Ally, Adversary, and Partner Use of Space

111 Pages·2017·2.39 MB·English

2017
D ecember

Ally, Adversary, and Partner

Use of Space

A Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa)®
Report

Deeper Analyses
Clarifying Insights
Better Decisions
Produced in support of the Strategic Multilayer Assessment
www.NSIteam.com
(SMA) Office (Joint Staff, J39)
Ally, Adversary, and Partner Use of Space 1

Authors
Weston Aviles Nicole Peterson
Dr. Belinda Bragg George Popp

Please direct inquiries to George Popp at [email protected]

ViTTa® Project Team
Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois Sarah Canna Nicole Peterson
Executive VP Principal Analyst Associate Analyst
Weston Aviles Dr. Larry Kuznar George Popp
Analyst Chief Cultural Sciences Officer Senior Analyst
Dr. Belinda Bragg Dr. Sabrina Pagano Dr. John A. Stevenson
Principal Research Scientist Principal Research Scientist Principal Research Scientist

Interview Team*

Weston Aviles Nicole Peterson
Analyst Associate Analyst
Sarah Canna George Popp
Principal Analyst Senior Analyst

What is ViTTa®?
NSI’s Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa®) provides rapid response to critical information needs
by pulsing our global network of subject matter experts (SMEs) to generate a wide range of
expert insight. For this SMA Contested Space Operations project, ViTTa was used to
address 23 unclassified questions submitted by the Joint Staff and US Air Force project
sponsors. The ViTTa team received written and verbal input from over 111 experts from
National Security Space, as well as civil, commercial, legal, think tank, and academic
communities working space and space policy. Each Space ViTTa report contains two
sections: 1) a summary response to the question asked (see Summary Response section)
and 2) the full written and/or transcribed interview input received for the question asked
from each expert contributor organized alphabetically (see Subject Matter Expert
Contributions Section). Biographies for all expert contributors have been collated in a
companion document.

* For access to the complete corpus of interview transcripts and written subject matter expert responses hosted on our NSI
SharePoint site, please contact [email protected].

Cover Art: https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/bwhi1apicaaamlo.jpg_large.jpg
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Question of Focus
[Q2] How does each entity in the following categories conceive of space operations for military and
commercial purposes? How do they approach space operations and services? Is there any difference
in how their commercial ventures (if any) consider security during peace, crisis, and conflict?
a. PRC, Russia, Iran, North Korea
b. European Space Agency, Japan, India, South Korea, Israel
c. Canada, Brazil, Australia, Singapore, Ukraine, others
Expert Contributors
Major General (USAF ret.) James B. Armor, Jr.2 (Orbital ATK); Dr. Gawdat Bahgat (National Defense
University); Marc Berkowitz (Lockheed Martin); Brett Biddington (Biddington Research Pty Ltd,
Australia); Duncan Blake (International Aerospace Law and Policy Group, Australia); Caelus Partners,
LLC; Dean Cheng (Heritage Foundation); Faulconer Consulting Group; Gilmour Space Technologies,
Australia; Dr. Namrata Goswami (Wikistrat and Auburn University Futures Lab); Dr. Laura Grego (Union
of Concerned Scientists); Harris Corporation, LLC.; Dr. Jason Held (Saber Astronautics, Australia);
Theresa Hitchens (Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland);
Jonathan Hung (Singapore Space and Technology Association, Singapore); Juan Hurtado (United States
Southern Command); Group Captain (Indian Air Force ret.) Ajey Lele3 (Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses, India); Dr. Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command); Agnieszka Lukaszczyk (Planet,
Netherlands); Sergeant First Class Jerritt A. Lynn (United States Army Civil Affairs); Colonel David Miller
(460th Space Wing, United States Air Force); Veerle Nouwens and Alexandra Stickings (Royal United
Services Institute, UK); Dr. Deganit Paikowsky (Tel Aviv University, Israel); Kevin Pollpeter (CNA);
Victoria Samson (Secure World Foundation); Brent Sherwood (NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory); ViaSat,
Inc.; Dr. Brian Weeden (Secure World Foundation); Charity Weeden (Satellite Industry Association)
Summary Response
Given the complex nature of this question and the number of countries covered, the body of this
summary response has been organized by country. Looking across all these countries, however, several
themes and patterns emerge, and these are presented in Table 1 below. While Iran, Russia, the PRC, and
North Korea have historically seen space as integral to national security and defense, the expert
responses suggest this attitude is spreading. Motivated by the perception that regional instability is
increasing, many other states, which previously conceived of their space operations as primarily civil in
nature, are beginning to regard space as essential to their national security and defense. This, in turn,
has led to a greater focus on dual-use technologies. Many, not just Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea,
also view space as a source of national pride and international prestige. Finally, while the specific
organization of the space sectors in these countries may differ, all have fewer institutional barriers to
military use of civil (government and/or commercial) capabilities than we see in the US. Furthermore,
there are institutional and financial incentives for government and commercial entities to work
together. These findings are consistent with the analysis of the experts who contributed to Question 7.4

2 The subject matter expert’s personal views, and not those of his organization, are represented in his contributions.
3 The subject matter expert’s personal views, and not those of his organization, are represented in his contributions.
4 To access the full NSI Space ViTTa Q7 report, please visit: http://nsiteam.com/commercial-space-industry-for-military-purposes-
by-non-western-states/
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Table 1: Summary Table of Actors’ Space Operations and Approach to Space Activities5
a
Characteristics of Actor’Csa Appapbriloitaiechs to Space Activities and Russia PRC Iran North Kore 6ESA Japan India ROK Israel Canada Brazil Australia Singapore Ukraine
Has an increasing focus on dual-use technology Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes - -
Perceives US dominance in space as a threat Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - - - No - No - -
Recognizes and may exploit US asymmetric dependence on space in times of crisis or
Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - - - No - No No -
conflict
Space operations are a source of national pride and international prestige Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - - -
Space operations are increasingly viewed as essential to national security and defense Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes No -
Uses, or seeks to use, civil space program for peaceful exploration and scientific
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - -
research
MILITARY
Has a military space program Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes - No No -
Uses space for military purposes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No -
Participates in joint military space ventures / receives military assistance from other
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
nation(s)
Military space activities reliant on partner nation capabilities No No - - Yes - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
CIVIL
Has a civil space program Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - -
Uses space for civil purposes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - -
Participates in joint civil space ventures with other nation(s) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - - -
COMMERCIAL
Has a commercial space sector - - No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes -
Commercial space sector largely reliant on government funding Yes Yes - - - - Yes - - Yes Yes Yes No -
Has a quasi-commercial space sector that is overtly or covertly controlled by the state Yes Yes - - - No Yes - Yes No No No No -
Engages in joint commercial ventures with international partners Yes Yes - - Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes - Yes Yes -

5 NOTE: A “-“ is used within the table to indicate characteristics that are not specifically addressed in the expert contributions.
6 NOTE: Coding here relates to ESA specifically, therefore it may not necessarily be reflective of individual member states’ national approach to space.
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People’s Republic of China (PRC)
Kevin Pollpeter of CNA considers China’s approach to space to be motivated by the desire to “increase
what [the PRC] calls its comprehensive national power … the basket of everything that makes a country
powerful: its military might, its economic power, its diplomatic power, its cultural power.” This
assessment is consistent among the contributors who discussed China,7 although there was some
deviation regarding the scope of China’s ambitions relative to their military, commercial, and
civil/scientific pursuits in the space domain. Veerle Nouwens and Alexandra Stickings of the Royal United
Services Institute refer to Beijing’s “strategic vision as a global power,” whereas Dean Cheng of the
Heritage Foundation frames such strategic vision as being more regional orientated and not
expeditionary in nature. These ambitions are grounded in the long-term “future-orientated,” multi-
generational planning (Dr. Namrata Goswami, Wikistrat and Auburn University Futures Lab)
characteristic of Beijing’s centralized approach to policy development.
How does the PRC approach space operations?
Multiple experts8 consider the PRC’s geopolitical priorities to be driving all aspects of its space
operations and services. Every component of China’s space operations effectively serves its objective of
increasing national power. The civil, commercial, and military components of the PRC’s space operations
have varying operational goals and programs, but all are ambitious and holistic in nature. For example,
the PRC’s civil and commercial efforts in space predominantly fall under the yoke of Beijing’s national
defense strategy in some form or another, but can still claim objectives independent of military
ambitions. Civil space ventures, in particular, are often consistent with the strategy of dual-use
technology9 that Nouwens and Stickings argue presents the potential for “degrading US assets in space
and on Earth.” Finally, as Cheng notes, Chinese leaders regard US dependence on space infrastructure as
a weakness, and will seek to avoid such reliance as it advances its own space capability.
How does the PRC conceive of space operations for military purposes?
There is broad consensus among contributors that the PRC’s military approach to space operations are,
as Marc Berkowitz of Lockheed Martin writes, “central to denying the US its ability to sense, decide, and
act effectively and thereby deter intervention.”10 The experts’ discussions of the PRC’s strategic vision
for space suggest that there is a concerted effort underway to decrease the United States’ advantage in
space. Nouwens and Stickings note that the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking “information
dominance capabilities in space, while developing capabilities to deny or degrade the capabilities [of the
US].” Several of the experts11 discuss the recent successful test of the “unhackable” quantum
entanglement as evidence of China’s aspiration for information dominance. Beijing’s development of
military space capabilities goes beyond the information domain—the PRC is also developing direct
ascent missile hit-to-kill technology which could be used to target satellites or to help it improve the
survivability of its nuclear-capable missiles (Grego).12

7 See the contributions from Hitchens, Sherwood, Goswami, Nouwens and Stickings, and Grego.
8 Berkowitz, Lindsey, and Pollpeter.
9 During the final review of this report, Grego cited debris clean-up satellites, such as Aolong, as such an example, while noting
that the PRC has also made significant and costly commitments to non-dual-use initiatives like human presence in space and
scientific exploration, which provide little utility militarily.
10 This is also supported by Armor, Cheng, Grego, Miller, Nouwens and Stickings, and Pollpeter.
11 Hitchens, and Nouwens and Stickings.
12 For further commentary on the PRC’s capabilities, see the contribution from Grego.
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How does the PRC conceive of space operations for commercial purposes?
Despite the military focus of the PRC’s space programs, there is significant commercial space activity in
China. This activity reflects China’s desire “to position itself as a great power that is at the forefront of
humanity’s exploration of space," and science and technology more generally (Nouwens and Stickings).
Nouwens and Stickings note that the PRC “has sought to promote greater innovation in the commercial
domain,” with entities such as ExPace demonstrating Beijing’s response to the success of the American
SpaceX (Pollpeter). Tempering the growth of innovation and cooperation in the space domain is what
the ViaSat, Inc. team characterizes as China’s “lack [of] a culture of openness and trust that is key to
private sector activity and innovation.”
Major General (USAF ret.) James Armor (Orbital ATK) and Berkowitz remark that, despite the advances
made by the PRC in cultivating a commercial space industry, such ventures are simply “extensions of the
regime” and will completely yield to functions of the state in the event of a crisis. Furthermore, Dr.
Martin Lindsey (United States Pacific Command) and Cheng warn that the dual-use nature of many
space technologies enables China to mask military ventures in space as civil-science operations.
Consequently, commercial interests “will not deviate from PRC goals during conflicts” (Goswami).
Commercial space assets may even be aggressively defended by the PRC during a crisis, and their
continued operation viewed as a strategic necessity.
Russia
Russia’s approach to space is primarily influenced by its resurgent rivalry with the US. Cheng
characterizes Moscow’s space operations and services as “one of the various instrumentalities available
to achieve deterrent objectives.” Yet, as several contributors13 note, Russia is falling behind the US in
terms of its space capabilities. Victoria Samson of the Secure World Foundation writes of the vagueness
of the role space has in current Russian policy, while noting that Moscow is, “just fearful of being left
behind and being perceived as being weak.” Nevertheless, Moscow is actively resisting US hegemony,
although its efforts are hampered by substantial resource constraints (Theresa Hitchens, Center for
International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland).
How does Russia approach space operations and services?
Despite its emphasis on space for defense and national security, Russia has made significant
contributions to international civil space by supporting the International Space Station (ISS) and other
civil space ventures. Additionally, the development of GLONASS14 and other commercial space services
indicates that Russia is interested in exploiting its space capabilities for commercial purposes (Hitchens).
Indian Air Force Group Captain (ret.) Ajey Lele of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses notes
that Moscow has “succeeded in keeping their space agenda [i.e., ‘orbital cooperation’ and other civil
pursuits] shielded from geopolitical tensions [with the US].” Supported by China, the Russian Federation
has proposed a treaty15 banning space weaponry. Grego suggests Moscow recognizes that securing
space operations as orderly, safe, and secure in peacetime benefits both their national security and

13 Grego, Sherwood, and B. Weeden.
14 The Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) is the Russian equivalent to the American GPS and is operated by
ROSCOSMOS.
15 The Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space
Bodies (PPWT) was first submitted to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Conference on Disarmament by China
and Russia in 2008.
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commercial interests, and contends that if “a crisis unfolds and the possibility of armed conflict in space
is entertained, [we should] expect that they [will] also prefer constraint and predictability and to be able
to manage the conflict.” These points of international collaboration speak to Moscow’s interest in
limiting US dominance in the space domain as well as ensuring future Russian space operations.
How does Russia conceive of space operations for military purposes?
Russia is clearly capable of fielding different types of reversible, nondestructive means of interfering
with satellites, and has some capability to field anti-satellite weapons and missile defense technologies
that are destructive (Grego). The escalatory potential of such space technology embodies the “Russia[n]
concept of ‘escalate to deescalate’ … with its apparent emphasis on a quick resort to irreversible
weapons effects” (Berkowitz), and illustrates Moscow’s interest in offensive capabilities (Hitchens). A
necessary adjunct to Russia’s military capabilities in space is space-based information capability. Russia’s
GLONASS PNT program embodies Moscow’s pursuit of an independent, state-controlled space
infrastructure that can support informationalized warfare.
How does Russia conceive of space operations for commercial purposes?
Russia designates over 100 small-to-medium companies as commercial space ventures. However, in
contrast to the US, each is administered by, and to a large extent under the control of, Russia’s space
agency, ROSCOSMOS (Lele). Although primarily intended for commercial purposes, these companies are
subject to Moscow’s agenda and needs. While this degree of control supports defense, the result is that
Russia “lack[s] a culture of openness and trust that is key to private sector activity and innovation,”
according to the ViaSat, Inc. team. Goswami notes that Russia’s commercial space efforts have included
“build[ing] space infrastructure in countries lacking such expertise and sharing its space technology;” a
practice which has become a means of revenue for the Russian military industrial complex (Lele;
Samson). In addition to generating revenue, Moscow’s civil and commercial space capabilities bolster
national pride, and highlight Russia’s international influence and prestige.
Iran
There is overall agreement among the contributors that Iran’s space ambitions are centered on national
security and reflect its desire for both regional hegemony and national prestige. Iran’s antagonistic
relationships with neighboring Arab nations and Israel provides the motivation for Tehran to pursue
sophisticated information dominance and missile defense and offense, while also growing its civil space
operations. Goswami identifies Iran as “the most advanced ‘space-assets nation’ in the Middle-East,
especially in relation to the Arab states in the region.” She suggests that, as tensions in the Persian/Arab
Gulf continue to grow, a space race may occur between Tehran and the Gulf nations.
How does Iran approach space operations and services?
Iran has a “large and sophisticated missile program” (Dr. Gawdat Bahgat, National Defense University)
that Grego observes has launched a small number of low-mass satellites that have little demonstrated
capability. In fact, discussion of Iranian space operations is often dominated by analysis of Tehran’s
missile technology and ambitions, although several experts16 point out that Iran has other civil space and
technological aspirations as well. Grego explains that Iran has long sought to jumpstart its space
scientific efforts through cooperation with the European Space Agency (ESA) and Italy, and the funding

16 Goswami, Grego, and Lele.
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of academic initiatives for space exploration. These efforts, along with their missile program, are seen by
Tehran as a means of bolstering nationalistic sentiments and pride associated with such pursuits
(Bahgat). The prospect of international prestige and the “dual-use nature of technology” (Lele) also
make a sophisticated space program irresistible, perhaps even a necessity for achieving Tehran’s
aspiration of becoming the dominant regional actor in the Middle East (Grego). Assistance from Russia is
vital to Iran’s missile program. China also has shown interest in cooperating with Iran on civil space
projects.17
How does Iran conceive of space operations for military purposes?
Grego writes that, given Iran’s security and domestic concerns, “good intelligence, reconnaissance, and
communications would seem essential for its national security as well as for its economic and social
development.” Goswami considers these capabilities to be particularly relevant to Iran’s involvement in
Yemen, and its fight against extremist groups such as ISIL. Grego believes that Iran is interested in and
capable of anti-satellite techniques such as jamming, dazzling, and cyber attacks that could help repel an
adversary’s attacks or intrusive uses of intelligence gathering, but that more sophisticated weapons,
such as direct-ascent weapons, are not in their foreseeable future. Hitchens views offensive capabilities
in space as a priority for Tehran and, looking forward, identifies counter space capabilities as a long-term
ambition.
How does Iran conceive of space operations for commercial purposes?
Again, the contributors are not aware of any Iranian commercial space industry,18 and indicate that the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard controls all of its space operations.
North Korea
North Korea’s space activities are motivated by the need to counter what its leaders perceive as the
existential threat posed by the US and South Korea. Moreover, to date, North Korea has demonstrated
little to no interest in science and technology that does not serve its defense objectives (Samson).
Hitchens refers to North Korea as an aspiring actor in the space domain, and despite its lack of
significant space capability, Pyongyang places tremendous value on the advancement of space
operations. It is likely that North Korea will seek to develop space technologies and capabilities as far as
necessary to support its growing nuclear arsenal and oppose regional adversaries.
How does North Korea approach space operations and services?
Perhaps more than any other nation, North Korea’s economy is focused on its primary national security
goal of regime survival, and its space program is not an exception to this. Contributors characterize
North Korean space operations as either a means of perpetuating the regime or of countering US
military superiority, or both. North Korea does not have a commercial space sector; any space operation
declared as civil is simply a facade for a military program (Cheng).

17 Cheng mentions Tehran’s cooperation with both Russia and China, and Goswami and Lele write of cooperation with Russia
and China respectively.
18 See the contributions from Bahgat, Berkowitz, and Goswami.
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How does North Korea conceive of space operations for military purposes?
Several contributors discuss military space programs that the Pyongyang regime is actively pursuing in
addition to its focus on achieving platforms for nuclear ICBM capability. In particular, North Korea seeks
counterintelligence technology capable of “jamming GPS signaling to defuse data on its internal
developments as well as jam early missile warning signals” (Goswami). However, strategic capabilities
such as communication, counter space technology, and other force enhancement pursuits in space are
manifested only by a nascent and unsophisticated satellite program. Ultimately, Pyongyang’s missile
program transcends all other activity in space. Samson notes that North Korea’s military space
operations are tempered by Pyongyang’s awareness that the development of capabilities such as anti-
satellite weapons or EMP bursts are probably unattainable and would lead to a regime ending response
if they are ever developed.
How does North Korea conceive of space operations for commercial purposes?
Grego argues that North Korea “does not have a developed civil society that it must be accountable to at
some level. North Korea’s battle is for survival. So, … all its space activities will be tailored very carefully
to that aim.” Lele suggests that illegal trade in missile parts or satellite components is the only likely
avenue for North Korea to engage in commercial space activity.
European Space Agency (ESA)
The European Space Agency (ESA) is an international space agency, not a state space actor, so it is
unique in comparison to the other actors presented in this summary. However, like some of the other
space actors presented, ESA appears to be increasingly thinking about dual-use aspects of space
capabilities and activities (Agnieszka Lukaszczyk, Planet).
How does ESA approach space operations?
Hitchens and Lukaszczyk explain that ESA was initially established to focus purely on civilian and
peaceful uses of space, not on military uses. However, Lukaszczyk notes that Europe’s current
geopolitical climate is increasingly driving European interests toward a closer focus on security concerns.
She suggests that this is starting to be reflected in ESA’s space interests and operations, particularly with
respect to its increasing acceptance of the use of space for security activities, capabilities, and
technologies. This is a recent development, according to Lukaszczyk, who notes that just 3-5 years ago
there was a clear, distinct separation between civil space and military space in Europe.
ESA is the world’s only regional space agency and its members are, in many cases, involved in other
space programs and agencies. Hitchens and Lukaszczyk detail three overlapping types of government
space actors in Europe:
• The national space programs, space agencies, and space offices of individual European states.
• ESA, which is comprised of 22 European member states.
• The EU, itself, which has its own space policies, space programs, and space operations that
cover its member states.
As Lukaszczyk explains, ESA and the EU are independent from one another and have different member
states, different procurement processes, and different ways of spending money. She contends that the
key difference between ESA and EU space initiatives is that ESA focuses on activities such as space
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exploration, research, and the technical aspects of space operations (i.e., similar to NASA in the US),
whereas the EU is more policy-oriented and focuses on the strategic aspects of space operations (i.e.,
similar to the US State Department and Department of Defense). Moreover, the EU has supranational
power that requires member states to abide by its directives, an authority ESA simply does not have.
While Lukaszczyk notes that there have been some instances of friction between ESA and the EU,
particularly over issues relating to authority and jurisdiction, she suggests that a significant step toward
improved coordination and cooperation was made with the development of the European Space
Strategy in 2016, which she describes as a space strategy for Europe as a whole. Perhaps most critically,
she asserts, the European Space Strategy was developed through a unified, collaborative effort that
included all three of the overlapping types of government space actors and programs within the EU
(member states, ESA, and the EU itself).
How does ESA approach space operations for military purposes?
Historically there has been little cooperation or collaboration between civil and military space actors in
Europe, and even the idea of dual-use was a sensitive topic of discussion, according to Lukaszczyk. She
contends, however, that a perception of increasing regional security threats has opened the door to the
idea of strengthening European defense capability by capitalizing on existing civil and commercial space
capabilities and technologies for military purposes and dual-use applications.
This change seems to be consistent with wider European perspectives on the role of space. As Lele
points out, NATO has historically viewed space as a force enabler and multiplier. He explains that the
space domain has been of strategic importance to many EU states for decades, particularly as EU states
have served with the US in recent military operations that depended heavily on satellites. Supporting
Lele’s point, the experts highlight two particularly relevant European space initiatives, both of which ESA
is now involved with: Galileo (the global navigation satellite system [GNSS] of the EU) and Copernicus
(an Earth observation program). Lukaszczyk explains that both Galileo and Copernicus were initially
established as purely civil and commercial space programs but the EU has adjusted each program’s
mandate to incorporate military and security objectives and operations. Major General (USAF ret.)
James Armor (Orbital ATK) and Colonel David Miller (460th Space Wing, United States Air Force)
highlight the strategic and operational value of Galileo to the EU as the provision of an independent
GNSS capability that increases European control over access to its own communications. This reflects
what Miller sees as the core reason why actors get involved in space in the first place: the fundamental
need to see and communicate over the horizon, for the benefit of national security objectives, civilian
objectives, and commercial objectives.
How does ESA approach space operations for commercial purposes?
According to Lele, European commercial space activity more commonly occurs at the EU member state
level, rather than at the ESA level. However, in general, Lukaszczyk suggests that Europeans tend not to
trust the private sector as much as Americans do, despite recognizing the obvious achievements and
successes of commercial space actors in the United States. Consequently, she explains, European
government and military space actors are typically reluctant to turn over control of aspects of their
programs to private sector actors. To illustrate this point, she points to a collaborative (ESA, EU, and EU
member state) Europeans space communications initiative, Government Satellite Communications
(GOVSATCOM). As she explains, Europe has excellent telecom operators (e.g., SES, Eutelsat, etc.) that
could, theoretically, meet the necessary security requirements and easily and effectively support
GOVSATCOM. Instead, she contends, the EU is planning to build its own, entirely separate satellite
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