Table Of ContentA SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOUSING
To the memory of
Robert Nozick
A Social Philosophy of Housing
PETER KING
Centre for Comparative Housing Research
De Montfort University
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First published 2003 by Ashgate Publishing
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Contents
Preface vii
1 Housing and Philosophical Justification 1
2 Theorising Housing Policy 11
3 From Need to Choice 25
4 A Right to Housing 45
5 Being Responsible 59
6 Individual Autonomy 81
7 What Housing is For 95
Bibliography 101
Index 107
Preface
Writing philosophically about housing poses one with an immediate problem. I can
explain this with an anecdote. A while ago I completed a paper on duties and the
role of social housing organisations (parts of which feature in this book), and sent it
off to an academic housing journal. The paper was quickly returned with the
comment that it was very interesting theoretically but it did not contain enough
housing content. Thinking I was being clever, I therefore sent if off to a philosophy
journal. It came back just as quickly with the comment that it was too policy-based
and therefore not philosophically sophisticated enough. The editor suggested that I
might try a housing journal! Both journal editors were doubtless correct in their
judgements, but this anecdote does point to a problem with discussing housing
philosophically, namely, just who is one writing for?
It is very difficult to satisfy both housing researchers and philosophers at the
same time. If one concentrates too much on philosophical concepts, housing
researchers may lose interest or not be able to follow the significance of the debate.
Yet to concentrate too much on the specifics of housing policy may be of no interest
to philosophers and a too literal connection between policy and theory can be seen
as naive.
Partly this is a problem of specialisation, in that disciplines have developed their
own literature, vocabulary and methods, and this makes it difficult for two different
disciplines to talk to each other at the same level. Thus if one uses one set of
literature or vocabulary, one may exclude the other. But it is also a matter of
perceived relevance and interest - what is interesting to one researcher may not
register with another. This is particularly the case when one discipline concentrates
on concepts and the other is data-driven. To an extent the gap between these
interests may be too great to bridge.
Yet housing is not a discipline in itself. As Jim Kemeny (1992) has argued,
housing is a subject-based field. As a result housing research is undertaken from the
standpoints of different disciplines. Geographers discuss the same subject as
sociologists, political scientists and economists. This is one of the reasons why
housing research is interesting and illuminating. But one worries sometimes
whether, in order to talk to each other, researchers do not take the lowest common
denominator approach. This involves the almost complete eradication of discipline-
based theory and an emphasis on policy discussion. What would be a pertinent
question, therefore, is whether geographers talk to other geographers about housing.
What is clear is that philosophers are not conversant with the housing literature or
the key issues. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of housing researchers
do not turn to philosophy to guide their work. This means I risk the possibility of
being ignored by both sides who might see that my appeal is elsewhere.
This might lead to the suggestion of why I bother to discuss housing
philosophically. Clearly the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and therefore I shall
leave the arguments and approach of this book to do its own convincing. Yet I do
viii A Social Philosophy of Housing
believe that the effort is worthwhile. I believe there are considerable insights to be
gained from a philosophical approach to housing, not least of which is the key
epistemological distinction between the private and public perception of housing. I
consider this to be a fundamental insight into housing, and one that could not be
gleaned using the methods of the disciplines more conventionally applied to housing.
This book is intended to be a summation of much of the work I have undertaken
over the last fifteen years or so. In essence it seeks to develop themes and issues
such as the role of individual action, the private nature of housing and notions of
competence I have discussed before. Hence concepts such as need, choice and rights
reappear. But my aim in this book is to bring these concerns together into what I
hope is a cohesive whole. This can be seen, therefore, as an attempt to draw several
strands together: to relate the existential concerns of The Limits of Housing Policy
(1996) with the more analytical approach of Housing, Individuals and the State
(1998). This has meant some shifts in emphasis and the use of different theoretical
approaches. However, there is a consistency of interest that runs through this body
of work. In many ways this work is an attempt to readdress the existential concerns
of the first book in the analytical language of the latter. Having said this, the
argument is developed considerably and takes on board new issues, particularly the
notion of responsibility.
In the planning stage of the book I had envisaged it as being much longer, and I had
intended to consider a number of other concepts I have touched on before. However,
as the main line of argument developed I decided to cut out large sections of the work
which, it seemed to me, would have detracted from this main line of reasoning.
Fortunately the finished book is much shorter and, hopefully, more focussed.
Whilst this is not necessarily intended as my last word on these issues I see this
book as drawing a particular phase in my thinking on housing issues to a close.
Unlike some other researchers, I am not claiming to have ‘done’ housing and move
on to other things. What I am suggesting is that I have said all I can on the issues of
individualism and housing for the time being at least, and perhaps forever. This, as
fallible as it is, is intended as a definitive statement of the individualist argument.
There are, however, still plenty of housing issues with which to concern myself,
particularly the role that social and political thought can play in understanding
housing phenomena.
This book is therefore a development out of and beyond my previous work.
Accordingly, several parts of it have been published previously in earlier forms. What
I have sought to do is to bring this material together and develop it further. Thus, even
though parts of this book have already been published, the whole presents a new and
distinct contribution, or at least, that is my hope. I am, of course, grateful to the various
editors and publishers for their permission to reuse this material.
The key development from my earlier works is that, in this book, I have sought to
build up a more fully developed philosophical theory of housing. The word ‘of is
important here. Other theorists, such as Jim Kemeny himself, have fought shy of this
little preposition. Whilst I can respect and appreciate their caution, this approach
does suggest that there is some necessary divide between housing and theory. We
can try and use one to illuminate the other, but they remain separate. This, to my
mind though, gives the impression that housing is not substantive enough for theory
building. Yet, as Jim Kemeny has argued so well, the problem with housing studies
Preface IX
is that it is (or was) anti-theoretical! It seems to me, therefore, that what is needed is
to get right on and theorise about housing - to build theories o/housing. We should
not be ashamed of housing, as if it were some insignificant intellectual backwater -
nothing could be more self-fulfilling - but see it as eminently suited to theoretical
work. I believe that this argument has now been won (thanks to Jim Kemeny as
much as anyone), and thus it is entirely appropriate and no longer eccentric to
discuss a social philosophy of housing (I shall work assiduously to get my job title
changed accordingly).
On the subject of the book’s title, this is definitely intended as a and not the
social philosophy of housing. Clearly, there are many different approaches from the
one taken here. My approach can broadly be described as Kantian libertarian,
relying, as it does, on the integration of Kant’s categorical imperative into libertarian
theory by Robert Nozick. Other approaches, be they socialist, Marxist or
conservative, are clearly possible, as would be other approaches within the
libertarian, liberal and Kantian traditions. This book does not exhaust the
possibilities for a social philosophical approach to housing. My aim is rather to
stimulate others to think and write about housing in this manner.
As I have just intimated, much of the inspiration for both this book and my
previous works has been the example of Robert Nozick. I first read his seminal
work, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), with the aim of finding fault and seeking to
refute his arguments. However, the danger of reading one’s apparent opponents is
that one might be convinced that they are right and that one has been wrong all
along. This indeed happened to me in this case. I found that his arguments could not
be so easily dismissed as I had thought, but rather they present a coherent and
sophisticated defence of individual liberty. This may put me in ‘bad company’, but
then Nozick was never the New Right monster he was portrayed by the collectivist
left. Rather he sought to rigorously apply the logic of individual freedom and see
where it led. In particular, I learnt from Nozick that ideas have consequences, and
that one needs to explore rigorously what those consequences are. This may lead
one to question the initial premises. But, after all, it is a failure to do that very thing
- to consider that if our ideas lead to starvation, death and humiliation, they might be
wrong - that has tarnished so many of the ideological projects of the last two
centuries. But it was not merely the content of his work that persuaded me, but also
the brilliant manner in which he develops his case. He made me realise that there is
more to analytical philosophy than its opponents contend. Thus not only did I
change my politics because of reading Nozick, but also my methods.
Nozick, in short, has inspired me. Much of my work, but particularly Housing,
Individuals and the State, can be seen as attempts to apply Nozick to housing. It will
soon become clear that this new work also bears the stamp of his influence. It was with
sadness therefore that I learnt of his death in January 2002. I hope it will not be
considered an impertinence on my part, as someone who can never aspire to his levels
of achievement and recognition, to dedicate this all too humble volume to his memory.
I have many other people to thank who have helped, consciously or otherwise, in
the production of this book. I am fortunate to have a number of colleagues in the
Centre for Comparative Housing Research at De Montfort University who have
acted as exacting yet constructive critics, especially as most of the time they
disagree with the content. Tim Brown, the Director at CCHR, deserves a special
