Table Of ContentACTION, DECISION, AND INTENTION
ACTION, DECISION,
AND INTENTION
Studies in the Foundations of
Action Theory as an Approach to
Understanding Rationality and Decision
Edited by ROBERT AUDI
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Reprinted from Theory and Decision, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1986)
D. Reidel Publishing Company / Dordrecht / Boston
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ISBN-13: 978-94-010-8588-5 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-4696-5
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ACTION, DECISION, AND INTENTION
Studies in the Foundations of Action Theory as an
Approach to Understanding Rationality and Decision
Edited by
ROBERT AUD!
ROBERT AUD! / Preface 205
ROBERT AUD! / Action Theory as a Resource for Decision
Theory 207
CARL GINET / Voluntary Exertion of the Body: A Volitional
Account 223
HUGH J. MCCANN / Intrinsic Intentionality 247
WILLIAM P. ALSTON / An Action-Plan Interpretation of
Purposive Explanations of Actions 275
BRUCE AUNE / Formal Logic and Practical Reasoning 301
JOHN G. BENNETT / Leading a Rational Life 321
Announcements 334, 335
PREFACE
Most of the papers in this collection are contributions to action theory
intended to be of some relevance to one or another concern of decision
theory, particularly to its application to concrete human behavior. Some
of the papers touch only indirectly on problems of interest to decision
theorists, but taken together they should be of use to both decision
theorists and philosophers of action. Robert Audi's paper indicates how
a number of questions in action theory might bear on problems in decision
theory, and it suggests how some action-theoretic results may help in the
construction or interpretation of theories of decision, both normative and
empirical. Carl Ginet's essay lays foundations for the conception of
action. His volitional framework roots actions internally and conceives
them as irreducibly connected with intentionality. Hugh McCann's essay
is also foundational, but stresses intention more than volition and lays
some of the groundwork for assessing the rationality of intention and
intentional action. In William Alston's paper, the notion of a plan as
underlying (intentional) action is central, and we are given both a con
ception of the structure of intentional action and a set of implicit goals
and beliefs - those whose content is represented in the plan - which form
an indispensable part of the basis on which the rationality of the action
is to be judged. Bruce Aune's paper explicity presents a conception of
practical reasoning as a process underlying rational action; and on the
view he proposes, we need not approach rational action in terms of a
framework radically different from that appropriate to theoretical
reasoning. In John G. Bennet's essay, the most global of all the papers
in its treatment of rationality, conduct is viewed in relation to the agent's
life plans. This essay suggests the urgency of some problems that are often
neglected, concerning the determination and weighting of the various
elements crucial for judging the rationality of an action.
ROBERT AUD!
Theory and Decision 20 (1986) 205.
ROBERT AUDI
ACTION THEOR Y AS A RESOURCE FOR
DECISION THEORY
Many problems in decision theory intersect problems in action theory.
But although this is widely realized, the connections between the two
fields have rarely been systematically discussed in the literature. This
essay will attempt to articulate some of those connections and a number.
of important problems they raise. The general topic is large, and I shall
have to work with simple decision-theoretic models and to restrict my
attention chiefly to normative decision theory as applied to individual
decision. Some implications for group decision theory, and for empirical
issues concerning decision, should be apparent; but my main focus will
be on individual cases, particularly in relation to standards of rationality.
Let us begin with an elementary decision-theoretic model which, whatever
difficulties it may raise, represents a major normative ideal. On this
model, an action is rational if and only if it maximizes the agent's
expected utility, and a decision is rational if and only if the action which
it is a decision to perform maximizes the agent's expected utility. Now
while we cannot explore many interpretations of this model, there are
some useful questions suggested by approaching it from an action-theo
retic point of view. One question is how to characterize the alternatives
among which the agent, S, decides. Still another concerns what causal
conditions the model imposes; and a third concerns how the psychological
sources of utilities and probabilities are to be construed. This section will
take these questions up in turn.
From an action-theoretic point of view, we should distinguish be
havioral choice and decision from psychological choice and decision. S
behaviorally decides between alternative actions A and B provided
(roughly speaking) that he simply performs one with a sense of the other
Theory and Decision 20 (1986) 207-221.
© 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
208 ROBERT AUDI
as also possible for him. Here deciding is roughly equivalent to a kind
of doing. It thus represents an action-token, which has a definite time and
place and is presumably some kind of particular. On the other hand, S
psychologically decides between A and B provided (roughly speaking)
that he makes up his mind to perform one, with a sense of the other as
also possible for him. Here the deciding is a mental event (though not
necessarily in a sense inconsistent with materialism), and making a
decision in this sense does not even require that either A or B is possible:
one can decide· to A, even rationally decide to A, so long as one takes
A to be possible for one. In both cases, the object of decision is an
action-type, e.g. accepting an invitation; but while behavioral decision
entails the tokening of the relevant type, that is not so for psychological
decision. Action-types are properties, since, unlike action-tokens, they
may be instantiated by different agents and at different times; and they
may be objects of a decision without being realized by it.
How might the distinction between behavioral and psychological de
cision be reflected in the formulation of the maximization of expected
utility model? Both sorts of decision should be accounted for, since, in
guiding our future behavior, we need criteria for what it is rational to
decide to do, while in assessing past or present behavior we need criteria
for rationally doing something. Perhaps one could start with a formu
lation like this: An action-type, A, is rational, for S, if and only if his
performing it has at least as much expected utility as his performing any
alternative S believes he has; i.e., if we add the products of the values,
for S, of each outcome of A which he takes to be possible, times the
probability he assigns to that outcome given his A-ing, we get at least as
high a sum as the same method yields for any alternative he believes he
has in the situation of decision. As used here, 'outcome' applies to what
is entailed by, or directly involved in, A-ing, as well as what is caused by
it, since we surely want to account for any intrinsic value S may take A -ing
to have. If we adopt this formulation, however, we are committed to
holding that an action-type might be rational for S even if it is not possible
for him, indeed, even if it is not possible for anyone. A natural restriction
here is to require that A range over actions possible for S. Even then there
may be actions possible for S such that (a) he does not believe they are
possible for him, yet (b) his performing them would in fact conduce more
to what he values than any action possible for him which he believes he
ACTION THEORY AS A RESOURCE FOR DECISION THEORY 209
can perform. Such an action might be called objectively more rational for
S. But I prefer to say that, while it may be objectively better, it need not
be more rational, e.g. because relative to what S can be expected to
believe, he takes account of all the possible actions one could reasonably
expect him to consider.
Supposing we do relativize rational action to those actions that are both
possible for S and so regarded by him, how would the· resulting model
apply to behavioral decision (as a special case of action)? The view which
comes most readily to mind is that an action-token, including decisions
as a special case, is rational for S if and only if the token represents a
type which is rational for S in the sense of maximizing expected utility
as just described. This thesis, or views roughly equivalent to it, seems to
be commonly held, at least as an idealization. But even qualified versions
of the thesis may be criticizable because they do not require an appro
priate connection between the action-token in question and the psychol
ogical elements in the agent - above all his values and beliefs - that are
the source of the expected utility. I have elsewhere argued that unless such
psychological elements can explain an action-token, then it is not rational
in the light of them: specifically, both for actions and for propositional
attitudes, rationality in the light of a reason - such as the action's
maximizing expected utility - apparently requires its explainability in
terms of that reason.1 For instance, one's accepting a conference invi
tation is rational in virtue of one's assigning it higher expected utility than
any alternative one supposes one has (e.g. declining), only if one's values
underlying that assignment are a reason why (an explanatory reason) one
accepts it. Otherwise, the assignment simply provides a rationalization for
accepting; and if the action is rational, it must be so on another basis,
e.g. because it is explained by a desire to see one's children on the same
trip. If the view of rational action (tokens) that I am proposing is correct,
what is the appropriate response from the point of view of incorporating
the relevant action-theoretic result into at least some decision-theoretic
models?
The maximization of expected utility model is not usually stated with
an explanatory condition (broadly, a causal condition) requiring that the
agent's reasons for the action - the psychological sources of its expected
utility - explain it. This is perhaps because the main focus in discussions
of normative decision theory has been prospective: on what it is rational
210 ROBERT AUDI
for 8 to decide, where the decision has not occurred. What I suggest is
that we distinguish two versions of the model. We may then say that the
model without the causal condition provides a criterion for an action's
being rationalfor 8 to perform, and hence a rational object of choice (or
decision), whereas with the causal condition it provides a criterion for 8's
having rationally acted. In the action-theoretic terminology we are using,
one might say that the former criterion applies to action-types, and tells
us when a type of action, say accepting a conference invitation, is rational
for 8; whereas the latter criterion applies to action-tokens, and tells when
an action actually carried out, such as Jane's accepting a particular
invitation, is rationally performed. The latter criterion, moreover, is more
relevant to empirical decision theory; for if a theory of decision is to help
us understand people's actual decision-making, surely the factors in terms
of which it evaluates a decision should have at least some significant
explanatory role in relation to the action.
On both interpretations of the maximization model, the basis of
assessment is standardly taken to consist of two sorts of variables:
subjective probabilities and subjective utilities. This leads to an important
question about how to interpret the psychological foundations of decision
theory. Are these variables identical with, or at least functions of, the
sorts of common-sense explanatory concepts which are a main concern
of action theory? Since my chief aim here is to connect decision theory
with action theory, I shall simplify matters by discussing only two of the
major common-sense explanatory concepts central in action theory,
believing and wanting. My main question here is simply whether those
concepts are useful for decision theory or are instead eliminable in favor
of some available alternatives.
Let us start with subjective probabilities. One can ascertain these in a
number of ways, including asking a suitably informed subject to assign
probabilities to outcomes. But plainly when 8 does that (sincerely) he is
expressing a belief. At the very least, then, the relevant SUbjective proba
bilities seem to be determined by 8's beliefs, even if subjective probability
is not itself a kind of belief. If beliefs are what (at least mainly) determines
subjective probabilities, then the concept of belief is important for at least
elementary decision theory. Is there a better substitute among cognitive
concepts? I doubt that there is at present, though recent developments
in cognitive psychology suggest that alternatives may be forthcoming.2
ACTION THEORY AS A RESOURCE FOR DECISION THEORY 211
Action theory is one major source of clarification of the concept of belief;
epistemology is another, and in both areas some of the literature might
bear on developing the psychological foundations of decision theory. 3
Assuming, then, that the concept of belief is important, and possibly
at present essential, for decision theory, what about the concept(s) crucIal
for understanding subjective value? A natural move is t.o use a kind of
belief, such as evaluative belief, for this task, and thereby simplify
decision theory by employing only one basic psychological concept. Thus,
the subjective value of something might appear to be a function of how
good the person in question believes it to be. There is no doubt a sense
of 'subjective value' for which this is true, though my own position is that
such beliefs express a valuation S places on the thing in question, as
opposed to how much he values it. In any case, I suspect that if such
beliefs can serve the purposes of decision theory, it is only because they
imply wanting. I have two main reasons for saying this.
First, if S believes an outcome to be good, but (as seems jointly
possible) in no sense wants it, it is by no means clear that acting to bring
it about is rational for him, though it is to be sure not plausibly said to
be irrational either: if, as I do, we consider 'rational' and 'irrational'
contraries, then (as I would view it) it simply is not rational. His wanting
to bring it about might still be rational; but unless rationality is un
derstood narrowly, say, as what is required by moral standards, it is
implausible to suppose even that it must be rational for him to want to
bring it about. In any event, this is not what we must suppose on the basis
of the strong association between rational self-interest and decision
theoretic rationality.
My second point is that unless we take evaluative belief to imply some
degree of wanting, we seem unwarranted in assuming an explanatory
connection between (a) the elements in terms of which, on the evaluative
belief interpretation of the maximization model, an action is rational, and
(b) the occurrence of the action (a connection which Hempel, 1965,
463-487, and others, have been at pains to preserve). Without this
connection, decision-theoretic rationality implies nothing definite about
how a rational action is to be explained, and is consistent with its being
explained in a way that would undermine its rationality: e.g., as wholly
a result of a posthypnotic suggestion which (1) just happens to dictate the
same action that maximizes expected utility, such as submitting a paper,
