Allies At War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq

274 Pages·2004·1.25 MB·English

by  Philip Gordon Jeremy Shapiro

Praise for
ALLIES AT WAR
“In Allies at War, Phil Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro do a masterful job
dissecting the recent rift between the U.S. and Europe over Iraq. More
important, theirs is a timely demonstration that a new transatlantic
compact is both possible and necessary for our common security.”
—Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
“An invaluable and lucid account of the present transatlantic crisis;
and a compelling plea for putting that crisis behind us.”
—Robert Kagan,Author,OfParadise and Power: America and Europe
in the New World Order
“A deservedly scathing indictment of an arrogantly unilateral policy
and a sensible plea for an urgent strategic readjustment.”
—Zbigniew Brzezinski,former National Security Adviser
“Allies at War is a superb but unsettling account of how the most suc-
cessful alliance in history almost came apart over Iraq. The Americans
and the Europeans have much to learn from this meticulously even-
handed account of a crisis both sides badly mishandled.”
—John Lewis Gaddis,Yale University
“This is a great book, likely to become the definitive account of this
period.”
—Charles Grant,Director,Center for European Reform
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ALLIES
AT WAR
A , E ,
MERICA UROPE
AND THE
C I
RISIS OVER RAQ
P H. G
HILIP ORDON
AND
J S
EREMY HAPIRO
A BROOKINGS INSTITUTION BOOK
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DOI: 10.0136/0071446907
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C
ONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
PART I: THE ALLIANCE BEFORE IRAQ
CHAPTER 1: FROM COLD WAR TO CLINTON 19
CHAPTER 2: BUSH AND EUROPE: THE GROWING DIVIDE 47
PART II: THE IRAQ CRISIS
CHAPTER 3: THE SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT 75
CHAPTER 4: TOWARD CRISIS 93
CHAPTER 5: THE TRANSATLANTIC SPLIT 115
CHAPTER 6: THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 155
PART III: WHAT NEXT?
CHAPTER 7: RESTORING THE ALLIANCE 185
NOTES 223
INDEX 256
v
A
CKNOWLEDGMENTS
T
he authors would like to thank the many friends and colleagues
who took the time to help us understand these events,relate their expe-
riences and opinions,and offer constructive comments and criticisms.
In addition to the many current officials on both sides of the Atlantic
whom we interviewed for this project, we would like to thank Ron
Asmus, Tony Blinken, Dan Byman, Ivo Daalder, John Lewis Gaddis,
Charles Grant, Pierre Hassner, Robert Kagan, Michael O’Hanlon,
Stephen Szabo,Strobe Talbott,and Justin Vaïsse for their generosity in
reading various stages of the manuscript. We owe a special thanks to
Jim Steinberg,who read several versions and gave liberally of his time,
insights,and support.Ruxandra Popa,Jennifer Linker,and Marc Sorel
provided invaluable and patient assistance in researching the book.Bob
Faherty, Jeffrey Krames, and Stacy Rosenberg steered us skillfully
through the publication process.We would also like to acknowledge the
financial support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States
and the Luso-American Foundation. Philip Gordon would like to
thank Rachel,Noah,Benjamin,and Dinah Gordon for their indulgence
of the time he spent at the computer instead of with them. Finally,
we are most grateful to Amanda Cause, without whose unflappable
calm, superb research skills, and constant encouragement we could
not have completed this project.
vi
I
NTRODUCTION
P
RESENT
AT THE
D
ESTRUCTION
I
n the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, Americans and Europeans surprised each other in positive
ways. George W. Bush, who had faced vast protests during his first
visit to Europe earlier that summer and was widely regarded there as
an ill-informed cowboy, surprised the Europeans with his patient,
careful, and proportionate action in Afghanistan. In turn, Europeans
also broke with stereotypes, strongly supporting military action not
only against the al Qaeda network but also against its Taliban hosts.
European leaders pledged their “unlimited solidarity”with the United
States, and within hours the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies invoked the Article V mutual defense clause.In a twist
that few could have predicted before September 11, within a month
America was conducting a major war halfway around the world,and
1
ALLIES AT WAR
the biggest problem for the European allies was that they wanted to
send more troops than Washington was prepared to accept.
Less than a year and a halflater,the U.S.-Europe clash over Iraq led
to the most serious deterioration of transatlantic relations in recent
memory. The dispute shook the alliance to its core and appeared to
confirm the growing impression among scholars and policymakers
alike that U.S. and European perspectives, interests, and even values
had seriously diverged in the wake ofthe end ofthe Cold War.In March
2003 a significant majority of Americans—over 70 percent—support-
ed President George W.Bush’s decision to overthrow the Iraqi regime,
while at least as large a share ofEuropeans opposed that decision.Some
European governments—in Britain,Spain,Poland,and Italy,for exam-
ple—overcame public opposition to support the American use offorce,
whereas others—primarily France, Germany, and Russia—strongly
opposed it and denounced it as illegal,illegitimate,or misguided when
it happened.
The dispute over Iraq ran so deep that it posed a challenge not only
to transatlantic relations, but to the main institutions underpinning
world order throughout the post-World War II period. The United
Nations Security Council, the supposed arbiter of international peace
and security,failed in March 2003 to reach a consensus on what to do
about Iraq and was denounced as “irrelevant” by many Americans.
NATO,the most successful and enduring military alliance in the history
of the world,not only failed to unite over Iraq,but had great difficulty
responding even to a request from one of its members,Turkey,to plan
for its defense.The European Union,although in the midst of a consti-
tutional convention to consolidate the continent’s political unification,
was profoundly divided.Indeed,the Iraq crisis exposed serious internal
rifts among European governments over the future of European inte-
gration and the issue of how to deal with the United States.
By the time the war actually began in March 2003, the Iraq crisis
was no longer just a result oftransatlantic differences,but a significant
2