Table Of ContentA Pragmatic Approach
to Libertarian Free Will
A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will argues that the kind of
free will required for moral responsibility and just desert is libertarian free
will. It is a source of great controversy whether such a libertarian view is
coherent and whether we should believe that we have such free will. This
book explains and defends Robert Kane’s conception of libertarian free will
while departing from it in certain key respects. It is argued that a suitably
modified Kanean model of free will can be shown to be conceptually
coherent. In addition, it is argued that while we lack sufficient epistemic
grounds supporting belief in the existence of libertarian free will, we may
still be justified in believing in it for moral reasons. As such, the book engages
critically with the works of a growing number of philosophers who argue
that we should jettison belief in the existence of desert-grounding free will
and the practices of praise and blame and reward and punishment which it
supports.
John Lemos is the Joseph McCabe Professor of Philosophy at Coe College in
Cedar Rapids, Iowa. He is the author of C ommonsense Darwinism: Evolution,
Morality, and the Human Condition (2008) and F reedom, Responsibility, and
Determinism: A Philosophical Dialogue ( 2013 ). He has also published over
30 articles in various philosophical journals, such as T he American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly, Dialectica, Law and Philosophy, M etaphilosophy,
Philosophia , and T he Southern Journal of Philosophy.
Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy
Nature and Normativity
Biology, Teleology, and Meaning
Mark Okrent
Formal Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism
In Defense of Belief in the Natural World
Tomoji Shogenji
Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity
Patrick Bondy
From Rules to Meanings
New Essays on Inferentialism
Edited by Ondřej Beran, Vojtěch Kolman, and Ladislav Koreň
Toleration and Freedom from Harm
Liberalism Reconceived
Andrew Jason Cohen
Voicing Dissent
The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public
Edited by Casey Rebecca Johnson
New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Edited by Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus, and Denis Perrin
A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will
John Lemos
For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com
A Pragmatic Approach
to Libertarian Free Will
John Lemos
First published 2018
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2018 Taylor & Francis
The right of John Lemos to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
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or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 978-1-138-49803-7 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-351-01727-5 (ebk)
Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
For those who raised me, my father, Ramon, and mother,
Mamie Lou, as well as my three older brothers—Noah, Bill,
and Chris
Contents
Acknowledgments viii
1 Introduction 1
2 Kane’s Libertarian Theory 8
3 Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Manipulation
Arguments 29
4 Kanean Libertarianism Examined 57
5 A Consideration of Alternative Event-causal
Libertarian Models of Basic Free Actions 83
6 Moral Responsibility Denial and the Problem
of Punishment 113
7 Libertarian Free Will and Moral Obligation 133
8 Hardheartedness and Libertarianism 151
9 Conclusion 170
Bibliography 173
Index 181
Acknowledgments
This book could not have been written without the help and support of vari-
ous institutions and persons. Were it not for the dedication of various teach-
ers at various institutions, I could not have written this book. So thanks are
due to the Miami-Dade County Public Schools and the many fine teachers
and coaches I had in that school system. Thanks are also due to the Uni-
versity of the South where I received my B.A. and Duke University where I
received my Ph.D. I am especially grateful to the wise teaching and counsel
of my undergraduate advisor, Professor Bill Garland, and my doctoral dis-
sertation advisor, Professor Michael Ferejohn, both of whom did much to
inspire my love for philosophy while patiently showing me how to do it
well. I have also benefitted greatly by holding a full-time teaching position
at Coe College for many years, where I work with two other philosophers,
Jeff Hoover and Peter McCormick, who have offered me various kinds of
support and encouragement over the years. At Coe, I’ve been supported by
its generous sabbatical program as well as an endowed chair, the Joseph
McCabe Chair in Philosophy.
Besides these institutions and persons, I’ve also benefitted greatly from
advice and encouragement from many other philosophers. There is no
doubt that I owe my greatest debt to Robert Kane. I believe I began email
correspondences with him in March 2007. I had always been attracted to
libertarian views of free will and had even defended the libertarian view in
one of the chapters of my first book, Commonsense Darwinism: Evolution,
Morality, and the Human Condition ( 2008 ). After completing that book,
my attention turned to full-time consideration of the problem of free will and
I am so fortunate to have found a wise and gracious kindred spirit in Bob
Kane. While we don’t agree on all matters surrounding the free will issue, we
do agree on much and I am forever in his debt for the patient and thoughtful
advice he has given me over the years. In addition to my correspondences
and conversations with Bob Kane, I have also benefitted from conversations
and correspondences with many other philosophers; among these are Joseph
Campbell, Gregg Caruso, Randolph Clarke, Michael Corrado, Richard Dou-
ble, Laura Ekstrom, Ryan Lake, Neil Levy, Michael McKenna, Alfred Mele,
Timothy O’Connor, Derk Pereboom, Saul Smilansky, and Bruce Waller. I
Acknowledgments ix
have probably left out some philosophers who deserve my thanks here, but
I know that I have spoken with or corresponded with each of these I list
here and have benefitted from them in various ways, whether through their
advice or encouragement or both.
Perhaps my greatest debts are owed to family. For instance, there is the
love and support I was offered by my parents and brothers growing up. It
is to them that I dedicate this book. However, I owe as much gratitude to
my wife, Laura, and my three children—Rosa, Billy, and Michael—who so
patiently put up with my work schedule and my philosophical pursuits.
Oddly enough, they do so with good cheer!
Finally, it should be noted as well that permission has been granted for
the use of all or parts of the following previously published works of mine:
“Kanian Freedom and the Problem of Luck,” The Southern Journal of
Philosophy 45 (2007): 515–532; “Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A
Reply to Griffith,” P hilosophia 39 ( 2011 ): 357–367; “Wanting, Willing, Try-
ing and Kane’s Theory of Free Will,” D ialectica 65 (2 011 ): 31–48; “Hard-
heartedness and Libertarianism,” Philo 16 ( 2013 ): 180–195; “Self-forming
Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility,” P hilosophia 43 (2015): 135–146;
“A Kantian Defense of Libertarian Blame,” J ournal of Cognition and Neu-
roethics 3 (2015): 251–263; “Moral Concerns About Responsibility Denial
and the Quarantine of Violent Criminals,” Law and Philosophy 35 (2016):
461–483; and “Hardheartedness and Libertarianism Again: A Rejoinder
to Double,” Journal of Philosophical Research 42 ( 2017 ). doi:10.5840/
jpr2017511104.
