Table Of ContentA Palestinian State
Written under the auspices of the Center for Strategic Studies,
Tel-Aviv University
A Palestinian State
The Implications for Israel
Mark A. Heller
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England
Copyright © 1983 by the President and Fellows
of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4
This book is printed on acid-free paper, and its binding
materials have been chosen for strength and durability.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Heller, Mark.
A Palestinian state.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Jewish-Arab relations —1973-
2. Palestine — Politics and government —1948-
I. Title.
DS119.7.H3855 1983 956'.04 82-15698
ISBN 0-674-65221-5 (cloth)
ISBN 0-674-65222-3 (paper)
for the children
Preface
Analyses of contemporary Middle Eastern politics are
notoriously perishable. Government policies are frequently
declared, and sometimes reversed, with dramatic effect,
regional alignments shift with impressive abruptness, and
leading personalities may disappear suddenly from the scene.
The volatility of the region was demonstrated, once again, by
three noteworthy events in the first half of September 1982.
During that period, President Ronald Reagan expressed an
American preference for Palestinian self-government in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, in association with Jordan; Arab
leaders, previously unable to overcome their political
differences, met in Fez, Morocco, and coupled their traditional
demand for an independent Palestinian state with a vaguely
worded peace plan which was later interpreted by King Husayn
of Jordan to portend recognition of Israel; and Bashir Jumayyil,
the president-elect of Lebanon, was assassinated nine days
before he was scheduled to assume office.
The turbulence of those two weeks, though unusual in its in
tensity, is hardly atypical of Middle Eastern politics, and it is
therefore not surprising that published writings, by the time
they have gone through the production process, often appear to
have been outmoded by intervening developments. Unfor
tunately, there is little reason to hope that the present study,
before it is published, will have been rendered obsolete by solu
tions to the problems it attempts to address.
This analysis was completed before the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon in June 1982. The Israeli campaign dealt the Palestine
viii Preface
Liberation Organization (PLO) a severe military blow, deprived
it of the protostate it had built up in southern Lebanon, and
compelled it to abandon its political base of operations in
Beirut. Nevertheless, the PLO has not been destroyed, and it
has emerged from the war in Lebanon with its prestige intact.
Whether or not this will be a transitory outcome cannot be fore
seen. But whatever the institutional fate of the PLO, the "Pales
tine problem" has not been resolved in a manner that can restore
stability to Lebanon, produce a viable, long-term status for the
West Bank and Gaza, normalize Israel's relations with the rest of
the Arab world, or alleviate the economic, diplomatic, and so
cial burdens imposed on Israel by the state of war. Furthermore,
even if the PLO ceases to exist in its present form, Israel will
almost certainly have to contend with some other manifestation
of Palestinian collective consciousness.
Indeed, far from making the analysis obsolete, current devel
opments may cause it to be even more relevant to the policy
agenda, because the exercise is predicated on a fundamental
change in the Palestinian position on the conflict, and the war in
Lebanon may finally disabuse the PLO —or any successor or
ganization—of the notion that maximalist goals are ever attain
able, or that violent means can secure any goals at all. Further
more, with the PLO's infrastructure crippled and Syria's
military reputation tarnished, many Israelis may also be more
assured about the balance of power in the region, and therefore
assess differently the relative risks and opportunities of various
political alternatives. It is, of course, difficult to predict how —if
at all — the political fluidities created by events in Lebanon will
be exploited, but debate on the issues will inevitably continue,
perhaps giving rise to serious negotiations, and it is hoped that
the ideas presented here will contribute to that process.
Any treatment of an issue as emotionally charged as the Israeli-
Arab conflict demands some clarification of the author's per
spective. I make no pretense at impartiality. My primary con
cern throughout is Israel's security and well-being, defined to
include certain social, political, and moral components in addi
tion to military imperatives. But while I am not a disinterested
observer, I have consciously attempted to examine strategies —
Preface IX
the means by which objectives may be pursued — in as rational a
fashion as possible. Analysis, of course, can never be com
pletely divorced from subjective concerns, but the effort to un
derstand reality without sentimental or mythological prisms
must still be made if policy is to be planned with maximum
effectiveness.
This goal is reflected in the effort to avoid value-laden termi
nology. Place-names, for example, are controversial because
they are often taken as implicit endorsement of the legitimacy of
ownership claims by one side or the other to the conflict. In this
study, conventional English usage is generally adopted, but
names preferred by Jews or Arabs are intended to be inter
changeable, in both text and maps, with no normative connota
tion. "Palestine" and "Eretz Yisrael" both refer to the 26,000
square kilometers of former Ottoman lands between the River
Jordan and the Mediterranean that were demarcated as a sepa
rate territorial-political entity after World War I. Similarly, "the
West Bank" and "Judaea and Samaria" denote that part of east-
central Palestine which came under Jordanian control in 1948
and was captured by Israel in 1967. Rigorous application of the
principal of terminological positivism would entail the modifi
cation of the term "Palestinian" whenever it is applied to people,
since it can describe Jews as well as Arabs, but for reasons of
economy, "Palestinian," unless otherwise specified, refers only
to Palestinian Arabs.
One result of this approach is that some readers have charac
terized the tone of the study as almost clinical. This is a criticism
to which I happily plead guilty. The historical, religious, and
ideological passions surrounding the creation of Israel and the
Israeli-Arab conflict are too blatant to be ignored and yet too
well known to require repetition; they are part of the environ
ment. Still, it is the obligation of policy analysts to ensure that
these passions do not paralyze thought. Without the first, action
is meaningless; without the second, it is futile.
Although I bear sole responsibility for the opinions expressed
here, many others helped bring this book to fruition. I am very
gratified that it is being published under the auspices of the Cen
ter for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv University. Since 1979, the
X Preface
CSS has provided, not just an institutional home, but intellec
tual challenge, friendship, and support in occasionally difficult
times. The Head of the CSS, Major General (Res.) Aharon Ya-
riv, has given encouragement in word and deed, solved every
crisis that arose, and reminded me of what people mean when
they say "mensch." Aryeh Shalev forced me to question every
thing I wrote and to consider things I did not. Our discussions
generated much heat, though perhaps not as much light as he
would wish, and his help is very much appreciated. Others at
the CSS contributed ideas and criticism. Without intending to
slight any of them, I want to acknowledge the special efforts of
two colleagues and friends. Shai Feldman supplied a responsive
sounding board early on and very useful comments on the first
draft. The late Avi Plascov gave me a generous share of the time
remaining in his too-short life in order to deepen my under
standing of a subject he knew well and help me clarify my own
thoughts. I believe that he would have approved of the final ver
sion. Thanks are due as well to the CSS administrative staff, es
pecially to Executive Editor Joseph Alpher and to Moshe
Grundman, head of the Documentation Center, who re
sponded, despite political misgivings, to requests for more 'am
munition" with grace and unfailing good humor.
I also benefited from the insights of scholars outside the CSS
— Shlomo Gazit, Aaron Klieman, Shaul Mishal, Elie Rekhess,
Eliyahu Kanovsky, and Nadav Safran —who took time from
their busy schedules to read part or all of the manuscript. The
maps were done by Haim Zvi Carmel. His cartographic skills
are self-evident, but his patience with a sometimes confused
author deserves special mention. At Harvard University Press, I
found tolerance, courtesy, and a constant desire to help. I
would particularly like to acknowledge the support of Aida
Donald and Elizabeth Suttell, whose guidance and editorial
skills transformed the manuscript into something better.
And then there is Barbi, my wife and partner, in this as in all
things. No words —
M.A.H.
September 1982
