A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies

210 Pages·2016·1.832 MB·English

by  Leonard Nelson, Fernando Leal, David Carus

Argumentation Library
Leonard Nelson
A Theory of
Philosophical
Fallacies
Translated by Fernando Leal and David Carus
A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies
Argumentation Library
VOLUME 26
Series Editor
Frans H. van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Editorial Board
Bart Garssen, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Scott Jacobs, University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign, USA
Erik C.W. Krabbe, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
John Woods, University of British Columbia, Canada
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5642
Leonard Nelson
A Theory of Philosophical
Fallacies
123
Leonard Nelson
Göttingen
Germany
Translated byFernando Leal andDavidCarus
Deceased—Leonard Nelson(1882–1927)
ISSN 1566-7650 ISSN 2215-1907 (electronic)
Argumentation Library
ISBN978-3-319-20782-7 ISBN978-3-319-20783-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015945152
SpringerChamHeidelbergNewYorkDordrechtLondon
©SpringerInternationalPublishingSwitzerland2016
Main text translated from the German language edition: Typische Denkfehler in der Philosophie by
LeonardNelson,©FelixMeinerVerlag2011.Allrightsreserved
AppendixtranslatedfromtheGermanlanguageedition:“DiekritischeEthikbeiKant,SchillerundFries:
eineRevisionihrerPrinzipien”,GesammelteSchrifteninneunBänden,vol.VIII,pp.27–192byLeonard
Nelson,©FelixMeinerVerlag1971.Allrightsreserved
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Contents
Introduction by Fernando Leal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
What Is the Theory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Who Was Leonard Nelson? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Some Objections to the Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Note on the Translation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Lecture I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Lecture II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Reference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Lecture III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Lecture IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Lecture V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Lecture VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Lecture VII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Lecture VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
v
vi Contents
Lecture IX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Lecture X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Lecture XI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Lecture XII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Lecture XIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Lecture XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Lecture XV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Lecture XVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Lecture XVII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Lecture XVIII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Lecture XIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Lecture XX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Lecture XXI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Lecture XXII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Appendix: Seven Kantian Fallacies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Introduction by Fernando Leal
Abstract In 1921 Nelson presented what seems to be the first theory of philo-
sophical argumentation, or at least of its negative or destructive part—a theory of
philosophical fallacies. That theory says that the peculiar nature of philosophical
thinkingrepeatedlyleadspeopletotakeordinaryconceptswithgreatphilosophical
import,suchascausalityorduty,andreplacethemwithnew,made-upones,whose
content is very different from that of the originally available ones. When the new
conceptsusurptheplaceoftheoriginaloneswithinaphilosophicalargument,they
invariably produce false results—on all sides of philosophical disputes. Many
apparently irresolvable disputes in philosophy are the product of such fallacious
concept-swapping.
The relationship between philosophy and argumentation is, to say the least, pecu-
liar. Philosophers argue all the time, that much we all know, even though quite
often it is difficult, and sometimes exceedingly difficult, to make out what exactly
theirargumentsare.Butevenconceding(forthesakeofargument)thatphilosophy
is all about arguing, it is again a hard fact that philosophers, in sharp contrast to
mathematicians or scientists, are rarely if ever convinced by each other’s argu-
ments. Moreover, the favourite occupation of philosophers is to pick holes in the
argumentsoftheirfellowphilosophers,therebyindicatingtotheoutsideworldthat
there is something rotten with all philosophical arguments.
None of this is controversial. A curious observer would therefore be readily
excusedifheorshewoulddrawtheconclusionthat,surely,philosophersmusthave
bynowdevelopedatheoryofphilosophicalargumentation.Thisishardlythecase.
A careful inspection of the relevant literature reveals it to consist basically of two
kindsofpublications.Ontheonehand,therearepractical‘textbooks’purportingto
givestudentssomeanalytictoolstoanalyzeandevaluatephilosophicalargumentsor
to construct and present their own. On the other hand, there are metaphilosophical
texts presenting a certain view of the nature of philosophy with more or less loose
©SpringerInternationalPublishingSwitzerland2016 1
L.Nelson,ATheoryofPhilosophicalFallacies,
ArgumentationLibrary26,DOI10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4_1
2 IntroductionbyFernandoLeal
observationsabouttherolethatargumentsplayordonotplayinphilosophy.1None
ofthesebooks,however,presentasystematictheoryofphilosophicalargumentation
as such,a theoryof how philosophersactuallyargue or failto argue.2
This is the main reason why the book the reader is now holding in his or her
hands merits attention. This book does present a theory of philosophical argu-
mentation.Itisperhapstoosoontosaywhetherthetheoryiscorrect,entirelyorin
part, but it is quite a clear theory, so that at the very least it might start a much
needed discussion about what a theory of philosophical argumentation should be.
InthefollowingIshallfirst brieflystatewhat thattheoryis, then Ishall present
its author, for he is not well known, and finally I shall endeavour to meet some
objections that can be raised against the theory.
What Is the Theory?
Nelson’s theory of philosophical argumentation, asset forth inthis book,is only a
partial theory, for it only concerns those philosophical arguments that go wrong,
that contain a fallacy, i.e. an error in reasoning. It does not say anything about
philosophicalargumentsthatarecorrectandfallacy-free.Moreover,thetheorydoes
not purport to cover all fallacies, but only the ‘typical’ ones, viz those that a
philosopher will commit sooner or later because of the peculiar business he is in.
Fallacies of such a typical sort are as it were an occupational hazard.
Even the plural—fallacies—has to be taken with a pinch of salt, for at bottom
there is, according to the theory, only one typical fallacy in philosophical argu-
mentation, although it comes in many shapes and forms. This may not look very
promising.Atheoryofphilosophicalargumentationthatisinfactaboutonefallacy?
Forittoworkwemustassumethatinphilosophywewill,alwaysoratleastforthe
1Tothefirstgroupbelonge.g.Cornmanetal.(1992),Rosenberg(1996),Morton(2004),Cohen
(2004), Martinich (2005), Baggini and Fosl (2010); to the second e.g. Stove (1991), Glymour
(1992),Bouveresse (1996), Williamson (2007),Gutting (2009),Schnädelbach(2012).Iamnat-
urallyexcludingfromconsiderationthosetextbookswrittenbyphilosophersaboutargumentation
ingeneral(usuallyinviewofcoursesinlogicorcriticalthinking)aswellaspapersorbooksin
whichparticularargumentsofparticularphilosophersaresubjectedtoscrutinyeitherforhistorical
orsystematicpurposes.Theymaycontainvaluableremarksaboutphilosophicalargumentationbut
belongtoadifferentballgamealtogether.AspecialcaseisNicholasRescher,whoinaseriesof
papers and books (e.g. 2001, 2006, 2008) has made some interesting, albeit in my opinion
somewhatrambling,attemptsatatheoryofphilosophicalargumentation.
2There seem to be two theories of philosophical argumentation apart from Nelson’s. Johnstone
(1959, 1978), developed in a long and distinguished career a theory that is both profound and
undeservedlyunderratedbyphilosophers,althoughithasfortunatelymetwithsomeattentionin
thefieldofargumentationstudies(seee.g.thespecialissueinhishonourinInformalLogic,2001,
as well as van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2007). I can see clear points of contact as well as
undeniabledifferencesbetweenJohnstone’stheoryandNelson’s,andIcertainlyhopetotacklethe
taskofcomparingtheminthefuture.Asfortheothertheory,seeFootnote7ofthischapter.
WhatIstheTheory? 3
mostpart,reasoncorrectlyifonlyweavoidthatonefallacytowhosedescriptionand
illustration this whole book isdevoted.Thatis exactly what Nelson assumes.
But what exactly is this fallacy? The analysis that uncovers it is a two-step
procedure.
Step1 Nelsonstartswiththefactthataphilosophicalargumentisalwayspartofan
ongoing, if not always fully explicit, discussion between philosophers each one of
whom affirms something that appears to imply denying what the other holds. The
logicalbuildingconstitutedbytheopposingargumentsNelsoncallsthe‘dialectics’
of the issue at hand—harking back to Plato, who invented the term to name the
peculiar art of dialogue developed by his master, Socrates. Although such logical
buildings—the sets of propositions and arguments pitted against each other all
along the history of philosophy—can sometimes be abstruse and convoluted,
Nelson’s analysis tries to reduce the basic opposition to its raw core, which he
sometimes represents in the shape of elegant diagrams. The reader will find in this
book five of those. Popper for one expressed his admiration for this analytical feat
of reduction and tried to imitate it (see Popper 1979).
Those diagrams show that the way philosophers arrive at their positive philo-
sophicaldoctrinesisbywayofdenyingthepositivedoctrinesoftheiropponents.They
managetobelievetheyhaveprovedsomething,sayP,becausetheyhaveshownthe
oppositedoctrine,sayQ,tobefalse.Theiropponentsplayexactlythesamegame,so
that the net result is the appearance of a relation of contradiction between P and
Qwherethereisinfactnosuchcontradiction.Thegameisplayedagainandagainby
philosophersonthestrength of acommon assumption,ausuallyhidden presuppo-
sitionsharedbythetwoadversaries,vizthatPandQexhaustallpossibilitiesavailable
tophilosophicalthought.YetifPandQexcludeeachother,theirnegationsdonot.In
otherwords,ifPistrue,thenQhastobefalse,andifQistrue,thenPhastobefalse;
butifPisfalse,Qdoesnothavetobetrue,andifQisfalse,Pdoesnothavetobetrue.
Inthetraditionallogicaljargon,thetwophilosophicaldoctrinesarenotcontradictory
butrathercontrarytoeachother—theycannotbothbetrueyettheymayverywell
bothbefalse,vizifthecommonassumptionthattheyaretheonlyalternativesisitself
false. The starting point of the discussion is then the choice between two options
(eitherPorQ),alogicaldisjunctionwhichisunderstoodbybothdiscussionpartners
asbeingbothexclusiveandexhaustive.Startingfromsuchadisjunctionthediscus-
sionevolvesinapredictableway,whichNelson’sdiagramstrytorepresentinaterse,
parsimonious manner. If we use arrows to indicate an inferential relation, then the
followingwouldbethegeneralformofaNelsondiagram: