a new proposed constitutional methodology for effecting transformation in the south african law of

431 Pages·2016·2.82 MB·English

A NEW PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
METHODOLOGY FOR EFFECTING
TRANSFORMATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN
LAW OF DELICT

by
EMILE ZITZKE

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
LLD

in the Faculty of Law,
University of Pretoria

August 2016

Supervisor: PROF DR TJ SCOTT
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
Declaration of Originality

Full names of student: Emile Zitzke

Student number: 10053787

Declaration
1. I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of the University’s policy in this regard.
2. I declare that this thesis is my own original work. Where other people’s work has been used
(either from a printed source, internet or any other source), this has been properly acknowledged
and referenced in accordance with departmental requirements.
3. I have not used work previously produced by another student or any other person to hand in
as my own.
4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of passing
it off as his or her own work.

Signature of student:

Signature of supervisor:
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Thesis Summary

The problem identified in this thesis is the haphazard methodology that features in constitutional
application to the South African common law of delict. Conventionally, the Constitution is said
to apply either ‘directly’, ‘indirectly’ or ‘not at all’ to common-law problems. How judges are
supposed to choose between those three possibilities is unclear. In light of a number of recent
delict cases, the author observes that the uncertainty, coupled with a conservative political
commitment to ‘contemporary common-law purism’, has resulted in judges preferring the option
of ‘constitutional avoidance’ instead of the direct- and indirect-application models. On the other
hand, the author also notes with concern the radically alternative approach of ‘constitutional
over-excitement’ where judges overlook established common-law rules and instead turn to a
pure application of constitutional principles. The author argues that these competing approaches
tend to valorise one source of law at the expense of an integrated reading of various sources.
This invariably leads to an uncritical acceptance of either the common law or the Constitution.
The author contends that the competing problems of constitutional avoidance and over-
excitement in the law of delict could be addressed by turning to the transformative method of
adjudicative subsidiarity that places the Constitution’s commitment to human rights at the centre
of common-law disputes (thus rejecting a blind veneration of the common law) while being
humbly mindful of the limits of constitutionalism. The author finally evaluates judicial
performance in a broader spectrum of delict cases since democratisation that further
demonstrates the need for the application of adjudicative subsidiarity.

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Financial Assistance Acknowledgements

The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation (NRF) towards this research is hereby
acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not
necessarily to be attributed to the NRF.

The financial assistance of the Rupert Foundation towards this research, in the form of the Anton &
Huberte Rupert Vice-Chancellor’s Prestige Bursary, is also acknowledged. The bursary made possible a
research visit in 2014 to the University of Luxembourg, under the supervision of Professor Johan van der
Walt. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be
attributed to the Rupert Foundation.

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Personal Acknowledgements

My grandfather, John Ferris, was an industrial union leader in England many years ago. On his deathbed in
2015 I asked him what the most important lessons were that he had learnt in 91 years. He told me three things:
(1) Live with a spirit of thankfulness; (2) always show tolerance to others; and (3) fight for those who are
suffering. This page is intended to adhere to the first point; the remainder of this thesis is, to a great extent,
based on the remaining two.
My parents, Riana and André, ensured that nothing would stand in the way of providing their children
with quality education. They have sacrificed so much for me to realise my dream of completing this thesis. But
they have also taught me many things beyond a formal education that certainly underlie this study: The notions
of altruism, selflessness and humanity – the commandment of Love – are all ideas that I can’t seem to remove
from my work. I am grateful for all the sacrifices and the life lessons. This success is yours. Many other
members of the Zitzke family have also engulfed me with their love and encouragement, notably Ronelle, Jean,
Landi, Christia, Ernst, Eduan, Victor and Nadéne. Special mention must also be made of Lisa, who taught me
about creativity and imagination, but passed away before the completion of this project.
There are so many dear friends and colleagues who have shaped my ideas about law and about this
study in particular. The (incomplete) list of intellectual-sustenance providers in the last three years include Joel
Modiri, Alfred Moraka, Tshepo Madlingozi, Anton Kok, Isolde de Villiers, Lorette Arendse, Annelize
Nienaber, Christo Botha, Erika de Wet, André van der Walt, Pieter Carstens, Johan van der Walt, Andrea
Bauling, Jason Gouveia, Tammy-Lynne Niemand, Melanie Murcott, Carin Cross, Danielle de Bruyn, Thorne
Godinho, Wesley Grimm, Mia Peyper, Lerikus Eksteen, Andrea Petrou and Carron Fick. A special word of
thanks goes to Karin van Marle who gave me the foundational tools to think about law and to do this work
and who has sparked a flame of passion for legal theory in so many law students, including myself. Duard
Kleyn and Jan Mutton are two exceptional friends who have given me loads of motivation and support. This
thesis and my life are richer because of you. My lifelong friend Christiaan Schutte was kind enough to do the
technical editing and reference checking. I am ever thankful for his friendship and brotherhood. Khuraisha
Patel has been a pillar of strength – I am thankful for hours of conversations, hundreds of pages of reading, all
the prayers and deeply cherished companionship and support.
My supervisor, Prof Johan Scott, is a real academic rock star and it has been a privilege to be taught
delict by him in my third year, having him as my dissertation supervisor in my final year of LLB studies and
now as my doctoral father. His guidance and industriousness in the review of this thesis have been remarkable.
I am particularly thankful for his willingness to entertain my ideas and for teaching me so much about delict
and about academic life.
Glory be to my Creator for this and so much more.
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Table of Contents

Declaration of Originality ................................................................................................................................... i
Thesis Summary ................................................................................................................................................ ii
Financial Assistance Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iii
Personal Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. iv
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................................. v

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION & RESEARCH PROBLEM ....................................................... 1

CHAPTER 1: Introducing the Study .......................................................................................................... 2
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 2
2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM IN BASIC TERMS .......................................................................................... 7
3 THE JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACH .......................................................................................................... 8
3.1 Introducing the Jurisprudential Approach ......................................................................................................... 8
3.2 Transformative Constitutionalism ....................................................................................................................... 8
3.3 Critical Legal Studies in South Africa ................................................................................................................ 13
3.4 Transformative Constitutionalism as Critical Legal Scholarship in South Africa ..................................... 17
4 A NOTE ON SOURCES AND STYLE............................................................................................................ 19
4.1 On Sources ............................................................................................................................................................. 19
4.2 On Style .................................................................................................................................................................. 20
5 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS ................................................................................................................................. 21

CHAPTER 2: Judicial Ad Hocery and a Call for Adjudicative Subsidiarity in the South African Law of
Delict ........................................................................................................................................................ 22
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 22
2 THE CURRENT AD HOC APPROACHES TO THE APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
TO THE COMMON LAW OF DELICT ......................................................................................................... 23
3 CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE ................................................................................................................ 28
3.1 The Philosophical Underpinnings of Constitutional Avoidance in Common-Law Matters ................... 28
3.2 The Constitutionally Wanting Approach .......................................................................................................... 42
3.2.1 Introducing Constitutionally Wanting Reasoning............................................................................ 42
3.2.2 The Problem in Heroldt ......................................................................................................................... 42
3.2.3 Grounds for Developing the Common Law .................................................................................... 45
3.2.4 A Specific Analysis of the Development in Heroldt ......................................................................... 56
3.2.5 Concluding Thoughts on Heroldt and Constitutionally Wanting Reasoning ............................... 63
3.3 Constitutional Heedlessness ............................................................................................................................... 63
3.3.1 Introducing Constitutional Heedlessness .......................................................................................... 63
3.3.2 Constitutional Heedlessness in Loureiro SCA ................................................................................... 65
3.3.3 Constitutional Heedlessness in Foetal Assessment Centre HC ........................................................... 69
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3.3.4 Constitutional Heedlessness in Oppelt SCA ...................................................................................... 73
3.3.5 Constitutional Heedlessness in Country Cloud SCA ......................................................................... 75
3.4 Anti-Constitutionalism ......................................................................................................................................... 78
3.4.1 Introducing Anti-Constitutionalism ................................................................................................... 78
3.4.2 An Introduction to RH v DE .............................................................................................................. 79
3.4.3 Rising to the Occasion of Common-Law Development................................................................ 80
3.4.4 The Claim for Adultery in Historical Context .................................................................................. 84
3.4.5 The Colony of South Africa ................................................................................................................ 86
3.4.6 Constitutionally Justified Logic ........................................................................................................... 90
3.4.7 Concluding Thoughts on RH v DE and Anti-Constitutionalism ................................................. 93
4 CONSTITUTIONAL OVER-EXCITEMENT ............................................................................................... 94
5 ADJUDICATIVE SUBSIDIARITY AS TRANSFORMATIVE METHOD FOR THE LAW OF
DELICT .................................................................................................................................................................... 98
5.1 Re-Reading the South African Constitution’s Application Provisions ....................................................... 98
5.2 Private Wrongdoers ............................................................................................................................................ 101
5.3 The State as Wrongdoer .................................................................................................................................... 105
5.4 A Perfect Methodology? .................................................................................................................................... 108

PART TWO: THE STATE AS WRONGDOER ...................................................................... 112

CHAPTER 3: The Constitutional Framework for Holding the State Delictually Liable: Reflections on
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security .......................................................................................... 113
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 113
2 FACTS, BACKGROUND AND THE LEGAL ISSUE .............................................................................. 114
3 THE REASONING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ................................................................. 116
3.1 The Constitutional Framework for Common-Law Development ............................................................ 116
3.2 What Does Section 39(2) Really Mean? .......................................................................................................... 117
3.2.1 Preliminary Observations ................................................................................................................... 117
3.2.2 Critique of the First Axiom ............................................................................................................... 118
3.2.3 Critique of the Second Axiom ........................................................................................................... 121
3.3 The Separation of Powers and Judicial Deference ....................................................................................... 122
3.4 The Generality of the Obligation to Develop the Common-Law ............................................................. 124
3.5 When Does the General Obligation to Develop the Common Law Arise? ............................................ 126
3.6 Dancing the Two-Step of Common-Law Development ............................................................................. 129
3.6.1 Introductory Choreography ............................................................................................................... 129
3.6.2 Step 1: Comparing the Common Law and the Constitution ....................................................... 129
3.6.3 Step 2: If the Common Law Must Be Developed, How Should It Be Developed? ................ 140
3.7 A New Test for Absolution from the Instance in Common-Law Development Cases ........................ 144
3.8 Raising Common-Law Development at a Late Stage ................................................................................... 148
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON CARMICHELE CC .............................................................................. 150

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CHAPTER 4: Vicarious Liability as Mechanism for Holding the State Liable in K v Minister of Safety
and Security .............................................................................................................................................152
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 152
2 FACTS, BACKGROUND AND THE LEGAL ISSUE .............................................................................. 155
3 THE REASONING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ................................................................. 157
3.1 An Expanded Constitutional Framework for Common-Law Development ........................................... 157
3.2 The Common-Law Rules of Vicarious Liability ............................................................................................ 172
3.2.1 The Overview of Rules Given by the Constitutional Court ........................................................ 172
3.2.2 The Pre-Rabie Position ........................................................................................................................ 174
3.2.3 The Rabie Case...................................................................................................................................... 181
3.2.4 Cases Decided between Rabie and K v Minister CC ........................................................................ 184
3.3 The New, Constitutionally-Inspired Interpretation of the Common-Law Rules of Vicarious Liability ....
................................................................................................................................................................................ 190
3.3.1 The Statement of Law in K v Minister CC ........................................................................................ 190
3.3.2 The affirmation in Minister of Safety and Security v Luiters and Minister of Finance and Others v Gore
NO .......................................................................................................................................................... 196
3.3.3 On Emphasising the Vulnerability of the Victim: F v Minister of Safety and Security .................. 197
3.3.4 Extending the Ambit of K v Minister CC in Minister of Defence v Von Benecke ............................. 199
4 DIRECT LIABILITY AS AN ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM OF STATE LIABILITY................. 200
5 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON STATE LIABILITY IN THE WAKE OF K v MINISTER CC ......
................................................................................................................................................................................... 205

CHAPTER 5: The Role of Constitutional Values in the Determination of State Liability ..................... 209
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 209
2 THE PREAMBULAR CALL FOR HISTORICAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LEGAL
TURN TO ‘MEMORY’ ....................................................................................................................................... 210
2.1 Introducing Geldenhuys HC ................................................................................................................................ 210
2.2 Facts, Background and Legal Problem in Geldenhuys HC ............................................................................ 213
2.3 Reasoning of the Court in Geldenhuys HC ....................................................................................................... 214
2.3.1 Introduction to Aquilian Liability ..................................................................................................... 214
2.3.2 Wrongfulness at ‘Common Law’ ...................................................................................................... 216
2.3.3 Wrongfulness and Memory ............................................................................................................... 219
2.4 Concluding Thoughts on Geldenhuys HC ........................................................................................................ 228
3 THE FOUNDING VALUE OF STATE ACCOUNTABILITY ............................................................... 231
3.1 Introducing State Accountability ..................................................................................................................... 231
3.2 Upholding State Accountability By Means of Common-Law Damages .................................................. 238
3.3 Upholding State Accountability in Different Ways: Unsuccessful Common-Law Damages Claims .. 259
3.4 Reaching the End of the Rope: Constitutional Damages and Accountability ......................................... 268
4 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE DELICTUAL LIABILITY OF THE STATE ................... 278

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PART THREE: PRIVATE WRONGDOERS .......................................................................... 280

CHAPTER 6: The Constitutional Framework for Holding Private Wrongdoers Liable: Thoughts on
Khumalo v Holomisa ...............................................................................................................................281
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 281
2 HORIZONTALITY UNDER THE 1993 CONSTITUTION ................................................................... 283
3 HORIZONTALITY UNDER THE 1996 CONSTITUTION: THE BLUEPRINT SKETCHED IN
KHUMALO ............................................................................................................................................................ 292
4 THE POSSIBILITIES OF HORIZONTALITY FOR THE TRANSFORMATIVE PROJECT OF
THE CONSTITUTION ...................................................................................................................................... 298

CHAPTER 7: Theories of Equality in Delict ......................................................................................... 304
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 304
2 GENRES OF EQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE...... 306
2.1 The Right to Equality in Context ..................................................................................................................... 306
2.2 The Formal/Substantive Equality Debate ..................................................................................................... 308
2.3 The Call for Complex Equality ........................................................................................................................ 311
3 EQUALITY IN DELICTUAL DISPUTES BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES .................................... 314
3.1 The Right to Equality in Loss-of-Support Claims ........................................................................................ 314
3.2 Equality for People Living with Disabilities .................................................................................................. 326
4 THE INEQUALITY IN DEY AND A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE ............................................ 330

CHAPTER 8: Commodity Dignity and Ubuntu Dignity in the Constitution and the Common Law of
Delict ...................................................................................................................................................... 334
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 334
2 UBUNTU DIGNITY IN CASE LAW ............................................................................................................. 340
3 COMMODITY DIGNITY IN CASE LAW ................................................................................................... 347
4 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE TENSION BETWEEN UBUNTU AND COMMODITY
DIGNITY ............................................................................................................................................................... 350

PART FOUR: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ......................................................................... 356

CHAPTER 9: Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 357
1 JUDICIAL AD HOCERY AND ADJUDICATIVE SUBSIDIARITY .................................................... 357
2 STATE LIABILITY .............................................................................................................................................. 360
3 PRIVATE LIABILITY ........................................................................................................................................ 367
4 OVERALL REFLECTION ................................................................................................................................ 371

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................... 374

Table of Cases ........................................................................................................................................ 404
South African Cases ........................................................................................................................................................... 404
International Cases ............................................................................................................................................................. 414
Foreign Cases ...................................................................................................................................................................... 415
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Table of Statutes ......................................................................................................................................416
South African Legislation ................................................................................................................................................. 416
South African Bills ............................................................................................................................................................. 417
International Instruments ................................................................................................................................................. 417
Foreign Legislation ............................................................................................................................................................ 418

Internet Sources .......................................................................................................................................419
Authored Internet Sources ............................................................................................................................................... 419
Internet Sources with No Particular Author ................................................................................................................. 419

Index ....................................................................................................................................................... 420
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