory of complexity, it has not been the inten
tion to reflect this theoretical bias. It is simply an inquiry into
whether certain structures like passives, negatives and inherent negat
ives, and ambiguities exhibit differences in their processing, storage,
4 AMBIGUITY IN PSYCHOLINGÜISIICS
or recall, and in which specific ways. Understanding the processing of
these linguistic structures may lead us to a fuller understanding of
the processes by which normal sentences are dealt with.
The question regarding ambiguity has been stated as follows. Is
it the case that at some level of performance all possible readings of
an ambiguous sentence are processed, one of which is finally selected
at some point in the overall comprehension process ? Or is it the case
that ambiguous sentences are treated exactly like unambiguous ones and
only one reading is' computed for any given ambiguous sentence. The lat
ter version leads one to expect that in some as yet unspecified fashion
contextual circumstances so severely constrain the possible readings of
the sentence that only one is possible. If only one reading is enter
tained, there should be no differences in the treatment of ambiguous
sentences as opposed to unambiguous sentences. However, the experimental
results reported to date are not completely clear in allowing for a
choice between these two simple polar opposites, having been ambiguous
on this score, supporting at times the single reading hypothesis and
often the multiple reading hypothesis. (A review of the basic issues
and conflicting results if offered by Kess and Hoppe (1979); some of
the problems inherent in the experimental investigation of the topic
of ambiguity are also presented in Kess and Hoppe (1978)). Of course,
one could always consider a third model of ambiguity comprehension. An
interpretation is given to a sentence, it being the most likely one,
the most common, and so forth, and that interpretation is rejected only
in those instances where some conflict occurs between the first choice
interpretation and other information. In this case, the first interpre
tation is rejected and a processing search for the correct interpreta
tion is set up for the next likely choice. This model, somewhat like
the one seen in several studies (see, for example, Cairns and Karerma' ,
1975), would also resolve the garden path phenomenon. This model seems
in some ways analogous to the phenomenon of visual perception in Gestalt
terms, where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Except n
this case, the whole is provided by the wholistic gestalt-like constel
lation of experiences with sentences of this type, such that only one
ISSUES IN AMBIGUITY RESEARCH 5
interpretation seems likely on the basis of such wholistic interpreta
tions, and only one reading is settled upon immediately. The same hap
pens with Gestalt figures which are visibly ambiguous; at times, the
subject will lock onto one visual interpretation, and the other may not
be able to break through because of the fixation-like blockage. The
parallel between processing ambiguous sentences and ambiguous or re
versible figures has been pointed out by Neisser (1967). This canon
ical, ordered approach to the interpretation of sentences may also give
some indication of why sentences which are in fact ambiguous are rarely
perceived to be ambiguous. Many grammatical or semantic contexts are
not likely, and are thus not even considered. Ambiguity may not be
troublesome because it is simply not noticed in many instances.
The study of ambiguity in linguistics, of course, was tied to its
being a key consideration in the establishment of a deep structure lev
el of the language. Attention to surface structure considerations alone
simply did not allow sufficient explanatory scope to provide separate
parsing procedures for ambiguities at any level. It has been pointed
out repeatedly by generativists that the ability to disambiguate is an
important part of native speakers' linguistic competence, and thus
should be included in the list of native abilities that a competence
grammar of the language should attempt to be responsive to.
One of the primary considerations in the study of ambiguity must
be its absolute pervasiveness. Ambiguity is rife throughout the lan
guage, though obviously not in any conscious sense. It may be mistaken
to consider the study of ambiguity as the study of a small isolated
subset of sentence types having little to do with any other aspect of
natural language processing. Rather, one may view ambiguity as being
at the very heart of this question, for the way in which ambiguous sen
tences are precessed may be no different than the way in which 'normal'
sentences are.
Upon careful consideration, one cannot but be amazed at the ubig-
uity of ambiguity in language. Yet, despite the fact of the pervasive
occurrence of ambiguity at the lexical, surface structure ordering, and
deep structure underlying levels of the language, it seldom appears to
