Allied Force Headquarters during the North African Campaign

124 Pages·2017·1.88 MB·English

Allied Force Headquarters during the North African Campaign: A study of Allied integrated
multi-national command organization from August 1942 – May 1943
Research Thesis
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with research distinction
in history in the undergraduate colleges of The Ohio State University
by
Thomas Wisbith

The Ohio State University
April 2018

Project Advisor: Dr. Peter Mansoor, Department of History
Glossary
AFHQ – Allied Force Headquarters
ACoS – Assistant Chief of Staff
CAO – Chief Administrative Officer
CCS – Combined Chiefs of Staff
C-in-C – Commander in Chief
COHQ – British Combined Operations Headquarters
CP – Command Post
CSC – British Chiefs of Staff Committee
DACoS – Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
DC-in-C – Deputy Commander in Chief
DQMG – Deputy Quartermaster General
GHQ MEF – General Headquarters Middle East Forces (British)
JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPS – Joint Planning Staff
NATOUSA – North African Theater of Operations, United States Army
SHAEF – Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
SOE – Special Operations Executive
SOS – Service of Supply
ETOUSA – European Theater of Operations, United States Army
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Introduction
With the ever-growing trove of literature on World War II it would seem that there are
few areas left to explore. Indeed, in the military history section of any given book store in the
United States, World War II will most likely stand out in sheer quantity of books being offered
for sale. This is no doubt because in the United States, the Second World War still looms large in
the national memory as a beacon of pride, and in the post-war world the United States was
catapulted firmly into the highest strata of world powers. The United States’ rise to preeminence
has resulted in a major focus within military history on the relationships between the Allied
nations, predominately that of the United States and Great Britain. The depth of research that has
been dedicated to this topic is truly extensive with numerous volumes dedicated to analyzing the
relationship of Roosevelt and Churchill, and between various generals of both nations. It would
appear to be a topic that simply cannot be discussed any further. But this is not the case.
When surveying this topic, one quickly realizes that the analysis of individuals has
revolved predominately around the highest strata of military and government officials. In fact, a
significant amount of effort has been spent on the same individuals at either the very top of the
command hierarchy, like Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Dwight Eisenhower, or
George C. Marshall; or they focus on senior commanders of the combat arms such as George S.
Patton Jr., Omar Bradley, Bernard Montgomery, or Harold Alexander. Naturally, the focus on
those individuals directly involved in shaping strategy or those leading large organizations in
combat is most attractive given the available subject material and the public interest in such
figures. Indeed, the strategic debates at the top and the feuds among commanders are rife with
heated arguments, controversy, and intrigue amid monumental struggles. This approach has,
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more or less, dominated the discussion and it continues to be one of keen interest to historians.1
Despite this heavy focus on the “higher-ups” of World War II, other more recent works have
taken on the more difficult task of giving a voice to those in the lower rungs of leadership and
staff work.2 Accompanying this vast array of literature on the Anglo-American relationship is
also an equally, if not larger, quantity of traditional military history with a heavy focus on
campaigns, operations, battles, or the units that took part in them.3 Yet, among these seemingly
endless quantities of analyses and re-evaluations of World War II and its most prominent figures,
it seems that very few historians have attempted to grapple with the command and staff
organizations that made the Allied enterprise function—especially during the nascent stages of
the Anglo-American alliance in North Africa.
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) was the first attempt in history at fully integrating a
command organization between two separate nations with two separate command structures.
AFHQ was created to oversee Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of French North

1 This approach to analyzing the Anglo-American relationship is embodied in books such as David Irving’s The War
Between the Generals (New York: Congdon & Lattès, 1981), volumes of biographies such as Churchill’s Generals
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991) edited by John Keegan, Andrew Roberts’ Masters and Commanders:
How Four Titans Won the War in West (New York: Harper, 2009), and Great Men in the Second World War: The
Rise and Fall of the Big Three (London: Bloomsbury, 2017) by Paul Dukes. One also need not look very hard for
numerous volumes focused on one individual, like Carlo D’Este’s Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 2002) or the four-volume series George C. Marshall (New York: Viking Press, 1963-1989) by
Forrest C. Pogue. Others, like War by Land, Sea, Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command
(2010) by David Jablonsky, examine both the individual and principles or concepts that they sought to pioneer
during the war.
2 Battalion Commanders at War: U.S. Tactical Leadership in the Mediterranean Theater, 1942-1943 (Lawrence,
K.S.: University Press of Kansas, 2013), by Steven Thomas Barry takes this approach in a re-evaluation of the U.S.
officer corps during the first years of America’s involvement in the war against Germany and Italy. James Holland,
in Together We Stand: Turning the Tide in the West: North Africa 1942-1943 (New York: Hyperion, 2005), merges
the accounts of both the more widely known generals and lesser known soldiers at the very bottom into the general
narrative of Anglo-American relations. This method of meshing analyses of top and bottom also appears in
Eisenhower’s Armies: The American-British Alliance During World War II (New York: Pegasus Books, 2015) by
Niall Barr, although it is not the main focus and the book stretches the length of the entire war.
3 It appears that this approach is taking a slightly new direction as can be seen in in Vincent O’Hara’s TORCH:
North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory (Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 2015). O’Hara has picked up an
operation in a theater of World war II that seems to be viewed as a backwater, surrounding a core focus on shipping
and the development of amphibious warfare with aspects of traditional military history.
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Africa and it provided the arena for General Dwight Eisenhower’s first taste of the complexities
of command during a time of war. It also eventually oversaw the entire North African Campaign
and the invasions of Sicily and Italy, forming an organizational foundation for the
headquarters—the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)—that oversaw
the invasion of France and the advance through the Low Countries and into Nazi Germany. The
U.S. Army official history of SHAEF, The Supreme Command, states that AFHQ “provided a
laboratory for testing principles and procedures of the command and training of U.S. and British
staffs in combined operations.”4 Despite its importance, very little has been written specifically
addressing the command organization and its role in the war. Indeed, some accounts of the North
African campaign, or the Mediterranean Theater of Operations more generally do not even
mention it. Others mention AFHQ only briefly or it only appears with a purpose of supporting
the main narrative with little discussion of the headquarters itself. As a result, most of the senior
officers who worked directly under Eisenhower in this command organization have hardly been
recognized in any meaningful capacity.5 Indeed, only one historian has placed AFHQ at the

4 Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954), 56.
The other headquarters that contributed largely to SHAEF’s creation was Headquarters, Chief of Staff to the
Supreme Commander (COSSAC), which was created during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 to plan the
cross-channel invasion of France; ibid., 56-58. For AFHQ’s role and evolution from 1942-1944 see the official
history of AFHQ parts I, II, and III. PDF files can be downloaded from the Defense Technical Information Center at
https://publicaccess.dtic.mil/psm/api/service/search/search?q=&num=10&site=default_collection&as_epq=History+
of+Allied+Force+Headquarters&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_ft=i&as_filetype=&as_occt=any&btnG=Search. For hard
copies in the U.S. see: History of Allied Force Headquarters, 1942-1945; Records of Headquarters, European
Theater of Operations, United States Army (World War II), 1942-1947, Record Group (RG) 498, Box 4071; NARA
2, College Park, MD. For hard copies in the U.K. see: Records of the Cabinet Office (CAB); War Cabinet Office:
Historical Section: Archivist and Librarian Files: (AL Series) (CAB 106); Subseries: War of 1939-1945; CAB
106/515-523, The National Archives (TNA), Kew, U.K. Parts IV and V are not published but can be found in
AFHQ Microfilm; Reel Section: Supreme Allied Commander’s Secretariat, Historical Section; Records of Allied
Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, RG 331; NARA 2.
5 For example, William Breuer’s Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1985) does not mention AFHQ at all nor any of the officers; neither does Orr Kelly in his book
Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa: From Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia
(New York: J. Wiley, 2002). Carlo D’Este mentions AFHQ only briefly in a few pages of his book World War II in
the Mediterranean, 1942-1945 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1990) with no mention of any
of the officers. The same could be said of Niall Barr’s Eisenhower’s Armies. Concerning the officers some are
indeed discussed but hardly in the context of the inner workings of AFHQ. For example, Lieutenant General Sir
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center of his evaluation of the Anglo-American alliance in the Mediterranean. Matthew Jones’
Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 (1990) attempts to place AFHQ
within a larger narrative discussing both the military and political situation that unfolded in
North Africa. On the surface it would appear that a book that places AFHQ at its core would
provide a more nuanced analysis of the command structure; however, it does anything but this.
In fact, Jones’s only attempt to provide any form of a layout of the command structure is buried
in the endnotes.6 Thus, it is with this understanding that I have attempted to examine AFHQ as a
command organization more closely, as well as a select group of lesser known senior officers,
and intertwine these details within the larger context of the war.
This approach has produced a considerable challenge as AFHQ quickly ballooned into a
monolithic command structure, numbering just over 4,000 personnel by the end of 1943,
excluding those in the combat arms.7 As a result, I have decided to narrow my analysis to the
senior officers who presided over the General Staff Sections. Additionally, the principles of
“unity of command and effort” and “balanced personnel,” which Eisenhower sought to champion
in AFHQ, are best demonstrated at this level. Through this the integrated nature of AFHQ that
forced British and American personnel to work together can be more closely examined. Another
factor that was necessary to take into consideration was the likelihood of finding information on
the personnel who are the focus of this study. Even limiting my examination of Anglo-American

Humfrey Gale, the British officer who presided over all the administrative functions of AFHQ is mentioned
frequently, but like AFHQ only as supporting information. The most famous officer from AFHQ, besides
Eisenhower, is probably General Walter Bedell Smith who, like Eisenhower, Patton, and Marshall, has received
much attention by historians.
6 See Endnote 7 of Chapter 2 of Matthew Jones, Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 246.
7 History of Allied Force Headquarters; Part II: December 1942 - December 1943, pg. 246; History of Allied Force
Headquarters, 1942-1945; RG 498, Box 4071; NARA 2, College Park, MD. From here on cited as “History of
AFHQ, Pt. #, pg. #, RG 498, NARA 2.” Parts II and III of the official history are subdivided into sections with each
section being its own book. Citations for parts II and III will thus have the addition of the section after the part
number. For example: “Pt. II, Sec. 2.”
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relations to the heads of the General Staff Sections has proved quite difficult as the information
available was variable at best. For example, it took researching the primary material created by
AFHQ in both the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, and the British National
Archives in Kew before I was even able to determine the exact names of certain British and
American officers. This created another issue of a balanced narrative when discussing the
relationships of the British and American General Staff officers. As a result, I have attempted to
discuss their interactions in a manner that brings life to AFHQ, juxtaposing them to the
extensively covered Anglo-American relations more generally.
Although the main focus of my work is a deep dive into the structural set-up of AFHQ
and the relationships of the General Staff officers, it is also necessary to place these issues in the
broader context of the war. This led to restricting my analysis to the period of AFHQ’s birth in
August of 1942 to the end of the North African campaign in May of 1943. This has allowed me
to focus on the period in which AFHQ was established, its organization first tested during the
invasion of North Africa in November of 1942; and through the subsequent push to Tunisia;
while including the changes that occurred as a result of the Casablanca Conference in January
1943 and the jarring defeat of U.S. forces at the Battle of Kasserine Pass. A further analysis of
AFHQ in the latter half of 1943 would require a longer and more extensive analysis as it was
during this time that the British headquarters in charge of the Middle East was merged with
AFHQ.8 Additionally, the official history of AFHQ notes that the operations of 1944 and 1945
“were designed and directed by the Headquarters organization little changed from what it had
become in 1943.”9

8 See History of AFHQ, Pt. III, RG 498, NARA 2.
9 Ibid., Pt. II, Sec. 1, pg. iv.
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The first section of this paper deals with Anglo-American relations more broadly in the
interwar period leading into the Arcadia Conference in December 1941, after the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor. From there the discussion transitions to a focus on the debates concerning
Allied strategy that ensued in the subsequent months. The section ends with the decision to
invade North Africa in July 1942, entitled Operation Torch. The second section shifts focus to
AFHQ more specifically, discussing both the principles on which the command was founded and
also the general layout of the headquarters, dealing primarily with General Staff Sections. The
section opens up with a discussion of the attempt by Marshall to create a unified command in
Southeast Asia in early 1942, and Eisenhower’s role in drafting its directives. As will be seen,
this event was a critical development for both Eisenhower and the creation of AFHQ, which is
subsequently examined. Indeed, the principles of “unity of command and effort” and “balanced
personnel” can be seen as “lessons-learned” from the experiences in Southeast Asia. Their
importance cannot be understated and as such they are examined first explicitly in their meaning,
and then demonstrated in the rest of the section with the breakdown of the General Staff
Sections.
The third section brings AFHQ out of its development phase and into the execution of
Operation Torch and the subsequent push into Tunisia. Emphasis here is less on the movements
of personnel, combat units, etc., and more so in discussing key events that exacerbated tensions
within the Anglo-American alliance both in a broader context and within AFHQ. After the
invasion the dealings with the French proved to be a considerable source of tension within the
alliance more generally but also in North Africa. The peace deal brokered with Vichy Admiral
Francois Darlan caused a political backlash domestically that simply cannot be ignored in the
context of AFHQ and the entire operation. Additionally, the inclusion of French forces at the
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Tunisian front was a shaping factor in how AFHQ operated and also where the French stood as
an Allied power within the context of the headquarters. Among these issues, internal disputes
between British and American officers began to resurge as the reality of events on the ground
began to strain what had been a relatively amicable and hopeful relationship. I examined these
more closely by utilizing the limited information available in order to create a set of “case
studies” that explore how the officers of the General Staff responded to these pressures.
Finally, in the last section I examine the changes in AFHQ that occurred as a result of the
Casablanca Conference of January 1943 and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s offensive that led to
the humiliating defeat of U.S. forces Kasserine Pass in February. It begins with a brief discussion
of the changes made in the combat commands, especially the incorporation of the British Eighth
Army and the creation of the 18th Army Group. The main focus, however, returns to the General
Staff sections and the creation of the North African Theater of Operations, which constituted a
profound shift in the administrative functioning of AFHQ. While military historians have
extensively analyzed the series of defeats in the month of February and their effects on the U.S.
military, the effects on the General Staff of AFHQ have not. This is not to say that the dismissal
of the chief of the intelligence section of AFHQ and the U.S. commander of II Corps have not
been covered by historians.10 Rather, historians have assumed that after these sackings the issue

10 In fact, there is a common narrative that has persisted with only one challenge to it occurring in the early 1980’s
by historian Stephen E. Ambrose and rejected by Ralph Bennett. In the sixth appendix of his book, Ultra and
Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945, Bennett chastises the attempts of Ambrose to exonerate AFHQ’s chief of G-2,
Mockler-Ferryman, in an article published in the Journal of Contemporary History. Relying on evidence given to
him based off of what the official British intelligence history was going to say, Ambrose claims that Mockler-
Ferryman was relieved of command to even out (on the basis of nationality) the sacking of Fredendall. Bennett
refutes this asserting that the official history, British Intelligence in the Second World War, fails to exonerate
Mockler-Ferryman in any substantial way. Returning to Ambrose, he points to the fact that in his book Eisenhower,
published three years after the article, Ambrose makes no mention of the information given to him on Mockler-
Ferryman. For Bennett’s argument see: Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945 (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 376. For Ambrose’s article see: Stephen E. Ambrose, “Eisenhower and the Intelligence
Community in World War II,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1981): 165. For what the British
official history does, and does not, say see: F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, British
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was resolved. My research has led me to challenge the assumptions made in this common
narrative that continues to hold the chief of AFHQ’s intelligence was sacked because of
incompetence. Admittedly, this challenge has absorbed a considerable amount of the final
section, however, the implications could potentially be considerable in how the Anglo-American
relationship should be viewed in the aftermath of the Kasserine Pass. The closing discussion
wraps up the section with a brief description of the final months of the North African Campaign
and the continued expansion of AFHQ throughout 1943.
The lack of combat narrative and battle statistics has been a deliberate undertaking
throughout this study. However, it includes enough information to keep the core discussion
within the larger context of the phenomenon in which AFHQ was created and functioned.
Indeed, one cannot ignore the physical conflicts when studying a military command structure in
a time of war by placing the subject material in a vacuum for the sake of ease and brevity.
Ideally, such a history would weave a complex narrative capturing every aspect from multiple
perspectives. Unfortunately, this is simply impossible and so those who seek to write a history of
their own must strike a balance between what is necessary and what can be sacrificed for the
greater narrative. This has been one of the greatest, and most frustrating, challenges in
conducting this study. However, such a study into the command and control bodies during a time
of war is critical to expanding our understanding of not just how the war was fought, and won,
but also the vast and complex array of individual reactions and relationships in an environment
of considerable stress. Finally, and more specifically, my study has attempted to pay more than

Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Operations and Strategy, Vol. IV (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), 577-592, 739-746.