Table Of ContentSophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy
of Traditions and Cultures 27
Zehou Li
A New
Approach
to Kant
A Confucian-Marxist’s Viewpoint
Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy
of Traditions and Cultures
Volume 27
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Zehou Li
A New Approach to Kant
’
A Confucian-Marxist s Viewpoint
123
Zehou Li
Department ofPhilosophy
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado
USA
JeanneHaizhen Allen, independenttranslator, Hamilton,ON, Canada;
Christopher Ahn,independent scholar andtranslator, NewYork,USA.
ISSN 2211-1107 ISSN 2211-1115 (electronic)
SophiaStudies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions andCultures
ISBN978-981-13-0238-1 ISBN978-981-13-0239-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0239-8
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Preface to the English Edition
Thisbookwaswrittenduring1972–1976(duringChina’sCulturalRevolution)and
published in 1979. Although it has been reprinted many times, I have been unable
to revise the parts devoted to the discussion of Kant’s philosophy as much as I
wouldhaveliked,sinceIhavemovedontootherthings.ANewApproachtoKant
wastheoriginaltitleIchoseforthisbook,andafterhavingconsideredtheparticular
circumstances of the time, I have decided to keep it. The Chinese title has always
been A Critique of the Critical Philosophy: An Introduction to Kant.
What, then, is the “new approach” in A New Approach to Kant? I wish to
tentatively propose a new anthropo-historical ontology for introducing, describing,
interpreting, and criticizing Kant’s philosophy. This approach is based on materi-
alism, the theory of practice, and the theory of sedimentation; and it highlights
Kant’s question “What is the human being?” It stresses that the only possible
answer to Kant’s question “How is knowledge possible?” (i.e., how are a priori
synthetic judgments possible) must also be theanswerto thequestion“How isthe
humanbeingpossible?”Theanthropo-historical-ontologicalapproachassumesthat
Kant’s philosophy, at its very heart, raises and discusses the question of “What is
human nature?” I am convinced that human nature is neither an endowment from
God nor an outcome of natural evolution; instead, human psychology has arisen
historically through the social and collective practice of making and using tools
over millions of years. Here, the term “psychology” refers neither to the psycho-
logical experience of reality nor to experimental positive science, but to a philo-
sophical perspective that begins with the belief that human beings possess
universal, necessary, self-constitutive psychological forms, structures, and frame-
worksthatarenotsharedbytheloweranimals.Therefore,whileonthesurface,this
book offers an account of philosophy from Kant to Marx, at a deeper level it is a
return from Marx to Kant. In other words, this book argues that the origin and
development of seemingly “transcendental” knowledge, morality, and aesthetic
psychological forms and structures begins from the basis of human existence that
can be found in the practical material activities and social relationships associated
with making and using tools—it is thus Kant’s philosophy turned upside down.
This point can also be integrated with Chinese Confucian teachings.
v
vi PrefacetotheEnglishEdition
PerhapsIshouldfirstanswerthequestionofwhetherornotIamaMarxist,since
the subtitle of this book, as well as many of its passages, refers to Marxism.
The answer is “both yes and no.”
Let me first explain the “no.”
There are three reasons for the “no.” First, I believe that, for some modern
intellectuals,Marxismistherevolutionarypursuitofanewsocialrealitythatmakes
theoretical assumptions about the future. This type of Marxism does not have a
class character, hence it does not represent the worldview of the proletariat (the
working class).Second,Idonotagreewithdoctrinessuchas“classstruggleisthe
impetus for historical advancement” and “revolution is the motor force for social
development”; nor do I support the view that class struggle and the dictatorship
of the proletariat are the program and central point of Marxism. Third, I use the
Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason to argue that Marx’s
primary work, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, proceeds from basic
concepts such as “abstract labor” and “socially necessary labor time” that are not
supported by experience. These are logical constructs based on an abstract com-
munism that does not involve capital, commodity, or a market economy. This is a
“transcendental illusion” that is not an objective and realistic possibility. It has
neither the possibility nor the necessity of bringing itself into being. Were there to
be such a concrete project and measures implemented to realize such an illusory
“ideal society,” the result would be catastrophe.
With these three convictions, I am surely not a Marxist.
Astotheanswer“yes,”Ihaveonlyonereason,althoughitisaveryfundamental
one. In all these years, I have maintained that the collective practical activity of
using and making tools is the definitive factor in the origin and development
ofhumankind.Inthis,IagreewiththeviewofMarxandEngelsthatthemakingof
tools, technology, productive forces, and the economy have been the fundamental
basisofhumansocietyandlifesincetimeimmemorial.Ibelievethatthisisthehard
core of historical materialism. But I do not accept the rest of the materialist con-
ceptionofhistory.Nevertheless,Iregardthishardcoreofthematerialistconception
of history as the most precious legacy of Marx and Engels. This legacy precisely
matches Chinese Confucian teachings in its emphasis on human beings’ material
life, worldly existence, and real life.
In addition, I believe that there is a point of commonality between
“Communism” and the ideal of Great Unity in the Confucian tradition. The
Confucian teaching that “(they accumulated) articles (of value), disliking that they
should be thrown away upon the ground, but not wishing to keep them for their
owngratification.(Theylabored)withtheirstrength,dislikingthatitshouldnotbe
exerted,butnotexerting it(only)with aview totheirown advantage” (Liji Liyun,
trans. James Legge) can be integrated into Communism’s rallying cry “from each
accordingtohisability,toeachaccordingtohisneeds”toconstituteaspiritualfaith
and a “social ideal” that encourages people; brings people together to change the
world and the bodies and minds of individuals; and becomes a regulative element
and significant continuation of the (political) religious morality of the Chinese
PrefacetotheEnglishEdition vii
tradition.IfthiscouldbeusedtodefinewhataMarxistis,Iwouldbecountedasa
Marxist, or even a Confucian-Marxist.
But why do I insist on adding the term “Confucian?”
I believe that Marx and Engels discussed the historical aspects of the material
existence of human society, yet failed to place sufficient emphasis on human
beings’inner psychology.Confucianism,ontheotherhand,hasalways treated the
question of human nature as its central concern. Confucianism emphasizes “in-
wardlythesageandexternallytheking.”Inphilosophy,Iproposeconceptssuchas
“cultural-psychologicalformation”and“emotional-rationalstructure”;inscience,I
believethat,inthefuture,brainscience,psychology,andpedagogywillbecomethe
central disciplines because of their positive and particular study of human nature.
TheseideasofferquiteanewsolutiontoKant’sfundamentalquestions“Whatisthe
human being?” and “What is human nature?” I have remarked that
anthropo-historical ontology is a three-in-one theory of Chinese Confucianism,
Kant, and Marx.
It is true that I could not very well have mentioned Confucianism when I was
writing this book, since Mao Zedong had at that time launched the Criticize
Confucius Campaign. In addition, this book is, after all, about Kant’s philosophy.
Therefore,onlyalongwithmyotherworks,suchas“AReevaluationofConfucius”
(published in 1980), and my thoughts on “proper measure,” “pragmatic reason,”
“thecultureofoptimism,”“thetheoryoftwomorals,”and“emotionassubstance,”
could a “three-in-one” theory be fully visible. Furthermore, this “three-in-one”
theorymakesuponlytheprincipalpartofmythought,asIhavealsoabsorbedand
assimilated other Chinese and foreign theories and ideas.
In spite of my deliberate concealment, this “three-in-one” approach to “what is
humannature”nonetheless manifestsitselfinonewayoranotherinthisbook.For
instance,inthediscussiononepistemology,myresponsetoKant’sfamousquestion
about“theunknowablecommonoriginofsensibilityandunderstanding”isthatitis
not transcendental imagination, but human practice. I maintain that sensibility
originates from the sensible experience of an individual’s practice, while under-
standing arises from psychological forms in the human history of practice. The
categories and principles of understanding that Kant sees as transcendental, I
believetobetheachievementofthehumanrace’suniquepracticeofpsychological
forms and structures over millions of years. This achievement, which has been
passed on from generation to generation through language and education, seems
“transcendental” to an individual. Nevertheless, I replace universal necessity with
objective sociality, with the intention of employing practical reason and the
“One-World View” to overturn Kant’s pure reason, which is indeed an unsub-
stantiatedsupposition.Iemphasizetheever-changingontologyofmeasurementthat
human beings grasp, create, and develop in their ongoing actions.
From the perspective of the ontological philosophy of anthropological history,
thatwhichisunknowable,andcanonlybeheldinawe,isthematerialthinginitself
that accountsfor theexistenceof theuniverse. Idescribethis as theessence ofthe
mystery of reason. A wider epistemological vision that “every discovery is an
invention” is made possible by these fundamental conceptions: the thing in itself,
viii PrefacetotheEnglishEdition
which can only be contemplated, but cannot be known; and the coexistence of the
universe and human beings. None of these thoughts may find sympathy in the
Western reader; nonetheless, they constitute a Chinese intellectual’s attempt to
integrate Kant’s philosophy into Chinese tradition.
Among the three formulations of the categorical imperative in Kant’s ethics,
“universal law” and “free will” are, in my opinion, also formal structures in the
constructionofhumanpsychologyovermillionsofyears.“Thehumanbeingasan
end” is not a categorical imperative; it is rather an ideality as well as a modern
social morality based on universality. Morality is based on reason rather than
emotion.Thecontentofreasonismadeupofthoseconceptsandideasthatchange
inaccordancewithdifferenttimes,societies,andcultures;andtheformofreasonis
the will, which is one of the universal and necessary structures of human moral
conduct and psychology, and which has remained unchanged since ancient times.
This is certainly the case with aesthetics, which is more relevant to individual
bodies and minds, the blend of sensibility and reason, and so on.
In short, that which seems to be “transcendental” to an individual is actually
sedimentation, which has been historically acquired through the collective experi-
enceofhumankind.Thisiswhata“theoryofanthropo-historicalontology”intends
by the expression “the empirical turns into the transcendental (a priori); history
builds up rationality (reason); psychology grows into substance.” This is also the
approach of A New Approach to Kant. Based on Chinese Confucianism and
Marxism, this approach offers a new understanding and interpretation of Kant’s
philosophy.
Darwin discusses the origin of the human being from the perspective of evo-
lution; while modern sociobiology has argued for a similarity between human
beingsandanimals,basedonthebeliefthatanimalsalsohavemorality,aesthetics,
even politics. This book agrees with Darwin, while disputing the doctrines of and
the trend toward the latter. I begin where Darwin ends. I believe that these ques-
tions:“Whatisthehumanbeing?”“Howishumankindpossible?”and“Howisthe
human being human?” can no longer be determined or explained by natural evo-
lution.Fromthisbooktomymostrecentworks,Ibeginfromthefundamentalview
of Chinese Confucianism and the distinction between human beings and animals.
From there, I have proposed the theory of the cultural-historical sedimentation of
human psychology; illuminated the question of “How is the human being possi-
ble?” by focusing on the making and use of tools; and maintained that, in order to
survive,humankindhasbeennecessarilyandfullyengaged,overmillionsofyears,
inthecollectivepracticalactivitiesofmakingandusingtools.Theseactivitieshave
enabled humankind to break through its animal life, which was genetically akin to
thatofchimpanzees,andthishasgivenrisetoreason,emotio-rationalstructure,and
language(mainlythesemanticmeaningsrelevanttomakingandusingtools,which
are not possessed by the lower animals). These practical activities have not only
initiated, produced, and determined the social features of human beings’ relations
withnature,groups,andtheselfbuthavealsoproducedformsofhumanknowledge
(e.g.,logic,mathematics,varioussymbolsystems)andconductandbehaviorbased
onethicalnormsandmorallaws.Moreover,itisthelatter(ethics)thatsparksoffthe
PrefacetotheEnglishEdition ix
former(knowledge).Ihavepaidspecialattentiontotheirindependentdevelopment
in the long run, which in turn continuously constitutes life and brings reality into
being, and enables humankind to possess supra-biological and super-biological
appendages, capacities, values, and its unique subjectality and subjectivity.
Language, which bears and sediments this historical experience, has become the
house of being. With this as its foundation, modern civilization has brought upon
itself many disasters and catastrophes. Nevertheless, in the main, civilization has
been beneficial rather than detrimental. Moreover, it has enabled human existence
to advance a giant step. It is precisely this sort of “brief history of humankind” to
whichConfucianismtodayshouldgiveitsattentionandaffirmation.Thisbookcan
onlyofferadisguisedintroductiontothistopicbymeansofanexpositionofKant’s
philosophy, as the particular circumstances of the time did not allow me to openly
talk about it.
After all, this book was written 40 years ago when China was facing adverse
circumstances. It wouldcertainly assume quite a different appearance were it tobe
written today. In spite of my wishes, my very frail constitution prevents me from
furtherwriting.Icannotevenmakeemendationstothedeficienciesofthisbookor
erase the historical marks of the age when the book was written, nor do I have the
strength to go over the translated manuscript. With a conscience-stricken mind, I
ask the reader’s allowance for my lack of care for the English edition.
Boulder, Colorado Zehou Li
October 2016
