Abortion and Unborn Human Life

193 Pages·2010·0.674 MB·English

by  Patrick Lee

Abortion
•
& Unborn
Human Life

Patrick Lee
Abortion
•
& Unborn
Human Life
Second Edition
The Catholic University
of America Press
Washington, D.C.
Copyright © 2010
The Catholic University of America Press
All rights reserved
The paper used in this publication meets the
minimum requirements of American National
Standards for Information Science—Permanence
of Paper for Printed Library materials, ANSI
Z39.48-1984.
∞
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
Data
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
Data
Lee, Patrick, 1952–
Abortion and unborn human life / Patrick
Lee.—2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8132-1730-7 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Abortion—Moral and ethical aspects. I. Title.
HQ767.15.L44 2010
179´.76—dc22
2010006653
To Frederick D. Wilhelmsen,
in gratitude and friendship

• Contents
Preface to the Second Edition ix
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction 1
1 Do Unborn Human Beings Become
Persons after Birth? 8
2 Do Unborn Human Beings Become Persons
during Gestation? 47
3 When Do Individual Human Beings
Come to Be? 71
4 Is Abortion Justified as Nonintentional
Killing? 108
5 Consequentialist Arguments 140

Works Cited 165
Index 173

• Preface to the Second Edition
Since 1996 when the first edition of this book appeared, the
debate about the morality of abortion has not subsided.
From the standpoint of philosophy many issues have be-
come clearer. In my judgment, the course of the debate has
confirmed the position I defend in this book, namely, that
unborn human beings have an equal and inherent dignity
and are subjects of basic rights from the moment they come
to be, which is at fertilization.
In this second edition I have not attempted a complete
rewrite of the original, since I believe the basic structure and
overall argument set out in the first edition remain sound.
Three developments, however, required significant updating.
The first of these developments has been an added pre-
cision required for the argument against the gradualist posi-
tion (the position that a human being only gradually comes
to be). Criticism of the argument I originally set out in the
first edition, especially by Dean Stretton, helped me to see
that two distinct propositions need to be established in or-
der to show that you and I are intrinsically valuable as sub-
jects of rights from the moment we come to be—that is, we
do not come to be at one time but become intrinsically valu-
able only at a later time. Not only are human beings them-
selves valuable, rather than being mere vehicles as it were
for what is intrinsically valuable (something made clear in
the first edition), but we also are valuable in virtue of the
fundamental kind of being (substance) we are (not clearly
ix