All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism

450 Pages·2005·22.55 MB·English

by  Paul W. Franks

Allor Nothing
Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments,
and Skepticism in German Idealism
Paul W. Franks
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
2005
Copyright ©2005 bythePresident and FellowsofHarvardCollege
Allrightsreserved
Printedinthe UnitedStatesofAmerica
LibraryofCongressCataloging-ln··PublicationData
Franks,PaulW., 1964-
Allornothing:systematicity, transcendentalar&uments,andskepticism in
Germanidealism I PaulFranks.
p, em.
Includesbibliographical referencesand index.
ISBN0-674-01888-5(alk.paper)
1. Idealism,German. 2. Merhodology-c-History-c-Iuthcentury. I. Title.
B2745.F73 2005
141'.0943-dc22 2005046184
Acknowledgments
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While writing this book, Ihave received muchhelp and support, in many
different ways, for all ofwhich I am deeply grateful.
For the fact that this book has come into being in this form-and for
somanyotherthings-I thankHindy Najman. WhenIset out towrite the
introduction to a book quite different from the one now in your hands,
and found that the material had, as usual, exceeded my expectations, it
was Hindy who suggested that I find a way to make what I had written
into aself-standingbook. In time, thiscame toseem not merely apractical
suggestionbutavaluable project. This is Hindy's Platonic way:she shows
ideas how to become realities, and unveils realities asimages ofan unsus-
pected perfection. . .
Stanley Cavell is a genial mentor, whose philosophical profundity and
practical wisdom are exemplary for me. Much of my approach in this
book-notablythe attentionto the presuppositionsofphilosophicalprob
lemsand tothestake ofskepticism-lowetohis teaching. HilaryPutnam's
indefatigable rethinking of the presuppositions ofhis work and ofthe an
alytic tradition first gave me the idea that analytic philosophy might still
have something important to learn from a renewed engagement with
German idealism. He continues to be a valuable guide and, when the oc
casion allows, a wonderful chavrutah. Fred Neuhouser introduced me to
Reinhold and Fichte, and set new standards forlucidity in the exposition
ofGermanidealism.Jim Conanthasbeenaconstantinterlocutorand friend
since graduate school. His philosophical paths continue to intersect with
my own in surprisingand, forme, everfruitful ways, Mostrecently, Ihave
learned much from his profound reflections on the varieties and vicissi
tudes ofskepticismin Kantand in Kantian strains ofthe analytic tradition.
I have been blessed with extraordinary colleagues. At Michigan, I was
lucky enoughtosharean officewithDavid Hillsand todiscover that there
are not enoughhours in the day to learnmore thana tiny portionofwhat
vi Acknowledgments
he has to teach. I had the good fortune to teach at Indiana University
Bloomingtonwhile Fred Beiser,GracielaDePierris,and MichaelFriedman
werealsothere, and ouroverlappinginterestsinKantand post-Kantianism
temporarilyturnedaMidwestern collegetown intojena-on-the-jordan.To
mention afewdebts that willhave tostand forothers, Fred pioneeredthe
Anglophonestudy ofso-calledminorfiguresbetween Kantand Hegel,and
encouraged me to take an interest in Maimon; Gracielahelped me to take
Humemoreseriouslythan Imight otherwise havebeeninclinedtodo;and
Michaeltaughtmemuchabout thephilosophyofmathematicsandphysics,
and about how to read the Kantian corpus in new and exciting ways.
Another unforgettable aspect of Bloomington in the late 1990s was the
unending conversation between David Finkelstein, Michael Morgan, and
myself,in various combinations. Ihope that the subtlety ofDavid'swork
on self-knowledge and of Michael's work on modem jewish philosophy
havelefttheir marks on this book.
AtNotre Dame, Ibenefitedenormouslyfrom regularconversationswith
KarlAmeriks, an unstintingly generous colleague and friend. It was from
Karlthat I first learned to take account of the rationalist heritage in Kant
and German idealism. My focus on systematicity arises in part from his
invitation to contribute a chapter on early German idealist systems to the
Cambridge Companion toGerman Idealism. Karlcommented painstakingly ,
on the manuscript that has become this book, and he also took the time
todiscussand debate allofhiscommentswith me. Ihopethat Ihavedone
minimal injustice in my representations ofhis views. Fred Rush has been
a wonderful conversation partner, whose generous collegiality pre-dates
our time together at Notre Dame. He too providedhelpful comments.
Colleagues from other universities have also read the manuscript and
made invaluable suggestions. After an unforgettable conversation on the
road between Dartmouth and Harvard, Robert Stern invited me to speak
at a conference in Sheffieldon transcendental arguments in 1997, an oc
casion that proved enormously useful. This book is to some extent an
extended answer to those who pressed me there about the motivation for
derivation fromasingle principle-David Belland MichaelRosen,aswell
as Roberthimself, who also commented helpfully on the manuscript. Se
bastianGardnercommentedgenerously on the manuscriptand invited me
topresent someofthe material at the 2002JointSessionoftheAristotelian
Societyand the MindAssociationin Glasgowand ata2004conference on
jacobi in London, on both of which occasions he was also an insightful
Acknowledgments vii
critic. Terry Pinkard, tireless and enthusiastic contributor to the study of
German idealism, commented on the manuscript with great care and re
markable generosity. Benjamin Pollock read the manuscript painstakingly
and raised thought-provokingquestions.
Among the manystudentsIhave beenfortunate toteach andlearnfrom,
I single out a fewwho have contributed especially to this book. Andrew
Janiakhas long beenasourceofencouragementandoffruitful suggestions.
His work on Newton and on Kant's Newtonianism has been particularly
helpful, and it is a pleasure to be able to cite his edition of Newton's
philosophicalwritings. ConversationswithChristianJohnsonhavebeenof
great value, especially on the transcendentalideal, and on its Kantian and
post-Kantian transformations in various accounts of conceptual content.
Caleb Lianghelped me to clarifywhatIwanted tosayaboutreality, hence
about realism and idealism, central themes of this book.Justin Shaddock
wrote the first extended critical response to this book, and Ihave tried to
incorporate his insightfulsuggestions.
Kevin Robbins has been an indispensable conversation partner, often
suggestinguseful connections to contemporaryphilosophy. Hisassistance
in the preparation0 the text has beenscrupulous and invaluable.
Lindsay Watershas long beenabelieverin this project, andIthankhim
for his editorial support and wisdom.
For financial support, I gratefully acknowledge the Michigan Society of
Fellows;the DepartmentofPhilosophyandtheCollegeofArtsandSciences
at Indiana University Bloomington; and, at the UniversityofNotre Dame,
Ithank the Department ofPhilosophy, the College ofArtsand Letters,and
the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts. For coffee and a place to
write, I thank MollyMcGuire.
Last,but farfrom least, Ithankmyparents, DavidandElizabethFranks,
and my parents-in-law, Chaimand Sherrell Najman, for their supportand
encouragement. I thank my sister, Gillian Pearlman, for hersage advice. I
thankmy siblings-in-law-SamuelPearlman,Yehuda andNaomi Najman,
James and Dina Najman-Licht, and Daniel and Aviva Najman-for their
friendship. And I thank Marianna and Ezra for the love and magic with
which they infuse my every day, as I look forward to the.day when they
can read this book.
With kind permission of the publishers, material from the following
previouslypublishedessayshas beenincorporatedintothis book. Chapter
2 includes material from "From Kant to Post-Kantian Idealism," in Pro-
0
viii Acknowledgments
ceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society. 76 (suppl.), no. 1 (Oxford: BasilBlack-
I
well. 2002). 229-246. Chapters 1 and 3 includes material from "What
L'I
Should KantiansLearnfromMaimon'sSkepticism?"inGideonFreudenthal
(ed.), Salomon Maimon: Rational Dogmatist, Empirical Skeptic (Dordecht:
Kluwer, 2003), 200-232. Chapter 3 includes material from "Does Post
Kantian Skepticism Exist?"in International Yearbook ojGerman Idealism. 1
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003). 141-163. Chapter4 includesmaterial
from "TranscendentalArguments. Reason.and Skepticism: Contemporary
Debates and the Origins of Post-Kantian Idealism," in Robert Stern (ed.),
Transcendental Arguments: Problems andProspects (Oxford: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1999), 111-146.
Contents
Introduction
1 Kantian Dualism 13
2 Post-KantianMonism 84
3 Post-Kantian Skepticism 146
4 Post-KantianTranscendentalArguments 201
5 The Fact of Reason and the Standpoint
ofGermanIdealism 260
6 Intuition, Negation, and the PossibilityofEvil 337
Conclusion 385
Bibliography 395
Index 421
All or Nothing
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r
Author'sNote
Abbreviationsused in the footnotes areexplained in the bibliography.
Introduction
Why are the German idealists-primarily,Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Fried
rich Wilhelm]osephvonSchelling, and GeorgWilhelm Fredrich Hegel
soobsessedwith theconstructionofaphilosophicalsystem-ofwhat they
would call thephilosophical system?Why do they think it impossible to
contributetothe resolutionofaphilosophicalproblemwithoutattempting
to resolve them all within an interconnected whole? Even if it is impor
tant-or at least worthwhile-to connect one's philosophicalviewsinto a
systematic unity, why should systematicity require the strong degree of
connection in virtue of a single principle insisted upon by the German
idealists?Why, for that matter, should it be the pursuit of systematicity
that givesGerman idealistphilosophyits distinctive shapes-as ifsystem
atization were the firstpriority in philosophy rather than, say, the last?In
short: Why do they seek, with so much urgency, to sayeverything about
.everything, which is unlikely to succeed, instead of being content to say
somethingaboutsomething, which mightavoid total failure? Mustitbeall
or nothing?
For many philosophers from the Anglo-American tradition, these un
answered-indeed, mostlyunasked-questionsprevent theincorporation
ofGerman idealists into the canon ofgreat philosopherswho illuminated
problems withwhich wearestillconcerned. Theirsystematicprojectseems
not only immodest but, to speak frankly,joreign. Tobe sure, the German
idealists are responsive to the perennial problems of philosophy, such as
the possibility of knowledge, the freedom of the will, and the nature of
morality and justice. But, we are told, their responses to these problems
areso closelyintertwined with their attempts to construct thesystem that
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