Table Of ContentDecember 4, 2002 13:28
Will The ARNG And USAR Really Ride To The Rescue?
By Paul Connors
During the last 13 months, members of the Air Force Security Forces community have struggled to carry out their vital
mission despite serious personnel shortfalls and wartime operational taskings that prompted the Air Force to impose
involuntary active-duty tour extensions of AFRC and ANG personnel.
When Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche lifted stop-loss in August 2002, he simultaneously ordered the
retention on active duty of 14,000 members of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. Of that number,
approximately 9,000 were personnel assigned to the Security Forces.
The involuntary extensions allowed the active Air Force to meet its year-end personnel strengths and also permitted the
separation and retirement of thousands of active-duty Air Force Security Forces personnel. But Reservists and
Guardsmen carried the burden as a result, languishing in place at their assigned stations. Some provided security at
bases here in the United States, while many more deployed to overseas assignments in the Persian Gulf and
Afghanistan.
Personnel shortfalls in the security forces persisted, and morale plummeted.
But finally, it appears that help - albeit short-term and limited help - is on the way.
According to information filtering down from the National Guard Bureau headquarters, Defense Department officials are
currently discussing plans to replace thousands of the Air Force security reservists and Guardsmen - including those
involuntarily extended in August 2002 for a second year - with Army National Guard and Army Reserve troops. The
proposal to use Army personnel to help the Security Forces is a straightforward and sensible solution - one that is
obvious enough that I identified and recommended it in general terms three months ago in DefenseWatch magazine
("Reservists: A Year of Plummeting Morale," Sept. 11. 2002).
One factor that has entered the ongoing discussions is the realization by defense planners that there has been little, if
any, balance in the utilization of reserve component personnel. Some units and components are over-burdened, while
others, especially in the combat arms of the ARNG and the combat support units of the USAR, have seen little additional
duty.
What has become clear is that after months of mounting complaints and increasing media coverage, DoD personnel
policy analysts appear to have recognized the seriousness of the problem. Many of the experts have belatedly
concluded that if not resolved, these disruptions will prompt many Reservists and Guardsmen to leave the reserve
components en masse, creating an additional set of problems for the Air Force that threatens to render the service
unable to meet future mission requirements.
Senior Pentagon leaders have repeatedly stated that their goal is to prevent individual reservists from having to serve a
second full year of involuntary active duty. The inter-service and joint discussions to equalize that burden are the first
steps in the right direction.
A second potential solution to the Security Forces crisis may come from improved technology and the outsourcing of
many security functions that will eliminate or at least minimize the need for uniformed members to fill a number of
positions. The Air Force is also considering beefing up the Security Forces roster by moving more open enlistment
option airmen into that community.
Ground-based security is not the only area that has drawn the attention of Pentagon planners. The "jointness" issue has
arisen in another key area of homeland defense. Since November 1997, continental air defense has been the sole
responsibility of the Air National Guard. Under the control of First Air Force at Tyndall AFB, Fla., the mission of
defending America in the air transitioned from a combined active Air Force/ANG relationship to one where 10 ANG
fighter wings, located at the corners of the country and points in-between, assumed full responsibility for continental air
defense and air sovereignty protection.
In the five short years since the ANG assumed the mission, the number of dedicated air defense fighter wings has
shrunk from 10 to four. Additional support from non-air defense units was available, but generally from units that were
geographically removed from the assigned and dedicated air defense unit.
On 9/11, none of the ANG's alert fighter aircraft were positioned to either intercept or down the "manned missiles" that
the al Qaeda terrorists used so effectively against us. And when Maj. Gen. Larry K. Arnold, commander of 1AF and
commander, CONUS NORAD Region, ordered manned ANG combat air patrols over American cities in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, this inadvertently offered further confirmation that units, personnel and equipment were overstretched.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas F. Hall has stated that he does not believe that the Guard
and reserves are as "joint" as the active components. To get to that point, Hall has suggested that Navy and Marine
Corps fighter aircraft and personnel - both active-duty and reserve units - join in the homeland defense role.
What remains unclear today is how many USAR and ARNG troops will be used to support USAF security missions.
Another consideration is which service will provide funding for use of the Army Guardsmen and Reservists. Officials
have yet to decide on these key questions.
But the issues themselves are clear.
The U.S. Air Force does not have sufficient numbers of people dedicated to the air defense and the security and force
protection missions. While defense planners are giving positive consideration to the suggestion in DefenseWatch
several months ago for augmenting the force with Army Reserve and National Guard personnel, even that suggestion
will only serve as a Band-Aid measure until the Air Force corrects its deep-rooted personnel problems.
That is, the ultimate cure will require the Air Force (and other services) to prevail against Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld's obsession with cutting the end strength for both the active and reserve components. It remains an uphill
battle.
Paul Connors is a Senior Editor of DefenseWatch. He can be reached at
