Table Of ContentSTUIlIA I'HILOLOGICA IIlJlJlJHICA
Monograph Series
IVa
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ALAYAVIJNANA
On the Origin and the Early Development
of a Central Concept of Yogacara Philosophy
Part I : Text
Lambert Schmithausen
Tokyo' The International Institute ror Buddhist Studies· 1987
ALA YAVHJNANA
On the Origin and the Early Development
of a Central Concept of Yogacara Philosophy
Part I : Text
Lambert Schmithausen
TOKYO
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies
1987
§ 1. 1
1. Introductory. pnpgrammatic and methodological remarks
1.1 As is well known, one of the specific features of the
philosopby of the Yogacara school is the theory that in
addition to the traditional six kinds of mind, viz. the five
sense-perceptions and non-sensory cognition (manoviJ'Mna), there
are two new, more or less subliminal forms, viz. kl.i{lta-manas and
cHayavijnana. The former is a continuous, subtle notion or feeling
of III , whereas the latter, in accordance with the frequent
1
Chinese rendering • • i. e. "store mind", "connaissance-re-
2
ceptacle", may, in a preliminary way, be characterized as the
container or store-house of the latent residues or Impressions of
previous actions (kal'man) and mind processes, or, following the
3
usual Tibetan translation kun gzi man! paT' lies pa ("fundamental
mind", "Grunderkennen,,4), as the basic layer of mind processes or
even the very basic constituent of the .... hole l iving being,5 It
should be kept in mind that (at l east in the !lorthodox" Yogacara
school) alayavijii.ana is strictly person-bound, each living being
hav.ing its own alayavijiiana.
The present. essay, though also including a fe .... remarks on the
origin of klifJta-manas (see § 7.IA.2.2), i s primarily concerned
a
.... ith the problem of the origin and development of 1 a y a v i-
j ii. ana. Yet, my treatment of this matter is not exhaustive
either. I have rather confined myself to dealing .... ith the problem
of the origin of alayavijfiana in a rather 1 i mit e d sense
(see § 1.4), and to an attempt to deduce, from my starting-point
and the data available in the oldest materia.ls, certai n crucial
aspects of the ear 1 y development of this concept.
In accordance .... i th the limited scope of the present essay, I
feel it justified to confine myself, as for pre v i 0 u s
res ear c h~ to a short s y s t c mat i c outline of the
essential aspects of .... hat it has contributed to the question of
the formation of the concept of alayavijfiana (§ 1.3). Though I
admit that a full acc·~nt of the history of research on alayavi.-
§ I. 2 - 2 -
jfiana would be useful. it would take much more tillle than I can
afford, and anyway it should, in vie\<" of the fact that most
pertinent works are in Japanese, be written by a Japanese scholar.
Nevertheless, apart from specific references in the notes, a few
r e c e n t tbeories on the origin of alayavijfiana will be
discussed in detail in § 7, because they advocate solutions
considerably differing from mine, and because I should scarcely be
justified in setting up a theory of Illy Olm if I did not give my
reasons for not adopting one or the other of those already set
forth.
1.2 As for the question of the 0 rig i n of the concept of
alayavijnana, the solution presented in this essay must
remain a h y pot h e tic a lone. In view of the fact that
even basic problems of the literary histQry of the older Yogacara
texts. esp. of the YogacarabhUmi, are still unsolved or controver
sial and since some early materials are known only from fragments
- and there may have been others no longer extant in explicit
quotations -, statements on the early history of Yogacara thought
are almost inevitably, at least for the time being. bound to be
6
hypothetical. But I think Sugur0 is right in emphashing that .... e
have no choice but to try to reconstruct the historical develop
ment of Yogacara thought if we want to re-enact it, as it were, as
a dynamic, living process, and not merely take stock of the
petrified (and often incoherent) results. Besides, even prelimi
oary observations in terms of a history of ideas may, if handled
with caution, on their part be helpful in resolving problems of
literary history. But what I consider essential is that, even if
we cannot (or cannot yet?). in our hypotheses on matters of the
history of ideas (as well as of the literary history) of uncertain
periods li ke early Yogacara, reach c e r t a i n t y, we are none
, ,
the less clearly called upon to proceed , from mere p 0 i-
b i 1 i t Y or non-commi t tal p 1 • u i b i 1 i t Y to
•
p r 0 b b i 1 i t y; i.e. we should try to find out criteria
which permi t u, to single out. from among the at times consider-
- 3 - § 1·3·0-1.3.1
able number of p 0 s sib I e explana tions, the one .... hich is
(or a t least those fe.... which are) pro b a b 1 ej and it is
precisely this that I intend to do in the present essay.
1.3.0 Modern scholars have tried to explain the introduction of
alayavijftana by pointing out that in certain s y s t e-
m • t i c • 1 (§ 1. 3. 1 ) and • x e get i ca l (§ 1.3.2)
7
contexts the assumption of this concept h.d become inevitable or
at least useful, and they have also dralffl attention to certain
8
related notions - occurdng either in the canonical texts or in
the dogmatic elaborations of some of the traditional schools (§
9
1.3.4), or even in the earliest Yogacara sources themselves (§
1.3.5) -, .... hich may be regarded as· more or less close precursors
or starting-points of alayavijftana. Some scholars, though not
denying the importance of the systematical and historical back
ground, have expressed the opinion that the main motive for the
introduction of the concept of alayavijftana has to be sought in a
(direct) y 0 g ice x per i e n e e of a subliminal layer of
. d 10
ml.n .
1.3.1 There are several s y S t e mat i ca l co n
t ext s in connection .... ith ... hich the introduction of
alayavijftana is regarded to have been helpful if not indispens
able. In a system that rejects - as most Buddhist schools unambigu
ously do - the existence of Self (atman) as a substantial, i .e.
permanent and unchangeable nucleus of the individual. a non-
eternal but continuous element of personality like alayavijftana
appears to be required or at least convenient. Accordingly. modern
scholars most frequently adduce, in connection .... ith the introduc
tion of alayavijnana, issues centering, more or less, around the
problem of the co n tin u i t y 0 f per .s 0 n ali t y. 11
In these contexts as ..... ell as in sOllie others, alayavijflana is in
fact employed by the Yogacaras themsel ves, and in most of these
contexts they have tried to sho ..... the indispensabili ty of alayavi
jnana by moulding them into proof s of its existence. What
§ 1.3. [ - 4 -
follows is only a preliminary list of such issues: 12
1) the issue of a continuous and homogeneous "subject" or more
J
precisely, individual substratum, of 8aJ?1sara t 3 and. in a
sense, even of the process of liberationj '4
2) the issue of a connecting link between karman and its re
, 15
sult·
J) the issue of a connecting link betwecn the last moment. of
mind before and the first one after unconscious states like
nirodha-aamapattij l6
4) the issue of an entity suitable for receiving Impressions
(oosand) and supporting the Seeds (bija) or bei ng itself the
J
Seed, of future effects; 17
This last is involved not only in the phenomena of memory
and recollection 18 but al so in the preceding issues of
19
karman and its fruition and of th' reappearance of
20
consciousness after periods of interruption, and it i s
-
involved even in th, issue of th, substratum of sal!lsara
and liberation, if sal)lsara is understood as rebirth due
to karman and to 0 e f i 1 em e n t s21 (kl.el1a) liable
t ore-emerge even a fter perl'O d s 0 f 1 a t ency, 22 and '""-f the
process of liberation is taken as the origination and
23
gro .... th of wholesome factors or at least as the abandon
ment even of 1 ate n t Defilements. 24
In all these cases, the situation appears to have come to
a critical point on account of the rejection of the
Sarvastivada doctrine of the existence of the past and
the future (which had allowed to derive later fruition
d ire c t 1 Y from the past deed, 25 the re-emerging
26
consciousness directly from its past antecedent, or
27
recollection directly from the past 3wareness and from
28
the past object ) or on account of the rejection of
hypostatized entities like Possession (prapti) (due to
which a non-saint is fettered by Defilements even while
29
they do not actually occur ). Some schools, especially
- 30 - - 31
the Sautrantikas and perhaps also the MahiSasakas,
- 5 - § 1.3·1
had tried to solve these problems by assuming dormant
forces or Seeds (bija) as gap-bridgers, but the Yogacaras
pointed out that in a traditional Buddhist system (i..e.
without alayavijiiana) both the impression (or reinforce
ment) and the preservation of these Seeds involve serious
difficulties.
5) the issue of a primary and homogeneous objective basis of the
notion or feeling of 'f' or Clinging to Self-, 32
6) the issue of a principle which - after death, and in accord
ance with, or as the result of, the Maturation (vipdka)33 of
previous karman - takes possession, or becomes the basis, of
34
a new existence and which, uninterruptedly continuing until
death as the homogeneous basic layer of this existence,35
guarantees that throughout a given life-span a living being
is affiliated to one and the sallie ..... av or form of existence
~yatana).
(gati/yoni) or cosmic level (dhtitu, 36 a guarantee
that holds even in the absence of other suitable factorsjJ7
7) the issue of mind as the principle of life, which throughout
38
a given life-span continuously pervades and "appropriates"
(uptidtina) corporeal matter, 39 esp. in unconscious states ""here
40
the ordinary vijnanas are absent.
T. ... o more issues in which alayavijnana figures appear to be
closely connected .... ith the preceding one:
8) the issue or- mind (vijnana) entering the womb and coalescing
(s~l'ch-) .... ith proto-embryonic matter at the moment of
Linking up (pl'atisandhi ) a new existence as a human being
1
(or womb-born animal),4 and
9) the issue that in the process of death the body is said to
gro .... cold part by part, due to a gradual .... ithdrawing of mind
2
(vijnana).4
There is still another issue involving alayavijftana which be
longs to this "somaticl! context, viz.,
10) the issue of certai n corporeal experiences the occurrence of
..... hich is said to be hardly explicable except if alayavijnana
is accepted,43 including the issue of pleasant corporeal
§ 1.3.2 - 6 -
44
sensations in states of deep concentration.
Another issue which would seem to point to the existence of
alayavijiiana is
11) that the perception of objects is said to be always accompa
nied by- a perception of the surrounding world (bhdjana) and
of one's own corporeal basis (a~paya).45
Finally, alayavijiiana figures, in some sources - but, as far as
1 can see, never in formal proofs of its existence -,
12) as the basic principle of Pollution (a~kle~a)J46
12) as the seat or sum of Badness (daU?fhuLya),47 and
1~) as constituting, or having the nature of, ultimate unsatisfac
toriness (8Gf!18kaT'a-du~khata) or the Truth of Suffering (du~
8
kha-sat ya) .4
, .3. 2 Apart from these systematical problems, e x e get i-
ca l reasons, too, are occasionally surmised to have
had a decisive impact on the introduction of alayavijii.ana,49 and
at any rate it .... as in fact used by the Yogacaras themselves for
50
solving sueh difficulties as the question of ho .... to interpret
51
1) the dependence of vijiuina on sa1pakaraa and of bhava on
52
upcidana in the twelve-membered pratitya8amutpada formula;
2) the mutual dependence of vijiiiina and ndmarupa which was set
forth in the Na9akalapik~sutra53 and, according to a passage
54
of the Yogacarabhumi also indicated by the Nagarasutraj55
1
J) the statement of the Dharmadinnasutra, etc.,56 that in niT'o
dhaaamapatti mind (vijiiiina) has not departed from the body;57
4) the statement of the mutual support and concomitance of
life(-force) (ayus), [bodily] heat (u~man) and mind (vi
iMna);58
5) the canonical concept of the Nourislunent "mind" (vijiiiiniiha
raJ. 59
One may also add:
6) the exegesis of the canonical reference to mind entering the
womb at the moment of conception,60
"'hich has already been listed as a systematical context. 61
- 7 - § 1.3·3-1.3·4.2
1.3.3 It. is important to make it clear that although most of
these systematical and exegetical contexts may render the
introduction of ala, avijiiana pIa u sib 1 e they cannot eo
1
ipso be acknowledged to have i n f act led to, or even merely
contributed to, this event. It is equally possible, nay, even
highly probable that even though the real moti ve( 5) will be
J J
inc. 1 u d e d among these contexts, yet in many of them alaya
vijiiana was rather found convenient and made use of only a f t
e r it had been introduced for some 0 the r reason.
1.3.4 As for historical starting-points and pre cur S 0 r s
of alayavijiiana, previous research has made two sugges-
tions:
1 .. 3.4.1 On the one hand, it has, in accordance with the exegeti-
- - 62
cal tradition of the Yogacaras themselves, pointed to
the vijii5.rw. of the canonical pratityasaJmJ.tpdda formula,63 which
is occasionally taught to t>.nter the womb at the moment of concep
tion and to keep, by its presence, the embryo and the child
growing,64 and which may be identified with the vijii5.na which,
along with life-span or life-force (dyus) and bodily heat (u{lman).
65
maintains the body alive and ",ithdraws from it at the moment of
66
death.
1.3.4.2 On the other hand, Abhidharmic concepts like mUlavijii5.na,
""QsaJ!Istirika-akandha and bhavatiga-vijiitina 67 ascribed to
various traditional schools have been acknowledged as Sravakayanist
forerunners of alaya.vijiiana not only by modern scholars but also
by the Yogacaras themselves, partly as early as in the MahayanasalJl
68
graha. The existence of such concepts may, to be sure, have
increased, on the part of the Yogacaras, the readiness to intro
duce a related concept. However. the historical relations of the
earliest Yogacara literature to these schools still pose unresolved
69
problems. Thus, one cannot exclude the possibility that those
o
Sravakayanist concepts, as also, almost certainly,7 a few canoni-
§ 1.3.5 - 8 -
1
cal passages like AN 11 131 (using the term 'citaya,)7 or the
Ak~arasisiitra, 72 were adduced only afterwards for the sake of
73
averting the reproach of innovativeness.
1.3.5 However no such possibility is there with regard to the
above-mentioned vijnana of the pratityasamutpdda formula
nor with regard to another set of related notions, namely Seeds
(bija),74 Badness {dauft:huLya),75 or Hind-containing-all-Seeds
6
(Barvabijak~ vijnanam),7 Hind which is [the result of the] Matu
77
ration [of previous karman (and delight in worldly eXistence )]
(vipdka-vijriana) ,78 [Result-of-JMaturation containing all Seeds
(sal'vabija/(o vipdka~), 79 Mind appropriating the gross elements of
the sense-faculties (*intil'iya-mahdbhutopddatr vijiidnam), 80 or Hind
under the sway of Clinging (sopcida1Ull[l vijrianam) . 81 Most of these
notions, too, have, in the Yogacara sources, been expressly identi-
fied or connected with, or at least de facto used as quasi-synonyres
of, alayavijnana,82 but they are, besides, clearly recognizable as
key-terms of, or as closely associated with, one or the other of
the systematical contexts in which alayavijfiana came to play a
centra], role (see § 1.3.1 ). ,",'hat is more: they do occur, already
in the old est Yogacara source and even in its earliest,
pre-alayavijnanic layers (see § 1.6). precisely in such contexts
where one would expect alayavijfiana, only that it is just not
mentioned or mentioned in such a way that it is clearly addition
83
al. The significance of these notions for the theory of alayavi
jfiana is thus beyond doubt. The question is however, whether
J
they, or at least one or the other of them, were - and if so: in
which way they were d ire c t 1 y influential on the
v e r y i n t rod u c t ion of alayavijfiana, or whether
instead they influenced the fur the r d eve lop men t
of this concept, being, as it were, the l oose ends of speculation
which came to be integrated into alayavijfiana after its introduc:-
tion for some o t he r reason, upon which they too were de-
veloped in terms concurring with the innovation. However this may
be, it is clear that for a comprehensive understanding of the
